Regional elections in Germany on September 20 demonstrated the weakening positions of traditional parties and the further fragmentation of the German electorate: Alternative for Germany (AfD) won in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, while in Berlin the Left took first place, according to an analysis by the Experts Club analytical center.
In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, AfD received 38.2% of the vote, compared with 16.7% in the previous elections in 2021. The Social Democratic Party of Germany received 35.5%, the Left — 6.5%, and the Greens — 5.7%. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democratic Union received 4.9% and, for the first time in history, failed to cross the five-percent threshold in a state election.
The CDU received 13.3% in the previous election in this state, meaning it lost more than 8 percentage points of support. According to the preliminary distribution of seats, AfD receives 32 seats, the SPD — 29, while the Left and the Greens receive five each. Since the other parliamentary forces rule out a coalition with AfD, the voting result alone does not determine the composition of the future state government.
In Berlin, the results demonstrated a different political configuration. The Left received 25.7% of the vote, compared with 12.2% in the previous election. The CDU came second with 18.8%, AfD received 16.3%, the Greens — 14.3%, and the SPD — 12.1%. The incumbent coalition of the CDU and the Social Democrats lost its parliamentary majority.
Experts Club points out that the September 20 results continued a trend that emerged at the beginning of the month. On September 6, AfD took first place in the election in Saxony-Anhalt with 43.8%, while the CDU received 17.2%. In 2021, the CDU had 37.1% in this state, while AfD had 20.8%.
Thus, according to Experts Club, the results of the September elections should not be reduced exclusively to a movement of the German electorate in a single ideological direction. In two eastern states, AfD received the greatest support, while in Berlin the Left strengthened significantly. This indicates that some voters of traditional parties are shifting toward different alternative political forces depending on the region and the structure of local problems.
According to Infratest dimap, in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern AfD managed to mobilize around 66,000 citizens who had previously not voted, as well as attract around 48,000 former SPD voters and approximately 32,000 former CDU supporters.
At the same time, the SPD’s result in this state is largely associated with the personal support enjoyed by Minister-President Manuela Schwesig. Almost half of Social Democratic voters surveyed after the election said that they would not have supported the party without her. This demonstrates the importance of the personal ratings of state-level politicians even when their parties have weaker positions at the federal level.
A separate problem for the CDU was voters’ perception of the party’s economic competence. Only 13% of respondents in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern named the CDU as the political force best able to solve economic problems. Some 89% of respondents also agreed with the statement that before the federal election the party had promised a great deal but delivered little. These results characterize one specific federal state and cannot automatically be applied to Germany as a whole.
In Berlin, one of the central factors of the campaign was the housing issue. The Left focused attention on rental costs, the shortage of affordable housing and regulation of the activities of large property owners. At the same time, migration and security remained among the important issues for AfD voters.
“These elections show not a linear movement of German society in one ideological direction, but a fragmentation of the electorate. In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, protest is concentrated around AfD, while in Berlin the Left became the main recipient of the protest vote and the vote of young urban residents. In other words, the common denominator is not ideology, but the declining ability of traditional parties to keep different groups of voters within the former model of the political center,” said sociologist and co-founder of the research company Active Group Oleksandr Poznii.
According to him, the mobilization of citizens who had not previously participated in elections is particularly illustrative. This may indicate not only a redistribution of the already established electorate, but also an expansion of the base of individual political forces.
Poznii also drew attention to the decline in confidence among some voters in the CDU’s traditional economic competence. In his view, for centrist parties the coming months will be associated primarily with the need to restore the confidence of different groups of voters, rather than only with personnel discussions.
Federal dynamics also demonstrate changes in party support. In the September ARD-DeutschlandTrend conducted by Infratest dimap from August 31 to September 2 among 1,319 voters, AfD was supported by 27% of respondents, the CDU/CSU by 21%, the Greens by 15%, the SPD by 13%, and the Left by 12%.
At the same time, state elections do not directly change the composition of Germany’s federal government or Berlin’s foreign policy. However, they influence the domestic political debate on the economy, budget spending, energy, migration and other issues.
The preliminary results of the elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin were released on the night of September 21. The final results are to be approved after the electoral records are checked.
The material was prepared on the basis of a study by the Experts Club analytical center, “AfD won in Mecklenburg, the Left in Berlin: regional elections increased pressure on Germany’s traditional parties,” published on September 21, 2026. Experts Club study on Experts.news
According to Fixygen, the German Ministry of Finance has drafted a proposal to reform the taxation of crypto assets, which would introduce a 25% tax rate on profits from the sale of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other cryptocurrencies, regardless of the length of time the asset was held.
The corresponding draft bill is in the early stages of approval within the federal government, Handelsblatt reported on September 9, citing a document obtained by the publication. Germany currently remains one of the most attractive major European jurisdictions for long-term private investors in cryptocurrencies. Under current rules, profits from the sale of crypto assets held for more than one year are generally not subject to income tax. If an asset is sold within 12 months of purchase, the profit is classified as a private sale of property and taxed at the taxpayer’s individual rate. This procedure was confirmed by official clarifications from the German Ministry of Finance on March 6, 2025.
The new model is expected to fundamentally change this approach. It is proposed to reclassify crypto assets from the category of private property transactions to the category of capital gains and tax them similarly to profits from stock transactions. The base rate of the Abgeltungsteuer will be 25%. Taking into account the solidarity surcharge, the effective tax rate could reach 26.375%, excluding any potential church tax.
The proposed rules would apply only to cryptocurrency acquired after December 31, 2026. For Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other assets purchased earlier, the current tax regime is expected to remain in place.
The bill calls for the new rules to take effect on January 1, 2027. However, automatic tax withholding by German cryptocurrency service providers is planned to be introduced only on January 1, 2028, to give platforms time to restructure their accounting systems.
The Ministry of Finance estimates that the rule change will generate approximately EUR 160 million in additional tax revenue for the budget in 2028. In subsequent years, the amount is expected to increase and, according to the ministry’s calculations, reach approximately EUR 350 million in 2030.
The reform will effectively eliminate the main tax advantage of long-term cryptocurrency ownership in Germany. It will no longer be sufficient for an investor to hold Bitcoin or Ethereum for more than a year to fully exempt the profit from the sale from taxation.
However, a final decision has not yet been made. The Ministry of Finance’s draft is in the early stages of interagency coordination, after which the document must undergo further review by the government, the Bundestag, and the Bundesrat.
Separately, Germany is already increasing tax transparency for transactions involving digital assets. In November 2025, the Bundestag approved the implementation of the European DAC8 Directive, which requires crypto service providers to report information on certain customer transactions to tax authorities.
The record victory of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the state elections in Saxony-Anhalt does not give the party the ability to independently change Germany’s foreign policy or stop military support for Ukraine, but it is capable of increasing political pressure on the federal authorities, according to an analysis by the Experts Club information and analytical center.
In the September 6 election, AfD received 43.8% of the vote and 39 of the 83 seats in the Landtag. An absolute majority requires 42 deputies. The simplest arithmetic option for creating a majority is an alliance between AfD and the five deputies of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), which would provide 44 votes. At the same time, there is currently no agreement on such a coalition. The CDU, SPD, Greens and The Left reject cooperation with AfD.
Even if AfD forms a state government, its powers will be focused primarily on education, culture, the police, regional administration, infrastructure and the state budget. Foreign policy and defense, in accordance with Germany’s Basic Law, fall within the competence of the federal government.
“The government of Saxony-Anhalt does not receive a separate vote in NATO and cannot independently cancel federal funding for aid to Ukraine,” emphasized Experts Club founder Maksym Urakin.
Saxony-Anhalt has four of the 69 votes in the Bundesrat. This allows the state government to influence part of federal legislation, especially on issues affecting the powers of the states, but it needs allies among other regions to block decisions.
Magdeburg will also not be able to introduce a political ban on the transit of military cargo for Ukraine. At the same time, state authorities participate in approving certain transport and administrative procedures, so a confrontational stance by the regional authorities could theoretically lead to delays and additional bureaucratic difficulties.
Important Bundeswehr facilities are located in Saxony-Anhalt, including the Army Combat Training Center in the Gardelegen—Letzlingen area, the Klietz training ground, where Ukrainian Leopard 1A5 crews underwent training, as well as logistics units in Burg. At the same time, these structures are subordinate to the federal defense authorities, not to the state government.
The consequences for Ukrainians living in the state itself may become more immediate. AfD advocates reducing social support for Ukrainians, changing approaches to integration programs and strengthening return policies. The state cannot abolish the temporary protection regime established at EU level, but it can influence additional regional programs and administrative practices.
The volume of passenger car imports to Ukraine, including cargo-passenger vans and race cars (UKT ZED code 8703), amounted to $2.62 billion in January–July 2026, which is 17% less than the figure for the same period in 2025 ($3.16 billion).
According to statistics released by the State Customs Service of Ukraine, in July alone, passenger car imports fell by 27.2% compared to July of last year—to $443.2 million, which is also 5.3% less than in June 2026.
The top three suppliers of passenger cars to Ukraine over the first seven months have consistently been the United States, Germany, and Japan, whereas in the previous year they were Germany, the United States, and China. Specifically, car shipments from the U.S. fell by 3.2% to $508.3 million, those from Germany decreased by 26% to $416.2 million, and imports from Japan totaled $371.2 million, whereas last year, cars worth $407.7 million were imported from China.
Imports of passenger cars from other countries during this period totaled $1.33 billion—20.4% less than last year’s figure.
At the same time, over the seven-month period, Ukraine exported only $2 million worth of such vehicles, primarily to Georgia, the Czech Republic, and Kazakhstan, whereas last year, total exports to the UAE, the Czech Republic, and Poland amounted to $4.54 million.
Passenger cars accounted for 4.52% of Ukraine’s total imports of goods in January–July, compared to 6.89% during the same period last year; their share of total exports was 0.01% and 0.02%, respectively.
As previously reported, in 2025, passenger cars worth nearly $6.15 billion were imported into Ukraine, which is 40.2% more than in 2024. The top three exporters were the United States, Germany, and China. Car exports totaled $10.1 million (2.7 times less).
The significant increase in passenger car imports to Ukraine starting in the summer of 2025 was driven by news that VAT exemptions on electric vehicle imports would be abolished as of January 1, 2026; as a result, imports have declined significantly since the beginning of this year. However, starting in March, a slow but steady recovery of the passenger car market—including electric vehicles—began.
In January–July 2026, Ukraine imported $507.5 million worth of tractors, which is 2% more than during the same period last year, when imports totaled $497.8 million, according to data from the State Customs Service.
However, in July alone, tractor imports fell by 5% compared to July 2025 and by 3% compared to June of this year, to $70.6 million.
Germany was the largest supplier of tractors to Ukraine over the seven-month period, accounting for 19.4% of imports, or $98.3 million.
China supplied nearly the same volume—$98 million, or 19.3% of total imports. The United States ranked third with shipments worth $89.6 million, accounting for nearly 17.7%.
Thus, the three largest countries accounted for about 56.4% of all tractor imports into Ukraine during January–July.
Compared to last year, the supplier structure has changed. In January–July 2025, the United States was the largest supplier with $94.1 million in shipments, followed by China with $87.3 million and Germany with $83.9 million.
Over the year, shipments from Germany increased by approximately 17%, and those from China by more than 12%, while imports from the United States decreased by about 5%.
For the full year of 2025, Ukraine imported tractors worth $845.7 million, which was 7.9% higher than in 2024. The main suppliers at that time were also the United States ($179.7 million), Germany ($145 million), and China ($142.8 million).
Thus, in 2026, the growth in tractor imports continued, but its pace slowed noticeably: over the first seven months, the figure increased by only 2%, and by July, a negative year-over-year trend had already been recorded.
According to Dw.com, German law enforcement authorities detained a 33-year-old Ukrainian citizen suspected of gathering information about a defense contractor in Bavaria to prepare for possible sabotage.
As reported on August 6 by the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Bavarian State Criminal Police Office, the man was detained on August 2 in the federal state of Thuringia with the assistance of local police. The following day, a Munich district court issued an arrest warrant, after which the suspect was placed in a pretrial detention center in Bavaria.
According to the investigation, in June 2026, the man allegedly photographed the premises of a defense contractor in southern Germany and transmitted the images to his client. German law enforcement officials suspect that this material could have been used to prepare acts of sabotage.
The suspect is considered a so-called “low-level agent.” German security agencies use this term to describe individuals whom foreign intelligence services may recruit to carry out specific, straightforward tasks, such as photographing facilities, conducting surveillance, or gathering publicly available information.
The prosecutor’s office has not disclosed which country’s intelligence service may have recruited the man. The name of the defense contractor is also being withheld due to the ongoing investigation.
In Germany, suspicion of espionage aimed at preparing acts of sabotage carries criminal liability. The investigation is currently ongoing, and the detainee’s guilt has not been established by a court.
German security agencies have previously warned of an increase in attempts by foreign intelligence services to recruit operatives via social media and messaging apps. Defense companies, military facilities, and transportation and energy infrastructure were cited as potential targets of such operations. At the same time, law enforcement officials have not yet officially linked the new arrest to a specific country or other investigations.
