Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced the dissolution of parliament and the holding of early parliamentary elections on November 29, 2026, after a fragmented parliament blocked a number of key government initiatives, including measures to combat the housing crisis.
On October 5, Sánchez announced the convening of an extraordinary cabinet meeting to initiate the procedure for dissolving parliament. The early election will take place nearly a year ahead of schedule.
The decision was made following yet another escalation of the housing crisis in Spain. Last week, parliament rejected the government’s proposed housing measures, and on October 3, tens of thousands of people took to the streets in protests across approximately 50 cities nationwide.
In Madrid alone, according to Reuters, about 70,000 people took part in the demonstrations. Protesters demanded tougher measures against rising rents, evictions, and the shortage of affordable housing. Protests also took place in Valencia and other major cities.
The housing crisis in Spain has worsened in recent years amid rapidly rising prices, insufficient supply of new housing, and high rental costs in major cities and tourist regions.
According to the latest Eurostat data, published on October 1, 2026, residential real estate prices in Spain rose by 12.1% in the second quarter compared to the second quarter of 2025. By comparison, housing prices across the European Union rose by an average of 4.7% during this period, and by 4% in the eurozone. Thus, the rate of price growth in Spain is more than double the European average.
Moreover, prices continue to rise on a quarterly basis: in the second quarter, prices in Spain rose by another 3.4% compared to the first quarter of 2026. In the first quarter, the annual growth rate was 12.8%.
High growth rates are also being seen in the resale market. According to indices published in early October by Spain’s largest real estate portals, the average price of resale housing continued to grow at double-digit rates in the third quarter. According to Idealista, prices rose by 11.8% year-over-year—to 2,930 euros per square meter—while Fotocasa estimates annual growth at 13.8% and the average price at approximately 3,140 euros per square meter.
At the same time, the situation is complicated by lending conditions. The Bank of Spain reported in July that in the second quarter of 2026, banks tightened lending conditions, and public demand for mortgage loans declined. Banks also expected lending conditions to tighten further in the third quarter.
Consequently, the housing issue has evolved from a primarily social and economic problem into one of the central factors on the Spanish political agenda. The rapid rise in real estate prices, the shortage of affordable housing, the situation in the rental market, and mass protests increased pressure on the government at a time when Sánchez’s cabinet was already struggling to pass bills in parliament.
Early parliamentary elections in Spain are scheduled for November 29, 2026.
According to The Serbian Economist, Kosovo is heading toward a new political crisis: if the parliament fails to elect a president by October 6, the Assembly will be dissolved, and the region will once again hold early parliamentary elections—the fourth in less than two years.
This time, the presidential crisis is directly linked to the trial of former leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in The Hague. According to a ruling by the Constitutional Court, the deadline for electing a new president expires on October 6. If the vote fails, parliament will be dissolved, and new elections must be held within 45 days—that is, no later than November 15.
Over the past 18 months, voters in Kosovo have already cast ballots three times in parliamentary elections—on February 9, 2025, December 28, 2025, and June 7, 2026.
The situation seems almost paradoxical: it was only on September 13 that Parliament finally approved Albin Kurti’s new government following the June elections. Sixty-two out of 120 lawmakers voted in favor of the government. But they have not yet managed to resolve another key issue—the election of a president.
In September, the Kosovo Special Chambers in The Hague handed down first-instance verdicts against four former leaders of the Kosovo Election Commission—Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Redžep Selimi, and Jakup Krasniqi.
Following this, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), of which Thaçi is a co-founder, demanded changes to the law governing the Special Chambers.
In particular, the PDK is seeking to limit the court’s jurisdiction to investigating the crimes listed in Dick Marty’s report, as well as to introduce international oversight of its activities. It was precisely after the Hague verdict that the party sharply stepped up this initiative.
For Kurti, this is an extremely difficult situation: there is practically no time left before October 6.
The Serbian publication “Blic” calls what is happening a “dangerous game.” Analysts interviewed by the publication believe that the DPK is attempting both to change the rules governing the Hague Tribunal and to shift political responsibility for any potential new elections onto Kurti’s “Self-Determination” movement.
Belgrade does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, declared in 2008, and considers the territory to be part of Serbia.
Moreover, non-recognition of Kosovo is by no means solely a Serbian position. Kosovo’s independence remains unrecognized by Russia and China—two permanent members of the UN Security Council—which is one of the obstacles to Kosovo’s admission to the UN.
Kosovo is also not recognized by Spain, Ukraine, India, and other countries.
According to an overview article by the Serbian business publication Parametar, the campaign leading up to the general elections on October 4 is coming to a close in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The vote will determine not only the internal balance of power in one of Europe’s most complex countries in terms of its political structure, but also future relations between Banja Luka and Sarajevo, the position of the Republika Srpska, and the nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s interactions with Serbia, the EU, the U.S., and Russia.
There are 3,414,364 registered voters. They will elect three members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the State Parliament, the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, the president and vice presidents of the Republika Srpska, as well as the parliaments of the Federation’s ten cantons.
Current Prime Minister Savo Minic is running for the office of President of the Republika Srpska on behalf of the SNSD, while Branko Blanusa is the SDS’s lead candidate. Bogdan Jovanovic and independent candidate Marko Jorgic are also running.
Milorad Dodik’s name does not appear on the ballot, but he remains the leader of the SNSD and is actively participating in the party’s election campaign. RTS notes that Dodik’s political presence remains a key factor in the campaign in the Republika Srpska.
The race for the Serbian seat on the three-member Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina features incumbent Presidency member Želka Cvijanović of the SNSD, Marinko Božović of the SDS, and Nebojša Vukanović of the “List for Justice and Order.”
Another race of fundamental importance to the country’s political structure is the selection of the Croatian member of the Presidency. The HDZ BiH has nominated Dariana Filipović, the bloc of Croatian opposition parties supports Zdenko Lukić, and the Democratic Front supports Slaven Kovačević.
A dispute has been raging over this position for many years: Croatian parties are demanding a change to the election mechanism, arguing that the current system allows the more numerous Bosniak voters to influence who will represent the Croats. Opponents of changing the model cite the need to preserve the existing voting rights of Federation citizens.
Competing for the Bosniak seat are incumbent Presidium member Denis Bečirović, SDA leader Bakir Izetbegović, Semir Efendić, and Fahredin Radončić.
Another major experiment in these elections involves technology. For the first time on this scale, biometric voter identification and ballot scanning are being used. The Central Election Commission has purchased the necessary system for polling stations, and observers are closely monitoring how it handles the workload following years of disputes over election transparency.
As Parametar notes, Bosnia and Herzegovina effectively exists simultaneously on several political levels. Under the 1995 Dayton Agreement, the country consists of the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Brčko has special status. The Federation, in turn, is divided into ten cantons.
Above this structure are state-level institutions, notably the three-member Presidency. At the same time, the Republika Srpska and the Federation have their own parliaments, governments, and a wide range of powers.
There is also another level—international oversight.
BiH is sometimes referred to in the media as an international protectorate, but legally this is inaccurate. It is a sovereign state. Following the Dayton Accords, the position of High Representative of the international community was created; this official oversees the implementation of the peace agreement in the civilian sphere and is vested with exceptionally broad powers, known as the “Bonn Powers.” These powers allowed the High Representative to make decisions and remove politicians from office.
Therefore, the outcome on October 4 is of great significance far beyond the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will determine the balance of power between Banja Luka and Sarajevo, the composition of the country’s collective leadership, and the alignment of forces regarding further European integration; it will also serve as an indicator of how the Serb, Bosniak, and Croat political components of the complex Dayton system will interact following the elections.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dayton Agreement, ELECTIONS, Presidency, Republika Srpska
Serbia’s presidential election may take place on December 13, 2026—this date is currently considered the most likely, according to the Serbian business news site Parametar, citing the Center for Local Self-Government (CLS).
According to the center, the presidential election would in that case be scheduled after the conclusion of the parliamentary election, and the campaign would last no more than 30 days.
However, the CLS emphasizes that a final decision has not yet been made and other options remain on the table.
Early presidential elections became necessary after Aleksandar Vučić resigned on September 27, ending his second presidential term early.
Ana Brnabić, Speaker of the National Assembly, has assumed the duties of acting president. Under Serbian law, the speaker of parliament may serve as acting head of state for no more than three months.
Following the early termination of the presidential term, an election must be held no later than three months thereafter. There must be no fewer than 30 and no more than 60 days between the official announcement of the election and Election Day.
Thus, the deadline for holding the presidential election is December 27, 2026; therefore, the date of December 13 cited by CLS falls within the timeframe prescribed by law.
Serbia’s political landscape now presents an unusual configuration. First, the country will hold early parliamentary elections, after which a new parliamentary composition is expected to take shape; then, Serbs will have to elect a new president.
Vucic himself stated after his resignation that he intends to participate in the parliamentary election campaign as an ordinary citizen.
Therefore, the December presidential election could become the second key vote for Serbia in less than two months and finally determine the new power structure following the conclusion of Vučić’s nine-year presidency.
The candidates for president have not yet been definitively determined.
Regional elections in Germany on September 20 demonstrated the weakening positions of traditional parties and the further fragmentation of the German electorate: Alternative for Germany (AfD) won in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, while in Berlin the Left took first place, according to an analysis by the Experts Club analytical center.
In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, AfD received 38.2% of the vote, compared with 16.7% in the previous elections in 2021. The Social Democratic Party of Germany received 35.5%, the Left — 6.5%, and the Greens — 5.7%. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democratic Union received 4.9% and, for the first time in history, failed to cross the five-percent threshold in a state election.
The CDU received 13.3% in the previous election in this state, meaning it lost more than 8 percentage points of support. According to the preliminary distribution of seats, AfD receives 32 seats, the SPD — 29, while the Left and the Greens receive five each. Since the other parliamentary forces rule out a coalition with AfD, the voting result alone does not determine the composition of the future state government.
In Berlin, the results demonstrated a different political configuration. The Left received 25.7% of the vote, compared with 12.2% in the previous election. The CDU came second with 18.8%, AfD received 16.3%, the Greens — 14.3%, and the SPD — 12.1%. The incumbent coalition of the CDU and the Social Democrats lost its parliamentary majority.
Experts Club points out that the September 20 results continued a trend that emerged at the beginning of the month. On September 6, AfD took first place in the election in Saxony-Anhalt with 43.8%, while the CDU received 17.2%. In 2021, the CDU had 37.1% in this state, while AfD had 20.8%.
Thus, according to Experts Club, the results of the September elections should not be reduced exclusively to a movement of the German electorate in a single ideological direction. In two eastern states, AfD received the greatest support, while in Berlin the Left strengthened significantly. This indicates that some voters of traditional parties are shifting toward different alternative political forces depending on the region and the structure of local problems.
According to Infratest dimap, in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern AfD managed to mobilize around 66,000 citizens who had previously not voted, as well as attract around 48,000 former SPD voters and approximately 32,000 former CDU supporters.
At the same time, the SPD’s result in this state is largely associated with the personal support enjoyed by Minister-President Manuela Schwesig. Almost half of Social Democratic voters surveyed after the election said that they would not have supported the party without her. This demonstrates the importance of the personal ratings of state-level politicians even when their parties have weaker positions at the federal level.
A separate problem for the CDU was voters’ perception of the party’s economic competence. Only 13% of respondents in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern named the CDU as the political force best able to solve economic problems. Some 89% of respondents also agreed with the statement that before the federal election the party had promised a great deal but delivered little. These results characterize one specific federal state and cannot automatically be applied to Germany as a whole.
In Berlin, one of the central factors of the campaign was the housing issue. The Left focused attention on rental costs, the shortage of affordable housing and regulation of the activities of large property owners. At the same time, migration and security remained among the important issues for AfD voters.
“These elections show not a linear movement of German society in one ideological direction, but a fragmentation of the electorate. In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, protest is concentrated around AfD, while in Berlin the Left became the main recipient of the protest vote and the vote of young urban residents. In other words, the common denominator is not ideology, but the declining ability of traditional parties to keep different groups of voters within the former model of the political center,” said sociologist and co-founder of the research company Active Group Oleksandr Poznii.
According to him, the mobilization of citizens who had not previously participated in elections is particularly illustrative. This may indicate not only a redistribution of the already established electorate, but also an expansion of the base of individual political forces.
Poznii also drew attention to the decline in confidence among some voters in the CDU’s traditional economic competence. In his view, for centrist parties the coming months will be associated primarily with the need to restore the confidence of different groups of voters, rather than only with personnel discussions.
Federal dynamics also demonstrate changes in party support. In the September ARD-DeutschlandTrend conducted by Infratest dimap from August 31 to September 2 among 1,319 voters, AfD was supported by 27% of respondents, the CDU/CSU by 21%, the Greens by 15%, the SPD by 13%, and the Left by 12%.
At the same time, state elections do not directly change the composition of Germany’s federal government or Berlin’s foreign policy. However, they influence the domestic political debate on the economy, budget spending, energy, migration and other issues.
The preliminary results of the elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin were released on the night of September 21. The final results are to be approved after the electoral records are checked.
The material was prepared on the basis of a study by the Experts Club analytical center, “AfD won in Mecklenburg, the Left in Berlin: regional elections increased pressure on Germany’s traditional parties,” published on September 21, 2026. Experts Club study on Experts.news
The Serbian business publication Parametar has prepared an interesting analysis of the parliamentary elections in Serbia. President Aleksandar Vučić has called for early parliamentary elections on October 25. Serbia has 250 parliamentary seats to fill, but in essence, the campaign is turning into a choice between preserving the current model of government and attempting a political reset.
The main favorite is the “Aleksandar Vučić—United Serbia” bloc centered around the SNS. Vucic himself is running as a candidate for prime minister. According to the Serbian media outlet Parametar, his campaign will focus on stability, infrastructure development, investment, economic growth, and the argument that the country must not return to a period of political instability.
For the first time, the main competitor is not a traditional party, but the Student List, which emerged from the protests following the tragedy in Novi Sad. Its main themes are corruption, government accountability, the independence of institutions, and bringing new people into politics. The movement’s slogans are as simple as possible: “Students Will Win” and “Either Serbia or the Mafia.”
Part of the opposition has already decided to support the students, but there will be no single anti-government list. Running separately are the pro-European “European Serbia,” the “People’s Serbia” bloc, Ivica Dačić’s Socialists, and several national-conservative and sovereigntist groups.
The campaigns of the two main power centers are also divided by fundamentally different emotional agendas. According to sociologist and co-founder of Active Group Aleksandar Pozniy, Vučić will build his campaign primarily around the theme of stability—reminding voters of economic growth, large-scale infrastructure projects, an influx of investment, and the overall progress Serbia has made in recent years. This strategy aims to convince voters that a change in government carries the risk of losing the country’s hard-won achievements. The Student List, on the other hand, will appeal to the long-standing demand for fighting corruption and reforming the political system, contrasting the current elite with new faces unaffiliated with traditional parties. Thus, the election may largely turn into a clash between two basic formulas—“stability and economic results” versus “a change in power and the cleansing of institutions.”
That is precisely why the key question will be what voters deem more important: preserving economic and political stability or the demand for profound systemic change.
Parties representing national minorities will traditionally form a separate segment. A special electoral system applies to minorities: they are not required to clear the general 3 percent threshold, and when seats are allocated, their results are adjusted using a special coefficient. At the start of the campaign, the Union of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM), the Bosnian parties SPP and SDA, representatives of the Albanian and Romani populations, and a number of small regional groups are expected to participate. Their composition may still change before the registration deadline.
Polling data so far is conflicting. Faktor Plus gives the SNS about 47% and the Students’ Party about 32%. An earlier CRTA poll showed the opposite picture—about 45% for the Students’ Party versus 36% for the SNS.
On international betting platforms, Vučić currently appears to be the clear favorite, but there is still a month and a half until the election, and the final list of candidates is still taking shape.
Read more at Parametar.rs.
