Ukraine could become a European lion in terms of economic growth, but it must continue with the necessary reforms, emphasized International Monetary Fund Managing Director (IMF) Kristalina Georgieva during a discussion on the project “Ukraine: At the Forefront of the Future,” organized by the Victor Pinchuk Foundation in Davos on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum.
“Electricity and heating are still subsidized… We know why the country does this, but it needs to be eliminated. There is still work to be done in terms of the fiscal situation. We are currently looking at how to make the distribution of the tax burden more equitable. It’s not easy, but it needs to be done,” she said.
“I look back on my country’s history and can tell you that it was very painful. After the euphoria of the disappearance of communism came the harsh reality that economic recovery requires sacrifices. Therefore, this is the number one issue — unfinished business,” the IMF chief emphasized, recalling Bulgaria’s experience.
Georgieva noted that it is also necessary to remove all obstacles to the dynamism of the private sector, and drew particular attention to security and the availability of labor.
According to her, during a meeting with business leaders in Kyiv last week, some of them raised the issue of access to labor, which needs to be resolved, above the issue of security. The IMF chief said that the Fund is ready to assist with practical issues such as the return of Ukrainians home, solving the problem of structural unemployment, and integrating veterans.
She added that it is also incredibly important for Ukraine to complete its accession to the European Union within a reasonable time frame, because this is a magnet for the Ukrainian economy to fully integrate into Europe.
“Third, you must believe in yourself like a lion. So get up in the morning and roar. Confidence matters. And I tell you from my own experience, from Bulgaria’s experience, that it will not be easy. But if you have that confidence and you demonstrate it day after day, if you put aside internal disputes, if you bury corruption for good, of course you will succeed,” Georgieva summed up the tasks.
As for achievements, she noted that during the war, Ukraine managed to achieve better results in reforms than before the war, including eight reviews of the four-year extended financing program launched in the spring of 2023.
As reported, under the EFF program, the Ukrainian government has committed to adopting a roadmap for the gradual liberalization of the gas and electricity markets within six months after the end of martial law, with a time-bound implementation plan for the period after its repeal.
“Such a roadmap is also part of the EU-Ukraine Plan and will cover reforms of special obligations (PSO), plans for a gradual increase in tariffs/tariff methodology, mechanisms for resolving the debt problem, as well as a comprehensive scheme to protect the most vulnerable households,” the program stated.
In turn, the IMF noted in mid-2025 that gas and electricity tariffs for the population cover about half of the market price.
At the end of last year, Ukraine and the IMF reached a staff-level agreement (SLA) on a new four-year program, which could theoretically be reviewed by the Fund’s Board of Directors in February this year, according to Communications Director Julia Kozak.
From January 1, 2026, China has completely stopped purchasing electricity from Russia, including the minimum contractual volumes. The reason is related to prices: the export cost of supplies from Russia in 2026 for the first time exceeded domestic electricity tariffs in China, making imports uneconomic. In China, the price remains virtually unchanged and is estimated at about 350 yuan per 1 MWh.
The contract for electricity supplies to China was concluded in 2012 and is valid until 2037.
Earlier, Inter RAO had already recorded a reduction in electricity exports to China in 2025 amid supply constraints in Russia’s Far East region, Reuters reported.
Electricity production in Uzbekistan in 2025 amounted to 86.7 billion kWh, which is 6% more than a year earlier: in 2024, the country produced 81.5 billion kWh of electricity.
Of the total production, 16.8 billion kWh came from renewable energy sources — solar, wind, and hydroelectric power plants. This figure increased by 29% compared to 2024.
At the same time, electricity production by solar and wind power plants alone amounted to 10.5 billion kWh, an increase of 2.1 times. The development of renewable energy has saved 3.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas and prevented the emission of 4.7 million tons of harmful substances.
There are 148 power plants operating in the country with a total capacity of 25,797 MW, including thermal power plants and CHPs (17,551 MW), HPPs (2,441 MW), solar power plants (3,930 MW), wind power plants (1,652 MW), and block stations (223 MW). During the year, 42 new generation projects with a capacity of 4,647 MW were commissioned, including solar, wind, battery, thermal, hydro, and cogeneration facilities. At the same time, 11 substations with a capacity of 1,614 MVA and 420 km of power grids were commissioned, and construction began on 21 more projects with a total capacity of 3,508 MW.
New industrial facilities were launched: a plant producing 155 hydroelectric units per year in the Bostanlyk district, an enterprise producing 15,000 transformers per year in Angren, and the first national hydroelectric power plant with a capacity of 38 MW in the Namangan region, assembled entirely from local components.
Electricity supply reached 77.1 billion kWh (+14%), with the number of consumers exceeding 8.7 million. The installed capacity of small solar panels increased to 2 GW, and the volume of solar collectors to almost 5 million liters. Households and businesses were provided with subsidies for the installation of solar systems in the amount of 322.9 billion soums.
Thanks to the modernization of the networks, the electricity supply to more than 800,000 households in 954 mahallas has been improved, and energy-saving measures have saved 2.7 billion kWh of electricity and 2 billion cubic meters of gas. According to the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the introduction of new capacities has enabled the country to transition to net electricity exports: 2.6 billion kWh are planned to be sent to neighboring countries, which will help reduce energy risks in the region.
In December 2025, Ukraine significantly increased its electricity imports – by 54% compared to the previous month, to 639.5 thousand MWh, which was the highest figure since July 2024, the DIXI Group analytical center reported on its website on Wednesday, citing data from Energy Map.
“The increase in imports occurred against the backdrop of a deterioration in the power grid due to massive attacks by the Russian Federation on energy infrastructure and seasonal growth in consumption,” the center said.
During December, Russia carried out four massive attacks, targeting electricity generation, transmission, and distribution facilities. In particular, the attacks on December 6 and 23 led to a forced reduction in the generation of nuclear power plants, which provide more than half of Ukraine’s total electricity production. An additional factor contributing to the increased load on the power system was a significant drop in air temperature throughout the country, which led to an increase in energy consumption.
According to Energy Map, the increase in supply volumes was usually recorded the day after or two days after the shelling, during a period of reduced available generation and growing power shortages. Thus, after the attack on December 6, imports increased to 21.3 thousand MWh on December 7 (+18%) and to 32.6 thousand MWh on December 8 (+81%). A similar trend was observed after other massive strikes that took place on December 13, 23, and 27.
In December, Hungary accounted for the largest share of imports – 41%. Slovakia accounted for 21%, Romania and Poland for 18% each, and Moldova for 2%.
In December, the maximum transmission capacity of inter-state crossings for electricity imports increased from 2.1 GW to 2.3 GW. On average, the available transmission capacity was used at 37.4% during the month.
“Thus, December 2025 was the third consecutive month that Ukraine ended as a net importer of electricity,” DIXI Group emphasized.
On the other hand, Ukraine did not export electricity in December. The last time zero export volumes were recorded was in August 2024.
Ukraine currently imports electricity from Europe around the clock at a maximum capacity of 1.6 GW during peak hours, which does not cover the maximum allowable import capacity due to grid restrictions.
This was announced by Anatoliy Zamulko, acting head of the State Energy Supervision Inspectorate of Ukraine (Derzhenergonadzor), on Thursday during the “Yedyni Novyny” telethon.
“The peak part of imports, depending on the situation, is 1.5-1.6 thousand MW, which is not yet the limit allowed to us by contracts with Europe. The only problem that remains today is network restrictions to push that electricity to eastern Ukraine,” he said.
As reported, the maximum agreed commercial capacity for imports from the EU from December 2024 is 2.1 GW. On average, in November 2025, the utilization of transmission capacity was 27.4%, but during peak evening consumption hours, it increases significantly.
“If we had the opportunity to restore that network infrastructure more quickly, we would certainly have much better opportunities to provide energy through imports,” said the head of the State Energy Regulatory Commission.
As he explained, with the current drop in temperature and the onset of frost in Ukraine, there has been an increase in energy consumption. To balance the energy system, transmission system operators (TSOs, regional power companies) together with regional military administrations are freeing up additional capacity for consumers by including facilities that were not previously subject to disconnection in consumption restriction schedules.
“We are fighting to mitigate the drop in temperature in various ways, including one of the effective tools that will be used throughout Ukraine, which is to take into account the facilities that are to be included in the schedules and increase the fairness that is being talked about in terms of distribution,” Zamulko said.
He stressed that the Ukrainian energy sector continues to function as a single entity.
“We remain a unified energy system, working in parallel with Europe, carrying out all transfers in accordance with the agreements reached with our partners, using import capacities and, if necessary, using emergency assistance,” said the head of the State Energy Regulatory Commission.
Ukraine imports record amounts of electricity from the EU, but millions of consumers still sit without electricity for 12-16 hours or more. In other words, there are imports, but no electricity. This raises a logical question: where are the megawatts “lost”?
However, the paradox is easily explained: imports are not “light in the socket,” but only an additional source of power. For electricity to reach a particular neighborhood or building, highways, substations, and distribution networks must be operational—and that is where the biggest problems lie today.
The issue is further exacerbated by the fact that after large-scale shelling in early December, the capacity of nuclear power plants (which are the base generation of the Ukrainian power system) was reduced. According to the IAEA, damage to the networks led to the shutdown of some units or their transfer to reduced capacity. Therefore, the topic of imports has been discussed very actively at all levels recently.
November already showed a systemic gap. Electricity exports fell by 94% compared to October 2025, to 5.3 thousand MWh, and have virtually stopped since November 11. Recall that in October, Ukrainian electricity exports fell by 85% compared to September. Imports, on the contrary, increased by 17% to approximately 415,000 MWh, reaching their highest level since the beginning of the year.
Data for December is not yet available, but it is already clear that Ukraine remains a net importer of electricity for the second month in a row. The structure of supplies has changed somewhat: as in October, Hungary is the largest supplier (about 44%), but the shares of Slovakia (10 times) and Moldova (2 times) have increased significantly. At the same time, Poland and Romania have declined in the structure of electricity imports.
On December 1, the maximum available import cross-section was increased from 2.1 to 2.3 GW, but it should be noted that both figures are still more theoretical. After all, the average actual use of the cross-section in November was only about 27%, with peaks of up to 88% at certain hours.
In other words, the resource is there, but not always where and when it is needed. There are several main reasons why even the available electricity does not reach the end consumer.
The market responds to shortages with prices. In November 2025, the Ukrainian day-ahead market became one of the most expensive in Europe (with a price of around €140 per MWh), while in Sweden the price was around €36/MWh and in France, for example, €43/MWh.
This is not about the “greed” of sellers and suppliers, but about the lack of cheap domestic supply and network constraints.
The EU is increasing inter-state flows, which lowers prices and adds flexibility. In 2024, France increased its nuclear and hydroelectric power generation and became the largest net exporter in the region.
But even France’s record surplus is not an automatic “magic bullet” for Ukraine. The reason is asymmetry of time and place: surpluses often occur at times when we have a different load profile, and at nodes from which we cannot quickly “pump” megawatts.
Some EU countries also have electricity surpluses, especially during so-called solar and wind windows, and are also looking for places to sell their surpluses. But the same problems arise: complex logistics (both in the EU and in Ukraine) and load asymmetry.
In other words, imports can be very useful, but they should not be seen as a strategy to replace our own maneuverable capacity.
However, the current situation is not hopeless. Ukrenergo expects a gradual reduction in restrictions as damaged facilities are repaired and there are no new attacks.
The government is synchronizing restoration, construction of protective structures, creation of fuel reserves, and connection of cogeneration plants to the grid. This will add local capacity where it is most needed.
The effect of increasing the cross-section to 2.3 GW is there, but it is limited by internal nodes. The closest practical relief will come from connecting decentralized sources and restoring networks.
In the coming weeks, the focus will be on speed and accuracy. First of all, it is necessary to restore throughput capacity in critical corridors and key substations, where a single replacement of a transformer or circuit breaker returns tens of megawatts to the city.
Mobile substations, field crews, and “hot” equipment logistics are a matter of hours and days, not months.
At the same time, cogeneration, gas piston, and gas turbine units need to be connected to the grid in deficient nodes. Where “black holes” of evening peak demand appear on the map, local generation can “pick up” the load.
In the next few months, the transition to managed demand will become key. Industry and large commercial consumers are able to “smooth out” the load according to clear rules and compensation. This is not an abstraction: power restriction schedules (PRS) are already in place, but they need to be transformed into civilized DR (demand response) programs with a predictable effect.
It is also necessary to continue creating additional “west-east” corridors, additional switching nodes in the 330-750 kV network, and local reserves around megacities and large substations. Energy storage devices in large nodes support the system during 2-3 peak hours and reduce the duration of GPP.
In the long term, more game-changing capacity is needed. We need 3.5-4 GW of new decentralized maneuverable generation, as close to the consumer as possible. Gas installations, cogeneration clusters for heat and electricity, microgrids for critical areas — all this makes the system less dependent on one or two nodes.
Engineering logic must go hand in hand with institutional logic: transparent corporate governance, stable settlement rules, and rapid procurement of critical equipment. Without trust, there will be no funding; without funding, there will be no underground distribution points, reinforced intersections, or warehouses with backup transformers.
Don’t expect a magic button that will turn off the GPV overnight. A realistic scenario is a gradual reduction in the duration and severity of outages in regions where:
– at least part of the west-east trunk lines have been restored;
– local cogeneration/gas plants are connected;
– demand management programs for businesses are in place;
– critical infrastructure is provided with reserves.
This is a “mosaic of solutions”: each piece separately does not save the day, but together they have a tangible effect.
Imports with a potential of 2.3 GW may be a temporary salvation, but by no means a panacea. As long as high-voltage lines and power transmission nodes remain damaged, imported megawatts will not turn into light in homes.
The path to shorter outages lies in three quick actions:
At the same time, it is necessary to invest in our own maneuvering capacity and the development of central and local networks. Record imports are a symptom of an open wound. It is treated not with intersection figures, but with systematic rehabilitation of networks and a return of trust in the rules of the game.
Source: https://expertsclub.eu/analiz-potochnoyi-sytuacziyi-z-importom-elektroenergiyi-v-ukrayini/
