At Kyiv University of Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, a discussion has arisen ahead of the rector election regarding a possible change to the university’s management model and the creation of a new position of university president, according to the Anti-Corruption Business Front (ACBF).
According to the public organization “Anti-Corruption Business Front” and Ukrainian media, the election for rector of the Kyiv University of Law of the NAS of Ukraine is scheduled to take place on July 2, 2026. The current rector, Yuriy Boshitsky, has led the university for more than two decades, and after completing his second term, his powers were extended by a decision of the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine for the duration of martial law.
The authors of the article note that, on the eve of the election, the position of university president appeared in the draft of the new charter of the State University of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. It is precisely this, in their opinion, that raises the question: Is an additional center of influence being formed at the university alongside the future rector?
According to the publication, the draft charter stipulates that the university president may participate in shaping the institution’s development strategy, coordinate the activities of separate structural units, participate in property management matters, represent the university in the sphere of international cooperation, and serve ex officio on the academic council.
The media, citing the APF, note that the position of university president is not prohibited in and of itself and may serve a representative or advisory role at various institutions. However, risks arise if such a position is granted actual managerial authority and can influence the institution’s strategy, assets, international relations, and internal policies.
The reports also state that the revised charter was approved at general staff meetings concurrently with the nomination of Sergey Matveev, vice rector for academic affairs, for the position of rector. The authors of the publication emphasize that the candidate’s participation in the election is not in itself a violation; however, combined with the creation of the position of university president, this raises questions about the competitiveness of the election and the genuine renewal of the university’s leadership.
A separate section of the publication is devoted to the Rivne Institute of the State University under the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The article discusses the need to investigate the use of the premises of this separate unit of the state university, including the grounds for the possible use of certain areas for purposes other than the educational process. The APF emphasizes that these facts require investigation and does not claim that they have been proven.
The civil society activists’ publications also mention criminal proceedings registered in 2024 on grounds of abuse of power or official position. According to APF, there is no information in open sources regarding anyone being notified of suspicion or the conclusion of the investigation.
The authors of the article believe that the situation at the Kyiv University of Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine is significant not only for this single educational institution, as it touches on the broader issues of leadership turnover at state universities, transparency in asset management, the role of the founding body, and the limits of university autonomy.
For the higher education system, this story could serve as a test case: can a state university’s charter establish an administrative position that effectively influences key decisions but is not subject to the rector’s election procedure and does not fall under the same term limits for holding a leadership position?
The Kyiv University of Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine was established in 1995 on the basis of the V.M. Koretsky Institute of State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The university is a state institution of higher education subordinate to the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and specializes in training professionals in the fields of law and international law.
Source:
https://apf.org.ua/yak-u-kyivskomu-universyteti-prava-mozhe-narodytysia-novyi-tsentr-vlady/
https://lenta.ua/yak-u-kiyivskomu-universiteti-prava-mozhe-naroditisya-noviy-tsentr-vladi-194784/
ADMINISTRATION, Boshitsky, CHARTER, ELECTIONS, NAS, rector, State University of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, UNIVERSITY
According to Serbian Economist, Kosovo held early parliamentary elections—the third in less than a year and a half. According to preliminary results, Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s Vetëvendosje movement once again took first place, garnering about 43% of the vote.
In second place is the Democratic Party of Kosovo with approximately 21%, followed by the Democratic League of Kosovo with about 18%. The “Serbian List,” the main party of Kosovo Serbs, received about 6.4% of the vote, according to Democracy in Action projections. Voter turnout was low—less than 37%—indicating voter fatigue from constant elections and a protracted political crisis.
The main problem for Kurti is that his victory does not give him a stable majority. To form a government, he will again have to seek partners or negotiate with the opposition. Therefore, the elections may not resolve the main issue—the creation of stable institutions and a way out of the political impasse.
For Serbia, these elections are important primarily because of Kurti’s stance on the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. His party traditionally takes a hard line and is not prepared to make significant concessions to Serbia. This means that rapid progress in EU-mediated negotiations is unlikely.
A separate issue is the representation of the Serbian community. If the “Serbian List” maintains its dominance among Serbian parties, Belgrade will continue to have an important political channel of influence in northern Kosovo and within Pristina’s institutions. But given Kurti’s hardline stance, this is unlikely to quickly reduce tensions.
For the region, this is also an economic issue. Political instability in Pristina is hindering reforms, obstructing access to international financing, and complicating the European agenda. And for Serbia, there remains an additional pressure from Brussels, which will continue to link Belgrade’s progress toward the EU with the normalization of relations with Pristina.
It is also important to keep the international context in mind. Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, but its statehood remains partially recognized. Kosovo is not a member of the UN. Many countries do not recognize Kosovo’s independence, including Serbia, Russia, China, Ukraine, and Spain.
Therefore, the new elections in Pristina are not just a matter of Kosovo’s domestic politics. They are part of a broader Balkan issue where the interests of Serbia, the EU, the US, Russia, China, and countries that do not recognize Kosovo’s independence intersect.
https://t.me/relocationrs/2984
The nationalist Scottish National Party (SNP), which advocates for Scotland’s independence from the United Kingdom, won the Scottish elections, securing 58 seats.
This was reported on the official website of the Scottish Parliament on Saturday.
The Reform UK party has 17 members of parliament, the Scottish Labour Party has 17 members, the Scottish Green Party has 15 members; the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party has 12 members; and the Scottish Liberal Democrats have 10 members of parliament
A majority requires 65 seats, but the SNP may form a coalition.
The 2026 local elections in Scotland (and across the UK), held in early May, ended in a significant defeat for Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s ruling Labour Party. The populist Reform UK party, led by Nigel Farage, achieved significant success, winning over 300 seats and setting a record.
The elections took place on May 7, 2026, and also covered England and Wales.
According to the “Serbian Economist,” the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina has scheduled general elections for October 4, 2026, the country’s election commission reports.
About 3.3 million registered voters will be called upon to elect the new composition of the country’s highest authorities at several levels. Voting will take place for members of the collective Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, deputies to the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, the president and vice presidents of the Republika Srpska, as well as cantonal assemblies within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The elections will traditionally be one of the key political events in the region, as Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a state with a complex system of governance, where a significant portion of decisions depends on the balance between Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, as well as on relations between the two entities.
At the state level, citizens elect three members of the BiH Presidency: one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb. The Bosniak and Croat members are elected within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Serb member of the Presidency is elected within the Republika Srpska. At the same time, a state-wide parliament is formed, upon which the work of the BiH Council of Ministers depends.
The elections will take place against the backdrop of ongoing political tensions in the country. In recent years, the Republika Srpska has remained the center of conflicts between the entity’s authorities, BiH state institutions, and the international community. Reuters previously noted that the leadership of the Republika Srpska had been pushing a separatist agenda, which hindered the implementation of reforms and the work of state-level institutions.
For the region, the election results will be significant in terms of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s stability, its European integration, relations with Serbia and Croatia, as well as the role of international institutions that continue to participate in supporting the Dayton system.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is structured as a complex state established following the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. The country consists of two main entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, as well as the separate Brčko District with special status. The Federation of BiH, where the majority of the population consists of Bosniaks and Croats, is further divided into 10 cantons with their own authorities. The Republika Srpska has its own government, parliament, and president. The Brčko District formally belongs to both entities but effectively functions as a separate self-governing administrative unit under the sovereignty of BiH.
This system makes BiH one of the most complex countries in Europe in terms of governance. In practice, power is distributed among the state level, the entities, the cantons, and the Brčko District. Therefore, elections in the country are not only a contest between parties but also a test of the balance between different ethnic communities, levels of government, and foreign policy orientations.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Election Commission, ELECTIONS
According to the results of Bulgaria’s early parliamentary elections, the Progressive Bulgaria coalition, linked to former President Rumen Radev, came in first. According to Reuters, citing partial official results after 91.68% of ballots were counted, the coalition received 44.7% of the vote. GERB came in second with 13.4%, and Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria came in third with 13.2%.
According to data from Bulgarian agencies and exit polls, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms and Vazrazhdane also secured seats in parliament, while the BSP – United Left hovered around the threshold. Thus, the new composition of the National Assembly remains multiparty, though the winner secured a significantly stronger mandate than any party in recent elections.
The key issue now is the formation of a government. If Progressive Bulgaria secures a sufficient number of seats (which is highly likely), Bulgaria could see a single-party or dominant cabinet for the first time in a long while. If, however, it fails to secure a majority, the country faces negotiations on a coalition or external parliamentary support. This is particularly important after several years of political instability and frequent changes in government.
For Bulgaria’s economy, the election result is significant in terms of fiscal policy, infrastructure decisions, and managing the implications of the country’s entry into the eurozone on January 1, 2026. A strong government could theoretically accelerate decision-making on investments and reforms, but much will depend on how quickly the winner can translate electoral success into a functioning executive model.
For the region, the election results are significant due to Bulgaria’s role as a member of the EU and NATO, as well as a country in the Black Sea basin. Any changes in Sofia’s foreign policy could affect regional coordination on energy, security, and issues related to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
According to Serbian Economist, the Hungarian opposition’s victory in the parliamentary elections and the upcoming change of government in Budapest have added uncertainty to the deal regarding the exit of Russian shareholders from NIS (Naftna industrija Srbije)—the company that operates Serbia’s only oil refinery in Pančevo and, according to estimates, supplies about 80% of the country’s fuel needs.
This refers to negotiations regarding the acquisition by Hungary’s MOL of a 56.15% stake in NIS, which is owned by Gazprom entities (44.9% by Gazprom Neft and 11.3% by Gazprom). In January, MOL announced the signing of a Heads of Agreement regarding this deal, as well as that it is considering the participation of ADNOC (UAE) as a minority partner.
A key factor is the deadlines set by the U.S. OFAC. In March, MOL reported that it had received an extension from OFAC on its license to negotiate until May 22, 2026. At the same time, MOL is seeking extensions of specific permits allowing it to continue operations and import raw materials during the negotiations.
The issue of price remains sensitive: the terms of the deal have not been officially disclosed. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić previously mentioned a range of up to €1 billion for the 56.15% stake, while a number of media outlets and analytical publications cited higher estimates.
Why the Hungarian elections have become a risk factor
The deal itself is corporate in nature and requires regulatory approvals, specifically from OFAC and Serbia. However, the change in government in Hungary affects the political backdrop and the pace of decision-making. The new leader, Péter Magyar, has publicly stated his intention to form a government quickly (specifically citing May 5 as the start date), meaning just a few weeks before the May 22 deadline. In this scenario, any additional government-level reviews, disputes over the transparency of terms, or simply the restructuring of interagency coordination could cause delays.
The most likely baseline scenario is that the parties will try to meet the deadline or request an additional license extension from OFAC if they are close to the final closing. Market participants have already seen extensions in this situation.
The negative scenario is a protracted negotiation process without a clear resolution. In that case, the risks for NIS become not a legal abstraction but a matter of supply stability: the U.S. sanctions regime is specifically aimed at the exit of Russian majority owners, and any disruptions with licenses complicate the logistics and financing of raw material procurement and operations.
For Belgrade, this turns the issue into one of energy security. Serbian authorities have previously signaled their interest in increasing the state’s stake in NIS, and if the situation worsens, tougher decisions regarding the ownership structure may be necessary to remove the company from under sanctions pressure and prevent a shock to the fuel market.
https://t.me/relocationrs/2628
