The pharmaceutical company PJSC NVC “Borshchahivsky Chemical and Pharmaceutical Plant” (BCHP) plans to submit four medicines for registration by the end of 2026, develop nine drugs, and conduct bioequivalence studies for two medicines.
According to BHFZ’s disclosure in the National Securities and Stock Market Commission (NSSMC) disclosure system, in 2026, in accordance with the approved Work Plan for expanding the product portfolio, work is planned on 16 drugs in five dosage forms.
Research and development expenses in the first half of the year totaled 6.41 million UAH, which is 13% more than in the same period of 2025.
Currently, the company’s product portfolio consists of approximately 130 items.
BHFZ also reports that during the first half of 2026, the company produced 22.1 million packages of pharmaceuticals with a total value of 1.389 billion UAH.
The average selling price of the drugs was 56.72 UAH per package. Average revenue amounted to 1.201 billion UAH.
In addition, the company reported that total exports amounted to 198.7 million UAH, accounting for 16.5% of total revenue.
According to the company, the main buyers in the first half of 2026 were BADM LLC, OptimaPharm LTD Joint Venture LLC, and Vaksina Healthcare LLC.
During the first six months of 2026, BHFZ exported its products to 14 countries: Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the United States, Uzbekistan, and Croatia.
At the same time, the domestic market accounts for 83.5% of total sales.
According to the company, based on the results for the first six months of 2026, BHFZ ranks sixth in the pharmaceutical market with a figure of 1.119 billion UAH.
As previously reported, BHFZ increased its net profit by 2.96% to 281.788 million UAH in 2025 and boosted pharmaceutical production by 16% to 37.4 million packages, worth 2.481 billion UAH. According to the company, total sales of finished products and goods in 2025 amounted to 43.8 million packages, which is 6.9% more than in 2024.
In addition, the company reported that in 2025, BHFZ exported products worth 307 million UAH, or 13.7% of total sales.
BHFZ forecasts an 18% increase in net sales revenue for 2026 compared to 2025. Annual growth during 2027–2028 is expected to be 13%
Currently, BHFZ is seeking to recover 50.7 million UAH in damages from the Russian Federation for the destruction and damage to property resulting from armed aggression, specifically the destruction and damage to property caused by a missile strike on July 31, 2025.
The amount of direct (actual) damages incurred by the BHFZ as a result of the loss, destruction, or damage to property (fixed assets and inventory according to the lists) in connection with the Russian Federation’s armed aggression (resulting from the explosion and fire on July 31, 2025), is estimated at 50,760,894 thousand UAH, which, at the NBU exchange rate as of the date of the assessment (July 31, 2025), is equivalent to $1,215,358 thousand.
Currently, the shareholders of BHFZ are the pharmaceutical company PJSC “Pharmaceutical Firm “Darnitsa” (Kyiv), which owns 31.8% of BHFZ’s shares; other shareholders include “Beldor Group” (21.26%) and “Lenik Group” (20.32%) .
The ultimate beneficiaries of BHFZ are Gleb Zagoriy, the beneficiary of the pharmaceutical company “Darnitsa,” as well as Yevgen Sova, Tetiana Artemenko, Mykola Bezpalko, and Oleg Goloborodko.
Marshal of the Polish Sejm Włodzimierz Czarzasty has stated that Ukraine’s accession to the European Union will require the Ukrainian side to reconsider controversial chapters of its own history, including its assessment of the mass killings of Poles in Volhynia during the Second World War.
Czarzasty made the statement on August 10 in Szczawnica following a meeting with Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Ruslan Stefanchuk, the Polish Press Agency PAP reported.
Czarzasty stressed that he personally supports Ukraine’s future membership in the EU but believes that European integration entails not only economic benefits but also the acceptance of a certain system of values and historical responsibility.
“The EU is about democracy and values; it is not merely an ATM,” the Marshal of the Sejm said, adding that it is also necessary “to call genocide genocide.” In his opinion, no nation can escape its own history.
The main subject of the historical dispute remains the mass killings of the Polish population in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943–1945, responsibility for a significant portion of which the Polish side places on the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
In Poland’s state historical policy, these events are officially classified as genocide. As early as 2016, the Sejm enshrined this interpretation in a parliamentary resolution, and in 2025 Poland went further: by law, it designated July 11 as the National Day of Remembrance of Poles — Victims of the Genocide Committed by the OUN and UPA in the Eastern Territories of the Second Polish Republic. The law was adopted unanimously by the Sejm and subsequently approved by the Senate.
The Polish side demands three things from Ukraine above all: recognition of the genocidal nature of the crimes, the opportunity to search for and exhume the remains of Polish victims without obstruction, and the dignified burial and commemoration of those killed. Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance regards the depoliticisation of exhumations as one of the key conditions for genuine historical reconciliation.
Warsaw therefore no longer views the issue solely as a dispute among historians. In recent years, it has become part of the state’s remembrance policy and is increasingly being linked by Polish politicians to the issue of Ukraine’s European integration.
Official Kyiv does not deny the mass killings of the Polish population or the need to honour the memory of those killed. However, it avoids accepting the Polish formula of sole responsibility on the part of Ukraine and the official classification of the entire Polish-Ukrainian conflict of that period as a genocide of Poles.
The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance predominantly uses the terms “Volhynia Tragedy” and “Ukrainian-Polish confrontation.” In July 2026, UINR head Oleksandr Alforov stated during a joint Ukrainian-Polish commemoration that the tragic events of 1943 must be remembered and that relations between the two nations should be built on mutual respect and acknowledgement of past mistakes.
The Ukrainian side also points out that not only Poles but also Ukrainians were killed in the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation, including as a result of retaliatory actions by Polish armed formations and the policies of the Polish state. Notably, in July 2026, Polish Ambassador to Ukraine Piotr Łukasiewicz also publicly stressed the need to take Ukrainian victims into account.
When the Polish Sejm legislatively designated July 11 as a day of remembrance for the “victims of the genocide committed by the OUN and UPA” in June 2025, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the decision unilateral and warned that such steps did not contribute to achieving mutual understanding and reconciliation. Kyiv proposed focusing on the joint work of historians, searches, exhumations and the dignified commemoration of all victims.
Despite the political dispute over terminology, substantial progress has been made in practical matters over the past year. Ukraine resumed issuing permits to the Polish side for search and exhumation work. In 2026, investigations were conducted, in particular, in the former villages of Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska in Volhynia, while on August 7, Ukraine’s interdepartmental commission approved new exhumation work in Huta Peniatska in the Lviv region and in the village of Uhly in the Rivne region.
Work in Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska was completed on August 7, and the remains discovered there are to be reburied. Thus, one of the most acute practical issues that had complicated relations between Warsaw and Kyiv for several years has gradually begun to move forward.
Following his meeting with Stefanchuk, Czarzasty also called for political and historical conflicts not to be transferred to relations between Polish and Ukrainian societies. According to him, a permanent channel of communication must be maintained between the parliaments of the two countries and mutual trust must be restored. At the same time, he stressed that “without a secure Ukraine, there is no secure Poland” and expressed support for Ukraine’s membership in the EU and Poland’s participation in the country’s post-war reconstruction.
The National Bank of Ukraine is preparing a new, large-scale foreign exchange liberalization package that, for the first time since the start of the full-scale war, is expected to significantly expand individuals’ opportunities to conduct foreign exchange and financial transactions abroad. NBU Governor Andriy Pyshnyy made this announcement on August 10. According to him, a significant portion of the consultations with the International Monetary Fund regarding this new phase of liberalization has already been completed, and the National Bank plans to announce the final details once the necessary procedures are finalized.
“We are preparing a currency liberalization package that, for the first time, will have a tangible impact on individuals as well,” said the NBU Governor.
Until now, the main stages of currency liberalization during the war have focused primarily on businesses: the NBU has gradually expanded opportunities for paying for imports, servicing foreign loans, repatriating dividends, and attracting capital from abroad. Transactions by individuals, including money transfers abroad, are part of a later stage of lifting restrictions in the NBU’s strategy.
According to sources in the banking sector, one of the main expected changes will be an increase in the monthly limit on transfers by individuals from foreign currency cards issued by Ukrainian banks to cards abroad, from 100,000 UAH to 200,000 UAH in equivalent value. Sources also note a possible roughly twofold increase in a number of other existing foreign currency limits; however, the NBU has not yet officially published their final parameters.
Currently, the NBU allows transfers from a foreign-currency payment card issued by a Ukrainian bank to another individual’s card abroad of up to 100,000 UAH equivalent per month. Transfers from hryvnia cards directly to cards issued by foreign banks remain prohibited.
For hryvnia cards, there is also a limit on non-cash payments for goods and services abroad of 100,000 UAH equivalent per month. Cash withdrawals abroad from hryvnia accounts are limited to 12,500 UAH equivalent per seven calendar days. There are no general limits of this type for payments with foreign currency cards for ordinary goods and services, although certain restrictions remain in place for some categories of transactions.
Thus, if the changes announced by the banking market are approved as expected, the new package will become one of the most significant relaxations of restrictions directly affecting Ukrainian citizens starting in 2022. Above all, it will simplify support for relatives abroad, the use of funds from Ukrainian accounts during extended stays abroad, and other cross-border transactions by individuals.
At the same time, this new phase of liberalization does not mean the complete abolition of foreign exchange controls.
The NBU maintains a managed floating exchange rate regime and continues to cover the structural foreign exchange deficit in the market through its own interventions. According to the regulator’s strategy, the further lifting of restrictions depends not on a predetermined timeline, but on the state of the foreign exchange market, international reserves, inflation, and other macrofinancial conditions.
The transition to easing restrictions for the general public is of particular importance, as such measures are part of the third stage of currency liberalization in the NBU’s roadmap, alongside foreign investments, freer capital flows, and the expansion of other cross-border financial transactions. At the same time, the NBU may implement certain steps from different stages in parallel, provided that macroeconomic conditions permit.
In January 2026, the NBU had already significantly expanded opportunities for businesses by introducing a so-called “credit limit,” which allows companies to use foreign loans raised after January 1 for a range of transactions, including servicing existing debts and additional repatriation of dividends. In April, the regulator implemented another round of easing measures for certain categories of individuals and companies.
The final amounts of the new limits for individuals, the date they take effect, and the full list of permitted transactions are to be determined by a separate decision of the NBU’s Board. As of the afternoon of August 10, the relevant resolution had not yet been published on the regulator’s official website.
Consumer prices in Ukraine rose by 0.3% in July 2026 compared with June, while annual inflation accelerated to 7.7% from 7.2% a month earlier, according to data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. Since the beginning of the year, consumer prices have risen by 6%. In January–July 2026, they were 7.8% higher than in January–July 2025.
The acceleration in annual inflation is partly due to the base effect: in July 2025, prices fell by 0.2%. However, the current rate of 7.7% remains lower than the 8.2% recorded in May.
Core inflation slowed to 0.3% in July from 0.5% in June and 0.7% in May. On an annual basis, it remained at 8.1%.
The trends in individual components of the consumer basket varied significantly. Food and non-alcoholic beverages fell in price by 0.2% over the month, while clothing and footwear fell by 4.8%. At the same time, housing and utilities rose by 1.6%, and transportation by 1.3%.
At the end of July, the NBU raised its inflation forecast for the end of 2026 from 9.4% to 10%, and its core inflation forecast from 7.2% to 9.2%. The regulator attributes the increase in underlying price pressures to rising business costs for logistics, labor, and energy resources.
Data from the State Statistics Service excludes territories temporarily occupied by Russia and parts of the country where hostilities are ongoing or have taken place.
According to Serbian Economist, in the first six months of 2026, Budva welcomed approximately 245,000 tourists, who spent nearly 800,000 nights at the resort, according to preliminary MONSTAT data cited by the Budva Tourism Organization. The number of overnight stays was slightly higher than last year’s.
As of August 7, there were 44,534 registered tourists on the Budva Riviera, of whom 44,143 were foreigners and only 391 were residents of Montenegro. Thus, foreign guests currently account for over 99% of the registered tourist flow. The private sector accommodated 24,888 people, while hotels accommodated 18,525.
Based on the results of the first half of the year, Serbia remains Budva’s largest foreign market, accounting for about 13% of tourist arrivals. The tourism organization also notes growth in the Western European market.
A precise breakdown of current vacationers by nationality is not published, but official data from TO Budva reveals the leading markets.
In group accommodations—primarily hotels—the largest number of tourists currently come from Serbia, Russia, Israel, the United Kingdom, Germany, Bosnia, Poland, Ukraine, and Turkey.
In private apartments and vacation rentals, the breakdown is slightly different: Serbia, Russia, Bosnia, Ukraine, Poland, Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, North Macedonia, and Romania lead the way. Thus, Ukrainians currently rank fourth among Budva’s main markets for private accommodations and are among the top ten in the hotel segment.
Despite changes in the structure of international tourism since 2022, the number of Russian tourists also remains high. Russians currently rank second in both group and private accommodations, behind tourists from Serbia.
At the same time, the market structure is becoming more diversified. The role of Israel, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Poland has noticeably increased in the hotel sector, and representatives of Budvanska rivijera, the largest hotel group, also note the presence of guests from the Baltic states, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Egypt, and China during the current season.
Thus, Budva’s main tourist flow today is driven by Serbia and neighboring countries, Russia and Ukraine, as well as the rapidly growing markets of Western Europe and Israel.
https://t.me/relocationrs/3425
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy continues to overhaul the diplomatic corps, a process that is gradually extending to include not only countries in the European Union and the Western Balkans but also nations in Asia and the Middle East.
On August 6, the president dismissed four ambassadors at once: Vasyl Kyrylych in Croatia, Volodymyr Shkurov in Albania, Oleg Gerasymenko in Montenegro, and Markiyan Chuchuk in Pakistan.
The relevant personnel decisions were formalized by decrees No. 709/2026–No. 712/2026.
According to the Experts Club think tank, the simultaneous replacement of the heads of four diplomatic missions appears to be part of a broader restructuring of Ukraine’s foreign policy apparatus, rather than an isolated personnel move.
As early as May 18, Zelenskyy had spoken of the need for “replacements and adjustments” within the diplomatic corps, and on July 15, he explicitly stated that he was discussing with First Deputy Head of the Office of the President Serhiy Kyslytsya and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andriy Sybiga a list of Ukrainian ambassadors who needed to be replaced.
The rotation began even before a series of decisions were made in August. Specifically, on June 26, the president dismissed the Ukrainian ambassadors to Oman, Cyprus, Vietnam, and Cambodia. At the same time, new appointments were made to other diplomatic posts.
Thus, this represents a gradual renewal of Ukraine’s network of diplomatic missions over the course of several months.
Three of the four ambassadors had served for more than six years
The length of the diplomats’ tenures also suggests that the August decisions should be viewed primarily in the context of rotation.
Vasyl Kyrylych was appointed Ukraine’s ambassador to Croatia on December 24, 2019, and served in Zagreb for more than six and a half years.
Volodymyr Shkurov took the helm of the Ukrainian Embassy in Albania on April 13, 2020, and also served for over six years.
Markiyan Chuchuk was appointed Ukraine’s ambassador to Pakistan on April 17, 2020. His diplomatic mission lasted over six years.
Oleg Gerasymenko headed the Ukrainian Embassy in Montenegro starting May 4, 2022—a little over four years.
The very fact that three of the four diplomats held their posts for such a long time is further evidence supporting the theory of a planned personnel rotation. The published decrees do not specify the reasons for the dismissals.
It is particularly telling that three of the four August decisions concern Southeast Europe—Croatia, Albania, and Montenegro.
Experts Club notes that the importance of this region for Ukrainian diplomacy has grown significantly.
Croatia is a member of the EU and NATO and remains one of Ukraine’s steadfast partners. Croatia’s experience with postwar reconstruction, demining, the return of the population, and the integration of territories following the conflicts of the 1990s is also important for Kyiv.
Albania is also a NATO member and actively supports Ukraine in international forums. Tirana hosted one of the previous summits in the “Ukraine–Southeast Europe” format.
Montenegro presents another area of interest. It is a NATO member and, at the same time, the most promising candidate for EU accession among the countries of the Western Balkans. Therefore, relations with Podgorica are becoming important for Kyiv in the context of its own European integration.
On July 15, Kyiv hosted the fifth “Ukraine–Southeast Europe” summit, attended by representatives from Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro. The participants reaffirmed their support for Ukraine and the need to expand regional cooperation.
Against this backdrop, the nearly simultaneous replacement of three Ukrainian ambassadors to Balkan countries may indicate Kyiv’s desire to inject additional momentum into this direction.
Of the three Balkan appointments, Montenegro may prove to be the most interesting.
Podgorica expects to conclude negotiations on accession to the European Union and become one of the next new EU members. For Ukraine, which is also negotiating membership, Montenegro’s experience could be of practical value.
In addition, Ukraine is gradually building a separate network of relations with countries in the Adriatic region—Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, and neighboring Serbia.
The most recent example is Zelenskyy’s official visit to Belgrade on August 8 and his talks with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, during which they discussed free trade, energy, agriculture, Ukraine’s recovery, and political cooperation.
Thus, the Balkans are gradually transforming from a secondary focus of Ukrainian diplomacy into an independent regional track.
The replacement of the ambassador to Pakistan presents a completely different challenge.
Islamabad is important to Ukraine as one of the largest centers in South Asia and a representative of the so-called Global South. Pakistan’s population is approaching 250 million; the country wields significant regional political influence and is a nuclear power.
At the same time, Pakistan’s foreign policy is based on a complex system of relations with China, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, Russia, and the Gulf states.
For Ukraine, expanding ties with Pakistan could be significant in several areas at once—food trade, industry, international organizations, and building support for Kyiv among Asian nations and the Muslim world.
As Ukraine’s foreign policy increasingly shifts away from focusing exclusively on the EU and the U.S., embassies in countries such as Pakistan, India, the Gulf states, Indonesia, and African nations are gaining greater importance.
That is precisely why replacing the ambassador in Islamabad after a mission lasting more than six years appears to be a logical part of the renewal of Ukraine’s Asian policy.
The August dismissals are likely not the end of the process.
As early as July 15, Zelenskyy publicly spoke about forming a “pool of ambassadors” slated for replacement. This suggests that new personnel decrees may be issued in the coming weeks.
At the same time, the current diplomatic rotation coincides with more extensive personnel changes in Ukraine’s government system, which took place in July and affected the government, security agencies, and other state institutions.
According to Experts Club, what matters most will not be the number of diplomats dismissed, but who Kyiv appoints to replace them.
If key posts are filled not only by career diplomats but also by former ministers, representatives of the Office of the President, economic negotiators, or prominent public figures, this could signal Ukraine’s transition to a model of so-called “political diplomacy,” in which embassies are assigned more specific economic, investment, and negotiating tasks.
As of August 10, 2026, presidential decrees appointing new Ukrainian ambassadors to Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, and Pakistan have not been published.
Experts Club believes that future appointments will provide a clearer understanding of the logic behind the current rotation.
If diplomats with significant European and economic experience are sent to Zagreb, Tirana, and Podgorica, this will confirm a strengthening of the Balkan focus. The appointment to Islamabad of a specialist in Asian affairs, trade diplomacy, or relations with the Global South, in turn, could signal an expansion of Ukraine’s activities beyond its traditional circle of Western partners.
Overall, the current rotation signals a transition of Ukrainian diplomacy to a new phase: after four years of full-scale war, embassies are now expected not only to secure international support for Ukraine but also to work toward EU membership, the country’s recovery, exports, attracting investment, and forging long-term regional alliances.
