People who regularly consume more coffee may have a lower proportion of total and visceral fat and, at the same time, greater muscle mass, according to the results of a new Finnish study. In men, higher coffee consumption was also found to be associated with characteristics of testosterone levels and more favorable indicators of glucose and insulin metabolism.
The study was published in the scientific journal European Journal of Nutrition. The researchers used data from the large-scale Northern Finland Birth Cohort 1966 project, whose participants have been followed since birth. The analysis included 2,264 people aged 46.
The participants were divided according to their habitual coffee consumption. Seventy people practically did not consume coffee, 296 drank one to two cups a day, 822 drank three to four cups, and another 1,076 participants drank five or more cups daily.
The researchers found an interesting pattern: body mass index did not differ significantly between the groups, but body composition did.
Participants who consumed more coffee had, on average, a lower percentage of body fat, lower total fat mass and a smaller area of visceral fat. At the same time, they had greater skeletal muscle mass. Differences in body composition were observed in both men and women.
“This study is interesting primarily because it demonstrates the limitations of the familiar BMI indicator. Two people may have practically the same body mass index but a completely different ratio of fat to muscle tissue. In the Finnish sample, it was body composition, rather than BMI, that was associated with the level of coffee consumption,” notes Sviatoslav Morozov-Leonov, Doctor of Biological Sciences and head of a division at the Experts Club analytical center.
The researchers separately studied hormonal indicators. In men, each additional cup of coffee per day was statistically associated with an increase in total testosterone of approximately 0.29 nmol/L and in bioavailable testosterone of approximately 0.08 nmol/L. The level of sex hormone-binding globulin — SHBG — also increased. These associations persisted after statistical adjustment for BMI, education, smoking, physical activity and alcohol consumption.
However, the hormonal results turned out to be considerably more complex than the phrase “coffee increases testosterone” might suggest.
Along with higher total and bioavailable testosterone, greater coffee consumption in men was associated with lower free testosterone and a lower free androgen index. In women, the researchers found no statistically significant association between the amount of coffee consumed and total or bioavailable testosterone. At the same time, women also had higher SHBG and lower free androgen indicators.
“Therefore, it would be incorrect to conclude from the study that five cups of coffee a day increase testosterone in men. The hormonal picture is much more complex: total testosterone increased, but free testosterone decreased at the same time. The authors themselves speak of a specific hormonal profile rather than a proven stimulating effect of coffee,” Morozov-Leonov emphasized.
Another interesting result is related to metabolism.
In men with higher coffee consumption, the researchers identified a more favorable profile of glucose and insulin indicators. In representatives of both sexes, coffee consumption was also inversely correlated with blood concentrations of branched-chain amino acids — BCAAs.
Elevated BCAA concentrations have been associated in a number of previous studies with insulin resistance and an increased risk of metabolic disorders. The authors of the Finnish study believe that the detected changes may help to better understand the association between coffee consumption and metabolic health observed in other studies.
At the same time, the scientists specifically warn that the results do not prove a cause-and-effect relationship.
The study was cross-sectional: coffee consumption, body composition, hormones and metabolic indicators were assessed essentially during the same period of time. Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether coffee led to the observed differences or whether people with a particular lifestyle and metabolic profile simply consumed coffee more often.
In addition, the participants self-reported the amount of coffee they consumed, while the group of people who did not consume coffee at all was small — only 70 people out of 2,264. The Finnish population is also relatively homogeneous, so the results cannot automatically be extrapolated to the populations of other countries.
“This is a good example of how nutrition studies should be read. An association between a product and a particular health indicator does not yet mean that the product is the cause of that effect. Practical recommendations require prospective studies and, most importantly, randomized controlled trials,” says Experts Club representative Morozov-Leonov.
The authors also do not recommend increasing coffee consumption on the basis of the results obtained. They point to the need for further research, including intervention studies in humans, which would make it possible to establish whether a causal relationship exists and which specific biologically active components of coffee may be responsible for the observed associations.
Coffee contains more than a thousand different compounds, so the potential mechanism of action remains uncertain. The researchers consider hormonal and metabolic changes to be one of the possible directions for further study of coffee’s effects on health.
“The most interesting result of the work is not the assertion that ‘the more coffee, the better.’ The study shows a much more complex relationship between habitual diet, body composition, hormones and metabolism. Testing these mechanisms in long-term and controlled studies should be the next stage,” Sviatoslav Morozov-Leonov summarized.
The study Associations of habitual coffee intake with testosterone and cardiometabolic markers: the Northern Finland Birth Cohort 1966 study. The analysis included 2,264 participants from the Northern Finland Birth Cohort 1966. The authors declared no conflict of interest.
The intensification of Russian attacks on Ukraine’s production, logistics, retail and digital facilities is increasingly affecting not only individual companies, but also the growth potential of the economy as a whole. The destruction of enterprises and critical business infrastructure leads to downtime, disruptions in supply chains, higher logistics costs and the need to direct investment resources toward recovery instead of development, reports the Experts Club information and analytical center.
According to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, in August 2026 alone, at least 32 attacks on facilities belonging to Fozzy Group, Epicentr, Nova Poshta, Rozetka, Aurora and Varus were recorded, compared with 11 in July. This figure concerns only the specified group of companies and does not reflect the total number of attacks on Ukrainian businesses.
Warehousing and transport logistics remain among the most vulnerable segments. In August, large distribution and logistics complexes belonging to Rozetka, NOVUS, MTI Group and EVA were destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of attacks. On August 31, a strike on a Nova Poshta terminal in Odesa destroyed a key sorting line. In September, production, warehouse and digital facilities of a number of companies were also damaged.
Experts Club founder and Candidate of Economic Sciences Maksym Urakin notes that the economic effect of such attacks significantly exceeds the book value of the destroyed property.
“When a distribution center, factory or data center is destroyed, economic losses cannot be calculated solely on the basis of the value of the facility itself. Along with it, part of production output temporarily disappears, supplies to dozens or hundreds of other companies are disrupted, inventories are lost, logistics and insurance costs increase, and businesses are forced to create backup capacity,” Urakin noted.
According to the joint RDNA5 assessment by the Government of Ukraine, the World Bank, the European Commission and the UN, as of the end of 2025, direct damage to Ukraine from the war amounted to $195.1 billion, while recovery needs over the next decade were estimated at $587.7 billion. Direct damage to trade and industry amounted to $19.2 billion, about 85% of which was attributable to industry. At the same time, these estimates do not yet take into account the new destruction of 2026.
The deterioration of the situation has already affected macroeconomic forecasts. In September, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development lowered its forecast for Ukraine’s real GDP growth in 2026 from 2.2% to 1.5%. Among the factors, the EBRD cited intensified attacks on enterprises, energy infrastructure and Black Sea ports, as well as labor shortages, weak business confidence and logistical constraints. The IMF had previously forecast growth of the Ukrainian economy in 2026 at 1–1.6%.
Experts Club emphasizes that the downgrade of forecasts cannot be explained solely by the physical destruction of enterprises. GDP is affected by the duration of downtime, the volume of lost production, the possibility of relocating production to other sites, the state of the energy sector and the speed of restoring logistics links.
Of particular concern is the displacement of investment in development by recovery expenditures. Enterprises have to simultaneously finance repairs, generators and electricity storage systems, backup warehouses, servers and the relocation of production facilities. This supports business continuity but limits the ability to invest in modernization, capacity expansion and the creation of new jobs.
According to Interfax-Ukraine, Ukraine’s economy showed the first signs of emerging from a recession in the first half of 2026, however, the high foreign trade deficit, inflationary pressures, and the dependence of public finances on international aid remain key macroeconomic risks, according to the latest issue of “Economic Monitoring.”
As noted by Maksym Urakin, Ph.D. in Economics and founder of the Experts Club information and analytical center, after real GDP fell by 0.6% year-over-year in the first quarter, the economy returned to growth in April–June.
In the second quarter, Ukraine’s real GDP increased by 0.4% compared with the same period last year and by 0.3% compared with the previous quarter. At the same time, the National Bank’s forecast projected growth of the Ukrainian economy at only 1.3% for the full year of 2026.
“Positive factors in the first half of the year included the resumption of at least minimal GDP growth, the return of international reserves to above $50 billion, stability in the foreign exchange market, more consistent international financing, and the adaptability of Ukrainian businesses. The main risks remain the war, the state of the energy sector, high production costs, a labor shortage, weak commodity exports, and a growing trade imbalance. Ukraine has a significant supply of external liquidity, but it cannot replace domestic economic growth,” Urakin noted.
Consumer inflation slowed to 7.2% in June, while core inflation accelerated to 8.1%. The NBU’s discount rate remained at 15%.
At the same time, after four months of decline, Ukraine’s international reserves increased by 12.1% in June—to $51.27 billion. The NBU’s foreign exchange interventions remained substantial.
Foreign trade remains one of the main structural risks to the Ukrainian economy. From January through June 2026, merchandise imports totaled approximately $49.3 billion, while exports amounted to about $21 billion. Thus, the merchandise trade deficit reached approximately $28.3 billion.
Public finances also remain under significant strain. Revenues to the General Fund of the state budget for the first half of the year totaled nearly 1.9 trillion UAH, while expenditures amounted to approximately 2.23 trillion UAH.
Approximately 1.4 trillion UAH, or about 63% of all General Fund expenditures, was allocated to the security and defense sector. The volume of international grants totaled 569.6 billion hryvnia.
According to Urakin, one of the main objectives of economic policy should be to transform significant imports of equipment, international funding, and defense spending into a foundation for creating new domestic production capacity.
“The next phase of economic policy should consist not only of maintaining financial stability, but also of transforming imported equipment, international funds, and defense spending into new production assets. The foundation for long-term development should be energy self-sufficiency, the defense-industrial complex, agricultural processing, machine building, production localization, logistics, digital technologies, and exports of high-value-added products,” says the founder of Experts Club.
At the same time, the first half of the year revealed significant differences between the world’s largest economies and emerging markets.
The Chinese economy grew by 4.7% in the first six months of 2026, while India posted a growth rate of about 7.8% in April–June.
Turkey continued to combine economic growth with extremely high inflation. In the second quarter, its GDP increased by 2.3% year-over-year and by 1.1% compared to the previous quarter, while annual inflation in June remained near 32%.
Brazil showed more moderate growth: its GDP in the second quarter increased by 2% year-over-year and by 0.5% compared to the previous quarter. In the first half of the year, the country’s economy grew by 1.9%, and annual inflation in June slowed to 4.64%.
“Key emerging economies ended the first half of the year with very different growth patterns. China grew by 4.7%, but its second quarter was weaker than the first, and domestic consumption lags significantly behind industrial output and exports. India continues to grow by nearly 8%, driven by the size of its domestic market and investment. Turkey remains an example of how inflation exceeding 30% limits the quality of economic growth, while Brazil is showing more moderate growth with gradual control of inflation. For Ukraine, the main conclusion remains the same: long-term growth requires its own industrial, technological, and export base,” Urakin emphasized.
In his assessment, the first half of the year confirmed the viability of Ukraine’s macrofinancial stabilization model, but at the same time revealed its limitations.
“The return of GDP to modest growth and the replenishment of reserves are positive signs; however, the $28.3 billion merchandise trade deficit, high underlying inflationary pressures, and the budget’s dependence on external financing reveal the limits of this model. Only by developing its own production and export base will Ukraine be able to transition from an economy of wartime stabilization to a model of sustainable postwar growth,” concluded Maksym Urakin.
“Economic Monitoring” is a monthly analytical and statistical publication led by Maksym Urakin, Ph.D. in Economics. The publication analyzes the main macroeconomic indicators of Ukraine and the world’s leading economies, as well as trends in GDP, inflation, public finances, international reserves, foreign trade, and key risks to economic development.
Regional elections in Germany on September 20 demonstrated the weakening positions of traditional parties and the further fragmentation of the German electorate: Alternative for Germany (AfD) won in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, while in Berlin the Left took first place, according to an analysis by the Experts Club analytical center.
In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, AfD received 38.2% of the vote, compared with 16.7% in the previous elections in 2021. The Social Democratic Party of Germany received 35.5%, the Left — 6.5%, and the Greens — 5.7%. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democratic Union received 4.9% and, for the first time in history, failed to cross the five-percent threshold in a state election.
The CDU received 13.3% in the previous election in this state, meaning it lost more than 8 percentage points of support. According to the preliminary distribution of seats, AfD receives 32 seats, the SPD — 29, while the Left and the Greens receive five each. Since the other parliamentary forces rule out a coalition with AfD, the voting result alone does not determine the composition of the future state government.
In Berlin, the results demonstrated a different political configuration. The Left received 25.7% of the vote, compared with 12.2% in the previous election. The CDU came second with 18.8%, AfD received 16.3%, the Greens — 14.3%, and the SPD — 12.1%. The incumbent coalition of the CDU and the Social Democrats lost its parliamentary majority.
Experts Club points out that the September 20 results continued a trend that emerged at the beginning of the month. On September 6, AfD took first place in the election in Saxony-Anhalt with 43.8%, while the CDU received 17.2%. In 2021, the CDU had 37.1% in this state, while AfD had 20.8%.
Thus, according to Experts Club, the results of the September elections should not be reduced exclusively to a movement of the German electorate in a single ideological direction. In two eastern states, AfD received the greatest support, while in Berlin the Left strengthened significantly. This indicates that some voters of traditional parties are shifting toward different alternative political forces depending on the region and the structure of local problems.
According to Infratest dimap, in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern AfD managed to mobilize around 66,000 citizens who had previously not voted, as well as attract around 48,000 former SPD voters and approximately 32,000 former CDU supporters.
At the same time, the SPD’s result in this state is largely associated with the personal support enjoyed by Minister-President Manuela Schwesig. Almost half of Social Democratic voters surveyed after the election said that they would not have supported the party without her. This demonstrates the importance of the personal ratings of state-level politicians even when their parties have weaker positions at the federal level.
A separate problem for the CDU was voters’ perception of the party’s economic competence. Only 13% of respondents in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern named the CDU as the political force best able to solve economic problems. Some 89% of respondents also agreed with the statement that before the federal election the party had promised a great deal but delivered little. These results characterize one specific federal state and cannot automatically be applied to Germany as a whole.
In Berlin, one of the central factors of the campaign was the housing issue. The Left focused attention on rental costs, the shortage of affordable housing and regulation of the activities of large property owners. At the same time, migration and security remained among the important issues for AfD voters.
“These elections show not a linear movement of German society in one ideological direction, but a fragmentation of the electorate. In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, protest is concentrated around AfD, while in Berlin the Left became the main recipient of the protest vote and the vote of young urban residents. In other words, the common denominator is not ideology, but the declining ability of traditional parties to keep different groups of voters within the former model of the political center,” said sociologist and co-founder of the research company Active Group Oleksandr Poznii.
According to him, the mobilization of citizens who had not previously participated in elections is particularly illustrative. This may indicate not only a redistribution of the already established electorate, but also an expansion of the base of individual political forces.
Poznii also drew attention to the decline in confidence among some voters in the CDU’s traditional economic competence. In his view, for centrist parties the coming months will be associated primarily with the need to restore the confidence of different groups of voters, rather than only with personnel discussions.
Federal dynamics also demonstrate changes in party support. In the September ARD-DeutschlandTrend conducted by Infratest dimap from August 31 to September 2 among 1,319 voters, AfD was supported by 27% of respondents, the CDU/CSU by 21%, the Greens by 15%, the SPD by 13%, and the Left by 12%.
At the same time, state elections do not directly change the composition of Germany’s federal government or Berlin’s foreign policy. However, they influence the domestic political debate on the economy, budget spending, energy, migration and other issues.
The preliminary results of the elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin were released on the night of September 21. The final results are to be approved after the electoral records are checked.
The material was prepared on the basis of a study by the Experts Club analytical center, “AfD won in Mecklenburg, the Left in Berlin: regional elections increased pressure on Germany’s traditional parties,” published on September 21, 2026. Experts Club study on Experts.news
According to Experts Club, Ukrainian citizens received 335,100 first-time residence permits in European Union countries in 2025, ranking first among citizens of all non-EU countries, according to Eurostat data.
Ukrainians accounted for 8.7% of all first-time residence permits issued in the EU to third-country nationals. Citizens of India ranked second with 227,600 permits, or 5.9%, while Morocco ranked third with 202,100 permits, or 5.2%.
Compared to 2024, the number of first-time residence permits issued to Ukrainians increased by 13.6%. A year earlier, there were about 295,000. Thus, despite the continuation of the temporary protection mechanism, the flow of Ukrainians who are transitioning to or initially applying for other grounds for legal residence in the EU remains significant.
The main reason Ukrainians obtained their first residence permit was employment. According to Eurostat, approximately two-thirds of the permits issued to Ukrainian citizens in 2025 were related to employment.
Poland remained the primary destination: it accounted for 72% of all first residence permits issued to Ukrainians in the EU.
At the same time, Eurostat specifically notes that these figures do not include individuals benefiting from temporary protection in connection with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Temporary protection is accounted for in separate statistics; therefore, the 335,100 permits reflect other grounds for residence—primarily work, family, education, and other categories.
In total, EU countries issued approximately 3.9 million first-time residence permits to third-country nationals in 2025.
EU, Eurostat, EXPERTS CLUB, MIGRATION, RESIDENCE PERMIT, UKRAINE
Direct funding for security and defense in Ukraine’s draft 2027 state budget amounts to approximately UAH 4.855 trillion, or 66.8% of all planned expenditures, reports the Experts Club information and analytical center.
Including UAH 30 billion in state guarantees, the government declares a total defense resource of UAH 4.885 trillion. Compared with the 2026 plan, this represents an increase of approximately UAH 517.8 billion, or 11.9%.
Most of the increase is allocated to military pay and salaries with related charges, which rise from UAH 1.454 trillion to UAH 1.792 trillion. Meanwhile, the comparable allocation for weapons and military equipment in the Finance Ministry’s presentation remains virtually unchanged at UAH 2.299 trillion, compared with UAH 2.297 trillion in 2026.
Civilian sectors will also receive nominal funding increases. Social spending rises to UAH 540.3 billion, education to UAH 328.5 billion, and healthcare to UAH 292.5 billion. However, part of these increases will be absorbed by projected average annual inflation of 8.6%.
The draft budget also relies on several tax measures that still require legislative approval. In particular, the calculations include an increase in the standard VAT rate from 20% to 21%, expected to generate an additional UAH 58.7 billion. Four proposed tax measures together are expected to raise UAH 117.3 billion.
The macroeconomic forecast assumes real GDP growth of 1.3% in 2027, average annual inflation of 8.6%, and an average exchange rate of UAH 47.1 per US dollar, compared with an expected UAH 44.4 in 2026. The year-end 2027 exchange rate is projected at UAH 48.3 per dollar.
