Imports of electric generator sets and rotating electrical converters to Ukraine in January–May 2026 fell by 33.3% compared to the same period in 2025—to $421.7 million, according to statistics from the State Customs Service.
According to the data, imports of this equipment in May 2026 fell by 46% compared to May 2025, but increased slightly compared to April 2026, reaching $62.4 million.
Most frequently in January–May, electric generators and converters were imported from the Czech Republic (19.9% of total imports of these products, or $83.9 million), China (19.7%, $82.9 million), and Turkey (16.5%, $69.5 million), whereas last year the top sources were the Czech Republic ($120 million), Austria ($88.6 million), and the United States ($78.83 million).
Exports of electric generators from Ukraine during this period were insignificant—$2.3 million, mainly to Latvia.
At the same time, according to data from the State Customs Service, imports of electric motors and generators increased more than 2.4-fold over the first five months of this year—to $486.6 million; specifically, $120.1 million worth were imported in May—2.4 times more than in May 2025.
As in the previous year, China remains the main supplier of this equipment (accounting for 93% of imports from January to May).
In addition, imports of electric batteries and separators to Ukraine during this period increased 3.8-fold—to $1.47 billion, with the majority coming from China ($1.31 billion, or 89.3%), as well as from the Czech Republic ($35.3 million) and Latvia ($17.4 million).
Last year, in January–May, the largest suppliers were China with a 75.9% share ($290.6 million), Taiwan with 5.8% ($22 million), and Vietnam with 4.3% ($16.5 million).
In May, imports of this equipment increased 3.5-fold compared to May 2025 and by 9.7% compared to April 2026, reaching $333 million.
Over the first five months, Ukraine exported $18.1 million worth of batteries, primarily to Poland, France, and Germany, while last year exports totaled $20.7 million, mostly to the same countries.
As reported, at the end of July 2024, Ukraine exempted the import of electric generator equipment and batteries into the country from customs duties and VAT.
According to the State Customs Service, in 2025 Ukraine increased imports of electric generators and converters by 2.3 times compared to 2024—to $1.69 billion—and batteries by 55% to $1.48 billion. At the same time, in January 2025, imports of electric generators increased eightfold compared to January 2024, and imports of batteries tripled.
BATTERIES, electric generators, IMPORTS, STATE CUSTOMS SERVICE
The volume of passenger car imports into Ukraine, including cargo-passenger vans and racing cars (HS code 8703), amounted to $1.71 billion in January–May 2026, which is 16.6% less than the figure for the same period in 2025 ($2.05 billion).
According to statistics released by the State Customs Service of Ukraine, specifically in May, passenger car imports fell by 23.6% compared to May of last year, while compared to April 2026, they rose by 11.2% to $400.4 million.
The top three suppliers of passenger cars to Ukraine over the five-month period were the United States, Germany, and Japan, while in the previous year these were the same countries, but Germany was the largest exporter, followed by the United States and Japan. Specifically, car imports from the U.S. fell by 5.6% to $317.4 million, from Germany by nearly 30% to $272.6 million, while from Japan they rose by 7.3% to $246.9 million.
Imports of passenger cars from other countries during this period totaled $874.6 million—20.3% less than last year’s figure.
At the same time, over five months, Ukraine exported such vehicles worth only $0.99 million, whereas last year, total shipments to the UAE, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia amounted to $2.69 million.
As reported, in 2025, passenger cars worth nearly $6.15 billion were imported into Ukraine, which is 40.2% more than in 2024. The top three exporters were the United States, Germany, and China. Cars worth $10.1 million were exported (2.7 times less).
The significant increase in passenger car imports to Ukraine in the final months of 2025 was driven by news that VAT exemptions on electric vehicle imports would be abolished as of January 1, 2026, while imports had declined significantly since the start of the current year. However, starting in March, a slow but gradual recovery of the passenger car market began, including the market for electric vehicles.
CAR MARKET, IMPORTS, PASSENGER CARS, STATE CUSTOMS SERVICE, UKRAINE
Artificial intelligence is moving from the realm of technological experimentation into the sphere of strict government regulation, notes the Experts Club information and analysis centre. The world’s leading economies are already dividing the market into two approaches: risk-based regulation with mandatory requirements, and a softer model where the state focuses on innovation, industry standards and ex-post control.
For Ukraine and other Eastern European countries, this issue is becoming increasingly relevant. AI is already being used in banking, telecommunications, defence technologies, medicine, education, public services, industry and the media. Therefore, the question is no longer whether artificial intelligence should be regulated, but how to avoid stifling innovation whilst protecting citizens, businesses and the state from risks.
The most developed legal framework has already been adopted in the European Union. The EU AI Act came into force on 1 August 2024 and is being implemented in phases. Its logic is based on risk classification: prohibited practices, high-risk AI systems, systems subject to transparency requirements, and general-purpose models. For countries targeting the EU market, this act effectively becomes an external standard, even if they are not members of the European Union.
South Korea became one of the first countries outside the EU to adopt a comprehensive national law on artificial intelligence. The AI Basic Act came into force in January 2026 and combines support for the AI industry with requirements for transparency, security, labelling of AI content and oversight of high-impact systems.
China has chosen a different path — not a single universal law, but a set of mandatory rules for specific sectors. The most important document has been the provisional measures for the management of generative AI services, in force since 2023. The Chinese model emphasises content control, data security, algorithm registration, verification of generative services, and compliance with the state’s political requirements.
In 2025, Japan adopted its first national law specifically dedicated to AI. However, the Japanese model is significantly softer than the European one: the law is primarily aimed at promoting research, development and the use of artificial intelligence, rather than imposing detailed bans and fines. This reflects Japan’s desire to maintain the competitiveness of its technology sector and avoid placing an excessive burden on business.
The US does not yet have a single federal law on artificial intelligence. Regulation is developing in a piecemeal fashion: through presidential executive orders, federal guidelines, NIST standards and individual state laws. The most notable example is the Colorado AI Act, which sets out obligations for developers and users of high-risk AI systems and aims to prevent algorithmic discrimination. At the federal level, the US is focusing on maintaining leadership, infrastructure, security and limiting excessive regulation.
The UK has opted for a ‘pro-innovation regulation’ model. Instead of a single AI law, London has proposed a set of principles for existing regulators: safety, transparency, fairness, accountability and the right to appeal decisions. This approach allows for faster adaptation to technological changes, but creates less legal certainty than the European model.
Canada attempted to pass the Artificial Intelligence and Data Act as part of Bill C-27, but the bill remained in the parliamentary process for a long time and did not become a fully-fledged law on AI. This shows that even developed democracies face difficulties: AI regulation simultaneously touches on digital rights, business, copyright, security, competition and the labour market.
Brazil is also in the process of creating comprehensive AI regulation. The Senate approved the artificial intelligence bill in December 2024, but for it to come into force, it must be considered by the Chamber of Deputies and receive final approval.
The Brazilian model is close to a risk-based approach, but also places a strong emphasis on human rights, copyright and developers’ liability.
Serbia is currently in the process of transitioning from a strategic framework to mandatory regulation. The country has already adopted strategic documents on AI development and set up a working group to draft its first law on artificial intelligence. The new law is intended to bring Serbia closer to the European model and provide businesses with clearer guidelines for working with AI systems.
For Ukraine, the issue of AI regulation is also becoming inevitable. On the one hand, the country needs technological modernisation as quickly as possible, particularly in the fields of defence tech, govtech, medicine, cybersecurity and education. On the other hand, integration into the EU market will require compliance with the EU AI Act, particularly for companies working with European clients or exporting digital products.
The main crossroads for countries that have not yet adopted legislation lies in choosing between three models. The first is the European model, with strict risk classification and a high level of compliance. The second is the British-Japanese model, with soft regulation and an emphasis on innovation. The third is the Chinese model, with strong state control over content, data and algorithms.
For Eastern Europe, a hybrid model is the most likely outcome. Countries involved in European integration or the export of IT services to the EU will be obliged to take the EU AI Act into account. However, due to the limited resources of regulators, they are likely to introduce regulations in stages, starting with sensitive sectors: public services, biometrics, healthcare, finance, education, employment and critical infrastructure.
Experts Club believes that AI regulation will become one of the key factors in the investment attractiveness of digital economies. Companies will choose jurisdictions where the rules are sufficiently clear for business but do not create excessive barriers to the development and testing of new products.
For Ukraine, it is important not simply to copy the EU AI Act, but to adapt it to its own capabilities. The optimal model should include a register of high-risk AI systems, regulatory sandboxes, transparency requirements for public services, personal data protection, labelling of synthetic content, and clear liability rules.
In the coming years, artificial intelligence will become as regulated an infrastructure as finance, telecommunications or energy. Countries that establish clear and flexible rules first will gain an advantage in attracting investment, developing start-ups and exporting digital services.
Former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been re-elected as leader of the Fidesz party for a one-year term, despite the party’s defeat in the April parliamentary elections and a drop in its poll ratings.
At the party convention, 729 delegates voted for Orbán out of 737 valid ballots. There were no votes against, and eight delegates abstained. Orbán was the only candidate for the party leadership.
The re-election confirmed that Orbán retains control over Fidesz even after losing power. The party moved into opposition after 16 years in power, losing the April elections to the Tisza party led by Péter Magyar.
According to Reuters, recent polls show a sharp shift in the political balance in Hungary: support for Fidesz has dropped to about 17%, while Tisza received about 55%. In the elections, Mályi’s party secured a parliamentary majority sufficient to overhaul parts of the political and institutional system established under Orbán.
At the convention, Orbán acknowledged responsibility for Fidesz’s defeat and stated that the party must learn to operate under new conditions—no longer as the ruling party, but as the opposition. At the same time, his re-election indicates that there is currently no public alternative to the former prime minister within Fidesz.
For Hungary, this means that Orbán remains a key figure in the right-wing opposition and the main political opponent of Péter Magyar’s government. In the coming year, Fidesz will likely attempt to restructure the party, retain its core supporters, and formulate a strategy for returning to power.
Péter Magyar, a former member of the Fidesz political system, founded the Tisza party after breaking with Orbán’s inner circle and became the main beneficiary of public discontent with corruption, the state of institutions, and Fidesz’s prolonged dominance. His election victory marked Orbán’s biggest political defeat since 2010.
Viktor Orbán is a Hungarian politician and one of Europe’s most prominent right-wing leaders. He first served as Prime Minister of Hungary from 1998 to 2002, then returned to power in 2010 and led the government for 16 years. During Orbán’s tenure, Fidesz established a model of governance that the politician himself called “illiberal democracy.” His governments pursued a strict immigration policy, tightened control over institutions and the media, and clashed with the EU over issues of the rule of law.
Ukraine has implemented about 15% of the reforms outlined in the 10-point plan agreed upon with the European Union as part of its preparations for accession negotiations, The Guardian reports, citing an assessment by EU officials.
According to the publication, the plan was agreed upon in December between European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos and Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka. It includes priority steps in the areas of the rule of law, anti-corruption policy, the judicial system, and the prosecutor’s office.
Specifically, the program calls for measures to strengthen the independence of Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the adoption of an anti-corruption strategy, and reforms to the procedures for appointing judges and prosecutors.
The Guardian notes that European officials acknowledge the efforts of Ukraine and Moldova to carry out reforms under difficult circumstances; however, in the case of Ukraine, this assessment is accompanied by disappointment over the insufficiently rapid implementation of agreed-upon priorities.
The publication appeared against the backdrop of the start of the first phase of Ukraine and Moldova’s EU accession negotiations. This stage concerns the so-called first cluster of negotiations—issues of the rule of law, democracy, the functioning of institutions, and fundamental reforms.
For Ukraine, these areas are key, as without progress in the anti-corruption and judicial spheres, further advancement through the negotiation clusters will be difficult. The EU traditionally views the independence of anti-corruption bodies and the quality of the prosecution service and judicial system as the foundation for all other reforms.
Ukraine applied for EU membership in February 2022 following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In June 2022, the country received candidate status, and in 2024, the EU formally opened accession negotiations. However, practical progress in the negotiations depends on the implementation of reforms and the unanimous support of all EU member states.
The Guardian reports that EU accession requires a candidate country to adopt thousands of European laws and decisions, as well as approval from all current EU members. Therefore, even with political support for Ukraine, the integration process could take years.
Source: The Guardian – “Ukraine and Moldova to enter first phase of EU membership negotiations”.
According to Serbian Economist, North Macedonian President Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova stated that the European Union needs to revise its methodology for accession negotiations, as the current format, in her words, should not be based on the principle of “shut up and listen.”
Siljanovska-Davkova emphasized that North Macedonia does not accept such an approach to dialogue with the EU. According to her, the negotiation process should be based on equality, respect, and clear criteria, rather than on political demands that go beyond the classic conditions for accession.
The criticism came amid a protracted deadlock in North Macedonia’s European integration. The country received candidate status back in 2005, but its path to the EU was blocked for many years, first by a dispute with Greece over the country’s name, and then by disagreements with Bulgaria regarding history, language, and the rights of the Bulgarian minority.
Following the 2018 Prespa Agreement, the country changed its name from Macedonia to North Macedonia, which paved the way for NATO accession and was intended to accelerate European integration. However, the negotiation process later stalled again due to demands related to the inclusion of Bulgarians in the country’s constitution.
In 2022, the EU agreed on the so-called French proposal, which was intended to lift the Bulgarian veto and unblock the negotiations. However, in Skopje, this formula sparked heated political controversy: some political forces believe that bilateral historical and identity issues should not become part of European criteria.
Siljanovska-Davkova has previously criticized the EU’s approach, stating that enlargement must return to the Copenhagen criteria, the principles of meritocracy, reforms, and the rule of law, rather than depend on additional bilateral requirements.
Formally, the country remains on the European path; however, without constitutional changes and a political compromise with Bulgaria, the opening and advancement of negotiation chapters remain complicated.
Currently, the official candidate countries for EU membership are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Kosovo is viewed by the EU as a potential candidate, but its status is complicated by the fact that five EU member states do not recognize Kosovo’s independence.
Turkey’s history shows that candidate status alone does not guarantee accession.
Turkey applied for membership in the then-European Economic Community as far back as 1987, received candidate status in 1999, and accession negotiations began in 2005.
However, Turkey’s negotiations with the EU have effectively reached an impasse and have not progressed for many years. The main reasons are the EU’s concerns regarding the state of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and media freedom, as well as political disagreements with certain EU member states. While Turkey formally remains a candidate country, its EU membership is not considered a realistic scenario in the near future.
For North Macedonia and other candidate countries, the Turkish example serves as a reminder that the accession process can take decades. Therefore, Skopje is pushing for a more predictable and politically balanced methodology, under which progress toward the EU would depend primarily on reforms rather than on new bilateral blockages.
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