In October, Ukrainians purchased 1,205 passenger cars (new and used) imported from China, which is 61% less than the figure for October of last year, according to a report by “Ukravtoprom” on its Telegram channel.
The majority of cars purchased last month were new passenger cars—823 units, which is 67% less than in October 2025, while 382 used cars were purchased—a 37% decrease.
Most of the passenger cars from China were electric vehicles—44% (in August 2026, the share was 57%).
The most popular new car models were the BYD Sea Lion 06 (115 units), the Great Wall Wingle 7 (66 units), the Zeekr 7X (42 units), the Zeekr 8X (39 units), and the Chery Tiggo 4 (34 units).
Among used cars, the most frequently purchased models were the Volkswagen ID.Unyx—57 units; the BYD Sea Lion 06—23 units; the BYD Tang L—19 units; the BYD Song L—19 units; and the Zeekr 7X—19 units.
As previously reported, according to data from the State Customs Service, in 2025 China became one of the top three suppliers of passenger cars to Ukraine—behind only the U.S. and Germany—thanks to electric vehicles; its share of total passenger car imports stood at 16.4% (more than $1 billion).
At the same time, based on the results for January–September of this year, China is no longer among the top three exporters of these vehicles to Ukraine, a list led by the United States.
The Interdepartmental Commission on International Trade (ICIT) announced the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation into imports into Ukraine of pesticides originating in the People’s Republic of China, following a complaint filed by Alfa Smart Agro LLC and supported by Bilotserkivsky Plant of Formulations LLC.
According to a statement released by the IIT on Tuesday, the commission made this decision on November 3 of this year, recognizing that the complaint contained sufficient substantiated evidence and was filed and supported by companies whose share of total production of certain types of pesticides in Ukraine exceeds 50%.
“The complaint contains sufficient substantiated evidence to conclude that imports into Ukraine of certain types of pesticides originating in the People’s Republic of China may have been made at dumped prices, and the level of the dumping margin cannot be considered minimal, nor can the import volumes be considered insignificant under the law,” the announcement states.
The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade also agreed that there is substantiated evidence that the dumping of certain types of pesticides from China into Ukraine threatens to cause material injury to domestic producers. In particular, according to the complaint’s materials, during the investigation period (2022–first half of 2025), there was a trend of declining sales volumes and market share for the complainant in the domestic market, accompanied by a simultaneous increase in consumption of certain types of pesticides in Ukraine.
It is noted that the volume of dumped imports of certain types of pesticides from China into Ukraine increased by 44.9% in absolute terms, and by 30.4% and 21.0%, respectively, relative to the production and consumption of certain types of pesticides in Ukraine.
In addition, the average import prices into Ukraine for these goods were lower than the average prices and production costs of the applicant’s specific types of pesticides.
The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade clarified that this refers to “a herbicide based on: terbuthylazine …, classified under code ex 3808 93 13 00 according to the Ukrainian Classification of Goods for Foreign Economic Activity (UKT ZED); propisochlor . … under code ex 3808 93 15 90…, nicosulfuron … under code ex 3808 93 23 00; and diquat … under code ex 3808 93 2790 in accordance with the Ukrainian Classification of Goods for Foreign Economic Activity (UKT ZED).”
Imports from China of a single-component fungicide based on the active ingredient tebuconazole under code ex 3808 92 50 90 according to the Ukrainian Classification of Goods for Foreign Economic Activity (UKT ZED) were also included in the investigation.
The Ministry of Economy has been tasked with conducting the investigation.
The volume of Chinese exports in October rose by 35.2% year-over-year, to $412.33 billion, according to data from the country’s General Administration of Customs.
Imports rose by 41.6% to $307.05 billion, marking the highest growth rate since May 2021.
Analysts surveyed by Trading Economics had forecast, on average, a 33.5% increase in exports and a 32% increase in imports for October. In September, the growth rates were 36.3% and 31%, respectively.
Strong demand for chips and equipment for artificial intelligence development contributed to the robust growth of Chinese exports. Overseas shipments of microchips increased 2.4-fold last month.
Exports to the U.S. rose by 32.9% amid improving relations between the two countries. Shipments to the EU increased by 24.4%, and to ASEAN countries by 46.3%.
China increased its imports of high-tech products by 50.8% in October. Purchases of data processing equipment and related components rose 2.4-fold.
Imports from ASEAN countries rose by 28.1%, from South Korea by 79.1%, from Taiwan by 29.2%, and from the EU by 4.6%.
China’s trade surplus in October totaled $105.28 billion ($88 billion a year earlier). Over the first ten months of this year, the surplus reached $1.043 trillion.
The Communist Party of China (CPC) has approved the expulsion of 33 senior officials, including 16 members of the military leadership, and carried out a major reshuffle of its top party bodies. The decisions were adopted at the fifth plenary session of the 20th CPC Central Committee, held in Beijing on October 26–29, 2026, under the chairmanship of Xi Jinping, reports the Experts Club information and analytical center.
According to an official communiqué published by China’s Xinhua news agency, the plenum confirmed earlier Politburo decisions to expel party and state officials accused of serious violations of discipline and the law. At the same time, General Zhang Shengmin was elected to the Politburo, while ten alternate members of the Central Committee were promoted to full membership.
Those expelled included Ma Xingrui, a former Politburo member and party secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; Zhang Youxia, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission; and Liu Zhenli, the former chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission.
The personnel changes also affected China’s diplomatic, industrial and financial sectors. Among those expelled were Liu Jianchao, former head of the CPC Central Committee’s International Department; former industry minister Jin Zhuanglong; and Yi Huiman, former chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Li Yunze, the former head of China’s financial regulatory authority, was stripped of his party positions, although his expulsion from the CPC was not announced.
The most significant changes occurred within the military leadership. China’s Central Military Commission, which consisted of seven members in 2022, had been reduced to just two serving leaders by October 2026 — Chairman Xi Jinping and Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin. The latter previously oversaw military discipline and anti-corruption investigations. Following his election to the Politburo, he became the only military representative in that body.
The scale of the reshuffle is also reflected in attendance figures. A total of 279 people participated in the plenum, including 162 full Central Committee members and 117 alternate members. This was 97 fewer participants, or 25.8%, compared with the original membership established in 2022. By comparison, 315 participants attended the October 2025 plenum. However, absence from the meeting does not necessarily indicate expulsion from the party.
Chinese authorities have justified the decisions as necessary to strengthen party discipline and combat corruption. International analysts, meanwhile, view the reshuffle as a possible instrument for further concentrating power in Xi Jinping’s hands. Nevertheless, official documents do not confirm the existence of an organized opposition group within the CPC leadership.
The changes are particularly significant ahead of the CPC’s 21st National Congress, scheduled for the second half of 2027. The congress is expected to appoint a new Central Committee, Politburo and other senior party bodies. Analysts anticipate that Xi Jinping will seek to retain his position as CPC general secretary for a fourth term.
The reshuffle could also affect the implementation of defense programs, financial regulation and the speed of economic decision-making. However, the official outcomes of the plenum do not provide for any revision of China’s foreign policy course or its main economic priorities.
Global steel production from January through September 2026 totaled 1 billion 367.493 million metric tons, down 0.7% compared to the same period in 2025.
According to the World Steel Association (Worldsteel), China retained its top spot in the global rankings, producing 724.77 million metric tons of steel over the nine-month period. However, the country’s production declined by 2.9% year-over-year.
India ranked second with 129.957 million metric tons, increasing output by 5.6%. The United States ranked third with 64.945 million metric tons, which is 5.8% more than in January–September 2025.
Russia produced 49.421 million metric tons of steel, a decrease of 3.6%, while South Korea produced 48.04 million metric tons, an increase of 2.9%. Turkey’s production rose by 6.1%, to 29.777 million metric tons, while Germany’s increased by 4%, to 26.529 million metric tons.
Against this backdrop, Ukrainian steelmakers reduced steel production by 19.8% over the nine-month period, to 4.431 million metric tons. Ukraine ranked 25th among steel-producing countries.
In September, global steel production decreased by 0.2% compared to the same month last year, to 142.4 million metric tons. Production in Ukraine for the month totaled 131,000 metric tons, compared to 611,000 metric tons in September 2025.
Ukrainians’ attitudes toward Taiwan in August 2026 became noticeably more positive compared to March, while China remains the country with the worst balance of positive and negative assessments among the 50 countries surveyed. 42.5% of respondents view Taiwan positively, while 18.2% view China positively, according to the Experts Club information and analytical center, based on the results of a joint study with Active Group, presented in September 2026.
Thus, positive attitudes toward Taiwan among Ukrainians are 2.3 times more prevalent than those toward the People’s Republic of China, despite the fact that Ukraine officially adheres to the “One China” policy and has no diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
According to the results of the August survey, 14.5% of Ukrainians have a completely positive attitude toward Taiwan, while 28% have a mostly positive attitude. 45.6% of respondents hold a neutral position, 6.5% have a mostly negative attitude, and 2.3% have a completely negative attitude. Another 3.1% of respondents were undecided.
The overall share of positive assessments is 42.5%, negative assessments—8.8%, and the net balance of positive and negative attitudes is +33.7 percentage points. Positive responses outnumber negative ones by nearly five to one.
By comparison, Ukrainians’ attitudes toward China are characterized by a predominance of negative assessments. 18.2% of respondents view China positively, 33.9% neutrally, and 43.6% negatively. Another 4.3% were undecided.
The balance of positive and negative attitudes toward China stands at minus 25.4 percentage points. This is the lowest result among all 50 countries and territories included in the study. The difference between the balances of attitudes toward Taiwan and China reaches 59.1 percentage points. At the same time, the share of negative assessments of China is nearly five times higher than the corresponding figure for Taiwan.
It is particularly telling that China remains Ukraine’s largest trading partner, while Taiwan plays a significantly smaller role in Ukraine’s foreign trade. Thus, the intensity of economic relations is not always accompanied by a corresponding level of public favor.
According to an analysis by Experts Club, Ukraine’s trade volume with China totaled approximately $14.68 billion in the first half of 2026. Of this amount, nearly $13.9 billion came from Chinese imports to Ukraine, while Ukrainian exports amounted to approximately $778 million.
China supplies Ukraine with electronics, batteries, transformers, electrical equipment, machinery, and other industrial products. Ukrainian exports to China consist mainly of iron ore, vegetable oils, oilseed processing products, soybeans, and other agricultural goods. However, China’s significant economic presence does not ensure a positive perception of the country among the Ukrainian public.
The trend in attitudes toward Taiwan over the past five months shows the opposite pattern.
In March 2026, 36.6% of Ukrainians viewed Taiwan positively, including 11.4% who viewed it entirely positively and 25.2% who viewed it mostly positively. 51.3% of respondents held a neutral position, 7.3% held a negative one, and another 4.9% were undecided.
In August, the share of positive assessments rose by 5.9 percentage points, to 42.5%. Meanwhile, the neutral segment shrank by 5.7 percentage points, to 45.6%.
The share of negative responses also increased slightly—from 7.3% to 8.8%—but the growth in the positive segment was significantly more pronounced.
Changes occurred in both categories of positive attitudes. The share of fully positive assessments increased from 11.4% to 14.5%, while the share of mostly positive assessments rose from 25.2% to 28%.
As a result, the balance of positive and negative attitudes toward Taiwan improved from approximately plus 29.4 percentage points in March to plus 33.7 in August 2026. This also slightly exceeds the figure for August 2025, when the balance stood at plus 33.3 points.
At the same time, the balance of attitudes toward China has worsened over the past five months: in March 2026, it stood at minus 21.7 percentage points, and in August, it was minus 25.4. However, compared to August 2025, when this figure stood at minus 28.7 points, the negative balance has narrowed slightly.
Oleksandr Pozniy, director of the research company Active Group, commenting on the previous wave of the study, drew attention to the importance of public awareness in shaping attitudes toward countries and territories with which Ukrainians have limited direct experience.
Maksym Urakin, founder of the Experts Club information and analytical center and a candidate of economic sciences, commenting on the survey results, emphasized the need to distinguish between public perception of individual countries and Ukraine’s long-term economic interests.
In his view, the negative attitude of a significant portion of Ukrainians toward China should not lead to a curtailment of economic ties with the world’s second-largest economy. On the contrary, the scale of trade between the two countries requires systematic efforts to maintain mutual trust, resume dialogue, and expand cooperation.
“It is extremely important for Ukraine and China to maintain good, trusting relations. We must remember that our countries have a long history of cooperation, and back in 2011–2013, the foundation for a strategic partnership was laid at the highest state level. These agreements should not be forgotten, as they were designed to last for decades and envisaged the development of trade, investment, infrastructure projects, and industrial and scientific-technical cooperation,” Urakin noted.
He recalled that on June 20, 2011, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a Joint Declaration in Kyiv on the establishment and development of strategic partnership relations between the two countries.
The next important step was Yanukovych’s state visit to China in December 2013. During talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping on December 5, the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between Ukraine and China, a Joint Declaration on Further Deepening Strategic Partnership Relations, and the Program for the Development of Strategic Partnership Relations for 2014–2018 were signed.
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation on May 15, 2014. The relevant documents provided for the development of cooperation in the trade and economic, agricultural, energy, infrastructure, aerospace, and humanitarian spheres.
According to Urakin, this legal framework remains an important historical legacy of Ukrainian-Chinese relations, although specific areas of cooperation need to be revised in light of current conditions, the war, and Ukraine’s economic interests.
The founder of Experts Club drew particular attention to the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue for official Beijing.
“Ukrainians should not try to exploit the contradictions between China and Taiwan. We must understand that this is an extremely sensitive issue for the Chinese state and society. Ukraine has its own official position on the ‘One China’ policy, and it is important that discussions surrounding Taiwan do not become an additional factor in the deterioration of Ukrainian-Chinese relations. Instead, we need to actively develop a constructive dialogue with the PRC, seek common economic interests, and rebuild trust,” Urakin believes.
In his view, one of the key practical areas of focus should be changing the structure of Ukrainian exports to China.
Currently, bilateral trade is characterized by a significant imbalance: Ukraine imports mainly industrial products and equipment, while the structure of Ukrainian exports depends largely on the supply of raw materials and agricultural goods.
“Our task is not simply to sell grain, ore, or other raw materials to China. We need to be much more proactive in opening up the Chinese market to Ukrainian finished products with high added value. These could include highly processed food products, equipment, machinery, pharmaceuticals, technological solutions, and other competitive Ukrainian goods. The Chinese market is extremely large, but it requires systematic work, an understanding of local consumers, product certification, and long-term relationships with partners,” Urakin emphasized.
He believes that Ukrainian government agencies, trade representatives, industry associations, and companies need to work more actively to remove barriers to the entry of finished products into the Chinese market.
Specifically, this involves harmonizing veterinary and phytosanitary requirements, certifying food products, developing logistics routes, promoting Ukrainian brands, and finding local distributors.
An important avenue could be the participation of Ukrainian manufacturers in specialized trade shows in China, the holding of industry-specific business forums, and the organization of direct negotiations between companies.
According to Urakin, improving the informational presence of China in Ukraine and of Ukraine in China is of particular importance.
“Diplomacy and economics must work together. If there are extensive trade ties between the two countries but public perception remains negative, this indicates a need for better communication. It is important for Chinese partners to tell Ukrainians more about the concrete results of cooperation, and for Ukrainian businesses to more actively showcase their own technologies, products, and investment opportunities in China. “In the long run, this could contribute to more balanced economic relations,” noted the founder of Experts Club.
At the same time, he emphasized that the expansion of economic cooperation must be based on the principles of mutual respect, international law, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.
In the case of Taiwan, the survey results paint a different picture: despite the absence of official diplomatic relations with Ukraine, the perception of Taiwan among respondents is predominantly positive or neutral.
At the same time, these sociological indicators should not be interpreted as support by Ukrainians for a specific option for a political resolution of the Taiwan issue. The study measured respondents’ general attitudes, not their position on Taiwan’s status under international law.
Ukraine established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China on January 4, 1992, and adheres to the “One China” policy. In a joint Ukrainian-Chinese communiqué dated October 31, 1992, Ukraine recognized the government of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China and confirmed that it would not establish official relations with Taiwan. This position remains the foundation of Ukraine’s official diplomatic stance on the Taiwan issue.
At the same time, Taiwan has its own elected governing bodies, administrative system, and economic policies, and exercises de facto self-government. The People’s Republic of China considers Taiwan to be part of its territory.
Thus, the findings of Experts Club and Active Group demonstrate a significant discrepancy between a state’s diplomatic position, the economic structure of its foreign relations, and public perceptions of specific countries and territories.
Ukrainians’ positive attitude toward Taiwan continues to grow, but respondents with a neutral stance remain the largest single group. At the same time, China, despite its leading role in Ukraine’s foreign trade, continues to have the lowest public sentiment rating among the countries surveyed.
According to Maksym Urakin, these results should serve as a basis not for reducing international economic contacts, but for more systematic and pragmatic cooperation with partners. This is particularly true for China, where Ukraine has significant potential to expand exports of finished goods and develop industrial cooperation.
The study “Ukrainians’ Attitudes Toward Countries Around the World” was conducted in August 2026 by Active Group in collaboration with the Experts Club Information and Analytical Center using a self-administered online questionnaire on the SunFlowerSociology panel. The survey included 800 Ukrainian citizens aged 18 and older. The sample was representative in terms of age, gender, and region. The maximum stated theoretical statistical margin of error for indicators at the 50% level is ±3.5 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.
This is the third wave of the study, following surveys conducted in August 2025 and March 2026.
