According to “Serbian Economist”, the Vetëvendosje movement led by incumbent Prime Minister Albin Kurti came in first in Kosovo’s early parliamentary elections, but failed to secure an outright majority in the 120-seat parliament.
According to Kosovo’s Central Election Commission, Vetëvendosje received 47.13% of the vote and won 53 seats. At least 61 seats are needed to form a government.
The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) came in second with 19.44% and 22 seats. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) received 16.69% and 18 seats, while the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) received 6.74% and 7 seats.
Of the 20 seats reserved for national minorities, the Serbian List won 9 seats. The Democratic Turkish Party of Kosovo won 2 seats, with the remaining minority seats distributed among other political forces.
For Kurti, the result looks like a victory, but not a way out of the political impasse. His party remains the largest political force, but to form a stable government, it will need the support of minority parties or broader agreements. The issue of electing a president remains particularly complex, as the first rounds require the presence of at least 80 deputies.
It was precisely the presidential issue that triggered the current crisis. After the previous elections, the parties were unable to agree on a presidential candidate, parliament was dissolved, and Kosovo held yet another early election. This is already the third parliamentary election in less than a year and a half.
This sends an important signal to the region’s economy. Prolonged political instability in Pristina hinders the work of institutions, complicates access to international funds, and impedes progress toward EU and NATO membership. For Serbia, the key issue remains not only the composition of the new government but also whether Pristina will be ready for substantive dialogue on northern Kosovo, Serbian municipalities, trade, and security.
For Belgrade, Kurti’s victory means the continuation of a hardline political stance in Pristina. It was under his government that relations with Serbia remained tense, and the Kosovar authorities’ actions in the north provoked a sharp reaction from the Serbian side and criticism from some Western partners.
From an economic standpoint, the continuation of the crisis in Kosovo is detrimental to the entire region. Instability reduces predictability for investors, complicates transport and trade links, hinders infrastructure projects, and creates political risk for companies operating between Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and the EU.
Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, but Belgrade does not recognize this status and considers Kosovo and Metohija to be part of its territory. Kosovo has been recognized by the United States and most EU countries, but it is not a member of the UN due to the position of Serbia and its allies, notably Russia and China.
Kosovo’s independence is also not recognized by a number of major countries and EU member states, including Russia, China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Ukraine, Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and South Africa. Of the 27 EU countries, five do not recognize Kosovo: Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Cyprus.
According to “Serbian Economist”, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has effectively announced the start of a new election campaign, stating at a rally of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party in Belgrade that he will resign as head of state in a few weeks. Formally, this appears to be a resignation nearly a year before the end of his term, but politically, it is less about the end of the Vučić era and more about an attempt to relaunch it in a new configuration.
Speaking to supporters at the “Serbia—One Family” rally, Vučić stated that this was likely his last address to such a large gathering of citizens in his capacity as president of the republic. He emphasized that for 14 years he had “served Serbia” in various government positions—as deputy prime minister, prime minister, and president—and thanked his supporters for their backing during periods of political crisis.
The key moment of his speech was the announcement of his upcoming resignation. “These are my last days and last weeks as President of the Republic,” Vučić said, rejecting his opponents’ accusations that he intends to cling to power at any cost. At the same time, he immediately noted that he is not leaving politics: according to him, if the leadership of the Serbian Progressive Party deems it necessary, he will assist the ruling party in the upcoming elections.
It is precisely this combination—resignation plus participation in the campaign—that constitutes the main political message of the statement. Vučić is not simply cutting short his presidential term, but is shifting the crisis of legitimacy into the electoral arena. For him, this is a way to regain the initiative after a year and a half of protests that began following the tragedy at the train station in Novi Sad, where the collapse of a canopy became a symbol of the public’s grievances regarding corruption, the quality of public administration, and oversight of infrastructure projects.
The name Vucic has proposed for the list—“United Serbia”—is also no coincidence. It is intended to pit the ruling party not against individual opposition parties, but against the entire protest movement, primarily the student movement. This name incorporates a tactic typical of Vučić: to present the elections not as a competition of platforms, but as a referendum on stability, national unity, and the government’s ability to protect the country from chaos.
At the same time, Vučić clearly seeks to prevent the protest agenda from becoming the sole framework of the campaign. That is why, in his speech, socioeconomic promises took on almost as much importance as political statements. He promised that in two years, the average salary in Serbia would reach 1,400 euros and the average pension would reach 650 euros; he also announced additional support measures for low-income pensioners.
The economic portion of the speech serves several purposes at once. First, it is intended to steer the campaign back onto a track favorable to the government—growth in incomes, investments, infrastructure, and industrial development. Second, it is aimed at the most loyal segments of the electorate, primarily pensioners and workers in public-sector-dependent industries. Third, it allows Vučić to shift from a defensive stance on the issues of corruption and protests to an offensive agenda focused on “future development.”
Separately, Vučić emphasized technological modernization, energy, and defense. He spoke about robot manufacturing, data centers, gas-fired power plants, hydropower, and even future small- and large-scale nuclear power facilities. This segment is aimed at a different audience—those who see Serbia as a regional industrial and technological hub.
However, the president’s early resignation also carries risks for Vučić. If he does indeed resign in the coming weeks, Serbia will enter a period of accelerated institutional procedures. Presidential elections must be held within a limited timeframe, and holding early parliamentary elections will require a separate decision to dissolve parliament. This means that the government is taking on the responsibility of drastically compressing the political calendar and conducting a campaign amid high levels of polarization.
At Kyiv University of Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, a discussion has arisen ahead of the rector election regarding a possible change to the university’s management model and the creation of a new position of university president, according to the Anti-Corruption Business Front (ACBF).
According to the public organization “Anti-Corruption Business Front” and Ukrainian media, the election for rector of the Kyiv University of Law of the NAS of Ukraine is scheduled to take place on July 2, 2026. The current rector, Yuriy Boshitsky, has led the university for more than two decades, and after completing his second term, his powers were extended by a decision of the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine for the duration of martial law.
The authors of the article note that, on the eve of the election, the position of university president appeared in the draft of the new charter of the State University of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. It is precisely this, in their opinion, that raises the question: Is an additional center of influence being formed at the university alongside the future rector?
According to the publication, the draft charter stipulates that the university president may participate in shaping the institution’s development strategy, coordinate the activities of separate structural units, participate in property management matters, represent the university in the sphere of international cooperation, and serve ex officio on the academic council.
The media, citing the APF, note that the position of university president is not prohibited in and of itself and may serve a representative or advisory role at various institutions. However, risks arise if such a position is granted actual managerial authority and can influence the institution’s strategy, assets, international relations, and internal policies.
The reports also state that the revised charter was approved at general staff meetings concurrently with the nomination of Sergey Matveev, vice rector for academic affairs, for the position of rector. The authors of the publication emphasize that the candidate’s participation in the election is not in itself a violation; however, combined with the creation of the position of university president, this raises questions about the competitiveness of the election and the genuine renewal of the university’s leadership.
A separate section of the publication is devoted to the Rivne Institute of the State University under the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The article discusses the need to investigate the use of the premises of this separate unit of the state university, including the grounds for the possible use of certain areas for purposes other than the educational process. The APF emphasizes that these facts require investigation and does not claim that they have been proven.
The civil society activists’ publications also mention criminal proceedings registered in 2024 on grounds of abuse of power or official position. According to APF, there is no information in open sources regarding anyone being notified of suspicion or the conclusion of the investigation.
The authors of the article believe that the situation at the Kyiv University of Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine is significant not only for this single educational institution, as it touches on the broader issues of leadership turnover at state universities, transparency in asset management, the role of the founding body, and the limits of university autonomy.
For the higher education system, this story could serve as a test case: can a state university’s charter establish an administrative position that effectively influences key decisions but is not subject to the rector’s election procedure and does not fall under the same term limits for holding a leadership position?
The Kyiv University of Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine was established in 1995 on the basis of the V.M. Koretsky Institute of State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The university is a state institution of higher education subordinate to the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and specializes in training professionals in the fields of law and international law.
Source:
https://apf.org.ua/yak-u-kyivskomu-universyteti-prava-mozhe-narodytysia-novyi-tsentr-vlady/
https://lenta.ua/yak-u-kiyivskomu-universiteti-prava-mozhe-naroditisya-noviy-tsentr-vladi-194784/
ADMINISTRATION, Boshitsky, CHARTER, ELECTIONS, NAS, rector, State University of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, UNIVERSITY
According to Serbian Economist, Kosovo held early parliamentary elections—the third in less than a year and a half. According to preliminary results, Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s Vetëvendosje movement once again took first place, garnering about 43% of the vote.
In second place is the Democratic Party of Kosovo with approximately 21%, followed by the Democratic League of Kosovo with about 18%. The “Serbian List,” the main party of Kosovo Serbs, received about 6.4% of the vote, according to Democracy in Action projections. Voter turnout was low—less than 37%—indicating voter fatigue from constant elections and a protracted political crisis.
The main problem for Kurti is that his victory does not give him a stable majority. To form a government, he will again have to seek partners or negotiate with the opposition. Therefore, the elections may not resolve the main issue—the creation of stable institutions and a way out of the political impasse.
For Serbia, these elections are important primarily because of Kurti’s stance on the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. His party traditionally takes a hard line and is not prepared to make significant concessions to Serbia. This means that rapid progress in EU-mediated negotiations is unlikely.
A separate issue is the representation of the Serbian community. If the “Serbian List” maintains its dominance among Serbian parties, Belgrade will continue to have an important political channel of influence in northern Kosovo and within Pristina’s institutions. But given Kurti’s hardline stance, this is unlikely to quickly reduce tensions.
For the region, this is also an economic issue. Political instability in Pristina is hindering reforms, obstructing access to international financing, and complicating the European agenda. And for Serbia, there remains an additional pressure from Brussels, which will continue to link Belgrade’s progress toward the EU with the normalization of relations with Pristina.
It is also important to keep the international context in mind. Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, but its statehood remains partially recognized. Kosovo is not a member of the UN. Many countries do not recognize Kosovo’s independence, including Serbia, Russia, China, Ukraine, and Spain.
Therefore, the new elections in Pristina are not just a matter of Kosovo’s domestic politics. They are part of a broader Balkan issue where the interests of Serbia, the EU, the US, Russia, China, and countries that do not recognize Kosovo’s independence intersect.
https://t.me/relocationrs/2984
The nationalist Scottish National Party (SNP), which advocates for Scotland’s independence from the United Kingdom, won the Scottish elections, securing 58 seats.
This was reported on the official website of the Scottish Parliament on Saturday.
The Reform UK party has 17 members of parliament, the Scottish Labour Party has 17 members, the Scottish Green Party has 15 members; the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party has 12 members; and the Scottish Liberal Democrats have 10 members of parliament
A majority requires 65 seats, but the SNP may form a coalition.
The 2026 local elections in Scotland (and across the UK), held in early May, ended in a significant defeat for Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s ruling Labour Party. The populist Reform UK party, led by Nigel Farage, achieved significant success, winning over 300 seats and setting a record.
The elections took place on May 7, 2026, and also covered England and Wales.
According to the “Serbian Economist,” the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina has scheduled general elections for October 4, 2026, the country’s election commission reports.
About 3.3 million registered voters will be called upon to elect the new composition of the country’s highest authorities at several levels. Voting will take place for members of the collective Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, deputies to the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, the president and vice presidents of the Republika Srpska, as well as cantonal assemblies within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The elections will traditionally be one of the key political events in the region, as Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a state with a complex system of governance, where a significant portion of decisions depends on the balance between Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, as well as on relations between the two entities.
At the state level, citizens elect three members of the BiH Presidency: one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb. The Bosniak and Croat members are elected within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Serb member of the Presidency is elected within the Republika Srpska. At the same time, a state-wide parliament is formed, upon which the work of the BiH Council of Ministers depends.
The elections will take place against the backdrop of ongoing political tensions in the country. In recent years, the Republika Srpska has remained the center of conflicts between the entity’s authorities, BiH state institutions, and the international community. Reuters previously noted that the leadership of the Republika Srpska had been pushing a separatist agenda, which hindered the implementation of reforms and the work of state-level institutions.
For the region, the election results will be significant in terms of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s stability, its European integration, relations with Serbia and Croatia, as well as the role of international institutions that continue to participate in supporting the Dayton system.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is structured as a complex state established following the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. The country consists of two main entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, as well as the separate Brčko District with special status. The Federation of BiH, where the majority of the population consists of Bosniaks and Croats, is further divided into 10 cantons with their own authorities. The Republika Srpska has its own government, parliament, and president. The Brčko District formally belongs to both entities but effectively functions as a separate self-governing administrative unit under the sovereignty of BiH.
This system makes BiH one of the most complex countries in Europe in terms of governance. In practice, power is distributed among the state level, the entities, the cantons, and the Brčko District. Therefore, elections in the country are not only a contest between parties but also a test of the balance between different ethnic communities, levels of government, and foreign policy orientations.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Election Commission, ELECTIONS
