According to Serbian Economist, the event will take place at Porto Montenegro, and city authorities are already preparing temporary traffic restrictions, changes to access procedures, and enhanced security measures.
Montenegrin President Jakov Milatović and European Council President António Costa have sent joint invitations to the leaders of EU countries and Western Balkan states. The summit is set to bring together European leaders at a time when enlargement policy is once again high on the EU’s agenda.
The summit is expected to be attended by European Union member states and six Western Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. These six economies are traditionally part of the EU-Western Balkans format, which is used to discuss the region’s European integration, reforms, security, infrastructure, energy, and economic convergence with the EU.
Earlier, local authorities reported the arrival of over 30 European delegations, though the final number may be higher when accounting for representatives of EU institutions, EU member states, countries in the region, and accompanying teams.
For Montenegro, hosting the summit is of particular significance. Milatović called it a historic moment, as the country is hosting such a major meeting between the European Union and the Western Balkans for the first time.
Tivat will operate under special arrangements in connection with the forum. On June 4–5, the city expects temporary traffic restrictions, heightened security measures, and changes to access in the Porto Montenegro area, where the summit will take place. Short-term road closures are possible, primarily on the route from Tivat Airport to the city center, as well as special traffic arrangements on Arsenalska and Istarska Streets.
Some parking lots will be temporarily closed, and Tivat Airport will adjust its operations to accommodate the international forum. Authorities are also considering changes to school schedules on June 4–5 and are preparing a cultural program for residents and visitors on the city waterfront on June 4.
The main political theme of the summit is the European perspective for the Western Balkans. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, intensifying geopolitical competition, and the EU’s desire to accelerate expansion, the region has once again found itself in the spotlight in Brussels. Montenegro and Albania are considered the most advanced candidates for EU accession, while Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia face more complex political and institutional dynamics.
For the region’s economy, the summit is important not only as a political meeting. The focus is expected to be on infrastructure connectivity, access to European funds, energy security, a common regional market, transport corridors, and investments.
https://t.me/relocationrs/2850
Ukrainian cement exports to the EU are nearly blocked with the implementation of the second phase of the CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism); our country must take a proactive stance in supporting its own producers, emphasized Lyudmila Kripka, Executive Director of the “Ukrcement” Association.
“The conditions that the Ukrainian cement industry faced at the start of the second phase of the CBAM, that is, at the beginning of this year, can be more realistically described not as a ‘barrier’ but as an ‘embargo.’ We were assigned default CO2 emission values for cement from Ukraine at 1,518 kg/t of clinker, which is nearly double the actual figures, even using the wet production method,” Kripka said at the “Trade Wars: The Art of Defense” conference in Kyiv on Wednesday.
She also noted that there are currently no verifiers in the EU for the purposes of the CBAM, but even if there were, the arrival of European verifiers in Ukraine (a mandatory requirement in the first year) is unlikely due to the high level of security risks.
“Under such conditions, exports are impossible in principle! And we see the consequences: cement production has decreased, budget revenues have shrunk, and foreign exchange earnings have fallen, leading to an even greater imbalance in the country’s trade balance,” Kripka noted.
The “Ukrcement” Association, both on its own and together with partners whose products fall under the CBAM mechanism, appealed throughout 2025 to the government, the EC, and all stakeholders regarding the application of the declaratory principle for the duration of the war and reconstruction (this is possible under Part 7 of Article 30 of the CBAM Regulation on force majeure, which has devastating consequences for the economy and industrial infrastructure). However, according to Kripka, EC officials reassured them that the impact of the CBAM’s implementation on the Ukrainian economy would be minimal. First-quarter results showed that the impact is significant, effectively blocking exports.
“Currently, the EC acknowledges that the default value is incorrect; they also see a problem with the certification of verifiers, which concerns not only Ukraine but also EU countries. They promise to correct these issues within a month,” Kripka said.
According to her, these encouraging statements have prompted companies to resume exports, but the risk of catastrophic sanctions remains for companies and dealers that made these shipments.
At the same time, the cement industry is one of the leaders in domestic industry in terms of systematic preparation for the full launch of the CBAM.
“We have made significant progress in the use of alternative fuels, have concrete examples of launching our own ‘green’ power generation, conduct continuous emissions monitoring (CEM), and have verified these emissions using verifiers available in the country,” Kripka said.
Therefore, she emphasized, in response to the question “what is holding back the development of exports to EU countries,” one can point to “uneven competitive conditions.”
“We see that the world is shifting toward a model of economic pragmatism and the protection of domestic markets. Under these conditions, Ukraine has very limited time to adapt its economy to the new reality. “We must take a proactive stance in supporting our own producers,” Kripka explained.
She cited neighboring Poland as an example of healthy “aggressive pragmatism.” In 2024, Ukrainian cement exports to Poland totaled 854,000 tons. Poland produced 17.7 million tons of cement that year. In fact, exports from Ukraine accounted for 3.7% of Poland’s production. Meanwhile, front-page headlines in the press spoke of the “disappearance of Polish cement plants,” and an inter-factional parliamentary group called “Support for the Development of Poland’s Cement Industry” was established in the Polish Sejm.
Kripka emphasized that in order not to be left behind in industrial competitiveness, our country must take a proactive stance in supporting its own producers.
Serbia has the potential to become a key logistics and industrial hub between Ukraine, the markets of the Western Balkans, and the European Union, said Marko Čadež, President of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
“By using the Danube route from the ports of Izmail and Reni toward Serbian ports and intermodal terminals, goods from Ukraine can be efficiently redirected to Corridor X and the markets of Central Europe and the Adriatic region,” he said in an interview with the agency “Interfax-Ukraine.”
According to Čadež, the development of intermodal logistics and free zones gives Serbia the opportunity to be not only a transit point but also a place where new value can be added to Ukrainian raw materials and semi-finished products before they enter regional and European markets.
“Serbia positions itself as an important geo-economic center of the region, at the intersection of Eastern European resources and European transport corridors,” emphasized the president of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
He also noted that Serbia could serve as a production and technology base for Ukrainian companies seeking to enter the markets of the Western Balkans, the EU, Asia, and Africa.
BALKANS, Čadež, EU, HUB, SERBIA, Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
EU member states and the European Parliament have so far failed to agree on the internal mechanism for implementing the trade agreement with the United States, despite pressure from Washington and the threat of new tariffs on European automobiles.
Negotiations between representatives of the European Parliament and EU countries took place on the evening of May 6 and lasted more than six hours, but no final decision was reached. According to Bloomberg, Cyprus, which currently holds the presidency of the Council of the European Union, confirmed that the parties discussed possible amendments to the transatlantic agreement concluded in the summer of 2025, but failed to reach a final compromise.
The issue concerns EU-US trade arrangements announced in July 2025. Under the agreement, Brussels is expected to abolish tariffs on a range of American industrial goods, while Washington maintains a baseline tariff rate of 15% on a significant share of European exports. Stricter conditions remain in place for steel, aluminum, and copper, including 50% tariffs.
The main dispute within the EU is related not so much to the principle of the agreement itself as to guarantees in case the United States fails to fulfill its obligations. The European Parliament insists on additional safeguard mechanisms, including the possibility of suspending concessions if Washington violates the arrangements. Some EU countries, by contrast, support a faster approval of the deal in order to avoid further escalation of the tariff conflict.
The situation escalated after threats by US President Donald Trump to raise tariffs on cars and trucks from the EU from 15% to 25%. Brussels fears that this would hit Germany and other countries with major automotive exports particularly hard. According to Reuters, most EU countries are interested in completing the procedure as quickly as possible, while the European Parliament demands stronger safeguards be built into the agreement.
Chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade Bernd Lange stated that the negotiations had moved forward, but that “there is still a way to go” before a final decision is reached. The next round of consultations between the European Parliament and EU member states is scheduled for May 19 in Strasbourg.
For the European Union, this dispute is a test of its ability to conduct a unified trade policy under pressure from the United States. Some countries emphasize the need to quickly remove the risk of new tariffs for industry, while others fear that an overly soft EU position would create a precedent in which Washington could secure concessions through threats of additional duties.
For European businesses, the main uncertainty is currently linked to the automotive sector, industrial supplies, and transatlantic production chains. If the EU fails to coordinate its internal position in time, the risk of higher US tariffs will remain, and trade relations between the world’s two largest economic blocs could once again enter a phase of acute confrontation.
The Parliament of Romania has supported a vote of no confidence in the government of Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan, leading to the سقوط of the pro-European cabinet and opening a new phase of political uncertainty in one of the key countries on the eastern flank of the EU and NATO.
A total of 281 deputies voted in favor of the no-confidence motion, exceeding the required minimum of 233 votes. Only four parliamentarians voted against. This result became one of the largest no-confidence votes in the history of Romanian parliamentarism.
The political crisis escalated after representatives of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) withdrew from the government. Following this, the Social Democrats, together with right-wing and far-right forces, initiated the consideration of the no-confidence motion at a joint session of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Immediately after the announcement of the voting results, Bolojan left the parliament building and returned to the government residence.
One of the causes of the crisis was disagreements over fiscal austerity measures. Bolojan’s cabinet pursued a course of deficit reduction, tax increases, and spending cuts, which provoked resistance from the Social Democrats. After PSD’s withdrawal from the coalition, the government effectively lost its stable majority.
Bolojan remains acting prime minister until a new government is formed; however, his powers will be limited. The President of Romania, Nicușor Dan, is expected to begin consultations with political parties to find a new cabinet formula. Possible scenarios include restoring a pro-European coalition in a revised composition, appointing a technocratic prime minister, or forming a new minority government.
The political situation is further complicated by the fact that the Romanian parliament remains highly fragmented. Following the parliamentary elections of December 1, 2024, no party secured a majority in either the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate.
In the Chamber of Deputies, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) became the largest force with 86 seats. It is followed by the right-wing nationalist Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) with 63 seats, the National Liberal Party (PNL) with 49 seats, the liberal Save Romania Union (USR) with 40 seats, the far-right S.O.S. Romania with 28 seats, the Party of Young People (POT) with 24 seats, and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) with 22 seats. An additional 19 seats are held by representatives of national minorities.
In the Senate, PSD secured 36 seats, AUR — 28, PNL — 22, USR — 19, S.O.S. Romania — 12, UDMR — 10, and POT — 7 seats.
Politically, the parliament is now условно divided into three blocs. The first consists of moderate pro-European parties: PSD, PNL, USR, UDMR, and representatives of national minorities. In theory, they could form a new majority, but they have significant disagreements over budget, taxation, and social policy. The second bloc is the nationalist and eurosceptic flank, primarily AUR, S.O.S. Romania, and POT. The third consists of situational groups and individual deputies, whose role increases in tight votes.
The crisis in Bucharest has not only domestic but also regional significance. Romania remains one of the most important countries for Ukraine’s logistics, exports via the Danube and the Black Sea, hosting NATO infrastructure, and maintaining security on Europe’s eastern flank. Any prolonged political uncertainty may complicate decision-making on budgetary, defense, and infrastructure issues.
Economic risks are also substantial. Political instability increases concerns about Romania’s sovereign ratings, access to EU funds, and the stability of the national currency. Bucharest must implement reforms and meet deficit reduction targets to maintain access to significant resources from European recovery funds.
According to the analytical center Experts Club, the fall of the Romanian government creates three main risks for the region: slower fiscal consolidation, increased volatility in financial markets, and weakened political predictability in matters of support for Ukraine.
“For Ukraine and the entire region, it is important that the political crisis in Romania does not turn into institutional paralysis. Romania is not a peripheral player, but one of the key hubs of Eastern European security, Danube logistics, and interaction with the EU. If a new government is formed quickly and maintains a pro-European course, the effect will be limited. However, if the crisis drags on, it may affect infrastructure projects, defense coordination, and the investment climate across the region,” said the founder of Experts Club, Maksym Urakin.
According to him, the factor of far-right forces that supported the no-confidence vote is of particular importance.
“The no-confidence vote itself does not mean a turn away from the EU or NATO. However, it shows that protest against fiscal austerity and social pressure can be used by forces advocating a more confrontational and less predictable foreign policy. For neighboring countries, this is a signal: economic fatigue of the population is becoming a security factor,” Urakin noted.
Experts Club believes that the baseline scenario remains an attempt by the president and moderate parties to restore a manageable pro-European configuration without the participation of the far right. However, even in this case, the new government will have to balance between EU requirements for deficit reduction, social discontent, and the need to maintain Romania’s active role in regional security.
The population of European Union countries is projected to decline by 53 million (11.7%) between 2025 and 2100, according to a forecast by the EU’s statistical office (Eurostat).
In 2025, the EU population was estimated at 451.8 million, resuming its growth trend in 2022 after a hiatus caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021. The population is projected to grow over the next three years, peaking at 453.3 million in 2029, after which it will gradually decline to 398.8 million by 2100.
By the start of the next century, the share of children and youth (ages 0–19) in the total population will decline to 17% from 20% last year, and the working-age population (ages 20–64) will fall to 50% from 58%. In contrast, the share of people aged 65–79 will rise to 17% from 16%, and those aged 80 and older to 16% from 6%, according to a Eurostat report.
Earlier, the Experts Club think tank released a video on how the world’s population has changed in recent years; a more detailed video analysis is available here – https://www.youtube.com/shorts/MnNXy72azrw
