Moldova is preparing proposals regarding the possible transfer of 20 locomotives to Ukraine; the parties are also working on opening a new joint border crossing and ensuring the unimpeded transit of Ukrainian cargo, said Mykola Kalashnyk, Ukraine’s Minister of Recovery, Infrastructure, and Transport.
“Our priority is unimpeded traffic from Odesa to the Danube region,” Kalashnik wrote following a working meeting in the Odesa region with Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure and Regional Development, Vladimir Bolea.
According to him, to ensure transit, it is necessary to guarantee free and safe passage along a 7-kilometer section of the M-15 highway near Palanka. The parties are also preparing to open a new joint border crossing point.
In the field of rail transport, Moldova is preparing proposals regarding the possibility of providing Ukraine with 20 locomotives. The parties are also working to ensure competitive freight rates and additional routes for Ukrainian cargo through Moldova to the Romanian port of Constanța.
Kalashnik noted that the agreements are expected to result in an increase in the number of routes, faster border crossings, and strengthened logistics links between Ukraine, Moldova, and the European Union.
Short-lived rain and thunderstorms are expected in southeastern Ukraine on Monday afternoon, August 10; no precipitation is expected in other regions or elsewhere overnight, according to the Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Center.
Winds will be from the northeast, and from the south in the western regions, at 5–10 m/s. Nighttime temperatures will range from 11–16°, and daytime temperatures from 24–29°; in the south and southeast of the country, nighttime temperatures will range from 16–22°, and daytime temperatures from 28–33°.
In Kyiv on August 10, no precipitation is expected. The wind will be from the northeast at 5–10 m/s. Nighttime temperatures will range from 14–16°, and daytime temperatures from 27–29°.
According to data from the Boris Sreznevsky Central Geophysical Observatory, the highest temperature recorded in Kyiv on August 10 over the entire period of meteorological observations was 34.7° in 2015, and the lowest was 9.2° in 1891.
On Tuesday, August 11, there will be no precipitation anywhere in Ukraine; only in the western and northern regions will there be brief showers and thunderstorms in some areas during the day. The wind will be predominantly southwesterly, 7–12 m/s. Nighttime temperatures will range from 13–18°, reaching up to 22° in the southern part; during the day 28–33°.
In Kyiv on August 11, no precipitation at night, with brief showers in some areas during the day. Winds will be from the southwest at 7–12 m/s. Nighttime temperatures will range from 16–18°, and daytime temperatures will be around 30°.
The National Bank of Ukraine fined “Financial Company Krediplus” LLC 595,000 UAH for violations of financial monitoring regulations.
The regulator identified deficiencies in the company’s internal documents designed to manage the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as violations of customer due diligence requirements.
In addition, according to the NBU, the financial company did not fully provide the regulator with accurate information and documents in response to its requests, and also violated procedures for preparing statistical reports on financial monitoring.
“FC Krediplus” LLC was registered in May 2016 and is engaged in lending. The company operates in the market under the FinX brand, among others. Its authorized capital amounts to approximately 11.86 million UAH. According to the NBU’s ownership structure data as of January 1, 2026, 100% of the company is owned by Bereg-Group LLC. According to the Unified State Register, the ultimate beneficial owner is Rodion Butko, and the director is Alexander Makedonsky.
Cyprus’s real estate market continued to grow rapidly in the summer of 2026: from January through July, 12,047 real estate purchase and sale agreements were filed with the country’s land registries, a 14% increase compared to the same period last year.
In July, approximately 2,040 contracts were registered, which is about 11% higher than the figure for July 2025. Thus, July became one of the busiest months for the Cypriot real estate market this year. The data is based on statistics from the Department of Land and Geodesy of the Republic of Cyprus.
Demand from foreign buyers continues to play a significant role in the market’s growth.
In July, Cypriot citizens concluded 1,211 transactions, which is 12% more than a year earlier. They accounted for about 59% of the market. Another 829 contracts, or approximately 41%, were concluded by foreign buyers.
Of these, buyers from European Union countries concluded 277 contracts, compared to 274 in July of last year—an increase of just 1%.
Demand from citizens of non-EU countries grew much faster. They concluded 552 transactions, compared to 478 a year earlier—a 15% increase. Thus, more than two-thirds of all July purchases by foreigners were made by citizens of third countries.
In the first seven months of 2026, sales to buyers from countries outside the EU increased by 19% year-over-year, with growth recorded in all five administrative districts under the control of the Republic of Cyprus.
Limassol, Paphos, and Larnaca attract the most foreigners
The geographic distribution of demand among local and foreign buyers differs significantly. Among Cypriots, sales in Limassol grew particularly rapidly—in July, they increased by 39%, to 445 transactions. In Paphos, growth stood at 29%, while domestic demand declined in Larnaca and Famagusta.
Foreign demand is particularly noticeable in coastal areas. In July, non-EU citizens signed 150 contracts in Larnaca, a 42% increase from the previous year. Paphos traditionally remains one of the island’s most foreigner-oriented markets, while Limassol is the largest market for high-end real estate and corporate relocation.
From January through July, foreigners from the EU and third countries together accounted for approximately 41% of all real estate sales in Cyprus.
The Land Registry’s preliminary statistics do not break down the nationalities of foreign buyers by country. However, the Cypriot Ministry of the Interior has previously provided more detailed data on nationalities to Parliament.
According to government statistics for the period from September 2024 to September 2025, the composition of foreign buyers varies significantly by region.
In Limassol, Russian citizens led the way among foreign buyers with 846 purchases, followed by Israelis with 571 and Greek citizens with 261.
In Paphos, British citizens constituted the largest group—890 purchases—followed by Israelis—683—and Russians—327.
In Larnaca, Israeli citizens were particularly active buyers—850 properties—followed by Lebanese—723—and British—302.
In Nicosia, Greek citizens led the way with 403 purchases, followed by Romanian citizens with 112, Russian citizens with 80, and Lebanese citizens with 79. The Ministry of the Interior submitted this data to the Cypriot Parliament, and it was subsequently published by the Cyprus Mail.
Ukrainian citizens are also among the active buyers of Cypriot real estate, although they do not yet rank among the top three groups.
The most detailed breakdown by country, provided by the Cypriot Ministry of the Interior to Parliament in January 2025, covered transactions from 2021 through early 2025.
According to these data, Ukrainians were among the top ten most common nationalities of buyers in four coastal districts—Limassol, Paphos, Larnaca, and Famagusta. In Limassol and Paphos, they were preceded by Russians, British, Israelis, Greeks, Romanians, and Chinese.
As for Nicosia, there is separate data on applications by foreign citizens to purchase real estate in 2024. Ukrainians accounted for 4% of these applications, the same percentage as British citizens. Chinese and Lebanese nationals each accounted for 16%, Russians for 14%, Israelis for 10%, Syrians for 6%, and Egyptians for 5%.
However, it is currently impossible to accurately calculate the number of purchases made specifically by Ukrainians between January and July 2026: the DLS’s monthly public statistics group Ukraine together with all other countries outside the EU.
The US Senate on Friday approved the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which significantly expands sanctions pressure on the Russian energy sector and gives the US president the authority to impose tariffs of up to 500% on imports of Russian goods.
The bill was supported by 86 senators, with 11 voting against it, the New York Post reports. The bill must now pass the House of Representatives, which will return from its summer recess on August 31, after which it must be signed by the US president. Until then, the new sanctions and tariffs will not take effect.
The bill is a revised version of a sanctions initiative that Congress has been discussing since 2025. The original version did indeed provide for 500% tariffs for virtually all countries purchasing Russian oil, gas and uranium. In the final Senate version, this mechanism was significantly narrowed.
500% — Directly on Russian Goods
If the law takes effect, the US president will be required within 30 days to receive the authority to raise tariffs on all goods of Russian origin imported into the United States to 500% of their value.
The text specifically lists oil, natural gas, LNG, petroleum products, petrochemical products, coal and other Russian goods.
Moreover, these tariffs will be imposed in addition to existing US tariffs, anti-dumping duties and other charges.
In practice, a 500% tariff effectively makes most direct Russian exports to the United States commercially meaningless.
For example, with a customs value of $1 million, the additional tariff could theoretically reach $5 million.
However, the significance of this mechanism for Russian exports is limited by the fact that direct trade between Russia and the United States has already declined substantially following the introduction of previous sanctions.
The second mechanism — the so-called secondary tariffs — could prove considerably more significant for global trade.
The president will be able to impose tariffs of up to 100% on all goods imported into the United States from countries that rank among the five largest purchasers of Russian oil or natural gas.
For a country to fall under this mechanism, it must continue making new purchases of Russian commodities 30 days after the law takes effect and simultaneously rank among the top five importers by volume over the previous 12 months.
China and India are primarily at potential risk. Reuters notes that, depending on the structure of supplies, certain European countries and Japan could also be included in the relevant list. The law itself does not name specific countries in advance.
This means that the tariff would not apply to the Russian oil purchased, for example, by India, but potentially to all Indian exports to the United States.
This is precisely why the mechanism is a significantly more serious instrument of pressure than conventional sanctions against Russian companies.
In simple terms, a country is given a choice — continue large-scale purchases of Russian energy and risk access for its goods to the US market, or reduce imports from Russia.
Separately, the law allows tariffs of up to 100% to be imposed against the five largest countries that, according to the US assessment, facilitate the circumvention of sanctions on Russian oil.
Thus, the sanctions mechanism applies not only to buyers of Russian commodities, but also to countries through which schemes involving their resale, transportation or concealment of origin may operate.
In addition, the bill provides for additional sanctions against Russia’s “shadow fleet” — tankers and companies associated with them that are used to transport Russian energy resources in circumvention of Western restrictions.
US authorities will be required to review the list of the largest buyers and potential violators every 180 days, meaning that the composition of countries at risk may change along with trade flows.
The bill includes a provision for countries importing Russian natural gas.
Tariffs may not be applied if the respective country accounts for less than 15% of Russia’s total natural gas exports and simultaneously takes substantial steps to reduce its dependence on Russian gas.
This provision is particularly important for European countries that still receive some Russian gas but are gradually reducing their purchases.
The widely circulated claim about additional 100% tariffs on the largest buyers of Russian uranium does not correspond to the current version of the bill. In the original version, uranium did indeed feature in the mechanism of 500% secondary tariffs. However, following negotiations with the White House, this mechanism was changed.
In the current document, Russian uranium is regulated separately.
The law requires the implementation of restrictions on imports of Russian uranium into the United States and provides for sanctions against the leadership, management and controlling shareholders of Rosatom and entities associated with it.
Tariffs Are Only One Part of the Package
The law provides for mandatory sanctions against Russia’s top political and military leadership, a number of major Russian financial institutions, state-owned companies and foreign persons supporting the Russian military-industrial complex.
The official overview of the bill specifically names the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Sberbank and Gazprombank.
The sanctions also apply to major energy projects, including Yamal LNG, Arctic LNG 1, Arctic LNG 2 and Arctic LNG 3, as well as future Russian projects in the Arctic.
US persons will be prohibited from making new investments in Russia and the Russian energy sector, purchasing Russian sovereign debt, making certain financial transfers to the Russian state, as well as exporting US energy products to Russia.
Another important feature of the law is that the president will have the ability to adjust the intensity of secondary tariffs.
The rate may range from zero to 100%, depending on the behavior of a particular country and the volume of its purchases of Russian energy.
If a country reduces its purchases, the US Trade Representative will be able to lower the tariff. If imports increase, the pressure may be intensified.
The president will also have the right to temporarily waive the application of certain sanctions or tariffs if he formally certifies to Congress that such a step is in the national interests of the United States.
Thus, the new law is not an automatic trade blockade of China, India or other buyers of Russian oil, but rather an instrument that the White House will be able to use to exert pressure in negotiations.
The Iranian part of the bill is somewhat different in nature.
The package includes a five-year extension of existing US sanctions authorities against Iran’s energy and weapons sectors, which were due to expire at the end of 2026.
Therefore, the claim that Russia and Iran will face an entirely identical regime of “500% sanctions” is incorrect.
The main new tariff mechanism is specifically directed against Russia and the largest buyers of Russian energy resources, while the Iranian part primarily preserves the United States’ existing sanctions authorities.
Why the New Mechanism Is Considered Particularly Tough
The key idea of the law is to exert pressure not only directly on the Russian economy but also on buyers of Russian commodities.
After 2022, Russia redirected a significant portion of its oil exports from Europe to Asia. Therefore, restricting only the US or European market does not stop oil revenues from flowing into the Russian budget.
The new mechanism attempts to change this situation through access to the US market.
For major exporters such as China and India, a potential tariff of up to 100% on goods supplied to the United States could carry far greater economic weight than the benefit obtained from purchasing discounted Russian oil.
This is why the authors of the bill expect to confront the largest buyers with an economic choice between trading with Russia and maintaining full access to the US market.
At the same time, the consequences of such a mechanism could also be significant for the US economy itself. Reuters reported that some Democrats and Republicans are concerned about rising import costs, retaliatory trade measures and an excessive expansion of the president’s tariff powers.
EXPERTS CLUB, SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA, SECONDARY TARIFFS, URAKIN, US SANCTIONS
Turkey has called on Russia and Ukraine to agree to a moratorium on attacks on ships and maritime-related facilities in the Black Sea amid a sharp increase in attacks on the commercial fleet.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated on August 8 that Ankara is proposing that the parties establish a special mechanism to halt mutual attacks in the Black Sea.
“We have called on both sides to establish a mechanism for declaring a moratorium,” Fidan said in an interview with the Turkish state news agency Anadolu. According to him, Ukraine had previously put forward a similar proposal, after which Turkey conveyed it to the Russian side and is now awaiting Moscow’s response.
The Turkish foreign minister noted that the war has effectively spread to the entire Black Sea. While the attacks initially targeted mainly military ports and warships, commercial vessels are now increasingly coming under fire.
Ankara is particularly concerned about attacks on vessels linked to Turkey—those flying the Turkish flag, owned by Turkish companies, or carrying Turkish crew members.
According to Fidan, Russia and Ukraine are also attacking logistics facilities of strategic importance to the opposing side, and the further escalation of such actions is becoming “extremely dangerous.”
Ankara’s statement came after a sharp deterioration in the security situation for commercial shipping.
According to data from Ukraine’s Ministry of Community and Territorial Development, as cited by Reuters, in July alone, Ukraine recorded 35 attacks on ships in ports, 22 attacks on ships at sea, and 67 strikes on port infrastructure.
By comparison, Reuters counted 14 attacks on ships in the Ukrainian sector of the Black Sea throughout all of 2025. At the same time, Ukraine has intensified its strikes on tankers linked to the Russian oil trade. Both Moscow and Kyiv claim that their targets are facilities associated with military activities.
The escalation is already affecting global trade in grain and oil. More than 90% of the country’s agricultural exports pass through Ukrainian Black Sea ports, while the Russian ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse remain major export hubs for grain and petroleum products.
The cost of war risk insurance for ships calling at Black Sea ports has risen to approximately 2% of a ship’s value, up from about 1% two weeks earlier, while the cost of chartering oil tankers on certain routes has exceeded $300,000 per day.
Amid rising risks, reports emerged that Turkey had begun restricting the passage of certain commercial vessels into the Black Sea. However, on August 9, two Turkish officials told Reuters that traffic through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles was proceeding as usual. Ankara has indeed implemented temporary additional security measures, but these do not mean that the straits are closed to commercial shipping.
Passage is governed by the 1936 Montreux Convention, which grants Turkey control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and special powers regarding military vessels, while ensuring freedom of passage for civilian vessels.
For Ankara, the security of the Black Sea is of fundamental economic importance. Large volumes of Russian and Ukrainian agricultural products, oil, and petroleum products pass through this region, and Turkish shipowners are actively engaged in these routes.
Since the start of the full-scale war, Turkey has maintained contacts with both Kyiv and Moscow and has sought to play the role of mediator. Ankara has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, yet it continues to cooperate with Ukraine and has repeatedly acted as a mediator on issues related to Black Sea shipping.
