In January–April of this year, Ukraine reduced its imports of coke and semi-coke by 2.1% in volume terms compared to the same period last year, down to 251,317 thousand tons.
According to statistics released by the State Customs Service (SCS), 59,900 tons of coke were imported in April, 68,313 tons in March, and 54,408 tons in February.
Coke imports in monetary terms in January–April 2026 increased by 5.7% to $87.651 million. Coke was imported from Poland—accounting for 97.95% of shipments in monetary terms—the Czech Republic (1.63%), and Colombia (0.37%).
The country did not export any coke during the first four months of the year.
As reported, in 2025, Ukraine increased its imports of coke and semi-coke by 5.9% in volume terms compared to the previous year—to 700,650 thousand tons—and increased revenue by 1.4%—to $238.656 million. Coke was imported mainly from Poland (93.37% of shipments in monetary terms), Indonesia (4.01%), and the Czech Republic (2.59%).
In 2025, Ukraine exported 3 tons of coke worth $2,000 to Albania.
Additionally, it was reported that in January 2025, Metinvest suspended operations at the Pokrovsk Coal Group due to changes in the situation on the front lines, electricity shortages, and a deteriorating security situation.
Imports of insulated wires and cables, including fiber-optic cables, to Ukraine in January–April 2026 increased by 23.8% compared to the same period in 2025, reaching $220.8 million.
According to statistics from the State Customs Service, the largest suppliers of these products to Ukraine were China—$59 million, or 26.7% of total imports—Hungary—$57.7 million, or 27%—and Poland—$29.2 million, or 13.2%.
For comparison, in January–April 2025, imports from Hungary amounted to $51.7 million, from China—$36 million, and from Poland—$26 million.
As reported, according to the State Customs Service, in 2025 Ukraine increased imports of insulated wires and cables by 24.3% compared to 2024—to $590.7 million.
In January–April of this year, Ukraine reduced imports of aluminum ores and concentrates (bauxite) by 48.5% in volume terms compared to the same period last year—to 6,946 thousand tons from 13,494 thousand tons.
According to statistics released by the State Customs Service (SCS), bauxite imports in monetary terms decreased to $1.186 million from $1.476 million in January–April 2026.
Imports came from China (59.36% of shipments in monetary terms) and Turkey (40.64%).
Ukraine did not re-export bauxite in 2026, just as it did not in 2025.
As reported, in 2025, Ukraine increased imports of aluminum ores and concentrates by 23.7% in physical terms compared to the previous year—to 43.5 thousand tons—and by 15.8% in monetary terms—to $4.754 million. These imports came mainly from Turkey (81.84% of shipments in monetary terms), China (15.97%), and Guyana (2.19%).
Ukraine did not re-export bauxite in 2025, just as it did not in 2024 and 2023.
In 2024, Ukraine increased its imports of bauxite by 77.4% in volume terms compared to 2023—to 35,173 thousand tons—and by 74% in monetary terms—to $4.107 million. Imports came mainly from Turkey (78.48% of shipments in monetary terms), China (19.48%), and Spain (1.9%).
Bauxite is an aluminum ore used as a raw material for producing alumina, and from that, aluminum. It is also used as a flux in ferrous metallurgy.
In Ukraine, bauxite is imported, in particular, by the Mykolaiv Alumina Plant (MAP), which is currently idle.
Imports of goods to Ukraine from January through April 2026 increased by 30% in monetary terms compared to the same period in 2025—reaching $32.2 billion— and by 47% compared to January–April 2024—to $21.9 billion, according to data from the Telegram channel of the State Customs Service (SCS) of Ukraine.
Despite the growth in imports, exports remain nearly at the 2024 level—at that time, they amounted to $13.4 billion for January–April, $13.3 billion for the same period in 2025, and $13.9 billion for the first four months of this year.
“At the same time, taxable imports amounted to $22.3 billion, accounting for 69% of the total volume of imported goods. The tax burden per 1 kg of taxable imports in January–April 2026 was $0.55/kg,” the agency stated in a Friday release.
The largest volumes of goods were imported into Ukraine from China ($8.7 billion), Poland ($3.1 billion), and Turkey ($2.2 billion).
The largest exports from Ukraine went to Poland ($1.5 billion), Turkey ($1.2 billion), and Italy ($857 million).
Of the total volume of goods imported in January–April 2026, 72% consisted of machinery, equipment, and transportation—$13.3 billion (with 74.3 billion UAH paid to the budget during customs clearance, or 26% of customs revenue), fuel and energy products – $5.3 billion (UAH 103.5 billion paid, or 36% of payments), and chemical industry products – $4.6 billion (UAH 38.4 billion paid to the budget, accounting for 14% of customs revenue).
The top three most exported goods from Ukraine were: food products – $8.5 billion, metals and metal products – $1.3 billion, and machinery, equipment, and transportation – $1.2 billion.
“In January–April 2026, during customs clearance of exports of goods subject to export duties, UAH 585.9 million was paid to the budget,” the State Customs Service added.
In April 2026, Ukraine reduced its electricity imports by 41%—to 558,300 MWh, according to the DIXI Group analytical center, citing data from Energy Map.
“This is the second consecutive month of declining volumes of purchases from abroad,” the center noted.
At the same time, exports rose by 10%—to 33,300 MWh—but remained insignificant and occurred only during specific hours of temporary surplus in Ukraine’s power grid. By the end of the month, Ukraine had imported 17 times more electricity than it exported.
As explained by DIXI Group, the decline in imports and the modest growth in exports in April were driven by several factors. On the one hand, predominantly warm and clear weather, as well as longer daylight hours, contributed to increased generation from solar power plants and reduced the load on the power grid due to lower consumption. On the other hand, the security situation remained tense: at least three waves of heavy shelling were recorded during the month (on April 1–2, 3, and 16), resulting in infrastructure damage and limitations on available generation. An additional factor was the temporary reinstatement of differentiated price caps starting April 1, which reduced the economic attractiveness of imports during certain hours.
Under these conditions, consumption restrictions were periodically applied to balance the power system, but they were significantly less extensive than in March.
Hungary accounted for the largest share of imports in April—305,600 MWh, or 55%. Poland and Romania accounted for 125,200 MWh and 124,200 MWh, respectively—22% each. Meanwhile, Moldova accounted for 3.2 thousand MWh (1%), and Slovakia for 0.13 thousand MWh (<0.1%).
For comparison: in April 2025, imports amounted to 187.0 thousand MWh—three times less than in the reporting month.
“The average utilization of the permitted transmission capacity in April was 36.9% of the approved nominal value (2.1 GW),” DIXI Group reported. In turn, in March of this year, this figure stood at 60.4%. The maximum value of 88.4% was recorded on April 19 between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.
The nominal capacity limit for imports from EU countries to Ukraine and Moldova has been 2.45 GW since January. At the same time, part of this capacity is used for electricity imports to Moldova, so approximately 2,100 MW of commercial imports are available to Ukraine. However, the amount of permitted import capacity for each country in the bloc is dynamic and may vary depending on the operational situation in the countries’ power systems.
Kazakhstan plans to completely stop purchasing electricity from Russia starting in 2027 thanks to the commissioning of its own power generation facilities, said the country’s Deputy Minister of Energy, Sungat Esimkhanov.
According to him, if the planned power facilities are commissioned in late 2026 or early 2027, Kazakhstan will be able to meet domestic demand without Russian supplies. “If we commission all of our planned power facilities by the end of this year or early next year, I think that in 2027 we will not purchase any electricity from Russia at all,” Esimkhanov said at a press conference.
In recent years, Kazakhstan has purchased electricity from Russia annually due to a shortage of its own capacity. According to the Ministry of Energy, the deficit is decreasing: in 2024 it stood at 2.1 billion kWh, in 2025—about 1.5 billion kWh, and in 2026 it is expected to be at the level of 1–1.2 billion kWh. The government expects to eliminate this deficit by 2027.
Earlier, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy Erlan Akkenzhenov stated that the country intends to fully meet the economy’s electricity needs by the end of the first quarter of 2027. To this end, Kazakhstan is implementing 81 energy projects with a total capacity of 15.3 GW and an investment volume of over 13 trillion tenge, or more than $25 billion.
Moving away from Russian supplies will be a significant milestone in Kazakhstan’s energy policy. For the country, this means reducing dependence on external electricity sources and transitioning to a more self-sufficient energy balance model. However, the plan’s success will depend on the timing of new facilities coming online, the condition of the grids, and the power system’s ability to handle peak loads.
The decision also has regional significance. Kazakhstan remains part of the Central Asian power grid and is connected to the Russian power grid, so reducing imports from Russia does not mean a complete technological disconnect. However, from an economic and political standpoint, the move to replace Russian supplies demonstrates Astana’s desire to strengthen its own energy security and reduce vulnerability to external disruptions.
For Russia, this means a gradual loss of a portion of its electricity export demand from Kazakhstan. For Central Asia, it is a signal to accelerate the modernization of power generation, the construction of new thermal power plants, the development of renewable energy, and the improvement of grid reliability, as power shortages remain one of the region’s main infrastructure challenges.
