Romanian Prime Minister Luca Niculescu stated that a possible unification of Romania and the Republic of Moldova depends on the will of the citizens of both countries; however, Bucharest’s current priority remains strengthening bilateral economic cooperation and supporting Moldova’s accession to the European Union. The head of the Romanian government made these remarks on October 27, 2026, in an interview with TVR Moldova during an official visit to Chisinau.
“This will happen when the citizens of both countries want it,” Niculescu said, responding to a question about the prospects for unification.
According to him, there are close historical, cultural, and economic ties between Romania and Moldova, which is why the issue of a possible unification remains a topic of public debate.
At the same time, the prime minister emphasized that the Romanian government is currently focused on further bringing the two countries closer together and accelerating Moldova’s European integration.
Niculescu made his first foreign visit after taking office as Prime Minister of Romania to Chisinau, where he held talks with his Moldovan counterpart, Vasile Tofan, and President Maia Sandu.
During the talks, the parties paid particular attention to expanding trade and economic cooperation, developing energy infrastructure and transportation links, and attracting Romanian investment.
According to Niculescu, trade between Romania and Moldova reached approximately €4.5 billion in 2025. Romanian investments have created about 12,000 jobs in Moldova.
The development of transport corridors across the Prut River remains one of the priorities of bilateral cooperation. The parties discussed accelerating the construction of a bridge in the Ungheni area, modernizing border infrastructure, and organizing joint control at the Cantemir–Fălciu crossing.
In the energy sector, discussions focused on expanding electrical interconnections between the two countries, including the construction of the Bălți–Suceava power line.
In addition, Moldova is interested in purchasing natural gas to be produced on the Romanian Black Sea shelf as part of the Neptun Deep project once it becomes operational.
During the visit, the prime ministers also reviewed the progress of the Chisinau substation modernization project, which is part of the new 157-km Vulcanesti–Chisinau power transmission line.
The new energy infrastructure is expected to strengthen Moldova’s independence from electricity supplies via the Transnistrian region and expand opportunities for imports from the European market.
The parties paid special attention to the participation of Romanian businesses in the Moldovan economy. Industry, energy, technology, and transportation infrastructure were cited as promising areas.
Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tofan also proposed viewing the country as a platform for Romanian companies to participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction projects.
The issue of regional security was another key topic of the talks against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.
Tofan stated that the security of Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania is closely intertwined, and that Russian air attacks and airspace violations pose threats to the entire region.
According to the Moldovan prime minister, more than 100 unauthorized overflights have been recorded in the country’s airspace since the start of the full-scale war.
Niculescu confirmed Bucharest’s intention to continue supporting Moldova’s European integration, including facilitating the opening of the remaining negotiation chapters by the end of 2026.
Thus, the Romanian government views economic integration, the development of shared infrastructure, and Moldova’s accession to the EU as priority areas for cooperation. The possible political unification of the two states remains a separate issue, the resolution of which, according to Niculescu’s position, must be based on the will of their citizens.
Romania and the Republic of Moldova share a border approximately 680 km long and have close linguistic and cultural ties. Most of the territory of modern-day Moldova was part of Romania from 1918 to 1940. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Moldova declared its independence on August 27, 1991. Romania has been a member of the European Union since 2007, while Moldova was granted EU candidate status in June 2022, and official accession negotiations began in June 2024.
Investment firm Concorde Capital forecasts a 1% decline in Ukraine’s GDP by the end of 2026 and expects a further contraction next year, said the company’s founder and CEO, Ihor Mazepa, during the Forbes Ukraine “Private Investments” conference in Kyiv on Tuesday.
“Industrial production will decline by 3%, and inflation will be around 12%,” he added, elaborating on the forecast for 2026.
This forecast takes into account the consequences of Russian attacks, including the closure of major metallurgical and agricultural companies, as well as the destruction of warehouses.
As previously reported, in its October macroeconomic review, the KSE Institute downgraded its forecast for Ukraine’s real GDP in 2026 from 1.9% growth to a 0.3% decline, and for 2027—from 2.1% growth to a 0.6% contraction—due to intensified Russian attacks on critical infrastructure and production facilities.
In early October, the World Bank projected a slowdown in Ukraine’s GDP growth to 1.2% in 2026 from 1.8% in 2025, followed by an acceleration to 1.5% in 2027, while revising down its forecast for the following year from 4%.
In the October issue of the World Economic Outlook, the IMF forecasts Ukraine’s GDP growth in 2026 at 1%, down from 1–1.6% in its June forecast, and maintained its forecast for 2027 at 3.5%.
Due to Russia’s attacks on ports and ships in the Black Sea, the EBRD has lowered its forecast for Ukraine’s real GDP growth in 2026 to 1.5% from 2.2%, and for 2027 to 2.5% from 4%.
Dragon Capital currently expects Ukraine’s GDP to contract by 0.5% in 2026 and by 1% in 2027, whereas prior to the escalation of the war in July, it had forecast growth of 1.5% and 0.5%, respectively.
The ICU Investment Group, which in June downgraded its forecast for Ukraine’s real GDP growth in 2026 to 0.8% from 1.2%, now expects it to contract by 0.6% this year and by 1.9% next year.
The international rating agency Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ukraine’s long-term foreign-currency issuer default rating (IDR) at “CCC” and its long-term local-currency IDR one notch higher at “CCC+.”
“Ukraine’s long-term foreign-currency IDR reflects significant credit risk given the war and its macroeconomic and fiscal implications. These factors are offset by a manageable debt service schedule in the short term, improved foreign exchange reserves, and significant support from official partners, primarily the EU,” the agency noted on its website.
It attributed the higher rating in local currency to expectations that debt obligations denominated in local currency will be treated on a priority basis, as the majority of hryvnia-denominated debt is held by domestic banks (primarily state-owned) and the National Bank of Ukraine. According to Fitch, this limits the feasibility of restructuring such debt, as it could lead to additional fiscal costs (in particular, for recapitalizing banks).
The agency noted that in 2026, the war intensified: Russia stepped up airstrikes on various sectors of the economy and continues its de facto blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, which severely hinders key export routes; however, Russian troops have achieved only minor territorial gains. Diplomatic efforts have reached an impasse, and the positions of the parties remain diametrically opposed.
“Fitch expects the war to continue into 2027, as the prospects for a ceasefire are currently weak,” the document states.
The agency forecasts a slight contraction of the economy in 2026 (following zero growth in January–August) followed by 0.2% growth in 2027, provided that however, this latter figure depends on how well the Ukrainian economy can adapt to the expected new phase of airstrikes, the continuation of the naval blockade in the Black Sea, as well as the volume and timing of additional external financial assistance.
According to the report, Ukraine will continue to face a significant budget deficit due to weak domestic revenues (largely caused by a severe disruption of economic activity), as well as very high and inflexible expenditures, primarily related to defense. Fitch forecasts that the fiscal deficit will reach 18% of GDP in 2026 (28% excluding grants) and will decline slightly to 15.6% of GDP by 2028.
It is noted that the Ukraine Support Loan (USL) program covers a significant portion of Ukraine’s financing needs in 2026 (initial forecast: $56 billion) and 2027 (forecast: $43 billion); however, the escalation of the conflict has led to additional financing needs: $27 billion (12.4% of GDP) in 2026 and $33 billion (14.5% of GDP) in 2027; the sources to cover these needs have not yet been definitively determined.
“Support from international donors remains strong and is a key factor underpinning the credit rating. Fitch assumes that the volume of funding—primarily from the EU—will be sufficient to cover short-term financing gaps,” the document states.
At the same time, Fitch added that the prolonged persistence of significant financing needs in the medium term could lead to “donor fatigue” (particularly in the EU), given political disagreements among member states regarding the form and scale of support.
The agency noted that as of the end of 2025, the general government sector’s gross debt stood at 101.2% of GDP, and payments on Eurobonds will not begin until 2029. According to Fitch’s projections, this ratio will rise to 134.3% of GDP by 2028, driven by persistent significant budget deficits and the gradual depreciation of the Ukrainian hryvnia. Fitch treats funds under the USL mechanism and most of the financing under the ERA (Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration) program as contingent liabilities, as their repayment is contingent on Russia’s payment of reparations to Ukraine.
At the same time, the EU’s $18.1 billion contribution to the ERA program, provided through the macro-financial assistance mechanism, is counted as public debt.
According to Fitch’s projections, the current account deficit will reach 24% of GDP in 2026, while the merchandise trade deficit will amount to 40% of GDP. The agency expects the deficit to remain relatively high—averaging 20% of GDP during 2027–2028. Assuming that official external financial support continues, international reserves are projected to cover an average of 4.6 months of current external payments in 2026–2028.
Kyiv ranks first among Ukraine’s regions in terms of the number of individuals registered as owners or beneficiaries of at least 50 companies. As of October 2026, there were 131 such owners in the capital out of 478 nationwide, according to data from an OpenDataBot study published on October 26.
Thus, Kyiv accounts for more than a quarter of all so-called mass company owners listed in the Unified State Register.
Second place goes to the Kyiv region, where 34 individuals are registered, each linked to at least 50 companies.
In third place is the Dnipropetrovsk region with 27 such owners.
Next are the Donetsk region, where 24 mass company owners are recorded, and the Kharkiv region with 18 entries.
Combined, Kyiv and the Kyiv region have 165 mass owners, accounting for more than a third of the national total.
At the same time, the largest owners by number of affiliated companies are also predominantly based in the capital.
Vitaliy Ilnitsky of Kyiv ranks first in the Ukrainian ranking with 5,889 companies. Another Kyiv resident, Vladislav Melekhin, ranks third with 858 companies.
Kateryna Doroshenko of Kyiv ranks fifth with 674 registered companies.
The largest mass owner outside Kyiv is Ruslan Merzlyakov from Donetsk, who is listed as the owner or beneficial owner of 2,221 companies.
According to the study’s methodology, mass owners are defined as individuals with registration ties to at least 50 legal entities.
However, the owner’s address listed in the registry does not necessarily correspond to the location where the companies they own actually operate.
Therefore, the concentration of mass owners in Kyiv does not mean that a corresponding proportion of these companies conducts business directly in the capital.
The structure of ownership of a large number of legal entities deserves special attention. Miroslav Laba, an expert on tax and regulatory policy at the Economic Expert Platform, notes that the registration of hundreds of companies under a single individual may be a sign of nominal ownership.
At the same time, he emphasizes that the mere fact that a single individual owns or manages a large number of companies does not, in and of itself, violate the law.
According to the expert, to ensure transparency in business activities, it is important to identify the actual managers and individuals who make business decisions.
In total, according to “OpenDataBot,” as of October 2026, there were 478 individuals registered in Ukraine, each of whom is linked to 50 or more companies.
Source: “OpenDataBot,” study dated October 26, 2026.
Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction should involve not only the rebuilding of destroyed infrastructure and enterprises, but also a structural transformation of the economy—specifically, a shift from a raw materials-based model to the production of high-value-added goods. This was stated by expert Stakovychenko Igor, according to the publication “Glavred.”
In his assessment, the reconstruction could serve as an opportunity for the technological modernization of Ukrainian industry, increasing productivity, and strengthening the competitiveness of domestic enterprises in international markets.
“Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction is not just the largest infrastructure project in the history of the independent state. It is a chance to change the structure of the national economy, to transition from a raw materials-based model to the production of high-value-added goods,” Stakovichenko noted.
According to a joint assessment by the Ukrainian government, the World Bank, the European Commission, and the UN, released in February 2026, the country’s needs for recovery and reconstruction over the next decade amount to nearly $588 billion.
Transportation infrastructure, the energy sector, housing, industry, and the agricultural sector will require the largest investments. At the same time, recovery efforts must continue even before the war ends, despite security risks.
Among the main challenges for the economy, experts highlight not only physical destruction but also a shrinking labor force, a shortage of skilled workers, logistical constraints, and insufficient access to financing. Under these conditions, restoring production capacity alone will not guarantee its effective operation.
Promising areas for development could include agricultural processing, energy, information technology, and the defense industry. In particular, the modernization of energy infrastructure creates opportunities for the development of distributed generation and improved energy efficiency, while defense technologies could serve as the foundation for establishing new high-tech manufacturing facilities.
At the same time, the private sector will remain a key factor in the country’s recovery. International financial assistance is necessary to overcome the consequences of the war; however, long-term economic growth will also require private investment, job creation, and the expansion of export capacity.
To attract capital, Ukraine must ensure the protection of property rights, access to credit, a predictable tax policy, a reduction in administrative burdens on entrepreneurs, and an effective judicial system.
According to Stakovichenko, the key criterion for successful reconstruction should not be the number of restored facilities or the amount of funds disbursed, but rather the economy’s ability to create new industries, jobs, and added value.
Thus, post-war reconstruction could serve as a tool for Ukraine’s transition to a more modern economic model focused on technology, productivity, and competitive manufacturing.
ECONOMY, INDUSTRY, INVESTMENT, RECONSTRUCTION, UKRAINE, СТАКОВИЧЕНКО
The victory of the opposition “Student List” in Serbia’s snap parliamentary elections on October 25, 2026, opens up the prospect of a change of government after 14 years of dominance by the political force of Aleksandar Vučić. However, as analyzed by the Serbian business publication Parametar, a fundamental change in Belgrade’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war may not occur in the near future: the student movement supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity but has simultaneously declared its intention to maintain Serbia’s refusal to impose sanctions against Russia.
According to preliminary data from the research organizations Ipsos and CeSID, the “Students Are Winning” list received approximately 52% of the vote and can expect to secure 138 of the 250 parliamentary seats. The political bloc “Aleksandar Vučić — United Serbia” won 39.3% of the vote, corresponding to approximately 104 seats.
On the evening of October 25, Aleksandar Vučić acknowledged the defeat of his bloc, stating that the student movement would receive between 135 and 140 seats in parliament, while his political force would obtain around 105.
A total of 126 parliamentary seats is required to independently form a parliamentary majority. Thus, if the preliminary results are confirmed, the student movement will be able to form a new government without the participation of the previous ruling coalition.
The final election results must be approved by Serbia’s Republic Electoral Commission.
As previously analyzed by the Serbian business portal Parametar, the main distinguishing feature of the 2026 elections was the transformation of the student protest movement into an independent political force capable of competing with the Serbian Progressive Party. In an article published on October 6, the outlet noted that the struggle for power had effectively become concentrated between the two largest blocs, while the traditional opposition had been pushed into the background.
At the same time, the key issues facing the future government will include not only the fight against corruption and the reform of state institutions but also relations with the European Union, Russia, China, and neighboring Balkan countries.
Despite its opposition to Vučić, the student movement does not advocate an immediate severing of Serbia’s political and economic relations with Russia.
On September 30, 2026, representatives of the “Students in Blockade” movement published a statement on foreign policy and sanctions, confirming their intention to maintain Serbia’s refusal to introduce restrictive measures against the Russian Federation.
The movement explained its position by citing its negative attitude toward sanctions as an instrument for resolving international conflicts, referring, among other things, to Serbia’s own historical experience and the consequences of sanctions policies for the population. Thus, on one of the most sensitive issues for Ukraine, the position of the future parliamentary force practically coincides with the policy of the previous Serbian authorities.
At the same time, the political program of the “Student List” provides for respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
As reported on October 24 by the European publication The New Union Post, citing the movement’s program, the students support maintaining the policy of not joining sanctions against Russia while simultaneously recognizing Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
This means that the movement does not propose revising Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders but also does not intend to automatically join the European Union’s sanctions policy.
At the same time, the students’ political platform brings together people with different views, including supporters of European integration and more conservative groups.
According to an assessment published on October 21 by the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), the student movement has focused primarily on domestic reforms, the fight against corruption, and restoring the independence of state institutions, while avoiding a detailed definition of its foreign policy course.
Therefore, the new government’s eventual policy toward Ukraine and Russia will depend on its personnel composition, the distribution of powers, and decisions made after the formation of the cabinet.
For Ukraine, the movement’s victory creates opportunities to renew bilateral political dialogue, but in itself does not guarantee a change in Serbia’s position on sanctions against Russia.
Under Aleksandar Vučić, Belgrade pursued a policy of balancing between Moscow, Brussels, and Kyiv.
Serbia officially supported Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, provided humanitarian assistance, participated in certain international initiatives, and maintained diplomatic contacts with the Ukrainian leadership. At the same time, the country refused to join most Western sanctions against Russia, continuing to maintain economic and energy ties with Moscow.
In August 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Belgrade, where he held talks with the Serbian leadership. Following the meetings, the parties reaffirmed mutual respect for territorial integrity and their interest in developing economic cooperation.
Ukraine’s position on Kosovo remains an important factor. Kyiv does not recognize its independence, which creates a certain basis for mutual understanding between the two countries on issues of international law and the inviolability of borders.
This position may also be preserved under the new government, since the student movement likewise opposes recognizing Kosovo’s independence.
At the same time, the lack of an intention to impose sanctions against Russia limits the possibilities for a rapid convergence of Kyiv’s and Belgrade’s foreign policy positions.
One possible change could be more active cooperation on European integration, democratic reforms, and the restoration of state institutions.
Representatives of the student movement have repeatedly emphasized the need to strengthen the rule of law, judicial independence, and the fight against corruption.
If the future cabinet intensifies negotiations on Serbia’s accession to the EU, Belgrade will inevitably face the question of more fully aligning its foreign policy with that of Europe, including its approach to sanctions against Russia.
However, to date, the student movement has not declared its readiness to change its position on this issue.
From an economic perspective, a change of government in Serbia could open up additional opportunities for cooperation with Ukraine in industry, construction, energy, agriculture, and information technology.
One potential area remains the participation of Serbian companies in the reconstruction of Ukrainian infrastructure after the war.
Serbia has construction, mechanical engineering, metallurgical, and electrical engineering enterprises whose products could be used in the reconstruction of Ukraine’s energy facilities, transport infrastructure, and industrial enterprises.
Ukrainian businesses, in turn, may be interested in expanding their presence in the Serbian market, developing joint production facilities, and using Serbia as a logistics and investment destination in the Western Balkans.
Additional prospects are associated with the agro-industrial sector, food processing, pharmaceuticals, and technology services.
At the same time, the implementation of such projects will depend on the economic policy of the new government and the willingness of both countries to create practical mechanisms to support bilateral business activities.
As Parametar noted in an analytical article dated September 28, 2026, one of the main problems of the Serbian economy remains its dependence on foreign investment and large state infrastructure programs.
According to data cited by the publication with reference to the National Bank of Serbia, the inflow of foreign direct investment in 2025 decreased by 33.5%, from a record €5.23 billion to €3.48 billion.
Against this background, one of the new government’s primary challenges will be restoring investor confidence and ensuring the predictability of state economic policy.
If institutional reforms are successfully implemented, Serbia could become a more attractive partner for Ukrainian companies interested in operating in the markets of Southeastern Europe.
Thus, the victory of the student movement could contribute to the development of Ukrainian-Serbian relations primarily through economic cooperation, European integration, and institutional reforms.
However, there are currently no grounds to expect Belgrade to automatically shift toward a tougher policy on Russia. The movement’s official position combines recognition of Ukraine’s territorial integrity with a refusal to impose sanctions against Moscow.
The decisive factors will be the new government’s first foreign policy decisions, its personnel composition, and its willingness to develop practical cooperation with Kyiv.
The “Student List” emerged from mass protests that began after the collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad on November 1, 2024, which killed 16 people. The movement’s main demands were an investigation into the tragedy, the fight against corruption, the independence of state institutions, and the holding of early parliamentary elections.
Source: Parametar
