Initial registrations of used passenger cars imported from abroad in 2025 increased by 22% compared to 2024, reaching 278,630 units, according to the Automotive Market Research Institute.
The annual import rating is headed by the unchanged leader — Volkswagen (37,200 cars), which, according to experts, offers everything from budget options to premium crossovers, as well as buses and vans.
“Audi (25,900) ranks second, which indicates Ukrainians’ high demand for comfort and status,” the Institute’s website says.
At the same time, it is noted that the main event of the year was Tesla’s entry into the top three with 24,140 cars registered.
“The purely electric brand surpassed many traditional competitors, becoming a symbol of the ‘green’ craze of 2025,” the report states.
The top five are rounded out by Nissan (21,600) and Renault (almost 17,000), which maintain their positions thanks to a combination of popular electric cars and practical diesel cars from Europe.
Next in the top ten brands are BMW, Hyundai, Ford, KIA, and Skoda.
Experts note that Volkswagen Golf retained its leadership in the model ranking (10,670), but its lead over its competitors is minimal (and not without the help of e-Golf).
The main competitor is the Tesla Model Y (10,550), and third place goes to the Tesla Model (9,200). Fourth in the ranking is the Skoda Octavia (7,700), and fifth is the Nissan Leaf (7,500).
“As for premium models, last year the Ukrainian car fleet was replenished with Porsche (1,265 units), Maserati (97), Lamborghini (21), Rolls-Royce (17), and the same number of Bentley, Ferrari (8), Aston Martin (6), and one McLaren,” the report says.
Experts report that in December last year, 41,700 used imported foreign cars were submitted for first registration, which is almost 2.7 times more than in December 2024 and 75.3% more than in November 2025.
The report notes that since the beginning of 2025, import volumes have gradually increased: from 14,500 cars in January to almost 42,000 in December.
“The last time such volumes of ”freshly imported“ cars were seen was in 2022, during the temporary ”zero customs clearance” period. Now, this activity has been caused by the ‘race for electric cars’, as VAT on their import was introduced on January 1,” experts note, stating that this is why Tesla is among the top three leaders.
“Overall, we have seen a 22% increase in imports over the year, but it should be understood that a significant portion of these cars were purchased ‘in advance’. We have actually taken a portion of sales in 2026, so now the warehouses are full, and there will be no such rush in the coming months,” Stanislav Buchatsky, head of the Automotive Market Research Institute, is quoted as saying in the report.
Ukrainian cheese producers are ending the year without the expected pre-holiday sales boost, although consumption traditionally increases in December, with more and more buyers preferring European cheeses because of their lower price, according to the industry analytical agency Infagro.
Analysts noted that the supply of inexpensive imported cheese on the Ukrainian market increased significantly at the end of 2025. Already, according to estimates, a significant share of semi-hard cheese sales comes from EU products, and this trend is likely to intensify.
“Sales of domestic products were supported mainly by active promotions, which had a negative impact on margins. Anticipating weaker demand in January, producers reduced production volumes at the end of the year, and at the end of the year, the output of hard and semi-hard cheeses decreased compared to last year,” experts noted.
According to their information, market participants do not expect a decline in imports next year, as European cheese remains competitive in terms of price. Even during promotions, Ukrainian cheeses are often more expensive than their imported counterparts, forcing manufacturers to either offer deep discounts or reduce production.
“Exports remain an alternative to the domestic market for some producers, where price conditions are more attractive,” analysts said.
Infagro emphasized that the processed cheese market remains relatively stable, without sharp fluctuations in demand or production, making it one of the few balanced niches in the cheese segment.
In 2025, Moldova was heavily dependent on imports of milk and dairy products, with Ukraine supplying more than two-thirds of the product to the local market, according to the Moldovan publication rupor.md, citing data from the republic’s Customs Service.
According to Moldovan customs, in January–November 2025, Moldova imported 26.7 thousand tons of milk and dairy products worth a total of $23.4 million. The largest volume of raw milk as a raw material came from Ukraine — 16.8 thousand tons (66.1% of total imports). Romania, Poland, and Belarus are also among the leaders in milk raw material supplies.
According to customs data, Moldova also imported finished dairy products, including sour cream and milk mixtures.
In the segment of full-fat sour cream (over 10%), Ukraine’s share was even higher — over 80% of imports. In addition, Ukraine led in the supply of milk and sour cream with added sweeteners, accounting for almost 68% of imports.
Ukraine significantly outperformed its competitors from Romania, Poland, and Belarus in the supply of dairy products.
“Moldova’s dependence on milk imports from Ukraine is due to close trade ties between the countries and geographical proximity, which significantly reduces logistics costs for importers,” Moldovan experts explained.
In December 2025, Tunisia imported 6.2 thousand tons of Ukrainian bran and feed flour (HS code 2302) worth $1.1 million, which is almost 26% of the total volume of supplies from Ukraine during this period in physical terms, according to the information and analytical agency “ APK-Inform ” reported.
“These are the first deliveries of this type of Ukrainian product to Tunisia since the beginning of both the marketing and calendar year. At the same time, in 2024, this country did not purchase the specified Ukrainian products,” analysts said.
According to their information, since the beginning of the 2025/26 marketing year (July 1 – December 23), Ukraine has supplied 168.6 thousand tons of bran and feed meal to foreign markets for a total of $26.8 million. The main buyers were Turkey (111.2 thousand tons), Syria (15.6 thousand tons), and Romania (9.7 thousand tons).
“In 2025/26 MY, flour production in Ukraine may reach 1.9 million tons (-8.4% compared to 2024/25 MY), which will result in wheat bran production of 530 thousand tons. At the current export rates, this will allow the export potential of this segment to reach 320-330 thousand tons, which is 8-11% less than in the previous marketing year,” APK-Inform noted.
Ukraine currently imports electricity from Europe around the clock at a maximum capacity of 1.6 GW during peak hours, which does not cover the maximum allowable import capacity due to grid restrictions.
This was announced by Anatoliy Zamulko, acting head of the State Energy Supervision Inspectorate of Ukraine (Derzhenergonadzor), on Thursday during the “Yedyni Novyny” telethon.
“The peak part of imports, depending on the situation, is 1.5-1.6 thousand MW, which is not yet the limit allowed to us by contracts with Europe. The only problem that remains today is network restrictions to push that electricity to eastern Ukraine,” he said.
As reported, the maximum agreed commercial capacity for imports from the EU from December 2024 is 2.1 GW. On average, in November 2025, the utilization of transmission capacity was 27.4%, but during peak evening consumption hours, it increases significantly.
“If we had the opportunity to restore that network infrastructure more quickly, we would certainly have much better opportunities to provide energy through imports,” said the head of the State Energy Regulatory Commission.
As he explained, with the current drop in temperature and the onset of frost in Ukraine, there has been an increase in energy consumption. To balance the energy system, transmission system operators (TSOs, regional power companies) together with regional military administrations are freeing up additional capacity for consumers by including facilities that were not previously subject to disconnection in consumption restriction schedules.
“We are fighting to mitigate the drop in temperature in various ways, including one of the effective tools that will be used throughout Ukraine, which is to take into account the facilities that are to be included in the schedules and increase the fairness that is being talked about in terms of distribution,” Zamulko said.
He stressed that the Ukrainian energy sector continues to function as a single entity.
“We remain a unified energy system, working in parallel with Europe, carrying out all transfers in accordance with the agreements reached with our partners, using import capacities and, if necessary, using emergency assistance,” said the head of the State Energy Regulatory Commission.
Ukraine imports record amounts of electricity from the EU, but millions of consumers still sit without electricity for 12-16 hours or more. In other words, there are imports, but no electricity. This raises a logical question: where are the megawatts “lost”?
However, the paradox is easily explained: imports are not “light in the socket,” but only an additional source of power. For electricity to reach a particular neighborhood or building, highways, substations, and distribution networks must be operational—and that is where the biggest problems lie today.
The issue is further exacerbated by the fact that after large-scale shelling in early December, the capacity of nuclear power plants (which are the base generation of the Ukrainian power system) was reduced. According to the IAEA, damage to the networks led to the shutdown of some units or their transfer to reduced capacity. Therefore, the topic of imports has been discussed very actively at all levels recently.
November already showed a systemic gap. Electricity exports fell by 94% compared to October 2025, to 5.3 thousand MWh, and have virtually stopped since November 11. Recall that in October, Ukrainian electricity exports fell by 85% compared to September. Imports, on the contrary, increased by 17% to approximately 415,000 MWh, reaching their highest level since the beginning of the year.
Data for December is not yet available, but it is already clear that Ukraine remains a net importer of electricity for the second month in a row. The structure of supplies has changed somewhat: as in October, Hungary is the largest supplier (about 44%), but the shares of Slovakia (10 times) and Moldova (2 times) have increased significantly. At the same time, Poland and Romania have declined in the structure of electricity imports.
On December 1, the maximum available import cross-section was increased from 2.1 to 2.3 GW, but it should be noted that both figures are still more theoretical. After all, the average actual use of the cross-section in November was only about 27%, with peaks of up to 88% at certain hours.
In other words, the resource is there, but not always where and when it is needed. There are several main reasons why even the available electricity does not reach the end consumer.
The market responds to shortages with prices. In November 2025, the Ukrainian day-ahead market became one of the most expensive in Europe (with a price of around €140 per MWh), while in Sweden the price was around €36/MWh and in France, for example, €43/MWh.
This is not about the “greed” of sellers and suppliers, but about the lack of cheap domestic supply and network constraints.
The EU is increasing inter-state flows, which lowers prices and adds flexibility. In 2024, France increased its nuclear and hydroelectric power generation and became the largest net exporter in the region.
But even France’s record surplus is not an automatic “magic bullet” for Ukraine. The reason is asymmetry of time and place: surpluses often occur at times when we have a different load profile, and at nodes from which we cannot quickly “pump” megawatts.
Some EU countries also have electricity surpluses, especially during so-called solar and wind windows, and are also looking for places to sell their surpluses. But the same problems arise: complex logistics (both in the EU and in Ukraine) and load asymmetry.
In other words, imports can be very useful, but they should not be seen as a strategy to replace our own maneuverable capacity.
However, the current situation is not hopeless. Ukrenergo expects a gradual reduction in restrictions as damaged facilities are repaired and there are no new attacks.
The government is synchronizing restoration, construction of protective structures, creation of fuel reserves, and connection of cogeneration plants to the grid. This will add local capacity where it is most needed.
The effect of increasing the cross-section to 2.3 GW is there, but it is limited by internal nodes. The closest practical relief will come from connecting decentralized sources and restoring networks.
In the coming weeks, the focus will be on speed and accuracy. First of all, it is necessary to restore throughput capacity in critical corridors and key substations, where a single replacement of a transformer or circuit breaker returns tens of megawatts to the city.
Mobile substations, field crews, and “hot” equipment logistics are a matter of hours and days, not months.
At the same time, cogeneration, gas piston, and gas turbine units need to be connected to the grid in deficient nodes. Where “black holes” of evening peak demand appear on the map, local generation can “pick up” the load.
In the next few months, the transition to managed demand will become key. Industry and large commercial consumers are able to “smooth out” the load according to clear rules and compensation. This is not an abstraction: power restriction schedules (PRS) are already in place, but they need to be transformed into civilized DR (demand response) programs with a predictable effect.
It is also necessary to continue creating additional “west-east” corridors, additional switching nodes in the 330-750 kV network, and local reserves around megacities and large substations. Energy storage devices in large nodes support the system during 2-3 peak hours and reduce the duration of GPP.
In the long term, more game-changing capacity is needed. We need 3.5-4 GW of new decentralized maneuverable generation, as close to the consumer as possible. Gas installations, cogeneration clusters for heat and electricity, microgrids for critical areas — all this makes the system less dependent on one or two nodes.
Engineering logic must go hand in hand with institutional logic: transparent corporate governance, stable settlement rules, and rapid procurement of critical equipment. Without trust, there will be no funding; without funding, there will be no underground distribution points, reinforced intersections, or warehouses with backup transformers.
Don’t expect a magic button that will turn off the GPV overnight. A realistic scenario is a gradual reduction in the duration and severity of outages in regions where:
– at least part of the west-east trunk lines have been restored;
– local cogeneration/gas plants are connected;
– demand management programs for businesses are in place;
– critical infrastructure is provided with reserves.
This is a “mosaic of solutions”: each piece separately does not save the day, but together they have a tangible effect.
Imports with a potential of 2.3 GW may be a temporary salvation, but by no means a panacea. As long as high-voltage lines and power transmission nodes remain damaged, imported megawatts will not turn into light in homes.
The path to shorter outages lies in three quick actions:
At the same time, it is necessary to invest in our own maneuvering capacity and the development of central and local networks. Record imports are a symptom of an open wound. It is treated not with intersection figures, but with systematic rehabilitation of networks and a return of trust in the rules of the game.
Source: https://expertsclub.eu/analiz-potochnoyi-sytuacziyi-z-importom-elektroenergiyi-v-ukrayini/
