Since the beginning of the year, Ukrainians have imported over 181,000 passenger cars, of which almost 80% are used. Despite the significant quantitative advantage of such vehicles, new cars accounted for almost half of the total import value – $1.2 billion out of $2.57 billion. At the same time, the value of used cars is $1.37 billion.
Used cars provided UAH 16 billion in customs duties to the state budget, while new cars provided UAH 10.7 billion.
The type of fuel chosen by Ukrainian consumers reflects both stable preferences and gradual changes in trends. Gasoline cars remain the most popular, accounting for almost half (48.5%) of all imports. Electric cars are in second place (22.1%), not only overtaking diesel (20.6%) but also significantly outperforming hybrids (8.8%).
Electric transport has become the most dynamic segment of the car market. Since the beginning of the year, more than 40,000 electric vehicles with a total value of $810 million have been imported into Ukraine. For comparison, twice as many gasoline cars were imported, but their total value is not much higher — $818 million.
If this trend continues, 2025 could be a record year for the number of electric cars imported.
The average cost of an electric car imported into Ukraine is over $20,000, a diesel car is almost $13,000, and a gasoline car is over $9,000.
It is also interesting that electric cars, although they belong to the more expensive segment, brought a relatively modest 333 million hryvnia in customs duties to the budget. This is due to the current tax breaks on imports of electric vehicles. For comparison, taxes on imports of gasoline cars amounted to over UAH 13 billion, diesel cars — UAH 7.7 billion, and hybrids — UAH 5.5 billion. In total, customs revenues from car imports amounted to UAH 26.7 billion in five months.
Since the beginning of 2025, passenger cars have been imported from more than 50 countries, but the undisputed leaders are:
USA — 69,000 (38% of the total number imported);
Poland — 22,300 (12%);
Germany — 20,400 (11%).
A total of almost 111,700 cars were imported from these countries, accounting for over 60% of the total. The US dominates the gasoline car and electric vehicle segments. Germany and Poland are the leaders in diesel cars.
Since the beginning of the year, exports of wood and wood products from Ukraine amounted to 1.42 million tons worth $671.8 million. Compared to the same period in 2024, when 1.34 million tons were exported for $593.9 million, the volume of exports increased by 81,700 tons, or 6%. At the same time, in monetary terms, there was an increase of $77.9 million, or 13%.
Pine products account for the largest share, 68.6%, indicating high demand for this type of wood on foreign markets. Spruce timber ranks second with 19%, followed by oak with 6.6% of the total volume.
At the same time, since the beginning of the year, customs authorities have detected violations amounting to over UAH 31.4 million.
This article presents key macroeconomic indicators for Ukraine and the global economy as of March 1, 2025. The analysis is based on current data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, the National Bank of Ukraine, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United Nations. Maksym Urakin, Marketing and Development Director at Interfax-Ukraine, PhD in Economics and founder of the Experts Club information and analytical center, presented an overview of current macroeconomic trends.
Macroeconomic indicators of Ukraine
The beginning of 2025 for Ukraine was marked by the continuation of complex but controllable economic dynamics. Amid the ongoing war, uncertainty in external markets, and a growing trade deficit, the Ukrainian economy is demonstrating resilience and gradual adaptation. As Maxim Urakine notes, at the end of 2024, the Ukrainian economy maintained a positive trajectory, although growth rates were more modest than expected:
“Real GDP growth of 2.9% in 2024 is, on the one hand, a positive sign of recovery, but on the other hand, it signals that the structure of the economy remains vulnerable. This growth is not based on profound investment changes or technological breakthroughs, but rather is the result of adaptation to extraordinary conditions. We are dealing with an economy that is surviving but not developing in the full sense of the word,” said Maxim Urakin, founder of the Experts Club information and analytical center.
In January–February 2025, consumer inflation remained high. In annual terms, it stood at around 12.6%, remaining close to the level seen at the end of 2024. According to the NBU, price pressures are driven by seasonal factors, higher energy prices, and a weak hryvnia.
Commenting on this trend, Urakin notes that the current level of inflation is not catastrophic, but it does not allow for economic maneuvering. High consumer prices are not only a macroeconomic problem, but also a daily challenge for millions of households. The National Bank is forced to balance between the need to maintain the hryvnia and the impossibility of sharply tightening monetary policy due to the vulnerability of the economy.
The external economic situation at the beginning of 2025 revealed a serious imbalance. In January–February, Ukraine exported $6.29 billion worth of goods, 13% less than in the same period of 2024. Imports, on the other hand, rose to $11.3 billion, up 12.3% year-on-year. As a result, the foreign trade deficit reached $5.01 billion, increasing by more than 76%. The ratio of exports to imports, at only 56%, reveals the economy’s critical dependence on foreign goods and energy resources.
“This gap between exports and imports is not just a figure. It is a symptom of structural fatigue. We are too dependent on imports: this applies to fuel, equipment, and industrial components. And until we start investing seriously in local production and processing, this deficit will only grow. On the other hand, exports are currently sustained mainly by agricultural products. But this is not enough to ensure currency stability and financial autonomy,” emphasized the founder of Experts Club.
Despite trade difficulties, Ukraine’s international reserves amounted to $40.15 billion at the beginning of March 2025. Although this figure is 6.7% lower than in January, the main reasons for the decline were currency interventions by the NBU and servicing of public debt. The total amount of public and guaranteed debt at the end of February exceeded $147 billion, of which more than $100 billion was external debt.
Maksym Urakyn believes that the government currently remains capable of meeting its debt obligations, controlling the currency market, and pursuing a balanced macrofinancial policy. However, this achievement is fragile. Without further reforms and without the real sector getting back on track, these reserves could quickly melt away.
Global economy
According to the International Monetary Fund, global economic growth in 2024 was 3.1%, and the forecast for 2025 is 3.2%. However, these figures mask significant regional differences.
According to BEA estimates, the US economy contracted by 0.3% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2025, the first decline since early 2022. The main factor was rapid growth in imports amid fears of new tariffs, which significantly increased the trade surplus. Inflation, according to the latest data, stood at 2.3% (CPI) and 2.6% (core PCE) in April, the lowest levels in recent years. The Federal Reserve is keeping rates at 5.25–5.5%, waiting to see if things calm down before easing.
The IMF forecasts China’s GDP growth at 4.0% for 2025, although the official target is around 5%. The current low inflation indicates weak domestic demand and the need for structural reforms. In March, at the session of the National People’s Congress, the government announced plans to stimulate the economy through consumer support and reforms, but no clear impetus for the real estate market has yet been provided.
According to the EC’s spring forecast, GDP growth in the European Union will be 1.1% in 2025 and 0.9% in the eurozone. Official statistics for the first quarter showed growth of +0.6% compared to the previous quarter, the best result since 2022. Inflation in the eurozone continues to decline, standing at 1.9% year-on-year in May.
The British economy is showing signs of recovery: GDP grew by 0.7% in the first quarter and by 1.2% compared to a year earlier, with a slight increase of 0.2% in March. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) forecasts that inflation will reach 3.2–3.5% in 2025, falling to the target of 2% only in 2027. The Bank of England has already lowered its base rate from 5.25% to 4.25% and is expected to take two more steps during the year.
At the end of the first quarter of 2025, Turkey’s economic growth is estimated at 2.3%, with annual growth of around 3.0%. Inflation fell to 38–39% in March but remains extremely high and continues to be a priority issue for the Turkish Central Bank.
The Indian economy is showing one of the highest growth rates: GDP in the first quarter of 2025 grew by 7.4% year-on-year, confirming that India remains one of the leaders among large countries. Inflation remains under control: in February, CPI was 3.6% and core CPI was 4.1%.
The Brazilian economy continues to grow, albeit at a slower pace: in March, activity was +3.5% y/y, and in the first quarter, +1.3% q/q, the highest figure in two years. BBVA and OECD forecasts point to a slowdown in growth to 1.6–2.1% in 2025. Inflation in March was 5.48%, the highest level since February 2023, raising concerns about the stability of economic policy.
“The global economy is showing a clear divide: the US is on the brink of recession due to imports and trade uncertainty, but inflation is falling. The EU is struggling with low growth and deflationary risks. The UK is trying to avoid stagnation, although inflationary risks remain. China is in a phase of structural decline and needs reforms. India is a striking example of rapid growth thanks to rural demand and industry. Turkey is once again on the brink of crisis due to inflation. Brazil is stable but vulnerable to inflationary pressures. Ukraine needs to choose a strategy against the backdrop of these global trends: either adapt or risk remaining on a marginal trajectory,” Maxim Urakin concludes.
Conclusion
The macroeconomic situation in Ukraine at the beginning of 2025 is one of cautious stability against a backdrop of growing external challenges. Moderate GDP growth, high inflation, worsening trade imbalances, and stable reserves all contribute to a complex but manageable landscape. Meanwhile, the global economy is showing mixed dynamics, opening up new opportunities for countries that are able to quickly adapt and modernize their economic models.
“For Ukraine, 2025 is a time of transition from mobilization to transformation. If we focus on industrial revival, digitalization, export-oriented clusters, and protection of domestic producers, then the country will be able to embark on a new trajectory of sustainable growth,” concludes Maxim Urakin.
A more detailed analysis of Ukraine’s economic indicators is available in the monthly information and analytical products of the Interfax-Ukraine agency, Economic Monitoring.
Head of the Economic Monitoring project, Candidate of Economic Sciences Maxim Urakin
https://interfax.com.ua/news/projects/1080355.html
In his inaugural address this January, Donald Trump declared that his proudest legacy would be that of “a peacemaker and unifier”, pledging that US power would “stop all wars and bring a new spirit of unity to a world that has been angry, violent, and totally unpredictable”.
Five months later, his second presidency is witnessing the spectacular unraveling of that lofty aspiration.
A president who vowed to end global conflicts – including one which he said he would resolve within his first 24 hours – has instead presided over their escalation – most recently the spiraling conflict between Israel and Iran.
The timeline of the latest conflict resuggests a stark disconnect between Trump’s aspirations and reality: the wave of Israeli airstrikes came just hours afterTrump urged Israel not to attack Iran.
Marco Rubio, Trump’s secretary of state, took pains to describe the Israeli attack as “unilateral”, stressing that the US was “not involved in strikes against Iran” – only for Trump to then insist he had been well informed of Israel’s plans – and warn that further attacks would be “even more brutal”.
Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, who has emerged as Trump’s primary diplomatic negotiator in the Middle East and Ukraine, still reportedly plans to go to Oman this weekend for talks on Tehran’s nuclear program, but it appeared unlikely the Iranians would attend.
Trump’s muddled peace agenda was already disarray long before Thursday’s attacks.
The Gaza ceasefire his administration helped broker collapsed within weeks, with Israel resuming massive bombardments and imposing a three-month total blockade on humanitarian aid to the territory, where the death toll has now surpassed at least 55,000.
In Ukraine – a conflict Trump once bragged he would end on his first day back in office – Russian forces have pressed ahead with a summer offensive, entering the Dnipropetrovsk region for the first time in three years and accumulating more forces – evidence that Putin has no interest in Trump’s peace overtures and intends to expand the war further.
Meanwhile, Trump’s abrupt announcement of a ceasefire between India and Pakistan was met with fury in New Delhi, where officials denied his claims of brokering the deal.
And while Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth acknowledged to Congress that the Pentagon has developed contingency plans to seize Greenland and Panama militarily, it’s unclear how territorial conquest fits into Trump’s definition of peacemaking.
His first term ended no wars, nearly sparked conflict with Iran, and saw his signature “peace” achievement – the Abraham accords – normalize relations between Israel and countries that weren’t fighting it anyway.
Part of Trump’s appeal to voters was precisely a promise to avoid foreign entanglements. In the stands at the inauguration viewing party, supporters told the Guardian how they valued his restraint in military deployment and favored his America-first approach that prioritized domestic concerns over international aid and intervention. And there is a an argument that for Trump peace is not an absence of conflict but rather Washington’s distance from it.
There is one potentially optimistic interpretation for the latest strikes in Iran. Alex Vatanka, the Iran director from the Middle East Institute in Washington, suggested that Israel’s attack could be a calculated gamble to shock Iran into serious negotiations. The theory holds that Israel convinced Trump to allow limited strikes that would pressure Tehran without triggering regime change, essentially using military action to restart stalled diplomacy. On Friday Trump suggested that the strike on Iran might have even improved the chances of a nuclear agreement.
“This is not likely to bring Iran back to the negotiating table,” said Andrew Borene, executive director of global security at Flashpoint and a former staff officer at the US’s office of the director of national intelligence. “It marks the opening of yet another rapidly expanding flashpoint within the global context of a new hybrid cold war, one that will be fought both on the ground and in the darkest corners of the web.”
Whether this strategy succeeds depends entirely on Iran’s response. The regime could either return to negotiations chastened, or abandon diplomacy altogether and pursue nuclear weapons more aggressively. Early indicators suggest Tehran may not be in a conciliatory mood after having its facilities bombed and leaders killed.
But even if the more optimistic readings prove correct, it does not change the broader reality: every major conflict Trump inherited or promised to resolve has intensified on his watch.
Trump promised to be a peacemaker. Instead, he’s managing multiple wars while his diplomatic initiatives collapse in real time. From Gaza to Ukraine to Iran, the world appears more volatile and dangerous than when he took his oath five months ago.
Understanding what is happening in the Middle East is more important than ever.
It’s the Guardian’s job to decipher this, and with reporters sharing live updates around the clock, we’re well-placed to provide comprehensive, fact-checked reporting, to help us all make sense of the events reshaping global politics. But we can’t do it without your support.
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https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jun/14/trump-gaza-ukraine-iran-israel
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić intends to pay an official visit to Ukraine in the near future, according to Serbian and Ukrainian sources. The main purpose of the trip will be to participate in high-level events in Kyiv and hold talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Key expectations from the visit:
Bilateral meeting with Zelensky The agenda will focus on discussing the current geopolitical situation, prospects for European integration, humanitarian cooperation, and regional stability issues. The visit is seen as a step toward deepening political dialogue between the countries.
Participation in an international conference
Vucic is expected to participate in a conference on the reconstruction of Ukraine, where Serbia may present initiatives in the areas of humanitarian aid, infrastructure cooperation, and education.
Context and significance of the visit:
• Policy of neutrality Although Serbia has not joined the sanctions against Russia, the country continues to support the territorial integrity of Ukraine and participate in providing humanitarian aid. This visit could strengthen Belgrade’s international position as a constructive mediator in European politics.
• Deepening the European course According to analysts, the upcoming visit is also linked to Serbia’s course towards rapprochement with the EU. It can be seen as a diplomatic signal of Belgrade’s commitment to European values, especially ahead of important decisions on the future expansion of the union.
Possible consequences:
Serbia – Ukraine
The visit could give new impetus to relations, especially in the humanitarian sphere and education.
Serbia – EU
This will be a symbolic confirmation of the European vector, strengthening trust on the part of Brussels.
Serbia’s domestic policy
Vučić is demonstrating a balance between Eastern and Western partners, which could strengthen his position within the country.
Belgrade. June 10. SERBIAN ECONOMIST
For the first time in two years, the average microloan amount has decreased slightly
According to the National Bank of Ukraine, Ukrainians have signed more than 2.17 million contracts totaling nearly UAH 13 billion with microfinance organizations (MFOs) this year. The number of microloans increased by 8%, but the average loan amount decreased for the first time in two years, amounting to UAH 5,858. In total, Ukrainians owed MFIs almost UAH 24.3 billion as of early April 2025. This is twice as much as at the beginning of the full-scale war.
Ukrainians signed over 2.17 million loan agreements with MFIs in the first quarter of 2025. This is 8% more than in the same period last year. The total amount of such agreements amounted to UAH 12.72 billion.
However, despite the increase in the number of loans, the average loan amount decreased for the first time in two years — by 2% compared to the same period last year, and currently stands at 5,858 UAH. Prior to this, the average check had only been growing.
On average, Ukrainians signed 724,000 agreements per month, which is slightly more than last year’s figure of 693,000 per month.
In total, Ukrainians owed MFIs UAH 24.28 billion as of April 1, 2025. This is twice as much as at the beginning of the full-scale war in April 2022. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, the debt increased by UAH 4.3 billion, or 22%.
It should be noted that according to updated data from the NBU, Ukrainians’ debts did not decrease by 2.7 billion hryvnia, as was reported in previous reports, but instead increased by 1.4 billion hryvnia at the end of 2024. In total, the debt doubled in 2024, increasing by 10.7 billion hryvnia.
63% of microloans are taken for a term of 93 days to 1 year. The share of such agreements has remained almost unchanged. At the same time, long-term microloans (1 to 2 years) increased 15 times. Their share currently stands at 3.6%. Short-term loans (up to 31 days) have also become more popular: their share increased from 14.5% to 24%. However, the share of loans with a term of 32 to 92 days decreased more than fivefold, from 16.5% to 3%.
https://opendatabot.ua/analytics/mfo-2025-1
