Steel production in China fell by 6.3% in March compared with the same month last year, to 87.04 million tonnes, according to the country’s National Bureau of Statistics. In the first quarter, steel production fell by 4.6% to 247.55 million tonnes.
Steel exports in March fell by 12.6% to 9.13 million tonnes, and by 9.9% over the three-month period to 24.71 million tonnes.
Pig iron output last month fell by 3.3% to 73.28 million tonnes. In January–March, it fell by 2.9% to 210.98 million tonnes.
Steel product output in March fell by 2.3% to 130.98 million tonnes, and by 1.7% in the first quarter to 351.44 million tonnes.
As reported, by the end of 2025, steel production in China had fallen by 4.4% to 960.81 million tonnes, the lowest level in seven years.
This year, China plans to complete construction and commission seven nuclear power units, according to the annual report of the China Nuclear Energy Association.
Currently, there are 60 nuclear power units in operation in the country, providing a stable foundation for the transition to clean energy, according to the report “Development of China’s Nuclear Energy.”
Thirty-six units are under construction, with construction on two of them having begun this year. China accounts for more than half of the total number of nuclear power plants under construction worldwide.
Plans for another 16 nuclear power units have been officially approved and are awaiting the start of construction, according to data from the report cited by China Daily.
The total installed capacity of China’s nuclear power plants is 125 GW, making the country the world leader in this category.
The entry of Ukrainian wheat flour into the Chinese market is a strategically important step, but one should not expect mass shipments to begin immediately, said Rodion Rybchynskyi, director of the Ukrainian Flour Millers Association.
“Opening the market at the intergovernmental level means the establishment of a legal and technical framework, but it is not a signal for an immediate start to exports. There will be no rapid commercial shipments for the time being. Signing the protocol is only the first step, which defines production and control requirements, setting the conditions for future operations,” the association’s press service quoted him as saying on Facebook.
One of Beijing’s strictest requirements remains full product traceability. This involves monitoring the entire chain: from the specific field where the wheat was grown to the final batch of flour.
According to the association’s head, building such a control system is a systematic effort that cannot be completed in a few weeks. In addition to technical barriers, exporters face complex logistics and economic challenges.
As Rybchynskyi noted, the Chinese market remains unique due to high import duties and VAT. The situation is further complicated by security risks to Ukraine’s port infrastructure, which drive up the cost of maritime transport and make assembling large shipments a difficult task.
The “Flour Millers of Ukraine” association is confident that the very fact of the protocol’s approval is a mark of quality for the domestic control system. This confirms that the flour meets the standards of one of the world’s most demanding markets, which in the long term will enable the diversification of sales of high-value-added products.
Chinese authorities have announced a package of measures to “expand exchanges and cooperation” with Taiwan, which includes accelerating the resumption of regular direct passenger flights across the Taiwan Strait and easing certain trade restrictions, particularly regarding the admission of some Taiwanese agricultural and fishery products to the mainland market.
According to reports, Beijing intends to “accelerate the full resumption” of regular direct flights, including routes to and from the cities of Urumqi, Xi’an, Harbin, Kunming, and Lanzhou, as well as expand support measures for the sale of Taiwanese agricultural and fishery products on the mainland while complying with quarantine requirements.
A separate item in the announced initiatives mentions plans to deepen infrastructure “integration” with the Taiwanese islands of Kinmen and Matsu—specifically, support for projects on the shared use of resources (water, electricity, gas) and the promotion of the construction of sea bridges “when conditions permit.”
In Taipei, in response to these statements, officials emphasized that any decisions on official matters regarding cross-strait relations must be made through the Taiwanese government, not through party or informal channels, calling Beijing’s initiatives politically motivated.
The results of a public opinion poll conducted in March 2026 by the research company Active Group in collaboration with the Experts Club information and analysis centre reveal a complex and contradictory pattern in Ukrainians’ attitudes towards China. Overall, 20.3% of respondents expressed a positive attitude, whilst 42.0% expressed a negative one. Compared to August 2025, positive assessments have risen (from 12.0%), but negative ones have also increased slightly (from 40.7%), indicating not a shift in the balance but a deepening of polarisation.
A more detailed breakdown of the responses shows that only 7.7% of those surveyed have a ‘completely positive’ attitude towards China, whilst 12.6% have a ‘mostly positive’ one. At the same time, the proportion of neutral assessments is significant — 34.3% — indicating a lack of a clear position among a significant proportion of respondents.
The negative segment is dominant and is predominantly moderate in nature: 33.1% chose the ‘mostly negative’ option, with a further 8.9% selecting ‘entirely negative’. This suggests that negative perceptions of China are not sharply radicalised, but remain persistent and widespread. The proportion of those who are undecided stands at 3.5%.
Comparative trends indicate a certain increase in interest in or reassessment of China, reflected in a rise in positive assessments. However, the parallel rise in negative sentiment suggests the absence of a single trend. Rather, it indicates the formation of more pronounced positions — both positive and critical.
“Ukrainians today quite clearly distinguish between a country’s economic weight and its perception in a political and social context. In the case of China, this is particularly evident: on the one hand, there is an awareness of its role in the global economy, and on the other, a reserved or negative attitude. This is precisely why we are seeing a simultaneous rise in both positive and negative assessments,” noted Oleksandr Pozniy, director of the research company Active Group.
The high proportion of neutral responses is also an important indicator. It may indicate a limited level of personal experience of interaction or a lack of awareness among some respondents. In such conditions, public opinion remains sensitive to changes in the information environment and the foreign policy context.
“The modern international economy is shaped not only by trade, but also by trust and the perception of partners. If a country is present in the market but is not associated with investment, technology or support, this affects its image in society. In the case of China, we see a clear example of such an asymmetry between economic presence and perception. Our people are guided by emotions and the picture presented by the media, rather than by concrete facts and statistics. It should be added that if Ukrainian citizens really did have such a negative attitude towards China, there would be a de facto self-imposed embargo on the purchase of Chinese technology, clothing and other goods, but this is not the case; China remains the number one trading partner, which would be difficult without a positive or neutral attitude towards the country. “Another issue is that China should also strengthen its presence in Ukraine in the fields of humanitarian aid, educational and scientific exchange, cultural diplomacy, and so on,” noted Maksym Urakin, founder of the Experts Club information and analytical centre.
Overall, the survey results indicate that China remains an important but ambiguous partner for Ukrainians. Positive assessments are on the rise, but they do not alter the overall balance, which is dominated by a cautiously negative perception. This points to the need for a deeper analysis of the factors shaping public opinion, as well as the potential for its further transformation depending on the development of economic and political relations.
According to a study conducted by the Experts Club information and analytical centre based on data from the State Customs Service, China is the leader in terms of total trade in goods with Ukraine, with a figure exceeding $21 billion. At the same time, imports from China significantly exceed exports of Ukrainian goods, resulting in a substantial trade deficit.
The study was presented at the Interfax-Ukraine press centre; the video can be viewed on the agency’s YouTube channel. The full version of the study can be found via this link on the Experts Club analytical centre’s website.
ACTIVE GROUP, CHINA, EXPERTS CLUB, Pozniy, SOCIOLOGY, SURVEYS, UKRAINE, URAKIN
According to Serbian Economist, Serbia is increasingly becoming a key industrial platform for China to enter the European market. This is no longer a matter of scattered investments, but rather a well-established system that integrates metallurgy, mining, transport infrastructure, and export channels.
A turning point was the acquisition by the Chinese company HBIS of the steel plant in Smederevo in 2016 for approximately €46 million, followed by investments in modernization. The second major flagship project was Zijin Mining’s expansion in Serbia’s copper sector—in Bora and at the Čukaru-Peki deposit, where total investment commitments exceeded €3 billion. This allowed Serbia to take a more prominent place in the European steel and copper supply chain.
Analysts emphasize that Chinese capital in Serbia controls several links in the industrial chain at once: copper mining, processing and smelting, steel production, and the export of products to European markets. Against this backdrop, Serbia is increasingly acting not merely as a recipient of foreign investment, but as a functional extension of China’s industrial base within the European economic space.
This is also reflected in trade. By 2025, China had become Serbia’s second-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $7 billion. At the same time, a significant portion of exports from Serbia to China is provided by Chinese companies operating in the country, primarily in the copper and metallurgical sectors.
Infrastructure plays a distinct role. Analysts link the new model to projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, including the Belgrade–Budapest railway, bridges, highways, and logistics hubs. In this system, Serbia serves as a transit hub between Piraeus, the Balkans, and Central Europe, reducing transportation costs and speeding up deliveries to the EU.
In addition to metals, China’s presence is expanding in the manufacturing sector as well. Consider the Linglong tire plant in Zrenjanin, valued at around €900 million, as well as projects by Hisense in Valjevo and the Minth Group in the automotive components sector. These manufacturers leverage Serbia’s lower costs and its trade preferences for supplying the EU market.
The country’s trade architecture has been an additional factor. Serbia combines preferential access to the EU market with a free trade agreement with China, which entered into force in 2024. As a result, the country has become a rare hub where Chinese capital can operate simultaneously under both European and non-European trade regimes.
At the same time, this model faces new constraints. The importance of the energy transition and the CBAM mechanism is growing, which could increase costs for Serbia’s energy-intensive export sectors. This is pushing Chinese investors toward the next phase—investments in renewable energy, storage, and grid infrastructure—to maintain the competitiveness of assets in Serbia on the European market.
Thus, Serbia is increasingly establishing itself as an industrial and logistics hub between China and Europe. However, the further development of this role will depend on Belgrade’s ability to simultaneously retain Chinese capital and adapt to the EU’s stricter regulatory requirements.
