Ukraine currently imports electricity from Europe around the clock at a maximum capacity of 1.6 GW during peak hours, which does not cover the maximum allowable import capacity due to grid restrictions.
This was announced by Anatoliy Zamulko, acting head of the State Energy Supervision Inspectorate of Ukraine (Derzhenergonadzor), on Thursday during the “Yedyni Novyny” telethon.
“The peak part of imports, depending on the situation, is 1.5-1.6 thousand MW, which is not yet the limit allowed to us by contracts with Europe. The only problem that remains today is network restrictions to push that electricity to eastern Ukraine,” he said.
As reported, the maximum agreed commercial capacity for imports from the EU from December 2024 is 2.1 GW. On average, in November 2025, the utilization of transmission capacity was 27.4%, but during peak evening consumption hours, it increases significantly.
“If we had the opportunity to restore that network infrastructure more quickly, we would certainly have much better opportunities to provide energy through imports,” said the head of the State Energy Regulatory Commission.
As he explained, with the current drop in temperature and the onset of frost in Ukraine, there has been an increase in energy consumption. To balance the energy system, transmission system operators (TSOs, regional power companies) together with regional military administrations are freeing up additional capacity for consumers by including facilities that were not previously subject to disconnection in consumption restriction schedules.
“We are fighting to mitigate the drop in temperature in various ways, including one of the effective tools that will be used throughout Ukraine, which is to take into account the facilities that are to be included in the schedules and increase the fairness that is being talked about in terms of distribution,” Zamulko said.
He stressed that the Ukrainian energy sector continues to function as a single entity.
“We remain a unified energy system, working in parallel with Europe, carrying out all transfers in accordance with the agreements reached with our partners, using import capacities and, if necessary, using emergency assistance,” said the head of the State Energy Regulatory Commission.
Ukraine imports record amounts of electricity from the EU, but millions of consumers still sit without electricity for 12-16 hours or more. In other words, there are imports, but no electricity. This raises a logical question: where are the megawatts “lost”?
However, the paradox is easily explained: imports are not “light in the socket,” but only an additional source of power. For electricity to reach a particular neighborhood or building, highways, substations, and distribution networks must be operational—and that is where the biggest problems lie today.
The issue is further exacerbated by the fact that after large-scale shelling in early December, the capacity of nuclear power plants (which are the base generation of the Ukrainian power system) was reduced. According to the IAEA, damage to the networks led to the shutdown of some units or their transfer to reduced capacity. Therefore, the topic of imports has been discussed very actively at all levels recently.
November already showed a systemic gap. Electricity exports fell by 94% compared to October 2025, to 5.3 thousand MWh, and have virtually stopped since November 11. Recall that in October, Ukrainian electricity exports fell by 85% compared to September. Imports, on the contrary, increased by 17% to approximately 415,000 MWh, reaching their highest level since the beginning of the year.
Data for December is not yet available, but it is already clear that Ukraine remains a net importer of electricity for the second month in a row. The structure of supplies has changed somewhat: as in October, Hungary is the largest supplier (about 44%), but the shares of Slovakia (10 times) and Moldova (2 times) have increased significantly. At the same time, Poland and Romania have declined in the structure of electricity imports.
On December 1, the maximum available import cross-section was increased from 2.1 to 2.3 GW, but it should be noted that both figures are still more theoretical. After all, the average actual use of the cross-section in November was only about 27%, with peaks of up to 88% at certain hours.
In other words, the resource is there, but not always where and when it is needed. There are several main reasons why even the available electricity does not reach the end consumer.
The market responds to shortages with prices. In November 2025, the Ukrainian day-ahead market became one of the most expensive in Europe (with a price of around €140 per MWh), while in Sweden the price was around €36/MWh and in France, for example, €43/MWh.
This is not about the “greed” of sellers and suppliers, but about the lack of cheap domestic supply and network constraints.
The EU is increasing inter-state flows, which lowers prices and adds flexibility. In 2024, France increased its nuclear and hydroelectric power generation and became the largest net exporter in the region.
But even France’s record surplus is not an automatic “magic bullet” for Ukraine. The reason is asymmetry of time and place: surpluses often occur at times when we have a different load profile, and at nodes from which we cannot quickly “pump” megawatts.
Some EU countries also have electricity surpluses, especially during so-called solar and wind windows, and are also looking for places to sell their surpluses. But the same problems arise: complex logistics (both in the EU and in Ukraine) and load asymmetry.
In other words, imports can be very useful, but they should not be seen as a strategy to replace our own maneuverable capacity.
However, the current situation is not hopeless. Ukrenergo expects a gradual reduction in restrictions as damaged facilities are repaired and there are no new attacks.
The government is synchronizing restoration, construction of protective structures, creation of fuel reserves, and connection of cogeneration plants to the grid. This will add local capacity where it is most needed.
The effect of increasing the cross-section to 2.3 GW is there, but it is limited by internal nodes. The closest practical relief will come from connecting decentralized sources and restoring networks.
In the coming weeks, the focus will be on speed and accuracy. First of all, it is necessary to restore throughput capacity in critical corridors and key substations, where a single replacement of a transformer or circuit breaker returns tens of megawatts to the city.
Mobile substations, field crews, and “hot” equipment logistics are a matter of hours and days, not months.
At the same time, cogeneration, gas piston, and gas turbine units need to be connected to the grid in deficient nodes. Where “black holes” of evening peak demand appear on the map, local generation can “pick up” the load.
In the next few months, the transition to managed demand will become key. Industry and large commercial consumers are able to “smooth out” the load according to clear rules and compensation. This is not an abstraction: power restriction schedules (PRS) are already in place, but they need to be transformed into civilized DR (demand response) programs with a predictable effect.
It is also necessary to continue creating additional “west-east” corridors, additional switching nodes in the 330-750 kV network, and local reserves around megacities and large substations. Energy storage devices in large nodes support the system during 2-3 peak hours and reduce the duration of GPP.
In the long term, more game-changing capacity is needed. We need 3.5-4 GW of new decentralized maneuverable generation, as close to the consumer as possible. Gas installations, cogeneration clusters for heat and electricity, microgrids for critical areas — all this makes the system less dependent on one or two nodes.
Engineering logic must go hand in hand with institutional logic: transparent corporate governance, stable settlement rules, and rapid procurement of critical equipment. Without trust, there will be no funding; without funding, there will be no underground distribution points, reinforced intersections, or warehouses with backup transformers.
Don’t expect a magic button that will turn off the GPV overnight. A realistic scenario is a gradual reduction in the duration and severity of outages in regions where:
– at least part of the west-east trunk lines have been restored;
– local cogeneration/gas plants are connected;
– demand management programs for businesses are in place;
– critical infrastructure is provided with reserves.
This is a “mosaic of solutions”: each piece separately does not save the day, but together they have a tangible effect.
Imports with a potential of 2.3 GW may be a temporary salvation, but by no means a panacea. As long as high-voltage lines and power transmission nodes remain damaged, imported megawatts will not turn into light in homes.
The path to shorter outages lies in three quick actions:
At the same time, it is necessary to invest in our own maneuvering capacity and the development of central and local networks. Record imports are a symptom of an open wound. It is treated not with intersection figures, but with systematic rehabilitation of networks and a return of trust in the rules of the game.
Source: https://expertsclub.eu/analiz-potochnoyi-sytuacziyi-z-importom-elektroenergiyi-v-ukrayini/
In October 2025, Ukraine imported 353.9 thousand MWh of electricity, which is 2.5 times more than in September, according to the DIXI Group analytical center, citing data from Energy Map.
“This is the highest monthly import figure since the beginning of the year. At the same time, exports fell sevenfold to 90.8 thousand MWh, which was the first decline in the last five months,” the center reported.
According to DIXI Group, the sharp increase in imports is due to the deterioration of the situation in the energy system caused by massive shelling of energy infrastructure. In particular, during October, Russian attacks damaged, among other things, thermal and hydroelectric power facilities, which led to a power shortage. As a result, emergency and scheduled hourly power cuts for the population were resumed, as well as restrictions on consumption for industry and business.
The situation was exacerbated by a drop in temperature. Low output from residential solar power plants due to cloudy weather, as well as the active use of electric heaters before the start of the heating season, placed an additional burden on the power system.
Electricity imports in October were wave-like in nature, due to enemy shelling. In particular, after a massive strike on October 10, external supplies rose sharply – on October 11, imports reached 19.0 thousand MWh, which is 141.5% more than the previous day.
A similar situation repeated itself after the attack on October 22: on October 23-24, there was a sharp increase in imports to 19.8 thousand MWh and 23.4 thousand MWh, respectively, or +64.8% and +94.4% compared to October 22. At the end of the month, after another large-scale attack on October 30, Ukraine was again forced to increase external purchases: on October 31, imports amounted to 22.4 thousand MWh (+76.9% compared to the previous day).
In the structure of imports by direction of electricity supply, Hungary accounts for more than 50% – 180.0 thousand MWh (50.9%). This is followed by Poland with 80.2 thousand MWh (22.7%) and Romania with 76.9 thousand MWh (21.7%).
The maximum agreed commercial capacity for imports from the EU from December 2024 is 2.1 GW. On average, in October 2025, capacity utilization was 22.6%, with a maximum on October 18 between 20:00 and 21:00 (84.4%) and the only hour of the month when no electricity was imported (October 3 between 22:00 and 23:00). At the same time, during peak morning and evening consumption hours, capacity utilization increases significantly.
In addition to the commercial capacity of 2.1 GW for Ukraine, an additional 0.25 GW of emergency assistance is available from neighboring ENTSO-E operators as “insurance” at critical moments. Thus, emergency assistance was provided during October from Poland, both in the form of additional electricity with a total volume of 28.8 thousand MWh and in the form of supplies of surplus electricity to Poland (5.25 thousand MWh). There is no public information available on other neighbouring power systems.
In turn, the main volumes of electricity exports in October were carried out during hours of minimum domestic consumption – mainly at night and early in the morning – from 0:00 to 6:00.
In terms of export structure by destination, Hungary prevails with 39.3 thousand MWh (43.2%), Moldova with 31.1 thousand MWh (34.3%), and Romania with 14.9 thousand MWh (16.4%).
“As a result, imports in October exceeded exports by almost four times – the negative balance in October amounted to 263.0 thousand MWh,” DIXI Group concluded.
Overall, based on the results of the first 10 months of 2025, Ukraine is a net importer of electricity, with a negative balance of 168.7 thousand MWh for this period.
EU countries could save EUR250 billion annually by 2040 by accelerating the transition to electricity, according to a press release from France’s Schneider Electric.
“The so-called ‘energy trinity’ – the balance between affordability, security, and sustainability – remains a challenge, as high dependence on fossil fuel imports keeps prices high and delays the achievement of climate goals,” the company said.
According to a press release based on Schneider Electric’s report “Europe’s Energy Security and Competitiveness – Accelerating Electrification,” the current level of electrification in Europe is only 21% — a figure that has remained unchanged over the past decade and is 10% lower than in China, where rapid electrification is taking place. At the same time, the cost of energy for domestic consumers in the EU is EUR0.27 per kWh, in the US — EUR0.15/kWh, and in China — EUR0.08/kWh.
“This means that daily energy consumption for each EU citizen is three times more expensive than for Chinese residents,” the report’s authors concluded.
According to the document, the pace and level of electrification in different European countries vary significantly due to differences in infrastructure, policy, market maturity, and consumer behavior. In particular, some countries, such as the Scandinavian countries, have made significant progress in the electrification of transport and buildings, while others are only beginning to scale up their efforts. At the same time, Southern Europe shows higher rates of building electrification, while Western and Central Europe focus on industrial electrification and the development of prosumer initiatives.
“To remain competitive on the world stage, Europe needs to accelerate the transition to a more electrified economy,” according to Schneider Electric analysts.
The report identifies several key policy areas that need to be implemented to achieve this goal.
First and foremost, according to the authors of the document, governments need to reduce the price difference between electricity and natural gas by gradually phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and reforming the tax system to encourage the use of clean energy.
Equally important is accelerating financing — simplifying access to investment, introducing targeted incentives, especially for small and medium-sized businesses, and directing revenues from emissions trading and innovation funds to electrification projects.
The report also highlights the need to develop local markets, which involves mandatory electrification of new buildings and industrial processes, support for the rapid introduction of heat pumps and electric vehicles, and encouragement of prosumer initiatives.
In addition, an important direction is to promote local development through sustainable public procurement, accelerate standardization, and support European innovation and manufacturing—this will allow the economic and social benefits of electrification to be fully realized across the continent.
“This study is one of the most thorough analyses of Europe’s electrification potential and the policy actions needed to realise it. It emphasizes that electrification is vital — not only for achieving climate goals, but also for stimulating economic growth, energy independence, and industrial competitiveness,” said Laurent Bataille, Executive Vice President of Schneider Electric in Europe.
In his opinion, Europe must urgently overcome the stagnation of electrification, for which the relevant technologies already exist and are ready for implementation. At the same time, appropriate policy incentives and decisive business action are also needed to unlock the economic and environmental potential that EU countries need.
Associations of mining and metallurgical, other industrial and extractive enterprises, manufacturers of building materials and cement have spoken out against increases in freight and electricity tariffs due to the risk of enterprises shutting down or a significant drop in production.
They made this statement at a press conference at the Interfax-Ukraine agency on Tuesday on the topic of “The tariff policy of state monopolies – JSC Ukrzaliznytsia and NEC Ukrenergo, their negative impact on industry and the economy of Ukraine.”
Alexander Kalenkov, president of the Ukrmetallurgprom association of enterprises, noted that the consumers of the services of so-called natural monopolies are mining and metallurgical companies, cement producers, building materials manufacturers, and the like.
“These are the main customers of companies such as Ukrzaliznytsia and Ukrenergo. Before the war, the mining and metallurgical complex, together with ferroalloy plants, consumed about 60% of all electricity supplied to industry and transported more than 40% of the traffic provided by Ukrzaliznytsia. Therefore, we are dependent on the activities of these companies, just as they are dependent on us,” Kalenkov stated, expressing hope that in the future these markets will become more competitive and monopolies will be broken up. But until then, the state must ensure that these monopolies do not abuse their position, he believes.
The head of Ukrmetallurgprom emphasized that Ukraine has the highest electricity tariffs in Europe. “In practice, this means that we are losing the competitive struggle to all entrepreneurs from the EU. I am not even talking about companies located in countries that still consume Russian energy resources—there, prices are several times lower than ours, both for gas and electricity. And that is why we are losing our traditional markets,” Kalenkov stressed.
As for railway tariffs, he said that they are currently cheaper in Poland and Slovenia than in Ukraine. “We already transport cargo by Ukrzaliznytsia at a cost that is 15-20% higher than in Europe, and there are plans to increase tariffs by another 37%. This is not only economically unreasonable and unjustified, it is a dead end,” Kalenkov said.
In his opinion, the tariff policy of Ukrzaliznytsia and Ukrenergo requires attention at the level of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Verkhovna Rada. Ideally, an independent body on transport tariffs, similar to the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission, should be created. To subsidize passenger transportation, UAH 26 billion should be allocated in the budget for 2026 so as not to increase freight tariffs. Otherwise, due to the increase in tariffs, our enterprises will begin to reduce production or exit the market.
Executive Director of the Ukrainian Cement Manufacturers Association (Ukrcement) Lyudmila Kripka emphasized that two-thirds of the cement produced in Ukraine, as well as the raw materials for it, are delivered by rail. Therefore, the industry is very sensitive to unjustified increases in freight tariffs.
“We have already gone down this road, such actions have already had negative consequences in the past, and this time there will be no miracles either. This will lead to negative consequences. Manufacturers will be forced to pass on the increase in tariffs to their products, that is, to the end consumer. This will reduce consumption of products and, consequently, reduce their production and transportation,” Kripka stressed.
At the same time, she pointed out the need to develop state support instruments for energy-intensive export-oriented industries as a temporary anti-crisis measure. According to her, technical and economic criteria should be introduced specifically for enterprises in priority industries. At the same time, the funds saved from the reduction in tariffs for electricity transmission and dispatching could be directed towards investment in our own renewable energy sources.
“In this way, we would fulfill the decarbonization targets set for us by the European Union,” Kripka stated.
She cited data from the state-owned company Ukrpromvneshexpertiza, according to which a 30% increase in freight tariffs would lead to a reduction in GDP of almost UAH 100 billion, a loss of foreign exchange earnings of UAH 98 billion, annual budget losses of more than UAH 36 billion, and the elimination of at least 76,000 jobs.
Sergey Kudryavtsev, executive director of the Ukrainian Association of Ferroalloy Producers (UkrFA), noted that the majority of ferroalloy enterprises are located along the shore of the Kakhovka Reservoir, i.e., in an area close to the combat zone, where working conditions are extremely difficult. In particular, manganese plants have been idle for two years.
“We cannot transport raw materials to ferroalloy plants because the railway lines have been destroyed. And we cannot pay to transport the raw materials needed for ferroalloy production by detours. Ferroalloy plants are currently operating at 15-20% of their capacity. This situation will lead to the end of ferroalloy production in Ukraine. Imported alloys will be brought to us, and the workers will be left without jobs,” Kudryavtsev said.
According to him, this frontline zone is currently being held together thanks to the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant (NFP), Nikopol pipe and metallurgical enterprises, but it could become “gray” if people leave.
“Today, we have problems with production, logistics, staff shortages, and electricity. This is a region that used to produce electricity, but today we get it from western Ukraine. The tariff is unaffordable for us. Therefore, we are in a situation where we may have to shut down, and it will not be possible to recover. Enterprises are currently operating at 15% capacity, maintaining a continuous process. Because if you stop a ferroalloy furnace, it will take six months to start it up again,” added the executive director of UkrFA.
Source: https://www.youtube.com/live/ATmga3Sdn3g
ELECTRICITY, FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION, KUDRYAVTSEV, TARIFF, КАЛЕНКОВ, КРИПКА
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine has extended the provision on imposing special obligations (SO) on electricity market participants until April 30, 2026, Prime Minister Yulia Sviridenko announced.
“Electricity prices for the population will remain unchanged this winter. The government has extended the SRO for electricity until April 30, 2026. This means that during the heating season, citizens will continue to pay UAH 4.32 per kWh,” Sviridenko wrote on Telegram following Wednesday’s government meeting.
According to her, preferential prices for consumers with electric heating will also remain in place.
Thus, for consumption of up to 2,000 kWh per month, the price will be 2.64 UAH per kWh, and for consumption above the established limit, the price will be 4.32 UAH per kWh.
“This is part of a comprehensive program to support Ukrainians in winter. We are reducing the financial pressure on families during the heating season,” the prime minister added.
As reported earlier, the Cabinet of Ministers extended the validity of the provision on imposing special obligations (SOP) on natural gas market entities for gas supplies to domestic consumers, gas distribution system operators, “last resort” suppliers, and gas-fired electricity producers from October 31, 2025, to March 31, 2026.
