Hungary is reinstating a ban on imports of Ukrainian agricultural products, which had earlier temporarily ceased to be in force due to the expiration of emergency decrees. The new decision is intended to maintain restrictions on Ukrainian goods in the domestic Hungarian market, while the transit of products through the country’s territory, as before, may remain permitted.
According to Hungarian media, the previous ban on the import of more than 20 categories of Ukrainian agricultural products ceased to be in force on May 14 after the expiration of the legal regime on the basis of which it had been introduced. The list of restrictions included grain, oilseeds, flour, poultry meat, eggs and a number of other goods.
After that, Budapest announced its intention to restore the ban, explaining the decision by the need to protect Hungarian farmers and the domestic market. Earlier, Hungarian Minister of Agriculture István Nagy repeatedly stated that the country would not open its market to Ukrainian agricultural products even after the renewal of the trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine.
Hungary’s position remains part of a broader conflict around Ukrainian agricultural exports to the EU. After the start of the full-scale war, the European Union abolished duties and quotas for Ukrainian goods in order to support the Ukrainian economy and compensate for problems with maritime logistics. However, EU border countries, including Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, have stated that cheap Ukrainian products were putting pressure on local farmers.
The Hungarian ban is not a general ban on all Ukrainian exports. It primarily concerns supplies to Hungary’s domestic market. The transit of Ukrainian products to other EU countries or beyond the union had previously been maintained, since for Ukraine land and Danube routes remain an important part of export logistics.
Hungary explains the restrictions by the need to protect farmers from sharp price fluctuations. In 2022, flows of Ukrainian grain and oilseeds to neighboring countries increased sharply due to the reorientation of exports from the Black Sea to European routes. Reuters noted that before the war Hungary annually imported up to 50,000 tonnes of grain and oilseeds from Ukraine, while in 2022 the volume of such supplies rose to 2.5 million tonnes, and in 2023, before the introduction of the ban, amounted to up to 300,000 tonnes.
Corn became the main problematic category for Hungary. According to The Cattle Site, citing customs statistics, during the year after the start of the full-scale war, Ukraine exported 1.7 million tonnes of corn to Hungary, compared with about 30,000 tonnes before the war.
For Ukraine, the Hungarian decision has more political and logistical significance than critical trade significance. The main markets for Ukrainian agricultural exports in the EU are not in Hungary, but in larger consumer and processing countries. However, for border trade and certain commodity groups, the ban limits exporters’ flexibility and increases dependence on licensing, transit routes and agreements with the European Commission.
In 2025, the EU had already revised trade conditions with Ukraine, increasing quotas for a number of goods: for wheat — from 1 million to 1.3 million tonnes, sugar — from 20,000 to 100,000 tonnes, barley — from 350,000 to 450,000 tonnes, and poultry meat — from 90,000 to 120,000 tonnes. These changes were intended to balance support for Ukrainian exports and the interests of farmers in EU countries.
The value of Ukraine’s exports of insulated wires and cables, including fiber-optic cables, increased by 6% in January–April 2026 compared to the same period in 2025, reaching $488.8 million.
According to statistics from the State Customs Service, Germany remained the largest importer of Ukrainian products, just as it was last year, with shipments to that country rising by 5% to $168.4 million. Its share of total exports of these products decreased slightly to 34.5%.
As in January–April 2025, the top three importers also included Hungary—$80.4 million, or 16.5%—and Poland—$80 million, or 16.4%.
In April, exports of these products rose by 3.6% compared to April 2025, reaching $125.6 million.
As reported, according to the State Customs Service, in 2025 Ukraine increased exports of insulated wires and cables by 10.6% compared to 2024—to $1.41 billion.
Ukraine is ready to deepen parliamentary cooperation with Hungary, said Ruslan Stefanchuk, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada.
“I congratulate Ágnes Forsthoffer (Ágnes Forsthoffer – IF-U) on her appointment as Speaker of the National Assembly of Hungary… Ukraine is ready to deepen parliamentary cooperation, strengthen interpersonal ties, and develop practical initiatives in the areas of trade, education, and cultural exchange,” Stefanchuk wrote on Facebook on Saturday.
According to him, he hopes for close cooperation and the further strengthening of the Ukrainian-Hungarian partnership in various areas.
The Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament wished Forsthofer success in realizing the will and aspirations of the Hungarian people.
Forsthofer, who previously served as deputy chair of Péter Magyar’s “TISZA” party, was elected Speaker of Parliament on May 9.
As reported, the Hungarian Parliament elected Magyar as the country’s prime minister on Saturday.
According to Serbian Economist, after several years of low activity among foreign buyers, Hungary’s real estate market may be entering a phase of renewed interest from foreign capital.
According to experts, the Hungarian market has long been operating below its potential: after four years of stagnation, foreign investors have largely ceded ground to domestic buyers. Now analysts expect that a combination of political changes, potential reforms, and pent-up demand could bring Hungary back into the spotlight for international investors.
An additional factor is the expectation of an improved investment climate and the potential release of European funding. Property Forum notes that market participants are discussing a “restart” of the Hungarian real estate market following the April 2026 elections, with macroeconomic stability, regulation, and the willingness of institutional investors to return to the country remaining key issues.
At the same time, the market has already gone through a period of significant price growth. According to Global Property Guide, citing the Hungarian National Bank’s housing price index, housing in Hungary rose by 21.29% year-over-year in the third quarter of 2025, or by 16.29% in real terms, indicating strong price momentum even before the full return of foreign demand.
In 2026, the market appears more balanced. According to data from Duna House cited by International Investment, approximately 78% of transactions are concluded below the initial asking price, indicating a strengthening of buyers’ bargaining power and the market’s transition from overheating to a more stable phase.
Budapest remains the main center of interest. The capital combines high rental demand, developed infrastructure, tourist traffic, and its status as the country’s business hub. However, it is in Budapest that authorities are also discussing restrictions on short-term rentals: earlier, one of the city’s central districts voted to ban short-term rentals starting in 2026, which could alter the investment model for some buyers.
For foreign investors, Hungary retains several advantages: prices are lower than in most Western European capitals, the market is part of the EU, and the weakening of the forint may make purchases more attractive to buyers with capital in euros or dollars. At the same time, the risks remain significant: rental regulations, high inflation in recent years, political uncertainty, and the market’s dependence on state support and credit conditions.
The return of foreign capital could support prices, especially in Budapest and other liquid locations. However, for local buyers, this could exacerbate the housing affordability problem, which has already become one of the key social issues in Hungary. The government has previously launched first-home support programs, including subsidized loans at 3% for up to 25 years, to help young buyers enter the market.
Thus, the Hungarian real estate market enters 2026 in a mixed state: prices have already risen significantly, demand has become more cautious, but expectations of political and economic changes may once again attract foreign investors. For the market, this means a likely uptick in transactions, and for buyers—the need to more carefully evaluate location, rental models, and regulatory risks.
According to Serbian Economist, the Hungarian opposition’s victory in the parliamentary elections and the upcoming change of government in Budapest have added uncertainty to the deal regarding the exit of Russian shareholders from NIS (Naftna industrija Srbije)—the company that operates Serbia’s only oil refinery in Pančevo and, according to estimates, supplies about 80% of the country’s fuel needs.
This refers to negotiations regarding the acquisition by Hungary’s MOL of a 56.15% stake in NIS, which is owned by Gazprom entities (44.9% by Gazprom Neft and 11.3% by Gazprom). In January, MOL announced the signing of a Heads of Agreement regarding this deal, as well as that it is considering the participation of ADNOC (UAE) as a minority partner.
A key factor is the deadlines set by the U.S. OFAC. In March, MOL reported that it had received an extension from OFAC on its license to negotiate until May 22, 2026. At the same time, MOL is seeking extensions of specific permits allowing it to continue operations and import raw materials during the negotiations.
The issue of price remains sensitive: the terms of the deal have not been officially disclosed. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić previously mentioned a range of up to €1 billion for the 56.15% stake, while a number of media outlets and analytical publications cited higher estimates.
Why the Hungarian elections have become a risk factor
The deal itself is corporate in nature and requires regulatory approvals, specifically from OFAC and Serbia. However, the change in government in Hungary affects the political backdrop and the pace of decision-making. The new leader, Péter Magyar, has publicly stated his intention to form a government quickly (specifically citing May 5 as the start date), meaning just a few weeks before the May 22 deadline. In this scenario, any additional government-level reviews, disputes over the transparency of terms, or simply the restructuring of interagency coordination could cause delays.
The most likely baseline scenario is that the parties will try to meet the deadline or request an additional license extension from OFAC if they are close to the final closing. Market participants have already seen extensions in this situation.
The negative scenario is a protracted negotiation process without a clear resolution. In that case, the risks for NIS become not a legal abstraction but a matter of supply stability: the U.S. sanctions regime is specifically aimed at the exit of Russian majority owners, and any disruptions with licenses complicate the logistics and financing of raw material procurement and operations.
For Belgrade, this turns the issue into one of energy security. Serbian authorities have previously signaled their interest in increasing the state’s stake in NIS, and if the situation worsens, tougher decisions regarding the ownership structure may be necessary to remove the company from under sanctions pressure and prevent a shock to the fuel market.
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According to the results of the April 12 parliamentary elections, the Tisza Party, led by Péter Mátyás, has secured 138 seats in Hungary’s 199-seat parliament, giving it a constitutional majority, according to international media and regional sources.
The previously ruling Fidesz-KDNP coalition has secured 55 seats, while Mi Hazánk has become the third-largest force with 6 seats. Thus, the new parliament effectively consists of three parliamentary groups, while a number of smaller parties failed to clear the electoral threshold.
A constitutional majority in Hungary traditionally means the ability to pass decisions requiring 2-3-thirds of the deputies’ votes, including amendments to fundamental laws. In this configuration, Tisza formally does not need coalition partners to form a government.
Mátyás’s campaign was built around the themes of changing the political model, fighting corruption, and restoring relations with the EU. In public speeches, he used phrases such as “Ennek a rendszernek vége van” (“This system is over”), and also spoke of a “regime change” and returning the country to a more pro-European trajectory. Reuters reports that among the stated priorities are strengthening the rule of law and anti-corruption measures, including alignment with European standards and an attempt to unblock frozen EU funds.
Separately, the name TISZA has become established in Hungarian political symbolism, interpreted as “Respect” and “Freedom” (Tisztelet and Szabadság).
