The European Union has established a legal framework allowing member states to sell Russian oil that was previously seized and confiscated in the course of cracking down on sanctions evasion.
The relevant provision is included in EU Council Regulation No. 2026/1848 of July 23, 2026, which formalized the 21st package of sanctions against Russia. The document states the need to enable national competent authorities to safely dispose of shipments of Russian oil that they seize and confiscate. Disposing of the cargo may include selling it to third parties.
However, the new provision does not grant EU authorities the automatic right to stop any tanker simply because it is transporting oil of Russian origin. First, the state must have legal grounds to detain the vessel and confiscate the cargo—for example, a violation of the sanctions regime, the absence of a valid flag, the provision of false documents, or other violations of European, national, or international law.
The new regulation primarily specifies what authorities may do with the cargo after its lawful confiscation. Once the confiscation procedure is complete, the former owner does not automatically receive the right to the proceeds from the sale of the cargo. However, the regulation does not establish a uniform procedure for distributing the proceeds across all EU countries, nor does it provide for their automatic transfer to Ukraine. Such decisions will depend on national legislation and the specific case.
According to Euractiv, the measure is primarily aimed at cargo from vessels used to circumvent EU oil sanctions. The option to sell the cargo is intended to address a practical problem: confiscated oil must be unloaded, stored, and safely sold, which entails significant costs and environmental risks.
The mechanism is part of the 21st EU sanctions package, adopted on July 23. The package also increases pressure on the Russian oil sector, traders, and the shadow fleet, and suspends the automatic review of the price cap on Russian oil until July 15, 2027.
In practice, the new rule may make it easier for EU member states to take action against vessels suspected of circumventing sanctions. However, each detention and confiscation must have a separate legal basis, and the owners of the vessels and cargo will be able to challenge such decisions in national and international courts.
The Hungarian government has launched an investigation into former Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó’s contacts with Russian authorities, Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced on July 16.
According to him, the case file contains classified documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies. However, it is not yet known which agency is conducting the investigation, whether a criminal case has been opened, or whether Szijjártó is considered a suspect.
The investigation was prompted by reports that the former minister may have briefed Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on the progress of negotiations within the EU. Szijjártó denied the allegations and stated that he had not passed on classified information to Moscow.
The investigation coincided with his departure from politics. On July 15, Szijjártó announced that he was resigning his parliamentary seat to take a leadership position at the Chinese company BYD. The prime minister called this a conflict of interest, since while serving as minister, Szijjártó had been involved in providing state support to the company.
European Union countries imported a record amount of liquefied natural gas from Russia’s Yamal LNG project in the first half of 2026, despite the gradual implementation of a ban on Russian gas supplies, the Financial Times reported, citing data from the analytics firm Kpler and the environmental organization Urgewald.
According to the publication, European countries received approximately 9.9 million metric tons of LNG from “Yamal LNG” between January and June, which is about 18% more than during the same period in 2025. This marks the highest half-year figure since exports from the project began in 2017.
Reuters cites slightly different operational data: according to Kpler, shipments to the EU totaled 9.97 million metric tons and increased by 16%. The discrepancy between the figures may be due to updates in information regarding tanker movements and the actual unloading dates of the shipments. Overall, both sources confirm imports of approximately 10 million metric tons and the setting of a new record.
In total, 140 tanker shipments were dispatched from Yamal LNG in the first half of the year. Of these, 136—or more than 97%—arrived at EU ports. China received only four shipments during the same period. Thus, the European market effectively absorbed nearly all exports from Russia’s largest Arctic LNG project.
The estimated value of the shipments delivered to the EU is 5.96 billion euros, or about 6.82 billion dollars. The main destinations were terminals in France, Belgium, and Spain.
The increase in imports occurred as European companies prepared for the final cessation of Russian gas supplies. According to estimates by the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), Russian LNG imports increased by 11% year-over-year in January–May 2026, while Russian pipeline gas supplies rose by 7%. Among the reasons cited by the agency is the early delivery of part of the contracted volumes before new restrictions took effect.
However, it is not yet accurate to say that the purchase of all Russian LNG is already banned in the EU. As of April 25, 2026, the ban applies to imports under short-term contracts concluded before June 17, 2025. Deliveries under previously concluded long-term contracts may continue until January 1, 2027. After that date, a complete ban on Russian LNG imports is set to take effect.
Therefore, a significant portion of Yamal LNG deliveries in the first half of the year could have been made under existing long-term contracts and did not formally violate European restrictions.
Data on the increase in the share of Russian gas in EU imports from 12% to 14% also requires clarification. According to the European Commission and the Council of the EU, Russian LNG and pipeline gas accounted for approximately 12% of European gas imports in 2025 overall. ACER estimated Russia’s share during the 2025–2026 winter season at approximately 14%. These figures relate to different periods and therefore cannot be directly interpreted as a definitive annual increase in market share of two percentage points.
The increase in supplies was also driven by the current restriction on the transshipment of Russian LNG at European ports for onward shipment to third countries. As a result, most of the gas arriving at EU terminals remains on the European market rather than being transshipped to other vessels for transport to Asia.
These record purchases highlight the tension between the EU’s policy of phasing out Russian energy sources and the need to ensure stable gas supplies amid a tight global market. At the same time, they highlight the Yamal LNG project’s dependence on European port, shipping, and financial infrastructure: with limited access to Asian routes, Russia has so far been unable to redirect a significant portion of its Arctic LNG to China.
The Yamal LNG project is located on the Yamal Peninsula in the Russian Arctic and is controlled by the Russian company Novatek. Novatek owns 50.1% of the project, with France’s TotalEnergies and China’s CNPC each holding 20%, and the Silk Road Fund holding 9.9%. The project’s production capacity is approximately 17.4 million metric tons of LNG per year.
The EU finalized its phased phase-out of Russian natural gas on January 26, 2026. A complete ban on Russian LNG is set to take effect on January 1, 2027, and on pipeline gas in the fall of 2027. In the event of a serious threat to energy supplies, the European Commission will be able to temporarily suspend certain restrictions for up to four weeks.
Original source Financial Times
According to Relocation, the Estonian government has approved a bill prohibiting citizens of Russia and Belarus from purchasing real estate if they do not have long-term resident status or the right of permanent residence in the country. If the bill is passed by parliament (the Riigikogu), the new rules will take effect on January 1, 2027.
The ban will apply throughout Estonia and will affect not only individuals but also companies from Russia and Belarus, as well as legal entities from other countries if their ultimate beneficial owner falls under the restrictions. The ban will cover apartments, land plots, building rights, and shares in real estate properties.
Tallinn cites national security concerns as the rationale for this initiative. The goal of the bill is to reduce the risks of real estate being used for intelligence activities, preparing sabotage operations, exerting influence, or establishing strongholds near strategic facilities. Interior Minister Igor Taro stated that the ban must not remain merely “on paper” and must not allow the restrictions to be circumvented through companies in Estonia or other EU countries.
However, the law will not be retroactive. Russians and Belarusians who already own real estate in Estonia will retain their property rights. Renting residential and commercial properties will also remain permitted. In certain cases, the government may issue a special permit for a purchase if the transaction does not conflict with the law’s objectives.
According to data from the Estonian Ministry of the Interior, as of January 9, 2026, there were 7,797 Russian citizens and 1,476 Belarusian citizens in the country with temporary residence permits—a total of 9,273 people. It is this group, if they do not have long-term resident status or permanent residence rights, that may be directly affected by the ban. At the same time, 70,237 Russian citizens and 1,190 Belarusian citizens held long-term residence permits and are to be exempt from the restrictions.
There is another aspect to consider—existing property owners. As of April 2025, there were 36,952 Russian citizens and 896 Belarusian citizens among real estate owners in Estonia. However, their current properties will not be seized, so the ban primarily concerns new transactions.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Turkey is working to bring the war between Russia and Ukraine to an end with a lasting peace, and is also working to resume negotiations and revitalize the diplomatic process.
According to a post by the Turkish president’s public relations office on social media platform X on Monday, Erdogan made these remarks during a phone call with German Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz.
Erdogan also expressed hope during the conversation that the NATO leaders’ summit, to be held in Ankara, would demonstrate a firm commitment to strengthening Europe’s own defense within the framework of NATO and preserving transatlantic ties, the statement said.
According to The Serbian Economist, the European Commission believes that Serbia’s granting of citizenship to Russian citizens poses potential security risks to the EU, as holders of Serbian passports are entitled to visa-free entry into EU countries.
Guillaume Mercier, the European Commission’s Enlargement Commissioner, stated that this issue had already been raised in the 2025 Enlargement Report. In that report, the European Commission recommended that Serbia continue to align with EU visa policy and ensure more thorough screening of third-country nationals, particularly those from countries that may pose security risks or contribute to illegal migration.
At the same time, the scale of Serbia’s naturalization of Russians remains incomparably lower than in EU countries. According to Serbia’s Migration Profile, 191 former Russian citizens received Serbian citizenship in 2024. In 2023, there were 532 such cases, and in 2022, 275.
By comparison, Germany alone granted citizenship to 12,980 former or current Russian citizens in 2024. That is nearly 68 times more than Serbia granted in the same year. Spain granted citizenship to 2,588 Russians, Finland to about 1,600, Switzerland to 815, Norway to 782, and the United Kingdom to over 2,300.
According to Eurostat, in 2024, approximately 31,000 Russians received citizenship in EU countries.
Estimated data on the granting of citizenship to Russians in Europe in 2024:
EU total – about 31,000 people
Germany – 12,980
Spain – 2,588
United Kingdom – over 2,300
Finland – about 1,600
Switzerland – 815
Norway – 782
Serbia – 191
For Belgrade, this issue is part of a broader dialogue with Brussels regarding visa policy, migration, and European integration.
For Serbia itself, the situation is ambiguous. On the one hand, the country is interested in maintaining relations with Russia, attracting capital and migrants, and supporting a visa-free regime for Russians. On the other hand, visa and migration policy could become an additional source of friction in relations with the EU.
https://t.me/relocationrs/3012
