Starting August 12, 2026, Ukrainian companies exporting packaged goods to European Union countries must comply with the new uniform European packaging requirements set forth in EU Regulation 2025/40 on packaging and packaging waste—the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation (PPWR).
The new rules apply not only to manufacturers from EU countries. The European Commission explicitly states that the regulation applies to all packaging placed on the EU market, regardless of material or origin. Thus, the requirements also apply to goods from Ukraine, Serbia, Turkey, China, and other third countries.
The regulation entered into force on February 11, 2025, but its main provisions began to apply on August 12, 2026. It replaced the European directive on packaging and packaging waste, which had been in effect for over 30 years.
For Ukrainian businesses, this primarily affects manufacturers of food and beverages, cosmetics, household chemicals, consumer and industrial goods, as well as e-commerce companies that ship packaged products to customers in the EU.
The new regulations establish requirements for the composition and safety of packaging materials, the reduction of excessive packaging, and the potential for reuse and recycling. Manufacturers must assess the packaging’s compliance with the established requirements and issue an EU Declaration of Conformity.
For shipments from Ukraine, direct legal responsibility for placing imported goods on the European market often lies with an importer registered in the EU. According to the regulation, an importer is a company or individual located in the European Union that places packaging or packaged goods from a third country on the EU market. With regard to imported products, the importer is responsible for verifying compliance with established requirements.
However, this does not mean that Ukrainian manufacturers will not have to make any changes. In practice, the European importer will need to obtain from the supplier information on the packaging’s composition, confirmation of its compliance with requirements, and technical documentation. If a Ukrainian company is unable to provide these documents or if the packaging does not comply with the PPWR, the European partner will not be able to properly place such goods on the EU market.
One of the requirements, which will take effect as of August 12, 2026, concerns packaging that comes into contact with food. It must not contain PFAS—so-called “forever chemicals”—in concentrations exceeding the limits set by the Regulation.
At the same time, some of the widely discussed PPWR requirements are being phased in gradually.
For example, the requirement to ensure that all packaging is recyclable is set for 2030, and the new unified labeling rules will also be introduced later. Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, as of August 12, 2026, companies are already required to comply with absolutely all future PPWR standards.
For Ukrainian exporters, the practical significance of the reform is that packaging compliance is gradually becoming just as much a prerequisite for access to the EU market as the safety and quality requirements for the product itself. Companies in the food, light industry, chemical, and FMCG sectors, as well as manufacturers producing under the private labels of European retail chains, should pay particular attention to their packaging.
On August 3, 2026, the European Commission additionally published updated guidance for businesses on the application of the PPWR, while the general effective date for the main provisions of the regulation was set for August 12.
Source: EU Regulation 2025/40 and the European Commission’s guidance on the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation.
In January–July of this year, Ukrainian companies increased their consumption of rolled metal by 0.27% compared to the same period last year, reaching 2.309 million metric tons.
According to a press release issued by the “Ukrmetallurgprom” association on Friday, 1.063 million metric tons were imported during this period, accounting for 46.06% of the domestic rolled steel consumption market.
According to “Ukrmetallurgprom,” in January–July 2026, Ukrainian steel companies produced 3.322 million metric tons of rolled steel (91.7% of the figure for the same period in 2025), of which, according to the State Customs Service of Ukraine, approximately 2.076 million metric tons—or 62.5%—were exported. In January–July 2025, the share of exports was
60.2% (2.182 million metric tons out of a total rolled steel production of 3.622 million metric tons).
The share of semi-finished products in export shipments in January–July 2026 was 42.58%, which is significantly higher than the figure for the first seven months of 2025 (32.58%). The share of flat-rolled products in exports from January through July 2026 was slightly lower than in January through July 2025 (43.74% and 44.55%, respectively). The share of long products, however, is noticeably lower than in January–July 2025 (13.68% in 2026 versus 22.87% in 2025).
The structure of imports in January–July 2026 is characterized by a marked dominance of flat-rolled products over structural steel (66.59% and 26.94%, respectively); however, in January–July 2025, the dominance of flat-rolled products over long products was significantly greater (74.77% and 20.19%, respectively).
“In January–July 2026, the domestic market capacity was 2.309 million metric tons of rolled steel, of which 1.063 million metric tons, or 46.06%, consisted of imports. In January–July 2025, the domestic market capacity was 2,302,700 metric tons, of which 862,700 metric tons, or 37.46%, were imported. “Thus, in January–July 2026, the domestic market capacity increased by 0.27% compared to January–July 2025, with a simultaneous 8.58% rise in the share of imports,” the press release states.
According to the State Customs Service, the main export markets for Ukrainian rolled metal in January–July of this year were the European Union (81.9%), the rest of Europe (9.6%), and the CIS (6.5%).
Among steel importers for the first seven months of 2026, other European countries ranked first (49.8%), followed by Asian countries (25.5%), and EU-27 countries (16.0%).
As previously reported, Ukraine’s rolled metal market grew by 21.73% in 2025 compared to 2024, reaching 4 million 1.6 thousand metric tons. Imports totaled 1 million 603.6 thousand metric tons, accounting for 40.07% of domestic rolled metal consumption.
Ukraine’s rolled metal market in 2024 contracted by 6.26% compared to the previous year—to 3,288.4 thousand metric tons, while in 2023 it grew 2.19 times compared to 2022—to 3,505.6 thousand metric tons.
According to Experts.news, the European Commission is preparing proposals to reform the EU enlargement process, which are set to form the basis for a strategic discussion among EU leaders in October 2026. One of the key areas of discussion is the introduction of additional safeguards that would allow for the restriction of certain rights of new member states in the event they violate their obligations to the EU.
The European Commission has confirmed that it is preparing the reform. As early as July 6, an EC representative told Euronews that Brussels was working on its own proposals ahead of the October summit, as member states themselves are increasingly engaged in discussions regarding the new rules.
The European Council has officially confirmed that at its meeting on October 15–16, 2026, EU leaders will hold a strategic discussion on the Union’s enlargement and internal reforms. However, there is as yet no official confirmation that the European Commission will present the final package on October 15 specifically.
One of the most discussed options is a temporary restriction on certain voting rights of new member states.
Back in June, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg proposed discussing the possibility of a transition period during which new EU members would be unable to block decisions in the most sensitive areas, where unanimity among all countries is currently required.
This primarily concerns foreign policy, the EU budget, and the Union’s further expansion.
In addition, the five countries propose including special safeguard mechanisms in future accession treaties. These would allow measures to be taken against a new member state in the event of a serious deviation from the principles of democracy, the rule of law, or media freedom.
These proposals are largely linked to Hungary’s experience under Viktor Orbán, when Budapest repeatedly used the unanimity requirement to block important EU decisions.
However, for now, the discussion centers on reform options rather than newly agreed-upon rules.
This discussion is of the greatest significance for Montenegro, which is currently the most advanced candidate for accession.
According to the European Commission, the country has opened all 33 negotiation chapters, 16 of which have already been provisionally closed. Podgorica intends to conclude negotiations and become the 28th member of the European Union in 2028.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated in June that Montenegro’s accession by 2028 is “achievable.” The EU has already begun drafting the future accession treaty.
Therefore, Montenegro’s accession treaty could potentially become the first document of a new generation, providing additional guarantees for the EU following the country’s admission.
However, the European Commission is concerned about a scenario in which new conditions would be developed exclusively for Montenegro. That is why Brussels wants to establish a universal approach that can also be applied to future candidate countries.
The reform will be of direct importance to both Ukraine and Moldova.
Negotiations with both countries accelerated significantly in the summer of 2026. In June, the EU opened the first negotiation cluster with Ukraine and Moldova, focusing on fundamental issues—the rule of law, democratic institutions, and public administration. In July, negotiations also made progress on foreign policy issues.
That said, Ukraine and Moldova are much further from concluding negotiations than Montenegro.
For Kyiv, the future model is particularly important: if the EU does indeed introduce transitional restrictions on the right of veto, Ukraine could potentially gain full membership but would initially have limited ability to block decisions in certain areas.
At the same time, such a system could facilitate political consensus on Ukraine’s membership within the current EU, as some member states fear that expanding from 27 to more than 30 members would significantly complicate decision-making.
The assertion that France, Germany, and the Netherlands are generally opposed to rapid EU enlargement requires clarification. These countries support further enlargement but belong to a group of states that demand prior strengthening of institutional safeguards and stricter oversight of future members’ compliance with the rule of law. Together with Belgium and Luxembourg, they have proposed developing a new template for accession treaties.
France, in particular, takes a cautious stance regarding Ukraine’s accelerated accession. Officials in Paris are concerned about the budgetary implications, the impact of Ukraine’s large agricultural sector on the single market, and the potential for the decision-making process to become more complicated in an expanded EU.
Germany, on the other hand, actively supports enlargement but at the same time insists on reforming the European Union itself and is considering options for the gradual integration of new member states.
Essentially, the debate boils down to an attempt to resolve the tension between two objectives.
On the one hand, the geopolitical situation is prompting the EU to accelerate the accession of Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, and Moldova. Brussels views enlargement as a tool for strengthening European security and limiting the influence of Russia and China in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, existing member states are reluctant to admit new members who, once admitted, could use their veto power to exert pressure on other EU countries.
Therefore, the future model may be based on the following principle: full membership is granted more quickly, but some of the new member state’s political tools remain limited during a transition period, and compliance with obligations continues to be monitored even after accession.
The final parameters of such a system have not yet been agreed upon. The main political discussion is set to take place at the European Council on October 15–16, 2026, after which it will become clearer which of the proposed mechanisms may be included in the future accession treaties for Montenegro, Ukraine, Moldova, and other candidates.
Marshal of the Polish Sejm Włodzimierz Czarzasty has stated that Ukraine’s accession to the European Union will require the Ukrainian side to reconsider controversial chapters of its own history, including its assessment of the mass killings of Poles in Volhynia during the Second World War.
Czarzasty made the statement on August 10 in Szczawnica following a meeting with Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Ruslan Stefanchuk, the Polish Press Agency PAP reported.
Czarzasty stressed that he personally supports Ukraine’s future membership in the EU but believes that European integration entails not only economic benefits but also the acceptance of a certain system of values and historical responsibility.
“The EU is about democracy and values; it is not merely an ATM,” the Marshal of the Sejm said, adding that it is also necessary “to call genocide genocide.” In his opinion, no nation can escape its own history.
The main subject of the historical dispute remains the mass killings of the Polish population in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943–1945, responsibility for a significant portion of which the Polish side places on the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
In Poland’s state historical policy, these events are officially classified as genocide. As early as 2016, the Sejm enshrined this interpretation in a parliamentary resolution, and in 2025 Poland went further: by law, it designated July 11 as the National Day of Remembrance of Poles — Victims of the Genocide Committed by the OUN and UPA in the Eastern Territories of the Second Polish Republic. The law was adopted unanimously by the Sejm and subsequently approved by the Senate.
The Polish side demands three things from Ukraine above all: recognition of the genocidal nature of the crimes, the opportunity to search for and exhume the remains of Polish victims without obstruction, and the dignified burial and commemoration of those killed. Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance regards the depoliticisation of exhumations as one of the key conditions for genuine historical reconciliation.
Warsaw therefore no longer views the issue solely as a dispute among historians. In recent years, it has become part of the state’s remembrance policy and is increasingly being linked by Polish politicians to the issue of Ukraine’s European integration.
Official Kyiv does not deny the mass killings of the Polish population or the need to honour the memory of those killed. However, it avoids accepting the Polish formula of sole responsibility on the part of Ukraine and the official classification of the entire Polish-Ukrainian conflict of that period as a genocide of Poles.
The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance predominantly uses the terms “Volhynia Tragedy” and “Ukrainian-Polish confrontation.” In July 2026, UINR head Oleksandr Alforov stated during a joint Ukrainian-Polish commemoration that the tragic events of 1943 must be remembered and that relations between the two nations should be built on mutual respect and acknowledgement of past mistakes.
The Ukrainian side also points out that not only Poles but also Ukrainians were killed in the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation, including as a result of retaliatory actions by Polish armed formations and the policies of the Polish state. Notably, in July 2026, Polish Ambassador to Ukraine Piotr Łukasiewicz also publicly stressed the need to take Ukrainian victims into account.
When the Polish Sejm legislatively designated July 11 as a day of remembrance for the “victims of the genocide committed by the OUN and UPA” in June 2025, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the decision unilateral and warned that such steps did not contribute to achieving mutual understanding and reconciliation. Kyiv proposed focusing on the joint work of historians, searches, exhumations and the dignified commemoration of all victims.
Despite the political dispute over terminology, substantial progress has been made in practical matters over the past year. Ukraine resumed issuing permits to the Polish side for search and exhumation work. In 2026, investigations were conducted, in particular, in the former villages of Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska in Volhynia, while on August 7, Ukraine’s interdepartmental commission approved new exhumation work in Huta Peniatska in the Lviv region and in the village of Uhly in the Rivne region.
Work in Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska was completed on August 7, and the remains discovered there are to be reburied. Thus, one of the most acute practical issues that had complicated relations between Warsaw and Kyiv for several years has gradually begun to move forward.
Following his meeting with Stefanchuk, Czarzasty also called for political and historical conflicts not to be transferred to relations between Polish and Ukrainian societies. According to him, a permanent channel of communication must be maintained between the parliaments of the two countries and mutual trust must be restored. At the same time, he stressed that “without a secure Ukraine, there is no secure Poland” and expressed support for Ukraine’s membership in the EU and Poland’s participation in the country’s post-war reconstruction.
The European Union has transferred an additional 30 million euros to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund, thereby increasing its total contribution to the fund to 279 million euros, according to Ukraine’s First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy Denys Shmyhal.
“The funds received through this financial instrument are helping us restore energy infrastructure damaged by Russian attacks, purchase urgently needed equipment for our energy companies, and ensure a reliable energy supply, first and foremost for critical infrastructure,” – Shmyhal was quoted as saying by the Ministry of Energy’s press service on its Telegram channel on Saturday.
According to Experts.news, Montenegro and Iceland may eventually become members of the European Union at the same time—the possibility of combining the two countries’ accession into a single package is being discussed in Brussels by representatives of the European Commission and European diplomats, Politico reports.
This option is being considered against the backdrop of Montenegro’s rapid progress in membership negotiations and Iceland’s possible return to the European integration process, which was put on hold more than a decade ago. The EU has not yet made a final decision on the countries’ joint accession.
A key event will be the referendum in Iceland on August 29, 2026, in which citizens will have to decide whether the country should resume negotiations on EU accession. The Icelandic parliament approved the referendum in May. If a majority supports resuming negotiations, the outcome will subsequently have to be put to a second referendum—this time directly on the country’s membership in the European Union.
European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos called Iceland a “special case,” as the country is already deeply integrated with the European Union through the European Economic Area and the Schengen Area.
In her assessment, if the referendum yields a positive result, negotiations with Reykjavík could potentially last only one or two years. Kos also stated that the EU is ready to seek special solutions for the issues most sensitive to Iceland, primarily fisheries and agriculture.
This theoretically allows Iceland to catch up with Montenegro and enter the final stretch of negotiations at roughly the same time as Podgorica.
Montenegro is currently the candidate that has advanced the furthest in the EU accession process.
All 33 negotiation chapters have already been opened, and following the EU–Montenegro Intergovernmental Conference on July 14, 18 chapters were provisionally closed. The most recent chapters to be closed were those on competition policy and the Customs Union.
Thus, Podgorica has completed more than half of the process of closing negotiation chapters and expects to conclude negotiations by the end of 2026.
The government of Prime Minister Milojko Spajić has officially set a goal of becoming the 28th EU member state in 2028. The European Union has already begun preparatory work on Montenegro’s accession treaty, and on June 30, the European Commission presented a financial package outlining the budgetary implications of the country’s future membership.
One of Politico’s sources at the European Commission stated that there is a significant likelihood of a joint package being formed for the two countries.
The economic rationale for this option lies in the substantial differences between the two countries.
Iceland is a wealthy economy and, upon accession, would likely become a net contributor to the EU budget. Montenegro, by contrast, due to its relatively low per capita income, would be a recipient of European funding.
According to European diplomats, combining the two countries into a single package could therefore simplify the political coordination of enlargement for current EU members.
Montenegro’s Minister for European Affairs, Maida Gorčević, told Politico that Podgorica is open to the possibility of linking its accession to that of Iceland.
Iceland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Torgurdur Katrín Gunnarsdóttir, also called joint accession “absolutely” possible.
However, each country will have to fulfill the membership criteria independently. Merely combining them into a single treaty or political package does not eliminate the need to complete negotiations and secure the consent of all current EU member states.
Despite the high level of economic integration, Iceland’s possible return to the negotiations does not guarantee their smooth conclusion.
For Iceland, control over fishery resources carries significantly greater economic and political weight than it does for most EU member states. The country’s foreign minister has stated that retaining control over fisheries will be one of the fundamental conditions of any future agreements with Brussels.
However, Iceland already applies a significant portion of EU legislation thanks to its membership in the European Economic Area. That is why the process could potentially proceed much faster than for most current candidates.
Montenegro applied for EU membership in 2008, was granted candidate status in 2010, and membership negotiations officially began on June 29, 2012. Currently, all 33 negotiation chapters have been opened, of which 18 have been provisionally closed. Following an acceleration of reforms in 2024–2026, the country became the leading candidate for the next EU enlargement.
Iceland took a completely different path. Following the global financial crisis, it applied to the EU in July 2009, and negotiations began in 2010. By the time negotiations were suspended, 27 negotiation chapters had been opened, 11 of which had been provisionally closed.
After a new government took office in 2013, negotiations were frozen, and in March 2015, Reykjavík asked the European Union to no longer consider Iceland a candidate country. At the same time, the country maintained the closest possible integration with the EU through the European Economic Area and the Schengen Area.
In 2026, the issue of membership returned to the political agenda. Parliament scheduled a referendum for August 29 on whether to resume negotiations.
The format of several countries joining the EU simultaneously is not new. Spain and Portugal joined the Community at the same time in 1986; ten countries joined the EU as part of the 2004 enlargement; and Bulgaria and Romania joined simultaneously in 2007.
If Iceland votes to resume negotiations and is able to quickly resolve contentious issues with Brussels, 2028 becomes, for the first time, a theoretically possible date for the simultaneous accession of Montenegro and Iceland. For now, however, this is a political scenario rather than an approved EU enlargement timeline.
