In January–July 2026, Ukraine imported $507.5 million worth of tractors, which is 2% more than during the same period last year, when imports totaled $497.8 million, according to data from the State Customs Service.
However, in July alone, tractor imports fell by 5% compared to July 2025 and by 3% compared to June of this year, to $70.6 million.
Germany was the largest supplier of tractors to Ukraine over the seven-month period, accounting for 19.4% of imports, or $98.3 million.
China supplied nearly the same volume—$98 million, or 19.3% of total imports. The United States ranked third with shipments worth $89.6 million, accounting for nearly 17.7%.
Thus, the three largest countries accounted for about 56.4% of all tractor imports into Ukraine during January–July.
Compared to last year, the supplier structure has changed. In January–July 2025, the United States was the largest supplier with $94.1 million in shipments, followed by China with $87.3 million and Germany with $83.9 million.
Over the year, shipments from Germany increased by approximately 17%, and those from China by more than 12%, while imports from the United States decreased by about 5%.
For the full year of 2025, Ukraine imported tractors worth $845.7 million, which was 7.9% higher than in 2024. The main suppliers at that time were also the United States ($179.7 million), Germany ($145 million), and China ($142.8 million).
Thus, in 2026, the growth in tractor imports continued, but its pace slowed noticeably: over the first seven months, the figure increased by only 2%, and by July, a negative year-over-year trend had already been recorded.
According to Experts.news, the price of aluminum rose in the final trading session of the week following several days of heightened volatility amid risks to supplies from the Middle East, changes in Chinese exports, and expectations of a possible easing of U.S. tariffs on Canadian aluminum.
On the London Metal Exchange on August 21, the price of aluminum rose by approximately 1.2% to $3,242 per metric ton. Other market indicators throughout the day showed prices ranging from about $3,230 to $3,250 per metric ton.
Over the past month, the metal has risen in price by about 1.8%, and compared to a year ago, aluminum remains nearly 24% more expensive.
Despite the rise during recent trading sessions, the price has fallen significantly from its early June high. At that time, three-month aluminum on the LME climbed to $3,787.5 per metric ton—its highest level in about four years. By mid-August, the price had fallen to approximately $3,270 per metric ton.
The main reason for the June surge was disruptions in supplies from the Middle East amid the conflict with Iran. Before the situation escalated, Gulf states accounted for about 10% of global primary aluminum production. Additional problems arose at plants that relied on gas supplies.
However, China offset a significant portion of the shortfall. In the first half of the year, Chinese exports of aluminum alloys nearly doubled to 238,500 metric tons, while shipments of semi-finished products increased by 18% to 3.2 million metric tons. At the same time, China’s domestic demand remained relatively weak, while primary aluminum production remained at a level close to historic highs.
Chinese companies are currently operating at the limit of the national production capacity cap of 45 million metric tons per year set by Beijing, which restricts the possibility of further rapid production expansion.
Trade negotiations between the U.S. and Canada have become another factor affecting the market. According to Reuters, the parties have moved closer to an agreement that could potentially lower U.S. tariffs on Canadian aluminum from 50% to 25%. Such a decision could once again increase the appeal of Canadian aluminum shipments to the U.S. and reduce the volume of shipments to Europe.
As a result, the aluminum market is caught between two opposing trends: the recovery and growth of Chinese shipments are capping prices, while geopolitical risks, production constraints, and trade barriers are keeping them significantly higher than last year’s levels.
Earlier, the Experts Club think tank published a short video on global aluminum production from 1970 to 2024. According to the think tank’s analysis, in 2024, China produced about 43 million metric tons of primary aluminum, or approximately 60% of the global total. Next were India—about 4.2 million metric tons, Russia—3.8 million metric tons, Canada—3.3 million metric tons, and the UAE—2.7 million metric tons.
Watch a short Experts Club video on global aluminum production — https://youtube.com/shorts/cVVIjdMZL-w?si=dAUR8Purot4TxLsm
According to Experts Club, the Taiwanese administration plans to include 235.7 billion New Taiwan dollars, or about $7.4 billion, in the 2027 budget for one-time payments to the population. Each recipient is set to receive 10,000 New Taiwan dollars, or approximately $314, according to the island’s chief executive, Lai Ching-te.
Lai described these payments as an opportunity to share the “dividends of artificial intelligence” with the public. However, this does not refer to dividends from companies or a special tax on AI, but rather to a budgetary payment that the government attributes to the sharp acceleration of the economy driven by demand for semiconductors, computing equipment, and other AI-related products.
It is important to note that this is currently a proposal in the draft central budget for 2027, not a payment that has been finally approved by parliament. Lai announced this on August 17 following the executive branch’s review of the budget draft. The plan calls for an increase in spending of NT$235.7 billion while maintaining a balanced budget and, according to the head of the administration, with virtually no new net borrowing.
Taiwan’s strong financial performance allows the government to take this step. The revenue forecast for the 2027 central budget has been raised to NT$3.9266 trillion.
The main reason for the increase in budgetary capacity is the technology boom. According to data from Taiwan’s Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DGBAS) published on August 14, 2026, the island’s GDP grew by 15.43% year-over-year in the first quarter and by 12.93% in the second quarter. In the first half of the year, the economy grew by approximately 14.15%.
The agency raised its forecast for Taiwan’s GDP growth for the entire year of 2026 from 9.64% to 11.05%. If the forecast holds true, this will be the highest annual growth rate since 1987, when the economy grew by 12.75%. For 2027, the DGBAS expects growth to slow to 6.04%.
Global demand for artificial intelligence infrastructure remains the main driver of the economy. The DGBAS expects Taiwan’s real exports of goods and services to increase by 21.28% in 2026, and private investment in fixed capital to rise by 11.58%.
Manufacturing output in the second quarter rose by 18.27%, driven primarily by semiconductors, computers, electronics, and optical products.
Taiwan plays a key role in the global supply chain for state-of-the-art semiconductors. High demand for artificial intelligence equipment and investments by the world’s largest technology companies have led to a sharp increase in production and exports in Taiwan’s electronics industry.
Authorities expect that direct payments will allow the benefits of the technology boom to extend to households and sectors not directly related to semiconductor and AI production. Recipients will be able to use the money as they see fit—for everyday expenses, education, caring for elderly relatives, or other purposes.
Taiwan de facto has its own administration, armed forces, and currency, and independently conducts domestic and economic policy; however, its status under international law remains disputed.
The People’s Republic of China does not recognize Taiwan as a separate state and considers the island part of China’s territory. Beijing adheres to the “One China” principle and requires countries that establish diplomatic relations with the PRC to refrain from having official diplomatic relations with the Taiwan authorities. According to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 183 countries have established diplomatic relations with Beijing.
Therefore, most countries in the world do not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, although many maintain close unofficial economic, trade, cultural, and political ties with it through representative offices.
As of August 2026, Taiwan maintains official diplomatic relations with only 12 countries and the Holy See, including: Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Marshall Islands, Palau, Tuvalu, Eswatini, and the Holy See. This list is provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan.
At the same time, the lack of official diplomatic recognition does not prevent Taiwan from remaining one of the world’s most important technology economies and a key player in the global semiconductor industry.
artificial intelligence, CHINA, ECONOMY, semiconductors, TAIWAN
China’s current account surplus in the second quarter of 2026 totaled $195.1 billion (1.33 trillion yuan), according to preliminary data from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).
This is a record high for this period. In April–June of last year, the surplus stood at $128.7 billion.
The goods trade surplus rose by 27.3% to $278.9 billion, while the services trade deficit increased by 11.3% to $52.4 billion. The primary income deficit decreased by 20.7% to $37.6 billion, while the secondary income surplus rose by 53.7% to $6.3 billion.
In the first half of the year, China’s current account surplus totaled 2.62 trillion yuan.
China’s total overseas direct investment (ODI) in the first half of the year increased by 3.8% compared to the same period last year, reaching 596.42 billion yuan ($86.5 billion), according to data from the Ministry of Commerce and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
Chinese investors made non-financial ODI totaling 453.06 billion yuan in approximately 6,870 companies across 144 countries and regions, China Daily reported, citing data from the agencies. Of this total, investments in countries along the “Belt and Road” amounted to 120.77 billion yuan, down 11.1% from the January–June 2025 period.
The value of overseas contracting work completed by Chinese companies in the first half of the year increased by 8% to 606.26 billion yuan. In Belt and Road participating countries, this figure rose by 11.8% to 520.71 billion yuan.
The signing of the “Mecca Joint Defence Agreement” by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan could become one of the most significant changes to the security architecture of the Middle East and South Asia in recent years, Experts Club analysts believe.
The agreement was signed on August 7, 2026, by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif after almost a year of negotiations.
The document’s main principle effectively replicates the basic logic of NATO’s collective defence: an armed attack against one participant must be regarded as an attack against all three.
On August 8, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan directly compared this mechanism with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. At the same time, he stressed that the agreement was not directed against Iran or any other specific country.
However, the political geography of the three participants makes it possible to identify several areas that may have influenced the creation of the new security mechanism.
Iran is the most immediate factor behind the formation of the alliance.
Saudi Arabia and Iran have competed for influence in the Middle East for decades, despite the restoration of diplomatic relations mediated by China. Following a new escalation of the regional conflict in 2026, the security of Saudi Arabia, the oil infrastructure of the Persian Gulf and maritime routes once again became a central concern for Riyadh.
Reuters links the signing of the agreement specifically to growing regional instability and threats to the Persian Gulf states. At the same time, Iran has already reacted rather critically to the creation of the new mechanism.
According to Experts Club, deterring a possible expansion of the regional conflict surrounding Iran should be regarded as the first function of the new agreement.
However, this does not mean the creation of a classic “anti-Iranian NATO.” Pakistan maintains its own relations with Tehran and shares a border with Iran, while Türkiye is interested in preserving economic and political channels of interaction with it.
It is therefore more advantageous for all three states to formulate the agreement as a universal system of collective protection without naming an adversary.
The second area is connected with Israel.
Israel’s growing military autonomy and the expansion of its operations in the region are causing concern not only in Iran but also among a number of Arab and Muslim states.
Reuters notes that the participating countries are concerned both about Iran’s actions and Israel’s military policy.
At the same time, the participants’ relations with Israel differ substantially.
Pakistan officially has no diplomatic relations with Israel. Turkish-Israeli relations have repeatedly gone through periods of sharp deterioration in recent years. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, had long considered the possibility of normalising relations with Israel, although regional wars have significantly complicated this process.
The issue is therefore less about preparing an anti-Israeli military alliance than about attempting to create an independent centre of power capable of limiting the unilateral dominance of any regional player.
The third area is considerably more complicated — India.
For Pakistan, India remains its principal long-term strategic adversary. Both countries possess nuclear weapons, and another serious armed clash between them occurred in 2025. SIPRI specifically notes that the India-Pakistan confrontation remains one of the factors contributing to global nuclear risk.
Türkiye traditionally maintains close political and defence relations with Pakistan, while disagreements between Ankara and New Delhi have repeatedly intensified because of Türkiye’s position on Kashmir.
However, it would be an exaggeration to regard the new trilateral agreement as being directly aimed against India.
Saudi Arabia is simultaneously developing a strategic partnership with New Delhi. India is a major consumer of Saudi oil, while cooperation between the two countries encompasses investment, energy, security and defence contacts.
Riyadh is therefore unlikely to be interested in turning the agreement into an automatic Pakistani instrument against India. It is more likely that the treaty gives Islamabad additional political weight and potential support from its partners, but the application of the collective defence principle in the event of a new India-Pakistan crisis will become one of the main tests of the agreement’s actual substance.
The principal distinguishing feature of the new triangle is that one of its countries is a nuclear power.
Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons. According to estimates by Western research centres, its arsenal comprises approximately 170 nuclear warheads. SIPRI classifies Pakistan among the world’s nine nuclear-armed states and notes the continued modernisation of its nuclear capabilities.
However, the text of the agreement does not indicate that Pakistan is providing Saudi Arabia or Türkiye with a so-called nuclear umbrella. This is fundamentally important.
The very participation of a nuclear power increases the political value of the deterrence mechanism, but no automatic obligations to use nuclear capabilities in the interests of the partners have been publicly announced.
In this sense, the agreement creates strategic ambiguity rather than a formal system of extended nuclear deterrence.
The situation is additionally noteworthy because India also possesses nuclear weapons, while Israel, according to SIPRI, is classified as a nuclear-armed state, although it does not officially confirm the existence of a nuclear arsenal. Iran is not included in this SIPRI group.
Another indication of the new format’s long-term ambitions is the possibility of its expansion.
Fidan said that other states could join the agreement in the future. Egypt is mentioned first among the potential participants. To implement the treaty, it is planned to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and a mechanism for regular meetings of foreign and defence ministers.
Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has already stated that such an association should not become a “closed club,” effectively allowing for the formation of a broader collective security system of Muslim states.
If Egypt and other major states actually begin joining the agreement, it may gradually become not merely a trilateral treaty but a new regional security architecture.
The creation of the new format does not mean that its participants are breaking with Washington. Saudi Arabia maintains extremely close military cooperation with the United States, Türkiye is a member of NATO, and Pakistan has a long history of cooperation with both the United States and China.
However, the new treaty demonstrates another trend: the region’s leading countries are seeking to create their own security guarantees that are not entirely dependent on decisions made in Washington. This is particularly evident against the background of simultaneously rising military expenditure, the crisis surrounding Iran, threats to the Persian Gulf’s energy infrastructure and instability along maritime routes.
The three countries bring together very different resources.
Saudi Arabia provides primarily the financial and economic component. According to SIPRI, its military expenditure reached approximately $83.2 billion in 2025, placing the kingdom eighth among the world’s largest military budgets. The strength of its armed forces and National Guard is estimated at approximately 250,000 personnel. The Saudi army is largely equipped with imported hardware and is closely integrated into the system of military cooperation with the United States and other Western countries.
Türkiye has the largest army by personnel among the three participants when regular armed forces are taken into account — approximately 495,000 military personnel, according to the World Factbook. Its military expenditure amounted to approximately $30 billion in 2025. Türkiye’s main distinguishing features are its large domestic defence industry and NATO membership, which give Ankara substantial institutional and technological resources.
Pakistan has the largest armed forces within the new association, with approximately 660,000 active military personnel. SIPRI estimated its military expenditure in 2025 at approximately $11.9 billion. Financially, Pakistan is significantly behind Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, but compensates for this with the scale of its armed forces and the possession of nuclear weapons.
Together, the three states have approximately 1.4 million active military personnel, while their combined military expenditure, according to 2025 data, exceeds $125 billion. However, the arithmetic addition of these figures does not yet turn the agreement into a unified military organisation. The parties have no joint command modelled on NATO, unified armed forces or publicly defined mechanism for automatically entering a war.
The main question is therefore not the quantity of resources possessed by the three states, but how far they are genuinely prepared to go to protect one another in a real crisis.
According to Maksym Urakin, founder of the Experts Club analytical centre: “The emergence of the Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan triangle primarily indicates the formation of a more multipolar security system extending from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf to South Asia. Iran and Israel are the most obvious regional factors behind its emergence, while India is becoming an important indirect factor because of Pakistan’s participation.”
At the same time, the official absence of a designated adversary enables the three countries to strengthen deterrence while maintaining economic relations with states that may potentially perceive the agreement as being directed against them.
