About 11–12 million people living in the territory controlled by Ukraine may be below the poverty line if the World Bank’s latest estimate of the share of the poor population is applied to current demographic estimates.
According to data from the Experts Club information and analytical center and the World Bank’s spring study, *Monitoring Living Conditions in Ukraine*, the poverty rate in Ukraine in 2025 was estimated at 41.6% of the population, compared with 37% in 2024. This figure has effectively doubled compared with 2021.
Olha Holubovska, president of the All-Ukrainian Association of Infectious Disease Specialists, noted during a roundtable discussion at the Interfax-Ukraine agency that this is no longer merely a decline in living standards, but a population living below the established poverty line and increasingly unable to finance medical treatment independently.
To convert this indicator into absolute figures, it is necessary to take into account that there is no exact current population figure for Ukraine because of the war and the absence of a census. According to an estimate by the Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Life Quality Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, approximately 27–29 million people lived in government-controlled territory in the summer of 2026.
If the poverty rate of 41.6% is conditionally applied to this range, the result is between 11.2 million and 12.1 million people.
This figure is an estimate rather than the official number of poor people as of September 2026, since the World Bank indicator relates to 2025, while the population estimate relates to 2026. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the real scale of the problem.
The World Bank calculates the indicator based on the actual subsistence minimum published by the Ministry of Social Policy and household survey data. At the same time, the bank notes not only an increase in poverty but also growing inequality: the Gini coefficient rose from 0.44 in 2024 to 0.50 in 2025. The real earned income of the poorest 20% of households fell by more than 30%, while it increased among the wealthiest groups.
At the same time, the financial resilience of families continues to deteriorate. At the end of 2025, about 17% of households were already borrowing money to cover basic expenses, approximately the same proportion were unable to pay utility bills on time, and the share of families forced to sell property to finance everyday needs increased.
Families with children, pensioners, internally displaced persons and residents of frontline territories remain particularly vulnerable.
Ukrainian MP Lesia Zaburanna noted during the roundtable discussion that the consequences of rising poverty are already visible not only in frontline regions but also in Kyiv, where residents are reducing spending on food, medical treatment and providing for their children.
According to Experts.news, the decline in the number of recorded attempts to illegally cross the state border has not yet been accompanied by a corresponding decrease in migration outflow from Ukraine through official border crossing points.
In the first half of 2026, border guards issued 7,523 citations for illegal border crossings or attempted illegal border crossings—approximately one-third fewer than a year earlier.
At the same time, official border statistics show that over the six-month period, Ukrainians left the country 7.13 million times and returned 6.89 million times.
Thus, the net difference between departures and returns amounted to 244,300 people. A year earlier, during the same period, it was comparable—about 251,000.
At first glance, these figures demonstrate a significant gap between illegal attempts to leave the country and the overall migration outflow. However, these are fundamentally different statistical categories.
244,300 is not the number of detected emigrants, but the arithmetic difference between official departures and arrivals of citizens during the first half of the year. Some of these people may return to Ukraine later.
Furthermore, this figure includes all citizens with legal grounds for crossing the border, specifically women, children, men in relevant categories, and other individuals.
The figure of 7,523, in turn, does not represent the number of Ukrainians who managed to leave the country illegally, but rather the number of administrative reports filed by border guards for detected illegal border crossings or attempts to do so.
However, the aggregate data show that the main demographic risk for Ukraine today is linked not only to illegal border crossings but also to the number of citizens who legally leave the country and subsequently do not return.
For the full year of 2025, the difference between the number of departures and returns of citizens amounted to 290,300 people. This was 1.5 times less than in 2024, when the negative balance reached nearly 443,000 people. Over the four years of full-scale war, according to OpenDataBot’s calculations, the cumulative difference between official departures and returns amounted to approximately 3.1 million citizens.
At the same time, in the first half of 2026 alone, the negative balance had already reached 244,300 people, which is about 84% of the figure for all of 2025.
June accounted for the bulk of this year’s difference: during that month, the number of people leaving Ukraine exceeded the number of returnees by 210,900. “OpenDataBot” attributes this, in part, to a seasonal increase in travel during the vacation period; therefore, final conclusions regarding annual migration can only be drawn based on the results for the whole of 2026.
Thus, the decline in the number of illegal attempts to cross the border represents a notable change compared to the peak year of 2024; however, this alone does not signify an end to the demographic outflow.
Ukrainian banks expect further growth in their business and household loan portfolios over the next 12 months, as well as an increase in demand for all types of corporate and retail loans in the third quarter, according to the results of a survey by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU).
At the same time, these expectations have become more subdued: the balance of responses regarding growth in the business loan portfolio fell to 38.2% from 72.2% in the first quarter of 2026, and for retail loans—to 38.9% from 65.1%.
Banks forecast a slight improvement in the quality of the corporate loan portfolio over the next 12 months: the balance of responses stood at 7.3% compared to 7.1% a quarter earlier. At the same time, for the fourth consecutive quarter, respondents expect the quality of loans to households to deteriorate, although the corresponding balance has become less negative—“minus” 16.3% versus “minus” 17%.
Financial institutions also expect growth in deposits from businesses and households. The balance of responses regarding the expected change in the volume of corporate sector deposits rose to 53.7% from 50.7%, reaching its highest level since the start of the full-scale invasion, while the balance for household deposits rose to 53.8% from 53.3%.
In the second quarter, business demand for loans increased: the overall balance of responses rose to 35.5% from 34.4% in January–March, also reaching its highest level since the start of the full-scale invasion.
Demand for long-term loans saw the sharpest increase—rising to 35.4% from 24.6%. Demand for loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) rose to 24.7% from 23.8%, while demand for loans to large enterprises also increased, though at a slower pace than a quarter ago: the balance of responses fell to 26.9% from 34%.
Banks cited the need for capital investments and working capital as the main drivers of the growth in corporate demand. In the third quarter, they expect demand to increase for all types of business loans, particularly long-term ones.
Household demand also rose in the second quarter for both mortgage and consumer loans. According to banks’ estimates, demand for consumer loans has been growing since the second quarter of 2023, and for mortgages—since the beginning of 2025.
In July–September, respondents expect a further increase in household demand for loans, particularly for mortgages. Several large banks cited lower borrowing costs and improved prospects for the real estate market as the main drivers of rising mortgage demand.
Lending standards for the corporate sector remained virtually unchanged in the second quarter: the balance of responses stood at 1.7%, compared with “minus” 2.9% a quarter earlier. Standards for SMEs eased, though to a lesser extent than in January–March: “minus” 3.3% versus “minus” 25.2%.
In the third quarter, banks generally do not plan to change their corporate lending standards but expect them to ease for SME loans.
The approval rate for business loan applications remained largely unchanged in the second quarter: the balance of responses stood at 0% compared to 12.6% a quarter earlier. At the same time, for SMEs, it stood at 13% versus 24.4%, as some banks reported the possibility of providing them with larger loans.
For households, banks eased standards in the second quarter for both mortgages and consumer loans. For mortgages, the net balance of responses fell to “minus” 14.9% from zero, while for consumer loans it stood at “minus” 21.5% compared with “minus” 23.1% a quarter earlier.
Competition among banks remained the main factor behind the easing of consumer lending standards. For mortgages, additional factors included expectations regarding overall economic activity and the outlook for the real estate market.
Banks also expect a further easing of standards for both mortgage and consumer loans in the third quarter.
The approval rate for household loan applications rose in April–June. Banks reported lower interest rates, higher loan amounts, and longer terms for consumer loans, as well as lower mortgage costs and somewhat stricter collateral requirements for mortgages.
Banks assessed the debt burden on businesses in the second quarter as moderate, although assessments regarding SMEs tended toward the low end of the scale. The debt burden on households remained low.
In the second quarter, banks recorded an increase in credit, foreign exchange, and liquidity risks. The balance of responses regarding credit risk rose to 30.3% from 24.9% a quarter ago; for foreign exchange risk, it stood at 14.5% versus 21.3%; for liquidity risk, 8.4% versus 18.8%; while interest rate and operational risks remained largely unchanged.
At the same time, respondents expect currency and credit risks, in particular, to intensify in the third quarter.
The survey was conducted from June 16 to July 8, 2026, among credit managers at 25 banks, which accounted for 96% of the banking system’s total assets.
BANK, BUSINESS, LOAN, NBU, POPULATION
In the first half of 2026, 259,853 thousand deaths were recorded in Ukraine, which is 4% more than during the same period last year.
This is the first officially recorded increase in the number of deaths in the last five years, OpenDataBot reported on July 22, citing information from the Ministry of Justice.
As is traditional, the highest number of deaths was recorded in the Dnipropetrovsk region—28,386 thousand cases. This region accounted for nearly one in nine deaths in Ukraine.
In Kyiv, 20,121 thousand deaths were recorded over the six-month period. Compared to the first half of 2025, the figure in the capital increased by 11%—the largest increase among all regions.
For comparison, 249,002 thousand deaths were recorded in Ukraine during the first half of 2025, and 250,972 thousand in 2024.
DEMOGRAPHY, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, KYIV, MORTALITY, POPULATION
The population in Ukraine’s government-controlled territories currently stands at 29 million people, according to Ella Libanova, director of the Mykhailo Ptukha Institute of Demography and Quality of Life Research at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.
In an episode of the Open Reality special project, she reported that this joint estimate by the State Statistics Service (SSS) and the Institute of Demography—made without a census—is based on data from mobile operators and government registries. “As of today, this is the joint estimate by the SSS and our Institute—29 million. I always say that it’s plus or minus about 300,000,” Libanova noted.
Since no population census has been conducted in Ukraine since 2001, the researchers used data from three mobile operators as a basis, supplementing it with other sources.
“We used this database as our foundation and supplemented it with various available sources of information for verification and refinement: the labor market; data from the Pension Fund, aggregated with data from tax authorities, which includes not only pensioners; data from the Migration Service and the Ministry of Justice from the demographic registry; we also used the ‘school registry’ and EHealth,” the expert explained.
Libanova acknowledged that this method is not ideal, but there is currently no alternative to it.
She also noted that, according to Eurostat, approximately 4.3 million Ukrainians currently reside in European Union countries.
At the same time, according to Libanova, there is no reliable data on the number of Ukrainians who have left for Russia since the start of the full-scale war. She also noted that a policy of demographic replacement is being carried out in the territories temporarily occupied by Russia: the Ukrainian population is being displaced and replaced by people from other regions of Russia, which, in her opinion, is a continuation of the practice of population assimilation.
Most Swiss are willing to support an initiative to cap the country’s population at 10 million by 2050, a move that could impact Switzerland’s immigration policy, labor market, and real estate market, according to local media reports.
According to a poll conducted six weeks before the nationwide referendum scheduled for June 14, 2026, 52% of respondents supported the initiative or were inclined to support it, 46% opposed it, and another 2% were undecided. Over 16,000 people participated in the survey.
The “No to 10 Million in Switzerland!” initiative is being promoted by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). It stipulates that the country’s permanent population should not exceed 10 million people by 2050. Upon reaching an interim threshold of 9.5 million people, the government would be required to implement additional measures to limit immigration, including potentially tightening quotas on work visas and asylum applications. Reuters notes that the proposal also calls for Switzerland to withdraw from the EU agreement on the free movement of citizens.
Supporters of the initiative link the need to limit population growth to the strain on infrastructure, housing shortages, overcrowded public transportation, and rising costs for social and medical services.
The Federal Council and both chambers of parliament recommend rejecting the initiative. Authorities warn that strict restrictions on migration could create legal uncertainty, complicate relations with the European Union, and exacerbate the labor shortage in the economy. Reuters also notes that Switzerland’s population already exceeds 9 million, and the share of foreigners stood at over 27% in 2024.
For the real estate market, the possible adoption of the initiative could have a dual effect. On the one hand, limiting population growth could theoretically reduce long-term pressure on housing demand. On the other hand, stricter immigration rules and a potential reevaluation of relations with the EU could affect Switzerland’s investment appeal, the availability of labor in the construction and service sectors, as well as demand from foreign residents.
According to data from the Swiss State Secretariat for Migration, as of the end of 2024, the largest groups of the country’s permanent foreign population were citizens of Italy—346,981 thousand people, Germany—332,132 thousand, Portugal—263,028, and France—173,353. In total, 1.579 million citizens of EU/EFTA countries and 789,735 citizens of third countries resided permanently in Switzerland.
Ukrainians occupy a distinct place in Switzerland’s migration statistics following the outbreak of full-scale war. According to SEM data, in 2024 the number of individuals with active S protection status rose to 68,070 compared to 66,083 the previous year. This figure can be used as a rough estimate of the number of Ukrainian refugees in the country, although the actual number of Ukrainians in Switzerland may differ due to people holding other types of residence permits.
