Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey have agreed to expand the mission of the joint Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group by adding the protection of critical infrastructure to its mandate.
The agreement was reached during the NATO summit in Ankara. This involves expanding the authority of the Mine Countermeasures Black Sea Task Group, which had previously focused primarily on locating and neutralizing mines in the Black Sea.
According to Reuters, the new mandate calls for the protection of energy and telecommunications facilities and undersea pipelines owned or operated by the three countries.
The Romanian Ministry of Defense stated that protecting critical infrastructure in the Black Sea requires a comprehensive, integrated, and long-term approach. The ministry also noted that a memorandum establishing the mine countermeasures security group was signed on January 11, 2024, by the defense ministers of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey.
The joint group became the first trilateral initiative of its kind among the three NATO countries with access to the Black Sea. Its initial task was to improve the safety of navigation following the appearance of drifting mines in the sea as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
According to Reuters, the group has already neutralized more than 150 mines since its creation. The expansion of its mandate reflects growing concerns among countries in the region regarding the security of maritime infrastructure, particularly against the backdrop of developing gas projects in the Black Sea.
For Ukraine, this decision is of direct importance, as Black Sea security affects shipping, export routes, energy infrastructure, and the overall naval situation in the region. Stronger coordination between Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey also signals greater NATO focus on the Black Sea region.
BLACK SEA, BULGARIA, DEFENSE, INFRASTRUCTURE, ROMANIA, TURKEY
The global ranking of armed populations, compiled on the basis of the Small Arms Survey, shows that the ten countries with the largest number of civilian weapons include the United States, India, China, Pakistan, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Germany, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Ukraine is not on this list, but even before Russia’s full-scale invasion, the country was among the states with a significant amount of weapons in the hands of citizens. The Experts Club Analytical Center analyzed global and Ukrainian statistics.
According to the Small Arms Survey for 2017-18, there were about 4.4 million civilian weapons in Ukraine—approximately 9.9 guns per 100 inhabitants. Of these, only about 800,000 were officially registered, and about 3.6 million belonged to the illegal segment.
According to the National Police database, as of July 31, 2018, there were 892,854 registered weapons in the country. In 2021, the Ministry of Internal Affairs estimated the number of weapons legally owned by citizens at approximately 1.3 million, against the backdrop of tighter regulations and growing public interest in self-defense after 2014.
The full-scale war of 2022 dramatically changed the picture. Against the backdrop of the formation of territorial defense and volunteer units, the state massively transferred small arms to citizens; at the same time, a significant number of captured and illegal firearms ended up in the hands of the population. Estimates today vary widely: according to Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko, Ukrainians may have between 1 and 5 million weapons, while a number of think tanks put the figure at 4–5 million, of which 2–3 million may be in illegal circulation.
Research by Small Arms Survey using sociological surveys shows that up to 11% of Ukrainian households may have at least one weapon, which on a national scale gives a range of 865,000 to 1.42 million armed households. At the same time, the share of households that openly report the presence of weapons in 2023–2024 remains at 5–6%, which indicates both a high level of distrust and the sensitivity of the issue in wartime.
To bring order, Ukraine has launched a Unified Weapons Register. By July 2024, 63% of households that own weapons stated that some or all of their weapons were registered; among those who are aware of the system, 74% claim to have registered all their weapons, but about 10% continue to keep unregistered weapons.
Thus, while before the war there were approximately 1.3 million registered weapons in Ukraine and several times more illegal firearms, now, against the backdrop of full-scale hostilities, there are millions of weapons, a significant portion of which must gradually be registered or confiscated.
This makes the issue of civilian weapons control one of the key issues for post-war security, law enforcement reform, and Ukraine’s negotiations with the EU on the harmonization of weapons legislation.
Source: https://expertsclub.eu/ukrayina-na-tli-svitovogo-rynku-czyvilnoyi-zbroyi/
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has recognized that M.S.L. does not have effective legal remedies for its complaints in Ukraine. This decision is the first substantive decision in the ECHR’s practice against Ukraine regarding the application of sanctions in accordance with the Ukrainian law “On Sanctions.”
As Elvira Lazarenko, a partner at the Barristers law firm, told the Interfax-Ukraine news agency, the relevant decision in the case of M.S.L., TOV v. UKRAINE” was published by the ECHR on October 16, 2025 (https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-245275%22]}).
Lazarenko noted that “today, there is a fairly well-established practice of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court in ‘sanctions cases’, which states that there is limited possibility for judicial review of decisions by state bodies on the application of sanctions due to the discretionary powers of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine to resolve issues of national security.”
“This practice has long been criticized by lawyers, as it demonstrated the de facto refusal of Ukrainian courts to review the factual grounds for the application of sanctions, i.e., a refusal to administer justice properly. The decision in M.S.L., TOV v. UKRAINE is important in that it raises questions about the limits of judicial review by Ukrainian courts of decisions on the application of sanctions and the possibility for courts to assess the significance of the risks that form the basis for the application of sanctions to individuals in accordance with the Ukrainian law “On Sanctions,” she said.
Lazarenko recalled that the case “M.S.L., TOV v. UKRAINE“ concerned the appeal by the company ”M.S.L.” against sanctions imposed on it by a decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and enacted in 2015 by a decree of the President of Ukraine, with the subsequent extension of the sanctions by decrees in 2016 and 2017.
The applicant company complained that the imposition of sanctions, in particular the freezing of assets, constituted an interference with its rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, as it was prohibited from using and disposing of its assets. The applicant company also raised an issue under Article 13 of the Convention in connection with its lack of an effective remedy for the violation of its property rights.
At the national level, the Ukrainian courts dismissed the applicant company’s claim regarding the first Presidential Decree of Ukraine, and the company withdrew its claims regarding the second and third Decrees.
“In dismissing the company’s claim, the national courts refused to assess the factual grounds for the application of sanctions, referring to the discretionary powers of the authorities that had issued the contested decisions. The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court indicated that the scope and results of the president’s assessment of the significance of the risks that served as the basis for imposing sanctions on the applicant company are beyond the scope of judicial review, since the administrative court does not have the competence to make decisions on matters of national security and defense,” the lawyer explained.
She noted that, in appealing to the ECHR, the company claimed, in particular, that the national courts had failed to administer justice because they had not examined whether the state authorities had sufficient grounds for imposing sanctions and whether those grounds were supported by any evidence.
“Moreover, the restriction of the scope of judicial review was not based on any provision of national law. In the company’s opinion, the president’s discretionary powers on national security issues should not limit judicial review by national courts or exempt courts from the obligation to verify the grounds for sanctions in accordance with the sanctions law,” Lazarenko said.
The lawyer noted that the ECHR, in turn, pointed out that the decisions of the national courts lacked a substantive judicial assessment of the decision to impose sanctions on the applicant company. In particular, the Supreme Court limited its analysis to the sole question of whether the decision of the NSDC and the first presidential decree complied with the formal requirements of the sanctions law and did not address the substance of the SBU’s allegations against the applicant company.
“Due to the fact that the courts did not verify whether the first presidential decree had a solid factual basis, the ECHR concluded that such judicial review could not be considered a sufficient procedural guarantee against arbitrariness. Accordingly, the ECHR recognized the interference with the applicant company’s right to peaceful enjoyment of property as unlawful,” she said.
In addition, Lazarenko noted that the ECHR, referring to its conclusion about the lack of adequate procedural safeguards against arbitrariness during the judicial review of the decision to apply sanctions, as well as the ineffectiveness of the company’s complaints to the SBU, concluded that the applicant company did not have effective legal remedies for its complaints.
“Given the established status of ECHR practice as a source of law, we expect an appropriate response to the ECHR’s decision in M.S.L., TOV v. UKRAINE,“ from the Administrative Court of Cassation and the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, as the courts of first and appellate instance designated to review decisions on the application of sanctions,” the lawyer concluded.
France has increased defense spending, some of which will be invested in production in Ukraine, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic to Ukraine Gael Vesierre has said.
During the 16th annual Kyiv Security Forum founded by Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s Open Ukraine Foundation, the Ambassador noted that France’s defense spending exceeded 2% of GDP.
Regarding investments in defense, the diplomat stressed that investments are also needed to produce in Ukraine what the Ukrainian Armed Forces need.
“We say: if we can start such production in Ukraine, we should do it,” Vesier said.
He also called for supporting Ukraine to achieve victory.
“Let’s imagine for a second if Russia wins. It means that Russia can destroy a neighbor and the international community can do nothing in response. It means that many countries will say: we now need to join the nuclear club because our security is at risk. It will be a more risky and unstable situation than today,” the French diplomat emphasized.
The 16th annual Kiev Security Forum, organized to mobilize transatlantic support for Ukraine, is taking place March 21-22.
Kyiv will increase funding for security and defense forces in 2023 compared to last year from almost UAH 850 million to over UAH 1.1 billion, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko has announced.
“This year, Kyiv will allocate more than UAH 1.1 billion to finance the security and defense forces of the capital. This is to help the Armed Forces, border guards, and police. Almost 350 million hryvnias have already been allocated from these funds,” he wrote on his Telegram channel on Thursday.
Klitschko reminded that “last year, Kyiv allocated almost UAH 850 million from the city budget to support the security and defense forces.”
“This money is spent, in particular, on military uniforms, bulletproof vests and helmets. It is also used to purchase drones, radio stations, repair military equipment, and transport. We also send aid to the front line that we raise ourselves – from international partners. We have sent vehicles, drones, Starlink systems, generators, and first aid kits. And we continue to do so,” Klitschko wrote.
Ukraine’s spending on the development and procurement of weapons and military hardware in 2022 has been increased by UAH 67.57 billion with UK loans totaling 1.7 billion and aimed at bolstering capacities of the Ukrainian Navy.
The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada adopted the respective bill by 342 votes on Tuesday.
The bill enlarges this year’s budget expenditures from UAH 1,525.930 trillion to UAH 1,593.5 trillion with the special fund’s growth to UAH 221.11 billion.
Meanwhile, the budget deficit ceiling was raised from UAH 188.8 billion to UAH 256.36 billion, including UAH 96.1 billion for the special fund.
In addition, the budget no longer has restrictions at the amount of 3% of the planned revenue for the provision of state guarantees, as well as restrictions at the amount of UAH 10 billion and UAH 20 billion, respectively, for the provision of portfolio guarantees and loan guarantees, in order to increase the national defense capacity.
The bill limits road fund expenditures. “The money will be primarily spent on repaying the state debt, defense, and the development and maintenance of roads,” the Servant of the People faction said in comment on the bill.
An explanatory note says that Ukraine will be implementing state investment projects to purchase two minesweepers from British suppliers, to deliver and service these minesweepers, to ensure the joint construction of eight missile craft, and to deliver and install weapons on the available ships. It is also planned to jointly build a frigate and to receive advisory and technical support for the construction of naval infrastructure, including the delivery of equipment.
At the end of January, the Verkhovna Rada ratified a framework intergovernmental agreement on loan funding of the development of the Ukrainian Navy. The agreement was signed in London on November 12, 2021, to envisage allocations for the construction of eight missile craft, the procurement of two minesweepers from the UK, and the opening of two naval bases in Ukraine.
