Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy continues to overhaul the diplomatic corps, a process that is gradually extending to include not only countries in the European Union and the Western Balkans but also nations in Asia and the Middle East.
On August 6, the president dismissed four ambassadors at once: Vasyl Kyrylych in Croatia, Volodymyr Shkurov in Albania, Oleg Gerasymenko in Montenegro, and Markiyan Chuchuk in Pakistan.
The relevant personnel decisions were formalized by decrees No. 709/2026–No. 712/2026.
According to the Experts Club think tank, the simultaneous replacement of the heads of four diplomatic missions appears to be part of a broader restructuring of Ukraine’s foreign policy apparatus, rather than an isolated personnel move.
As early as May 18, Zelenskyy had spoken of the need for “replacements and adjustments” within the diplomatic corps, and on July 15, he explicitly stated that he was discussing with First Deputy Head of the Office of the President Serhiy Kyslytsya and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andriy Sybiga a list of Ukrainian ambassadors who needed to be replaced.
The rotation began even before a series of decisions were made in August. Specifically, on June 26, the president dismissed the Ukrainian ambassadors to Oman, Cyprus, Vietnam, and Cambodia. At the same time, new appointments were made to other diplomatic posts.
Thus, this represents a gradual renewal of Ukraine’s network of diplomatic missions over the course of several months.
Three of the four ambassadors had served for more than six years
The length of the diplomats’ tenures also suggests that the August decisions should be viewed primarily in the context of rotation.
Vasyl Kyrylych was appointed Ukraine’s ambassador to Croatia on December 24, 2019, and served in Zagreb for more than six and a half years.
Volodymyr Shkurov took the helm of the Ukrainian Embassy in Albania on April 13, 2020, and also served for over six years.
Markiyan Chuchuk was appointed Ukraine’s ambassador to Pakistan on April 17, 2020. His diplomatic mission lasted over six years.
Oleg Gerasymenko headed the Ukrainian Embassy in Montenegro starting May 4, 2022—a little over four years.
The very fact that three of the four diplomats held their posts for such a long time is further evidence supporting the theory of a planned personnel rotation. The published decrees do not specify the reasons for the dismissals.
It is particularly telling that three of the four August decisions concern Southeast Europe—Croatia, Albania, and Montenegro.
Experts Club notes that the importance of this region for Ukrainian diplomacy has grown significantly.
Croatia is a member of the EU and NATO and remains one of Ukraine’s steadfast partners. Croatia’s experience with postwar reconstruction, demining, the return of the population, and the integration of territories following the conflicts of the 1990s is also important for Kyiv.
Albania is also a NATO member and actively supports Ukraine in international forums. Tirana hosted one of the previous summits in the “Ukraine–Southeast Europe” format.
Montenegro presents another area of interest. It is a NATO member and, at the same time, the most promising candidate for EU accession among the countries of the Western Balkans. Therefore, relations with Podgorica are becoming important for Kyiv in the context of its own European integration.
On July 15, Kyiv hosted the fifth “Ukraine–Southeast Europe” summit, attended by representatives from Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro. The participants reaffirmed their support for Ukraine and the need to expand regional cooperation.
Against this backdrop, the nearly simultaneous replacement of three Ukrainian ambassadors to Balkan countries may indicate Kyiv’s desire to inject additional momentum into this direction.
Of the three Balkan appointments, Montenegro may prove to be the most interesting.
Podgorica expects to conclude negotiations on accession to the European Union and become one of the next new EU members. For Ukraine, which is also negotiating membership, Montenegro’s experience could be of practical value.
In addition, Ukraine is gradually building a separate network of relations with countries in the Adriatic region—Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, and neighboring Serbia.
The most recent example is Zelenskyy’s official visit to Belgrade on August 8 and his talks with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, during which they discussed free trade, energy, agriculture, Ukraine’s recovery, and political cooperation.
Thus, the Balkans are gradually transforming from a secondary focus of Ukrainian diplomacy into an independent regional track.
The replacement of the ambassador to Pakistan presents a completely different challenge.
Islamabad is important to Ukraine as one of the largest centers in South Asia and a representative of the so-called Global South. Pakistan’s population is approaching 250 million; the country wields significant regional political influence and is a nuclear power.
At the same time, Pakistan’s foreign policy is based on a complex system of relations with China, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, Russia, and the Gulf states.
For Ukraine, expanding ties with Pakistan could be significant in several areas at once—food trade, industry, international organizations, and building support for Kyiv among Asian nations and the Muslim world.
As Ukraine’s foreign policy increasingly shifts away from focusing exclusively on the EU and the U.S., embassies in countries such as Pakistan, India, the Gulf states, Indonesia, and African nations are gaining greater importance.
That is precisely why replacing the ambassador in Islamabad after a mission lasting more than six years appears to be a logical part of the renewal of Ukraine’s Asian policy.
The August dismissals are likely not the end of the process.
As early as July 15, Zelenskyy publicly spoke about forming a “pool of ambassadors” slated for replacement. This suggests that new personnel decrees may be issued in the coming weeks.
At the same time, the current diplomatic rotation coincides with more extensive personnel changes in Ukraine’s government system, which took place in July and affected the government, security agencies, and other state institutions.
According to Experts Club, what matters most will not be the number of diplomats dismissed, but who Kyiv appoints to replace them.
If key posts are filled not only by career diplomats but also by former ministers, representatives of the Office of the President, economic negotiators, or prominent public figures, this could signal Ukraine’s transition to a model of so-called “political diplomacy,” in which embassies are assigned more specific economic, investment, and negotiating tasks.
As of August 10, 2026, presidential decrees appointing new Ukrainian ambassadors to Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, and Pakistan have not been published.
Experts Club believes that future appointments will provide a clearer understanding of the logic behind the current rotation.
If diplomats with significant European and economic experience are sent to Zagreb, Tirana, and Podgorica, this will confirm a strengthening of the Balkan focus. The appointment to Islamabad of a specialist in Asian affairs, trade diplomacy, or relations with the Global South, in turn, could signal an expansion of Ukraine’s activities beyond its traditional circle of Western partners.
Overall, the current rotation signals a transition of Ukrainian diplomacy to a new phase: after four years of full-scale war, embassies are now expected not only to secure international support for Ukraine but also to work toward EU membership, the country’s recovery, exports, attracting investment, and forging long-term regional alliances.
According to The Serbian Economist, based on the latest available official data, the ranking of the average cost of arable land is as follows:
1. Slovenia — 28,348 thousand euros per hectare, data for 2024.
2. Greece — approximately 14,312 thousand euros, 2024.
3. Serbia — 9,583 thousand euros, 2025.
4. Romania — 8.7 thousand euros, 2024.
5. Bulgaria — 8,679 thousand euros, 2024.
6. Croatia — 6,723 thousand euros, 2025.
The data reflects the cost of vacant arable land without buildings or perennial plantings. The periods of statistical observation vary, so the ranking shows the general price level rather than a fully synchronized comparison.
The most expensive land in the region is in Slovenia, where supply is limited and plots are often small and fragmented. In Greece, prices depend heavily on access to water, proximity to the coast, and the possibility of construction. Serbia has already surpassed Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia in terms of average price, although its figures remain approximately 37% below the EU average.
For foreigners, price is not the only criterion. In Serbia, the direct purchase of agricultural land is almost entirely prohibited. In EU countries, citizens of other EU member states typically have more opportunities, while buyers from third countries may face restrictions, reciprocity rules, or the requirement to purchase through a local company.
Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are not included in the ranking due to the lack of recent comparable national statistics. Listing prices there may differ significantly from the actual transaction values.
https://t.me/relocationrs/3397
According to Serbian Economist, Albania is stepping up tax oversight of the short-term rental market, which has become one of the country’s fastest-growing segments of the tourism real estate sector in recent years. The tax administration has launched a sectoral plan for the tourism sector through 2026, under which the activity of property owners on Airbnb, Booking.com, and other platforms will be cross-checked against tax returns.
In essence, Albania is becoming one of the first countries in Europe to transition tax oversight of short-term rentals via digital platforms to an automated format using artificial intelligence. This makes the country a regional test case for stricter control over revenue from tourism real estate.
The main tool of the new control system will be an AI-based automated monitoring system. Algorithms will scan the Albanian segments of Airbnb and Booking on a weekly basis, analyzing nightly rates, price trends, actual occupancy rates, booking calendars, as well as the number and dates of guest reviews.
Private homeowners renting out one or more apartments through Airbnb and Booking are not required to register as sole proprietors, but must file an annual individual DIVA tax return and pay income tax at a rate of 15%. The tax is calculated on net income after deducting the platform’s commission. Separate clarifications regarding new obligations for short-term rentals starting in 2026 also highlight the use of DIVA as a digital system for reporting individual income.
The authorities are paying special attention to VAT. In Albania’s tourism sector, a reduced rate of 6% applies instead of the standard 20%, but it may only be applied by properties that have passed a physical inspection and received an official classification certificate from the Ministry of Tourism. If an owner applies the 6% rate without such a certificate, the tax authority may retroactively assess VAT at the full 20% rate, along with fines and penalties.
Another requirement concerns cashless payments. By May 30, 2026, all accommodation facilities in Albania, including hotels, hostels, campgrounds, and certified guesthouses, must install physical POS terminals to accept payments. At the same time, the limit on cash transactions between commercial entities has been reduced from 150,000 to 100,000 lek.
For the real estate market, this marks the end of a period of lax oversight of income from short-term rentals. In recent years, Albania has experienced an investment boom in resort real estate, particularly along the coast, where buyers have relied on income from tourist rentals.
But now, the profitability of such properties will increasingly depend not only on occupancy and price, but also on the owner’s tax compliance.
For foreign investors, the new rules mean they must consider the property’s tax model in advance.
The Albanian model reflects a broader trend in the region. Montenegro is also tightening control over payments and taxes in the real estate and tourism sectors, but Albania is taking the next step—using digital monitoring and AI to compare actual activity on platforms with tax reporting.
Serbia has the potential to become a key logistics and industrial hub between Ukraine, the markets of the Western Balkans, and the European Union, said Marko Čadež, President of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
“By using the Danube route from the ports of Izmail and Reni toward Serbian ports and intermodal terminals, goods from Ukraine can be efficiently redirected to Corridor X and the markets of Central Europe and the Adriatic region,” he said in an interview with the agency “Interfax-Ukraine.”
According to Čadež, the development of intermodal logistics and free zones gives Serbia the opportunity to be not only a transit point but also a place where new value can be added to Ukrainian raw materials and semi-finished products before they enter regional and European markets.
“Serbia positions itself as an important geo-economic center of the region, at the intersection of Eastern European resources and European transport corridors,” emphasized the president of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
He also noted that Serbia could serve as a production and technology base for Ukrainian companies seeking to enter the markets of the Western Balkans, the EU, Asia, and Africa.
BALKANS, Čadež, EU, HUB, SERBIA, Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
According to Serbian Economist, organized crime groups from the Western Balkans have ties in Venezuela and are involved in investigations related to cocaine smuggling, Radio Free Europe (RFE) reports.
According to RSE, networks from the Balkans are considered by international organizations, including Europol and Interpol, to be key players in the supply of cocaine from Latin America to Europe, with Venezuela seen as one of the links in this logistics chain.
Sasha Djordjevic, an expert at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), told RSE that Venezuela is important for cocaine flows as a “strategic outlet” to the Atlantic, although it is not the only and main point of support in the region for Balkan groups.
RSE notes that interest in Venezuela’s role in drug trafficking has intensified following the early January arrest of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, who has been charged in the US and pleaded not guilty in a New York court on January 5.
As one example, RSE cites the case of the detention of the Aressa off the coast of Aruba in February 2020, when, according to the publication, about five tons of cocaine were seized and 11 Montenegrin crew members were detained. In March 2021, an Aruban court sentenced them to prison terms ranging from nine to 15 years. In addition, according to RSE, Europol linked Serbian citizen Miroslav Starčević, who was detained in May 2023 along with other suspects, to this case, and the proceedings in Serbia are currently under judicial review, according to the publication.
RSE also notes that Europol reported no direct cooperation with Venezuela, so information about the possible involvement of Balkan groups is obtained indirectly – through the law enforcement agencies of the countries in the region, while the Interior Ministries of Serbia and Montenegro, according to RSE, did not respond to requests prior to the publication of the material.
Cryptocurrencies are increasingly becoming part of the global financial system, and countries in the Balkan region are demonstrating a variety of approaches to their regulation.
Serbia
Status: Officially recognized and regulated.
Legislation: Law on Digital Assets (2020).
Regulators: The National Bank of Serbia and the Securities Commission.
Taxes:
Capital gains tax: 15%.
Income tax: 15%.
Penalties: Up to 5 million dinars ($46,400) or 20% of annual income for operating without a license.
Croatia
Status: Not recognized as legal tender, but not prohibited.
Regulation: There is no special law, operations are regulated by general rules.
Taxes: Income from cryptocurrencies is subject to capital gains tax.
Albania
Status: Regulated by law (2020).
Regulators: Financial Supervision Authority and National Agency for Information Society.
Taxes:
Capital gains tax: 15%.
Corporate tax: 15%.
Sanctions: Administrative fines and restrictions on activities.
Status: There is no special legislation, operations with cryptocurrencies are not prohibited.
Warnings: The central bank notes the risks associated with cryptocurrencies.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Status: Not legal tender, no exchange for official currency is possible.
Taxes: The tax on income from transactions is 10%.
Regulation: There is no legislation, but trading and buying cryptocurrencies is allowed.
Republika Srpska (part of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Status: Cryptocurrencies are legalized (amendments to the law on the securities market, 2022).
Supervision: Securities Commission.
Taxes: Income tax is 10%.
North Macedonia
Status: Not recognized as legal tender.
Regulation: There is no regulation, cryptocurrency activities are not prohibited.
Kosovo
Status: Not recognized as legal tender, no special legislation.
Restrictions: A complete ban on mining has been introduced since 2022 due to the energy crisis.
Approaches to cryptocurrencies in the Balkans vary:
Serbia and Albania establish a clear legal framework, ensuring the legality of operations.
Montenegro and North Macedonia have no special regulation, but do not prohibit its use.
Kosovo restricts activities due to the energy crisis.
It is important for potential users and investors to study local laws and consult with experts to work safely and legally with cryptocurrencies in the region.
Source: https://t.me/relocationrs/434
