According to Serbian Economist, Serbia is increasingly becoming a key industrial platform for China to enter the European market. This is no longer a matter of scattered investments, but rather a well-established system that integrates metallurgy, mining, transport infrastructure, and export channels.
A turning point was the acquisition by the Chinese company HBIS of the steel plant in Smederevo in 2016 for approximately €46 million, followed by investments in modernization. The second major flagship project was Zijin Mining’s expansion in Serbia’s copper sector—in Bora and at the Čukaru-Peki deposit, where total investment commitments exceeded €3 billion. This allowed Serbia to take a more prominent place in the European steel and copper supply chain.
Analysts emphasize that Chinese capital in Serbia controls several links in the industrial chain at once: copper mining, processing and smelting, steel production, and the export of products to European markets. Against this backdrop, Serbia is increasingly acting not merely as a recipient of foreign investment, but as a functional extension of China’s industrial base within the European economic space.
This is also reflected in trade. By 2025, China had become Serbia’s second-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $7 billion. At the same time, a significant portion of exports from Serbia to China is provided by Chinese companies operating in the country, primarily in the copper and metallurgical sectors.
Infrastructure plays a distinct role. Analysts link the new model to projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, including the Belgrade–Budapest railway, bridges, highways, and logistics hubs. In this system, Serbia serves as a transit hub between Piraeus, the Balkans, and Central Europe, reducing transportation costs and speeding up deliveries to the EU.
In addition to metals, China’s presence is expanding in the manufacturing sector as well. Consider the Linglong tire plant in Zrenjanin, valued at around €900 million, as well as projects by Hisense in Valjevo and the Minth Group in the automotive components sector. These manufacturers leverage Serbia’s lower costs and its trade preferences for supplying the EU market.
The country’s trade architecture has been an additional factor. Serbia combines preferential access to the EU market with a free trade agreement with China, which entered into force in 2024. As a result, the country has become a rare hub where Chinese capital can operate simultaneously under both European and non-European trade regimes.
At the same time, this model faces new constraints. The importance of the energy transition and the CBAM mechanism is growing, which could increase costs for Serbia’s energy-intensive export sectors. This is pushing Chinese investors toward the next phase—investments in renewable energy, storage, and grid infrastructure—to maintain the competitiveness of assets in Serbia on the European market.
Thus, Serbia is increasingly establishing itself as an industrial and logistics hub between China and Europe. However, the further development of this role will depend on Belgrade’s ability to simultaneously retain Chinese capital and adapt to the EU’s stricter regulatory requirements.
