A political confrontation in Poland escalated sharply on October 30 between Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government, President Karol Nawrocki, and the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party. The immediate trigger was the suspension of the Constitutional Tribunal’s leadership, which sparked protests, police intervention, and the president’s urgent return from an overseas trip, the Experts Club information and analytical center reports.
According to Polish and international media, police increased security around the Constitutional Tribunal building in Warsaw following the announced suspension of its president, Bogdan Święczkowski, and deputy president, Bartłomiej Sochański. Opposition supporters gathered outside the institution. Some protesters attempted to breach the fence, while objects were thrown at police officers. Authorities reported that three people had been detained.
The decision to suspend the court’s leadership was announced by Judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska. She accused the tribunal’s leadership of obstructing judges elected by the current parliamentary majority. However, Święczkowski’s supporters challenged the legality of the suspension, describing the developments as unlawful interference in a constitutional institution.
Prime Minister Donald Tusk defended the need for decisive measures to restore the rule of law. His government maintains that judicial reforms are necessary following years of PiS rule, during which European institutions repeatedly criticized Poland over concerns about judicial independence.
Justice Minister and Prosecutor General Waldemar Żurek announced motions to lift judicial immunity from Święczkowski and his deputy. The opposition, meanwhile, characterized the government’s actions as an attempt to bring the Constitutional Tribunal under political control.
President Karol Nawrocki, who was traveling to Senegal on an official visit, ordered his aircraft to turn around and return to Poland. He explained that the head of state needed to be present in the country during such a serious institutional confrontation.
The current crisis has deep historical roots. Between 2015 and 2023, the PiS government introduced judicial reforms that triggered disputes with the European Union. After taking office in 2023, Tusk’s coalition began reviewing some of those changes but encountered resistance from the conservative opposition and the president.
In 2026, tensions intensified over the appointment of new Constitutional Tribunal judges. The president refused to administer the oath to some candidates elected by parliament, while the tribunal’s leadership prevented several newly elected judges from assuming their duties.
According to Experts Club’s analysis, the dispute has moved beyond judicial appointments and become a broader confrontation over control of one of Poland’s most important constitutional institutions.
Future developments will depend on whether the opposing political forces can reach a legally sound compromise. Possible scenarios include an agreement on the tribunal’s composition and leadership, prolonged institutional confrontation, or renewed protests and political mobilization ahead of the next parliamentary elections.
The principal risk for Poland is a further erosion of public confidence in the judiciary, potentially complicating reforms and relations between the country’s central state institutions.
Israel’s parliamentary election on October 27, 2026, ended without a clear majority for either of the main political blocs. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party retained first place, but his right-wing religious bloc lost its majority in the Knesset. This sets the stage for difficult coalition negotiations and could affect Israeli policy toward Iran, the Palestinian territories and Ukraine, reports the Experts Club information and analytical center.
According to the results released by Israel’s Central Elections Committee on October 30, Likud secured 27 of the 120 parliamentary seats. Yashar, led by former Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, won 21 seats, while former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s B’Yachad alliance received 12. Arab political parties collectively secured a record 19 seats.
Netanyahu’s right-wing religious bloc controls 53 seats, compared with 48 for the opposition. Forming a government requires the support of at least 61 lawmakers. Voter turnout reached 77.9%, with more than 5.7 million people casting ballots. The results are scheduled to be submitted to President Isaac Herzog on November 4, while the new Knesset is expected to be sworn in on November 10.
Experts Club analysts identify three main political scenarios. Under the first, Netanyahu could form a new coalition with support from some opposition lawmakers or negotiate a national unity government. The second involves an opposition government headed by Eisenkot, potentially relying on external parliamentary support from Arab parties. The third is a prolonged political deadlock that could lead to another election in 2027.
Regardless of the coalition negotiations, a fundamental reversal of Israel’s security policy appears unlikely in the near term. Both Netanyahu and Eisenkot regard Iran’s military capabilities as a strategic threat. Their differences concern primarily the methods used to confront Tehran, coordination with the United States and the role of diplomatic initiatives.
A centrist government could nevertheless create additional opportunities for negotiations concerning the Gaza Strip, humanitarian arrangements and relations with Arab countries. By contrast, the continuation of a right-wing coalition would increase the likelihood of maintaining a hardline approach toward the Palestinian territories.
The election outcome is particularly significant against the backdrop of the war launched by Israel and the United States against Iran in late February 2026. Despite diplomatic contacts and mediation efforts by Qatar, no comprehensive settlement has been reached. Further escalation threatens shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, international energy markets and the stability of Persian Gulf countries.
For Ukraine, the election creates potential opportunities to expand cooperation with Israel on countering Iranian-made Shahed drones, intelligence sharing and the development of air defense technologies. However, even a change of government would not guarantee an immediate revision of Israel’s cautious policy toward Russia or the supply of Israeli air defense systems to Ukraine.
Another risk is growing competition among Ukraine, Israel and Middle Eastern countries for interceptor missiles and other defense resources. Kyiv’s preferred outcome would therefore be regional de-escalation accompanied by stronger bilateral technological cooperation.
The election results indicate that Israel is entering a period of political uncertainty. The composition of the next governing coalition will influence not only the country’s domestic stability but also its approach to regional conflicts and relations with international partners.
Latvia continues to enjoy a high level of positive perception among Ukrainians: in August 2026, 68.3% of respondents viewed the country positively, while only 3.9% viewed it negatively. Compared to March, the share of positive assessments has decreased slightly; however, the country continues to rank among the nations with the highest levels of public favor, according to the Experts Club Information and Analytical Center.
According to the results of the August survey, 39.7% of Ukrainians view Latvia entirely positively, and 28.6% view it mostly positively. 26.6% of respondents hold a neutral position. 2.5% view the country mostly negatively, 1.4% view it entirely negatively, and another 1.2% were undecided.
The balance of positive and negative assessments stands at plus 64.4 percentage points. Thus, positive attitudes toward Latvia outnumber negative ones by more than 17 times. Overall, the countries of Northern Europe and the Baltic states maintained some of the highest levels of positive attitudes among Ukrainians in the August wave of the survey.
In March 2026, 71.6% of respondents had a positive attitude toward Latvia: 42.4% viewed it entirely positively and 29.1% viewed it mostly positively. A neutral stance was held by 24.5% of respondents, negative assessments accounted for about 2.6%, and another 1.4% were undecided.
Thus, over five months, the share of positive assessments decreased by 3.3 percentage points—from 71.6% to 68.3%. The negative segment increased by approximately 1.3 percentage points, while the neutral segment rose by 2.1 percentage points. The balance between positive and negative attitudes decreased from approximately plus 69 to plus 64.4 percentage points.
At the same time, the most significant change occurred among respondents with the most strongly positive views: the share of entirely positive assessments decreased from 42.4% to 39.7%, while the share of mostly positive assessments remained close to previous levels—29.1% in March and 28.6% in August.
On an annual basis, the overall picture also remains stable. In August 2025, 72.7% of Ukrainians viewed Latvia positively, while 5.3% viewed it negatively. In other words, the current share of positive responses is slightly lower than a year ago, but the negative segment also remains smaller.
Oleksandr Pozniy, director of the research firm Active Group, commenting on the results of the previous survey wave regarding Latvia, attributed the high level of public support to the country’s consistent engagement with Ukraine.
“Ukrainians, in general, are very good at distinguishing between countries that demonstrate consistent support for Ukraine. At the same time, the level of positive attitude is shaped not only by political statements but also by concrete actions that people can experience firsthand. That is precisely why even small countries can have a very strong positive image,” Pozniy noted.
The latest wave of the survey shows a slight decline in positive assessments of Latvia, but no fundamental shift in public perception. More than two-thirds of Ukrainians continue to view the country positively, while the share of negative responses remains below 4%.
The survey was conducted in August 2026 using an online self-administered questionnaire via the SunFlowerSociology panel among 800 Ukrainian citizens aged 18 and older. The maximum theoretical margin of error for indicators at the 50% confidence level is ±3.5 percentage points.
ACTIVE GROUP, BALTIC STATES, EUROPEAN UNION, EXPERTS CLUB, international relations, LATVIA, Pozniy, PUBLIC OPINION, SOCIOLOGY, UKRAINE
Norway continues to enjoy one of the highest levels of positive perception among Ukrainians: in August 2026, 72% of respondents viewed the country positively, while only 2.7% viewed it negatively. Compared to March, the positive rating has declined slightly, but the overall pattern of assessments remains stable, according to the Experts Club Information and Analytical Center.
According to the results of the August survey, 35.8% of Ukrainians view Norway entirely positively, and 36.2% view it mostly positively. A neutral stance is held by 24.1% of respondents. 2.3% view the country mostly negatively, 0.4% view it entirely negatively, and another 1.2% were undecided.
The balance of positive and negative assessments stands at plus 69.3 percentage points. Thus, positive attitudes toward Norway outweigh negative ones by more than 26 times. According to the overall survey results, the country remains among the leaders in terms of public sentiment, alongside Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Finland.
In March 2026, 72.7% of respondents had a positive attitude toward Norway. At that time, 37.1% of those surveyed described their attitude as entirely positive, and 35.7% as mostly positive. A neutral stance was held by 24.2%, a negative one by 1.9%, and another 1.2% were undecided.
Thus, over the course of five months, the overall share of positive assessments decreased by only 0.7 percentage points—from 72.7% to 72%. The neutral segment remained virtually unchanged—24.2% in March versus 24.1% in August. At the same time, the share of negative responses increased by 0.8 percentage points—to 2.7%.
The balance between positive and negative attitudes decreased from approximately plus 70.8 to plus 69.3 percentage points. The changes remain insignificant and do not indicate a fundamental shift in attitudes toward the country: nearly three-quarters of Ukrainians continue to view Norway positively.
Oleksandr Pozniy, director of the research firm Active Group, commenting on the results of the previous wave, emphasized the stability of the established image of Norway.
“Ukrainians quite clearly differentiate between countries based on levels of trust and actual support. In the case of Norway, we see a consistently high level of positive sentiment, which is not shaped by current events but is based on a long-term perception of the country as a reliable partner. Even a slight decline in the figures does not change the overall picture—Norway remains one of the most positively viewed countries among all those surveyed,” Pozniy noted.
The results of the August wave effectively confirm this assessment. Despite a slight increase in the negative segment, it remains minimal, and the share of neutral responses has remained virtually unchanged. This distinguishes Norway from countries where public assessments have fluctuated significantly over the course of the year.
The previous survey wave was conducted in March 2026 among 800 Ukrainian citizens aged 18 and older using self-administered online questionnaires on the SunFlowerSociology panel. The sample was representative by age, gender, and region; the maximum theoretical margin of error for indicators at the 50% confidence level was ±3.5 percentage points.
ACTIVE GROUP, EXPERTS CLUB, international relations, NORTHERN EUROPE, NORWAY, Pozniy, PUBLIC OPINION, SOCIOLOGY, UKRAINE
Ukraine is preparing another review of its military personnel reservation rules, which could affect companies operating in the defense industry, energy sector, utilities and other sectors considered critical to the national economy. However, the final parameters of the proposed changes remain under discussion, and reports of a mass cancellation of existing exemptions have not yet been sufficiently substantiated, according to the Experts Club information and analytical center.
According to information published on October 22 by Dmytro Kysylevskyi, deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee on economic development, the Cabinet of Ministers plans to finalize the adoption of a new resolution by the end of the week. A provision that would have excluded employees with individual mobilization deferments from the total number of eligible employees used to calculate reservation quotas has already been removed from the draft.
Earlier proposals included reducing the maximum reservation quota for certain defense and energy companies from 100% to 85%, and for water supply, heating and waste management companies from 75% to 60%. However, these figures appeared in earlier versions of the draft and cannot be regarded as approved regulations.
According to Experts Club, the most vulnerable groups could include employees of companies that lose their critically important status, fail to confirm compliance with government criteria within the required period, or face reductions in available reservation quotas. Under existing regulations, an employer’s loss of critical status can already result in the automatic cancellation of its employees’ reservations.
Another issue concerns the distinction between essential operational personnel and support staff. One approach under discussion would preserve broader exemptions for specialists directly involved in defense manufacturing, equipment maintenance and critical infrastructure operations. However, no definitive list of positions potentially subject to restrictions has been approved.
The draft also provides for establishing a Coordination Center under the Cabinet of Ministers. The center is expected to assess the justification for criteria used to designate companies as critically important and recommend revisions. Final decisions would remain with the relevant government authorities.
Separately, legislative proposals concerning family-based mobilization deferments are also being discussed. They could introduce additional requirements for parents of children with disabilities, spouses of people with disabilities, caregivers of ill relatives and legal guardians. These initiatives are not part of the government’s resolution on reservation quotas and do not currently alter existing statutory protections.
The Ministry of Defense previously announced that more than 90% of existing individual deferments could potentially be extended automatically using information from state registers. The relevant procedure will continue until October 30, 2026. Failure to verify information automatically does not, by itself, mean that a person has lost their legal entitlement to a deferment.
Business representatives emphasize that frequent regulatory changes complicate workforce planning, contract fulfillment and uninterrupted operations. Experts Club analysts believe that the effectiveness of the reform should be measured not only by the number of reservations reviewed, but also by the state’s ability to meet defense needs, prevent abuse and maintain the functioning of critical industries.
DEFERMENTS, EXPERTS CLUB, MILITARY RESERVATIONS, mobilization
The European Union is facing significant disagreements over its long-term budget for 2028–2034, raising concerns about potential delays in approving up to €100 billion in financial assistance for Ukraine, according to the Experts Club information and analytical center.
Following the European Council summit on October 15–16, 2026, EU leaders failed to agree on the main parameters of the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Reaching a political compromise by the end of 2026 remains a negotiating objective rather than a legally binding deadline.
The European Commission’s original proposal, presented in July 2025, envisaged a seven-year budget of €1.763 trillion in constant 2025 prices, equivalent to almost €2 trillion in current prices. However, on October 10, 2026, Ireland, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, proposed reducing the framework to €1.622 trillion. The reduction amounts to €141 billion, or approximately 8%.
The largest proposed reduction concerns competitiveness, security and innovation programs, with funding cut by €66.6 billion. External action programs face a €33.1 billion reduction, while regional development and agricultural programs could lose €32.2 billion.
The main disagreements are between major net contributors to the EU budget, including Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, and countries seeking to preserve agricultural and regional subsidies. Rising defense spending, technological modernization requirements and the repayment of NextGenerationEU debt add further pressure.
According to EU budget documents, approximately €149.3 billion in constant 2025 prices is earmarked for servicing and repaying joint European borrowing during 2028–2034. These obligations reduce the resources available for new investment programs.
The European Parliament opposes the proposed cuts. Its negotiating position provides for financial resources approximately €316 billion higher than the Irish proposal, taking into account separate funding for debt repayment.
For Ukraine, the most significant development is the preservation of a dedicated financial reserve totaling €88.869 billion in constant 2025 prices. This corresponds to approximately €100 billion in current prices, as originally proposed by the European Commission.
The mechanism would support Ukraine’s economy, infrastructure reconstruction and European integration through grants, budget guarantees and lending instruments. However, the proposed allocation does not constitute approved funding, and actual disbursements will depend on subsequent EU decisions.
Negotiations are further complicated by the European electoral calendar, including parliamentary elections in Spain in late 2026 and presidential elections in France in spring 2027. These developments could encourage national governments to postpone politically sensitive decisions on increasing budget contributions.
Experts Club identifies three possible scenarios: reaching a compromise before the end of 2026, postponing an agreement until the first half of 2027, or allowing negotiations to continue until late 2027.
“The main risk for Ukraine is not an immediate reduction of the proposed €100 billion, but a possible delay in the legal approval and practical implementation of financial support after 2027,” the Experts Club analysis states.
A delay in adopting the new budget would not automatically suspend EU funding, as European treaties provide for the temporary extension of existing budgetary ceilings. Nevertheless, prolonged negotiations could complicate the launch of new programs, including long-term financial assistance mechanisms for Ukraine.
