Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bishkek on August 31, stated the need to move toward ending hostilities and finding a sustainable peaceful solution.
“Every day of war sets humanity back. We must work to end hostilities,” Modi said during the open part of the bilateral talks. He was referring to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. The Indian prime minister has consistently advocated ending it through negotiations and diplomacy. At his previous meeting with Putin at the SCO summit in Tianjin in September 2025, Modi also called for accelerating the end of the conflict and finding a long-term peaceful solution.
Modi and Putin met in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, on the sidelines of the 26th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The formal meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State is scheduled for September 1, while on August 31 the leaders are holding bilateral meetings and participating in other summit events.
The SCO was established on June 15, 2001, in Shanghai by Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on the basis of the so-called “Shanghai Five.” India and Pakistan became full members in 2017, Iran in 2023, and Belarus in 2024.
The SCO currently includes 10 states: Belarus, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Their combined population exceeds 3.4 billion people, and the organisation’s countries account for about a quarter of global GDP. Afghanistan and Mongolia are observers, while another 15 countries have dialogue partner status, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The SCO deals with regional security issues, while the organisation itself officially stresses that it is not a military alliance. Its permanent secretariat is located in Beijing, and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure is based in Tashkent.
The summit in Bishkek is taking place in the year of the 25th anniversary of the SCO. The Indian government had previously said that Modi intended to use the forum to promote three New Delhi priorities — security, transport and economic connectivity, and new opportunities for cooperation.
According to the “Serbian Economist,” Serbia’s economic ties with the European Union are now significantly more extensive than its trade with Russia, while Belgrade’s main dependence on Moscow remains primarily in the energy sector, said Andon Sapundži, Serbia’s ambassador to Ukraine.
According to him, about 70% of Serbia’s exports and imports go to European Union countries, with another approximately 15% going to countries in the region that are candidates or seeking to join the EU, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Albania.
“The remaining countries account for the rest of Serbia’s foreign trade, including the United States, China, and Russia. Russia’s share is approximately 7–8%, and a significant portion of this trade consists of energy resources, primarily natural gas,” Sapundži said in an interview with “Apostrophe.”
According to him, dependence on Russian energy resources remains one of the most sensitive aspects of Serbian-Russian economic relations, which is why Belgrade is working to diversify its sources and supply routes.
Separately, the ambassador commented on the situation surrounding Serbia’s largest oil and gas company, NIS, which has come under U.S. sanctions due to Russian ownership stakes.
According to him, the process of changing NIS’s ownership structure is in full swing. Serbia is discussing the company’s future structure with Hungary’s MOL, while negotiations with Russia’s Gazprom Neft are ongoing. To finalize the deal, appropriate approvals under the U.S. sanctions regime are required, among other things.
Sapundži identified Serbia’s two main priorities as maintaining energy security and finding a long-term, sustainable ownership structure for NIS.
The company is of strategic importance to the country’s economy, as it operates Serbia’s only oil refinery in Pančevo.
At the same time, the diplomat emphasized that a change in trade structure does not mean Serbia is completely abandoning its economic relations with Russia.
Belgrade, meanwhile, continues to pursue EU accession. According to Sapundži, European integration remains a strategic priority for the country, although Serbia’s refusal to join sanctions against Russia is creating difficulties in negotiations with Brussels.
Due to reduced availability of liquefied natural gas (LNG) on the European market, Belgium switched entirely to importing this fuel from Russia in July, a move driven by supply disruptions and high gas prices, according to Bloomberg.
Total LNG shipments to Belgium in July fell by more than 40% compared to the same period last year. At the same time, the country purchased about 0.4 million metric tons of this fuel from Russia, although the volume of Russian imports was lower than in early 2026.
One reason for the increased role of Russian LNG was disruptions in fuel supplies from the Middle East due to shipping problems in the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, most European buyers were postponing LNG purchases for winter stockpiles due to high gas prices.
“Europe received 16% more Russian LNG in the first half of 2026 compared to the same period the previous year, paying a total of 5.96 billion euros ($6.9 billion). The largest buyers were France, Belgium, and Spain,” the publication reports, citing data from the German nongovernmental organization Urgewald.
Low gas storage levels ahead of the winter season posed an additional challenge for Europe—they are the lowest for this period since records began in 2009.
According to Bloomberg, the last time Russia was the sole supplier of LNG to Belgium was in early 2021—before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and after European economies had begun to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic.
The European Union has established a legal framework allowing member states to sell Russian oil that was previously seized and confiscated in the course of cracking down on sanctions evasion.
The relevant provision is included in EU Council Regulation No. 2026/1848 of July 23, 2026, which formalized the 21st package of sanctions against Russia. The document states the need to enable national competent authorities to safely dispose of shipments of Russian oil that they seize and confiscate. Disposing of the cargo may include selling it to third parties.
However, the new provision does not grant EU authorities the automatic right to stop any tanker simply because it is transporting oil of Russian origin. First, the state must have legal grounds to detain the vessel and confiscate the cargo—for example, a violation of the sanctions regime, the absence of a valid flag, the provision of false documents, or other violations of European, national, or international law.
The new regulation primarily specifies what authorities may do with the cargo after its lawful confiscation. Once the confiscation procedure is complete, the former owner does not automatically receive the right to the proceeds from the sale of the cargo. However, the regulation does not establish a uniform procedure for distributing the proceeds across all EU countries, nor does it provide for their automatic transfer to Ukraine. Such decisions will depend on national legislation and the specific case.
According to Euractiv, the measure is primarily aimed at cargo from vessels used to circumvent EU oil sanctions. The option to sell the cargo is intended to address a practical problem: confiscated oil must be unloaded, stored, and safely sold, which entails significant costs and environmental risks.
The mechanism is part of the 21st EU sanctions package, adopted on July 23. The package also increases pressure on the Russian oil sector, traders, and the shadow fleet, and suspends the automatic review of the price cap on Russian oil until July 15, 2027.
In practice, the new rule may make it easier for EU member states to take action against vessels suspected of circumventing sanctions. However, each detention and confiscation must have a separate legal basis, and the owners of the vessels and cargo will be able to challenge such decisions in national and international courts.
The Hungarian government has launched an investigation into former Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó’s contacts with Russian authorities, Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced on July 16.
According to him, the case file contains classified documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies. However, it is not yet known which agency is conducting the investigation, whether a criminal case has been opened, or whether Szijjártó is considered a suspect.
The investigation was prompted by reports that the former minister may have briefed Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on the progress of negotiations within the EU. Szijjártó denied the allegations and stated that he had not passed on classified information to Moscow.
The investigation coincided with his departure from politics. On July 15, Szijjártó announced that he was resigning his parliamentary seat to take a leadership position at the Chinese company BYD. The prime minister called this a conflict of interest, since while serving as minister, Szijjártó had been involved in providing state support to the company.
European Union countries imported a record amount of liquefied natural gas from Russia’s Yamal LNG project in the first half of 2026, despite the gradual implementation of a ban on Russian gas supplies, the Financial Times reported, citing data from the analytics firm Kpler and the environmental organization Urgewald.
According to the publication, European countries received approximately 9.9 million metric tons of LNG from “Yamal LNG” between January and June, which is about 18% more than during the same period in 2025. This marks the highest half-year figure since exports from the project began in 2017.
Reuters cites slightly different operational data: according to Kpler, shipments to the EU totaled 9.97 million metric tons and increased by 16%. The discrepancy between the figures may be due to updates in information regarding tanker movements and the actual unloading dates of the shipments. Overall, both sources confirm imports of approximately 10 million metric tons and the setting of a new record.
In total, 140 tanker shipments were dispatched from Yamal LNG in the first half of the year. Of these, 136—or more than 97%—arrived at EU ports. China received only four shipments during the same period. Thus, the European market effectively absorbed nearly all exports from Russia’s largest Arctic LNG project.
The estimated value of the shipments delivered to the EU is 5.96 billion euros, or about 6.82 billion dollars. The main destinations were terminals in France, Belgium, and Spain.
The increase in imports occurred as European companies prepared for the final cessation of Russian gas supplies. According to estimates by the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), Russian LNG imports increased by 11% year-over-year in January–May 2026, while Russian pipeline gas supplies rose by 7%. Among the reasons cited by the agency is the early delivery of part of the contracted volumes before new restrictions took effect.
However, it is not yet accurate to say that the purchase of all Russian LNG is already banned in the EU. As of April 25, 2026, the ban applies to imports under short-term contracts concluded before June 17, 2025. Deliveries under previously concluded long-term contracts may continue until January 1, 2027. After that date, a complete ban on Russian LNG imports is set to take effect.
Therefore, a significant portion of Yamal LNG deliveries in the first half of the year could have been made under existing long-term contracts and did not formally violate European restrictions.
Data on the increase in the share of Russian gas in EU imports from 12% to 14% also requires clarification. According to the European Commission and the Council of the EU, Russian LNG and pipeline gas accounted for approximately 12% of European gas imports in 2025 overall. ACER estimated Russia’s share during the 2025–2026 winter season at approximately 14%. These figures relate to different periods and therefore cannot be directly interpreted as a definitive annual increase in market share of two percentage points.
The increase in supplies was also driven by the current restriction on the transshipment of Russian LNG at European ports for onward shipment to third countries. As a result, most of the gas arriving at EU terminals remains on the European market rather than being transshipped to other vessels for transport to Asia.
These record purchases highlight the tension between the EU’s policy of phasing out Russian energy sources and the need to ensure stable gas supplies amid a tight global market. At the same time, they highlight the Yamal LNG project’s dependence on European port, shipping, and financial infrastructure: with limited access to Asian routes, Russia has so far been unable to redirect a significant portion of its Arctic LNG to China.
The Yamal LNG project is located on the Yamal Peninsula in the Russian Arctic and is controlled by the Russian company Novatek. Novatek owns 50.1% of the project, with France’s TotalEnergies and China’s CNPC each holding 20%, and the Silk Road Fund holding 9.9%. The project’s production capacity is approximately 17.4 million metric tons of LNG per year.
The EU finalized its phased phase-out of Russian natural gas on January 26, 2026. A complete ban on Russian LNG is set to take effect on January 1, 2027, and on pipeline gas in the fall of 2027. In the event of a serious threat to energy supplies, the European Commission will be able to temporarily suspend certain restrictions for up to four weeks.
Original source Financial Times
