Former Brazilian presidential candidate and Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, who lost the second round of the presidential election to incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, arrived in the United States and declared himself the country’s legitimately elected president. The politician subsequently revised his statement, calling himself the “leader of Brazil,” but continued to refuse to recognize the voting results, Reuters reported.
Bolsonaro arrived in Miami on October 28 aboard a private plane with his wife and two daughters. After the second round of the election on October 25, he left Brazil, first crossing the land border into Argentina and then flying to the United States via Ecuador.
In an open letter published on the social network X, Bolsonaro initially described himself as the “true elected president of Brazil.” However, some time later, he deleted the original version and published a new document, replacing that wording with “leader of Brazil.”
The politician claimed that he had become a victim of alleged fraud in the presidential election and political persecution by the Brazilian authorities. However, he did not present evidence of large-scale irregularities capable of changing the voting results.
In his statement, Bolsonaro also thanked US President Donald Trump for allowing him to enter the country and Argentine President Javier Milei for his assistance during the trip.
The US administration had previously authorized Bolsonaro and his family members to enter the United States. Trump himself, commenting on the Brazilian politician’s statement, declined to assess his claim to the presidency but again described the election as strange.
According to the official results of Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE), published on October 26, Lula da Silva won the second round with 64,256,232 votes, or 51.79%. Flávio Bolsonaro received 59,826,041 votes, or 48.21%.
The difference between the candidates amounted to 4.43 million votes.
The voting results were recognized by Brazilian electoral authorities, international observers and the leadership of the Liberal Party, under whose banner Bolsonaro ran.
One of the losing candidate’s arguments concerned the decision by Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court to extend polling station hours by two hours. However, according to an analysis of electoral authorities’ data, fewer than 35,000 votes were cast during the additional period, significantly fewer than the final margin between the candidates.
Bolsonaro’s departure came amid an investigation into the politician on suspicion of money laundering. The Supreme Federal Court had previously ordered him to surrender his passports, but the senator left the country without complying with the order. Bolsonaro himself denies allegations of unlawful conduct and claims that he left to protect his family. In the published letter, he also stated that he intends to continue his political activities and lead the opposition from abroad.
The situation could further complicate relations between Brazil and the United States. Lula had previously accused Washington of supporting the Bolsonaro family, while the US administration rejected accusations of interfering in Brazil’s internal affairs.
According to political analysts, Bolsonaro’s presence in the United States could create new opportunities for the international activities of his supporters, but at the same time complicate the management of the opposition movement within Brazil.
Despite the defeat in the presidential election, conservative political forces significantly strengthened their representation in the National Congress, which will preserve their influence over legislative activity and economic policy during the next presidential term.
Flávio Bolsonaro is the eldest son of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, who led the country from 2019 to 2022. Jair Bolsonaro is serving a 27-year prison sentence in a case involving an attempted coup d’état following his defeat in the 2022 election.
The victory of the opposition “Student List” in Serbia’s snap parliamentary elections on October 25, 2026, opens up the prospect of a change of government after 14 years of dominance by the political force of Aleksandar Vučić. However, as analyzed by the Serbian business publication Parametar, a fundamental change in Belgrade’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war may not occur in the near future: the student movement supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity but has simultaneously declared its intention to maintain Serbia’s refusal to impose sanctions against Russia.
According to preliminary data from the research organizations Ipsos and CeSID, the “Students Are Winning” list received approximately 52% of the vote and can expect to secure 138 of the 250 parliamentary seats. The political bloc “Aleksandar Vučić — United Serbia” won 39.3% of the vote, corresponding to approximately 104 seats.
On the evening of October 25, Aleksandar Vučić acknowledged the defeat of his bloc, stating that the student movement would receive between 135 and 140 seats in parliament, while his political force would obtain around 105.
A total of 126 parliamentary seats is required to independently form a parliamentary majority. Thus, if the preliminary results are confirmed, the student movement will be able to form a new government without the participation of the previous ruling coalition.
The final election results must be approved by Serbia’s Republic Electoral Commission.
As previously analyzed by the Serbian business portal Parametar, the main distinguishing feature of the 2026 elections was the transformation of the student protest movement into an independent political force capable of competing with the Serbian Progressive Party. In an article published on October 6, the outlet noted that the struggle for power had effectively become concentrated between the two largest blocs, while the traditional opposition had been pushed into the background.
At the same time, the key issues facing the future government will include not only the fight against corruption and the reform of state institutions but also relations with the European Union, Russia, China, and neighboring Balkan countries.
Despite its opposition to Vučić, the student movement does not advocate an immediate severing of Serbia’s political and economic relations with Russia.
On September 30, 2026, representatives of the “Students in Blockade” movement published a statement on foreign policy and sanctions, confirming their intention to maintain Serbia’s refusal to introduce restrictive measures against the Russian Federation.
The movement explained its position by citing its negative attitude toward sanctions as an instrument for resolving international conflicts, referring, among other things, to Serbia’s own historical experience and the consequences of sanctions policies for the population. Thus, on one of the most sensitive issues for Ukraine, the position of the future parliamentary force practically coincides with the policy of the previous Serbian authorities.
At the same time, the political program of the “Student List” provides for respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
As reported on October 24 by the European publication The New Union Post, citing the movement’s program, the students support maintaining the policy of not joining sanctions against Russia while simultaneously recognizing Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
This means that the movement does not propose revising Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders but also does not intend to automatically join the European Union’s sanctions policy.
At the same time, the students’ political platform brings together people with different views, including supporters of European integration and more conservative groups.
According to an assessment published on October 21 by the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), the student movement has focused primarily on domestic reforms, the fight against corruption, and restoring the independence of state institutions, while avoiding a detailed definition of its foreign policy course.
Therefore, the new government’s eventual policy toward Ukraine and Russia will depend on its personnel composition, the distribution of powers, and decisions made after the formation of the cabinet.
For Ukraine, the movement’s victory creates opportunities to renew bilateral political dialogue, but in itself does not guarantee a change in Serbia’s position on sanctions against Russia.
Under Aleksandar Vučić, Belgrade pursued a policy of balancing between Moscow, Brussels, and Kyiv.
Serbia officially supported Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, provided humanitarian assistance, participated in certain international initiatives, and maintained diplomatic contacts with the Ukrainian leadership. At the same time, the country refused to join most Western sanctions against Russia, continuing to maintain economic and energy ties with Moscow.
In August 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Belgrade, where he held talks with the Serbian leadership. Following the meetings, the parties reaffirmed mutual respect for territorial integrity and their interest in developing economic cooperation.
Ukraine’s position on Kosovo remains an important factor. Kyiv does not recognize its independence, which creates a certain basis for mutual understanding between the two countries on issues of international law and the inviolability of borders.
This position may also be preserved under the new government, since the student movement likewise opposes recognizing Kosovo’s independence.
At the same time, the lack of an intention to impose sanctions against Russia limits the possibilities for a rapid convergence of Kyiv’s and Belgrade’s foreign policy positions.
One possible change could be more active cooperation on European integration, democratic reforms, and the restoration of state institutions.
Representatives of the student movement have repeatedly emphasized the need to strengthen the rule of law, judicial independence, and the fight against corruption.
If the future cabinet intensifies negotiations on Serbia’s accession to the EU, Belgrade will inevitably face the question of more fully aligning its foreign policy with that of Europe, including its approach to sanctions against Russia.
However, to date, the student movement has not declared its readiness to change its position on this issue.
From an economic perspective, a change of government in Serbia could open up additional opportunities for cooperation with Ukraine in industry, construction, energy, agriculture, and information technology.
One potential area remains the participation of Serbian companies in the reconstruction of Ukrainian infrastructure after the war.
Serbia has construction, mechanical engineering, metallurgical, and electrical engineering enterprises whose products could be used in the reconstruction of Ukraine’s energy facilities, transport infrastructure, and industrial enterprises.
Ukrainian businesses, in turn, may be interested in expanding their presence in the Serbian market, developing joint production facilities, and using Serbia as a logistics and investment destination in the Western Balkans.
Additional prospects are associated with the agro-industrial sector, food processing, pharmaceuticals, and technology services.
At the same time, the implementation of such projects will depend on the economic policy of the new government and the willingness of both countries to create practical mechanisms to support bilateral business activities.
As Parametar noted in an analytical article dated September 28, 2026, one of the main problems of the Serbian economy remains its dependence on foreign investment and large state infrastructure programs.
According to data cited by the publication with reference to the National Bank of Serbia, the inflow of foreign direct investment in 2025 decreased by 33.5%, from a record €5.23 billion to €3.48 billion.
Against this background, one of the new government’s primary challenges will be restoring investor confidence and ensuring the predictability of state economic policy.
If institutional reforms are successfully implemented, Serbia could become a more attractive partner for Ukrainian companies interested in operating in the markets of Southeastern Europe.
Thus, the victory of the student movement could contribute to the development of Ukrainian-Serbian relations primarily through economic cooperation, European integration, and institutional reforms.
However, there are currently no grounds to expect Belgrade to automatically shift toward a tougher policy on Russia. The movement’s official position combines recognition of Ukraine’s territorial integrity with a refusal to impose sanctions against Moscow.
The decisive factors will be the new government’s first foreign policy decisions, its personnel composition, and its willingness to develop practical cooperation with Kyiv.
The “Student List” emerged from mass protests that began after the collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad on November 1, 2024, which killed 16 people. The movement’s main demands were an investigation into the tragedy, the fight against corruption, the independence of state institutions, and the holding of early parliamentary elections.
Source: Parametar
As the Serbian portal Parametar reports in its article, two weeks before the snap parliamentary elections on October 25 in Serbia, published opinion polls continue to show sharply differing pictures of support for the two largest forces — the “Aleksandar Vučić – United Serbia” list and “Students Win”.
The most recent Faktor Plus poll, conducted on September 16–20 with a sample of 986 people, gives Vučić’s list 48.6% and the student list 37.1%. The gap amounts to 11.5 percentage points. In the same survey, Ivica Dačić’s Socialists receive 4.9%, while “European Serbia” receives 3.6%.
However, the NSPM poll published on September 30 shows almost the opposite situation: “Students Win” – 44.4%, “United Serbia” – 41.7%. Moreover, in the previous measurement by the same organization, the figures were 39.6% and 37.5%, respectively.
Thus, the difference between the two latest publicly available surveys is fundamental: one gives the authorities a lead of more than 11 points, while the other gives the students a lead of almost 3 points.
At the same time, the dynamics within the polls themselves are also interesting. At the beginning of September, Faktor Plus estimated Vučić’s list at 47.2% and the students at 31.5%. Just a few weeks later, the students’ figure rose to 37.1%, that is, by 5.6 percentage points, while Vučić’s list gained only 1.4 percentage points.
A separate June survey by CRTA and the Stanford Democracy Action Lab also showed a high degree of political polarization. It recorded significant differences in the views of supporters of the student list and the SNS and confirmed that Serbian society is increasingly dividing into two large political camps.
It is noteworthy that sociologists themselves are now cautious about attempts to determine the exact balance of support. Faktor Plus representative Vladimir Pajić stated on October 1 that the only thing that can be considered sufficiently probable based on the survey data is high voter turnout.
Turnout itself may become one of the key factors on October 25. In the September Faktor Plus survey, 64% of respondents said they would definitely vote, while another 11% were undecided. Among those intending to participate in the elections, 69% already knew exactly whom they would vote for.
Against this background, the campaign is increasingly resembling a referendum between the two largest blocs. Even NSPM researcher Đorđe Vukadinović explicitly spoke of the approaching “referendum atmosphere,” in which the space for third forces is noticeably narrowing.
There will be 18 parties on the ballot on October 25, but the actual struggle for the majority of votes is increasingly concentrated around the two largest political projects.
Source: Parametar, NSPM, CRTA.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced the dissolution of parliament and the holding of early parliamentary elections on November 29, 2026, after a fragmented parliament blocked a number of key government initiatives, including measures to combat the housing crisis.
On October 5, Sánchez announced the convening of an extraordinary cabinet meeting to initiate the procedure for dissolving parliament. The early election will take place nearly a year ahead of schedule.
The decision was made following yet another escalation of the housing crisis in Spain. Last week, parliament rejected the government’s proposed housing measures, and on October 3, tens of thousands of people took to the streets in protests across approximately 50 cities nationwide.
In Madrid alone, according to Reuters, about 70,000 people took part in the demonstrations. Protesters demanded tougher measures against rising rents, evictions, and the shortage of affordable housing. Protests also took place in Valencia and other major cities.
The housing crisis in Spain has worsened in recent years amid rapidly rising prices, insufficient supply of new housing, and high rental costs in major cities and tourist regions.
According to the latest Eurostat data, published on October 1, 2026, residential real estate prices in Spain rose by 12.1% in the second quarter compared to the second quarter of 2025. By comparison, housing prices across the European Union rose by an average of 4.7% during this period, and by 4% in the eurozone. Thus, the rate of price growth in Spain is more than double the European average.
Moreover, prices continue to rise on a quarterly basis: in the second quarter, prices in Spain rose by another 3.4% compared to the first quarter of 2026. In the first quarter, the annual growth rate was 12.8%.
High growth rates are also being seen in the resale market. According to indices published in early October by Spain’s largest real estate portals, the average price of resale housing continued to grow at double-digit rates in the third quarter. According to Idealista, prices rose by 11.8% year-over-year—to 2,930 euros per square meter—while Fotocasa estimates annual growth at 13.8% and the average price at approximately 3,140 euros per square meter.
At the same time, the situation is complicated by lending conditions. The Bank of Spain reported in July that in the second quarter of 2026, banks tightened lending conditions, and public demand for mortgage loans declined. Banks also expected lending conditions to tighten further in the third quarter.
Consequently, the housing issue has evolved from a primarily social and economic problem into one of the central factors on the Spanish political agenda. The rapid rise in real estate prices, the shortage of affordable housing, the situation in the rental market, and mass protests increased pressure on the government at a time when Sánchez’s cabinet was already struggling to pass bills in parliament.
Early parliamentary elections in Spain are scheduled for November 29, 2026.
According to The Serbian Economist, Kosovo is heading toward a new political crisis: if the parliament fails to elect a president by October 6, the Assembly will be dissolved, and the region will once again hold early parliamentary elections—the fourth in less than two years.
This time, the presidential crisis is directly linked to the trial of former leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in The Hague. According to a ruling by the Constitutional Court, the deadline for electing a new president expires on October 6. If the vote fails, parliament will be dissolved, and new elections must be held within 45 days—that is, no later than November 15.
Over the past 18 months, voters in Kosovo have already cast ballots three times in parliamentary elections—on February 9, 2025, December 28, 2025, and June 7, 2026.
The situation seems almost paradoxical: it was only on September 13 that Parliament finally approved Albin Kurti’s new government following the June elections. Sixty-two out of 120 lawmakers voted in favor of the government. But they have not yet managed to resolve another key issue—the election of a president.
In September, the Kosovo Special Chambers in The Hague handed down first-instance verdicts against four former leaders of the Kosovo Election Commission—Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Redžep Selimi, and Jakup Krasniqi.
Following this, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), of which Thaçi is a co-founder, demanded changes to the law governing the Special Chambers.
In particular, the PDK is seeking to limit the court’s jurisdiction to investigating the crimes listed in Dick Marty’s report, as well as to introduce international oversight of its activities. It was precisely after the Hague verdict that the party sharply stepped up this initiative.
For Kurti, this is an extremely difficult situation: there is practically no time left before October 6.
The Serbian publication “Blic” calls what is happening a “dangerous game.” Analysts interviewed by the publication believe that the DPK is attempting both to change the rules governing the Hague Tribunal and to shift political responsibility for any potential new elections onto Kurti’s “Self-Determination” movement.
Belgrade does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, declared in 2008, and considers the territory to be part of Serbia.
Moreover, non-recognition of Kosovo is by no means solely a Serbian position. Kosovo’s independence remains unrecognized by Russia and China—two permanent members of the UN Security Council—which is one of the obstacles to Kosovo’s admission to the UN.
Kosovo is also not recognized by Spain, Ukraine, India, and other countries.
According to an overview article by the Serbian business publication Parametar, the campaign leading up to the general elections on October 4 is coming to a close in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The vote will determine not only the internal balance of power in one of Europe’s most complex countries in terms of its political structure, but also future relations between Banja Luka and Sarajevo, the position of the Republika Srpska, and the nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s interactions with Serbia, the EU, the U.S., and Russia.
There are 3,414,364 registered voters. They will elect three members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the State Parliament, the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, the president and vice presidents of the Republika Srpska, as well as the parliaments of the Federation’s ten cantons.
Current Prime Minister Savo Minic is running for the office of President of the Republika Srpska on behalf of the SNSD, while Branko Blanusa is the SDS’s lead candidate. Bogdan Jovanovic and independent candidate Marko Jorgic are also running.
Milorad Dodik’s name does not appear on the ballot, but he remains the leader of the SNSD and is actively participating in the party’s election campaign. RTS notes that Dodik’s political presence remains a key factor in the campaign in the Republika Srpska.
The race for the Serbian seat on the three-member Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina features incumbent Presidency member Želka Cvijanović of the SNSD, Marinko Božović of the SDS, and Nebojša Vukanović of the “List for Justice and Order.”
Another race of fundamental importance to the country’s political structure is the selection of the Croatian member of the Presidency. The HDZ BiH has nominated Dariana Filipović, the bloc of Croatian opposition parties supports Zdenko Lukić, and the Democratic Front supports Slaven Kovačević.
A dispute has been raging over this position for many years: Croatian parties are demanding a change to the election mechanism, arguing that the current system allows the more numerous Bosniak voters to influence who will represent the Croats. Opponents of changing the model cite the need to preserve the existing voting rights of Federation citizens.
Competing for the Bosniak seat are incumbent Presidium member Denis Bečirović, SDA leader Bakir Izetbegović, Semir Efendić, and Fahredin Radončić.
Another major experiment in these elections involves technology. For the first time on this scale, biometric voter identification and ballot scanning are being used. The Central Election Commission has purchased the necessary system for polling stations, and observers are closely monitoring how it handles the workload following years of disputes over election transparency.
As Parametar notes, Bosnia and Herzegovina effectively exists simultaneously on several political levels. Under the 1995 Dayton Agreement, the country consists of the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Brčko has special status. The Federation, in turn, is divided into ten cantons.
Above this structure are state-level institutions, notably the three-member Presidency. At the same time, the Republika Srpska and the Federation have their own parliaments, governments, and a wide range of powers.
There is also another level—international oversight.
BiH is sometimes referred to in the media as an international protectorate, but legally this is inaccurate. It is a sovereign state. Following the Dayton Accords, the position of High Representative of the international community was created; this official oversees the implementation of the peace agreement in the civilian sphere and is vested with exceptionally broad powers, known as the “Bonn Powers.” These powers allowed the High Representative to make decisions and remove politicians from office.
Therefore, the outcome on October 4 is of great significance far beyond the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will determine the balance of power between Banja Luka and Sarajevo, the composition of the country’s collective leadership, and the alignment of forces regarding further European integration; it will also serve as an indicator of how the Serb, Bosniak, and Croat political components of the complex Dayton system will interact following the elections.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dayton Agreement, ELECTIONS, Presidency, Republika Srpska
