The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump is considering nominating former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán for the position of UN Secretary-General, hoping to secure the support of Russia and China. U.S. officials have already discussed this initiative with the Hungarian politician, but a final decision on his participation in the election has not yet been made, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on October 25, 2026, citing sources in three countries.
According to the publication, the idea of nominating Orbán initially originated within the U.S. administration, after which American officials suggested that the former Hungarian prime minister consider running for the position of UN secretary-general.
Washington hopes that Orbán could become a joint candidate of the U.S., Russia, and China, as he has maintained political contacts with the leadership of all three countries.
A U.S. State Department official told the WSJ that, according to preliminary estimates, Orbán can count on the support of eight out of the 15 members of the UN Security Council. Under favorable circumstances, the number of votes in his favor could rise to ten.
However, to recommend a candidate for Secretary-General, at least nine Security Council votes are required, provided there is no veto from any of the five permanent members—the U.S., Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France.
Thus, even with the support of Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, Orbán’s appointment will depend on the stance of the remaining Security Council members, primarily London and Paris.
According to the WSJ, representatives of the Trump administration view Orbán’s political experience and his ideological affinity with the American conservative MAGA movement favorably.
In particular, officials in Washington are noting his long-standing policy of restricting migration, his conflicts with European institutions, and his experience governing the country amid international political pressure.
It is expected that, should Orbán be officially nominated, U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance may publicly support him. However, according to the publication’s sources, such an announcement may be postponed until after the U.S. midterm elections in November 2026.
Orbán himself, according to journalists, has expressed interest in the proposal but is not ready to launch a campaign without sufficient confidence in his chances of being elected.
The White House, Moscow, and Beijing have not officially confirmed the information regarding the coordinated nomination of the Hungarian politician. Furthermore, as of October 26, his name is not included in the list of officially nominated candidates published by the UN.
The WSJ report was published in the Opinion section. The publication cites its own sources regarding the negotiations.
The term of current UN Secretary-General António Guterres ends on December 31, 2026. His successor is scheduled to take office on January 1, 2027.
According to the UN Charter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The election of the organization’s new leader will take place sometime in 2026.
Several international politicians and diplomats are vying for the position, including Rafael Gross, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Rebecca Greenspan, Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Orbán’s potential nomination could spark further debate regarding the foreign policy direction of the future UN leadership, particularly in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war.
During his tenure as head of the Hungarian government, Orbán maintained contacts with Russian President Vladimir Putin and repeatedly opposed certain EU sanctions and financial decisions regarding Russia and Ukraine.
In particular, his government blocked the approval of certain European initiatives to provide financial support to Kyiv, explaining its position by the need to protect Hungary’s national economic interests.
Following Orbán’s defeat in the parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the new government led by Péter Magyar announced its intention to improve relations with European institutions.
Viktor Orbán was born on May 31, 1963, in Székesfehérvár, Hungary. He graduated from the Faculty of Law at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. In 1988, he became one of the founders of the Fidesz party. He first served as Hungary’s prime minister from 1998 to 2002, then returned to the post in May 2010 and held it until 2026. During his years leading the country, he established a conservative political agenda based on national sovereignty, restrictions on immigration, and a critical stance toward certain aspects of European Union policy. In the parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, his party, Fidesz, was defeated by the opposition party Tisa, led by Péter Magyar. Orbán stepped down as prime minister after 16 years of uninterrupted rule.
The total transit of grains and oilseeds from Ukraine through neighboring Moldova, Slovakia, and Hungary increased by 46.5% in September compared to August, but the bulk of the increase came from Moldova and Slovakia, Ukraine’s Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Taras Vysotsky told reporters in Kyiv on Thursday.
According to his data, transit through Moldova rose by 59.7%—to 107,000 metric tons in September from 67,000 metric tons in August; through Slovakia—by 61.5%, to 336,000 metric tons from 208,000 metric tons; and through Hungary—by 8.5%, to 115,000 metric tons from 106,000 metric tons.
“An increase is possible; we’ll see how much. We’re working on all fronts,” Vysotsky emphasized.
At the same time, he refrained from making any forecasts.
“We’ll report the actual results every month,” the minister noted.
Regarding the prospects for opening a maritime grain corridor, the head of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy stated that “there are currently no signals from our partners that could be interpreted as providing any kind of planning horizon.”
“The situation remains unchanged—no more, no less,” Vysotsky said.
Earlier, the minister reported that in September, Ukraine managed to export 2.4 million metric tons of agricultural products, or 46% of what was supposed to be exported, including 1.4 million metric tons of grain (38%), 444,000 metric tons of oilseeds (83%), oil—311,000 metric tons, or 64%, and meal—280,000 metric tons, or 46% of the potential required exports.
EXPORTS, GRAIN, HUNGARY, MOLDOVA, SLOVAKIA, TRANSIT, UKRAINE
The Hungarian government has drafted a bill to introduce an annual tax on large fortunes at rates of 1–1.5%, which could affect not only Hungarian citizens but also foreign owners of real estate and businesses. The new tax is scheduled to take effect on December 15, 2026, and the first payments are due to the budget by August 31, 2027, according to a draft from the Hungarian Ministry of Finance.
According to the document, the net value of assets exceeding 1 billion forints (approximately $3.08 million) will be subject to taxation. A rate of 1% applies to the portion of taxable assets up to 100 billion forints, and 1.5% applies to the amount exceeding that threshold.
A tax-free allowance of 1 billion forints is granted to each individual separately, including spouses. When calculating the tax base, the value of assets is taken into account net of documented liabilities.
The list of taxable assets includes real estate, shares in companies, cash, securities, cryptoassets, investment-grade precious metals, and other valuable assets. The tax may also apply to works of art and jewelry valued at more than 3 million forints per item, as well as vehicles valued at more than 10 million forints.
Tax residents of Hungary are subject to taxation on their worldwide assets. However, a special rule applies to Hungarian citizens: after moving abroad, they will lose their resident status for purposes of the new tax only after ten years of living outside the country.
Foreign non-residents will pay tax exclusively on certain Hungarian assets, including real estate, property rights, and shares in companies registered in Hungary. Shares in foreign companies may also fall under the scope of the law if more than 75% of their balance sheet assets consist of Hungarian real estate.
However, simply owning an apartment or house in Hungary does not in itself create a new tax liability. A tax-exempt threshold of 1 billion forints is also provided for non-residents with respect to the relevant Hungarian assets.
According to estimates by the Ministry of Finance, the tax could affect approximately 15,000 high-net-worth individuals and 2,000 asset management entities. The expected additional revenue over four years is estimated at 800 billion forints.
The bill has passed the public consultation phase, which concluded on October 14; however, as of October 19, a final parliamentary decision has not yet been made.
The new tax regime is of interest to foreign investors, among whom citizens of Germany, Romania, Slovakia, China, the Netherlands, and Austria remain the largest groups of buyers of Hungarian real estate.
According to data from the National Bank of Hungary, compiled based on information from the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) and published in August 2026, foreign citizens accounted for 4% of all homebuyers in the country in 2025.
Citizens of Germany accounted for the largest share—1.1% of all homebuyers. Citizens of Romania accounted for 0.6%, Slovakia for 0.5%, the Netherlands and China for 0.3% each, and Austria for 0.2%.
More detailed statistics from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) for 2024 allow for an assessment of the number of purchases by nationality. At that time, foreigners purchased approximately 6,600 residential properties with a total value of 309 billion forints, accounting for 6.4% of the value of all transactions in the housing market.
German citizens purchased the most properties—1,369. They were followed by buyers from China—708 properties; Romania and Slovakia—671 each; the Netherlands—438; Vietnam—329; and Austria—268.
Russian citizens purchased 185 residential properties in 2024, while Ukrainians purchased 144. The average value of housing purchased by Russians was 83.5 million forints, and by Ukrainians—35.6 million forints.
Thus, the average transaction value for these two groups was significantly below the projected threshold for the new tax, although some wealthy investors may own significantly more expensive properties or multiple types of assets.
The geographic distribution of foreign demand varies noticeably depending on the buyers’ nationality.
Germans primarily purchase homes in the western and southwestern regions of Hungary, particularly in the Somogy and Zala counties, located near Lake Balaton and the borders with Austria and Croatia.
According to data from 2025, foreigners accounted for 11.3% of residential property purchases in both counties. More than two-thirds of these transactions were made by German citizens. Buyers from the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland are also active in the local markets.
Citizens of Romania and Slovakia tend to buy real estate in border regions. Chinese, Vietnamese, Israeli, and Russian buyers primarily focus on Budapest.
In the Hungarian capital in 2025, foreign nationals accounted for 5.5% of all homebuyers. In the central districts of Pest—including Districts V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX—their share reached 13.2%.
Chinese citizens were particularly active in central Budapest, accounting for 3.5% of all residential property purchases in these districts. The share of Vietnamese and Israeli citizens was 0.8% each, Turkish citizens 0.7%, Russian citizens 0.6%, and French citizens 0.5%.
These statistics reflect the distribution of new purchases by nationality, not the overall structure of real estate already owned by foreigners.
The proposed wealth tax could have the greatest impact on owners of expensive apartments, commercial real estate, large investment portfolios, and stakes in Hungarian companies.
For most foreign buyers of standard apartments, the new tax—based on the proposed threshold of 1 billion forints—should not create additional obligations, provided that the total value of their taxable Hungarian assets does not exceed the established limit.
The final terms of taxation will depend on the version of the law adopted by the Hungarian Parliament.
On October 20, Hungary blocked the next stage of the negotiation process regarding Ukraine and Moldova’s accession to the European Union by refusing to approve the results of the preliminary review of legislation for the last two outstanding negotiation clusters. Budapest’s position was not supported by the remaining 26 EU countries, according to “European Truth,” citing European diplomats.
The decision was discussed at a meeting of the EU Council’s Working Group on Enlargement (COELA) in Brussels. The participants had planned to approve the results of the screening of Ukrainian and Moldovan legislation regarding negotiation clusters No. 4 and No. 5, which is a necessary procedural step before their official opening.
However, the Hungarian representative refused to support the approval of the documents, despite the position of the other EU member states.
As three European diplomats told The Kyiv Independent, representatives from other countries asked the Hungarian delegation to explain the reasons for the refusal. According to one of the publication’s sources, Budapest did not provide any new arguments, stating only that its position remains unchanged.
At the time of publication, Hungary’s official mission to the EU had not provided the publication with a comment.
The fourth negotiation cluster, “Green Agenda and Sustainable Interconnectivity,” covers transportation policy, energy, trans-European networks, environmental legislation, and the fight against climate change.
The fifth cluster, “Resources, Agriculture, and Cohesion Policy,” involves harmonizing regulations in the areas of agricultural policy, food security, veterinary and phytosanitary controls, fisheries, regional development, as well as financial and budgetary provisions.
Both clusters are of significant importance for Ukraine’s economic integration into the EU, as they concern access for agricultural products to the European market, transportation, energy infrastructure, and future mechanisms for the distribution of European budget funds.
This new impasse occurred one week after the previous progress in the negotiation process.
On October 13, the Council of the EU officially opened two negotiation clusters for Ukraine and Moldova: No. 2, “Internal Market,” and No. 3, “Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth.” These clusters encompass 17 negotiation chapters, including issues related to competition, entrepreneurship, and economic regulation.
As reported by the Council of the EU, at that time, four of the six clusters provided for in the accession procedure had been opened for both countries.
The previous decision became possible after Hungary withdrew its objections to the opening of the second and third clusters following the Verkhovna Rada’s adoption on October 12 of amendments to education legislation concerning the rights of national minorities.
Previously, Budapest had linked the progress of negotiations to ensuring the linguistic and educational rights of the Hungarian community in Zakarpattia.
According to The Kyiv Independent, the current delay may prove to be temporary. European diplomats expect that the remaining two negotiation clusters will be officially opened in December 2026.
Ireland, which will hold the EU Council presidency in the second half of 2026, intends to continue discussing this issue at upcoming meetings of the Enlargement Working Group.
However, Hungary’s October decision does not cancel the negotiation clusters that have already been opened and does not mean the end of accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova. It does, however, delay the necessary harmonization of documents required for both countries to move forward.
Ukraine and Moldova were granted EU candidate status in June 2022. In December 2023, the European Council decided to open negotiations, and the first intergovernmental conference took place in June 2024.
The accession process involves aligning national legislation with EU law, implementing institutional reforms, and negotiating 35 chapters, most of which are grouped into six thematic clusters. The opening of all clusters marks a stage in the negotiations but does not in itself signify the completion of the accession process.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, EUROPEAN UNION, HUNGARY, MOLDOVA, UKRAINE
The Hungarian Parliament has repealed several provisions of a 2021 law that restricted the distribution to minors of materials containing information about homosexuality, gender identity, and gender transition. This information has been confirmed by Hungarian and international sources; however, this does not constitute a complete repeal of all existing restrictions on LGBT content in the country.
The amendments were adopted on October 13, 2026: 139 members of parliament voted in favor, while 51 voted against. Provisions prohibiting the “display” or “promotion” of sexual and gender diversity in content accessible to persons under the age of 18 have been removed from the legislation. Instead, a more general provision has been introduced to protect minors from material that could seriously harm their physical, intellectual, emotional, or moral development.
The restrictions were introduced in 2021 under Viktor Orbán’s government as part of the so-called Child Protection Act. In addition to measures against pedophilia, the document included a ban on the distribution to minors of materials that the authorities interpreted as “promoting” homosexuality or gender transition. The restrictions applied, in particular, to educational and media content.
The legislative change marked one of the first notable policy revisions in this area since Prime Minister Péter Mádjár’s government took office. The ruling Tisza Party, which holds a two-thirds majority in parliament, supported the amendments. Former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party voted against them.
The parliament’s decision followed a ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union on April 21, 2026. The court found Hungary’s 2021 restrictions to be incompatible with EU law and the fundamental values of the European Union. Following the vote, EU representatives described the changes as an important signal of Hungary’s commitment to common European principles.
Ukrainians’ attitudes toward Hungary have improved significantly compared to March 2026, but negative views still outnumber positive ones. In August, 22.9% of respondents viewed the country positively, 35.6% negatively, and another 37.4% took a neutral stance. This is evidenced by the results of the third wave of a survey conducted by Active Group and Experts Club, according to the Experts Club Information and Analytical Center. Experts.news
According to the results of the August survey, 6.3% of Ukrainians view Hungary entirely positively, while 16.6% view it mostly positively. A neutral attitude was expressed by 37.4% of respondents. At the same time, 28.8% view the country mostly negatively, 6.8% view it entirely negatively, and another 4.1% were undecided.
The balance of positive and negative assessments in August stands at minus 12.7 percentage points. Based on this indicator, Hungary remains among the countries with a negative balance of public opinion; however, the trend over the past five months has shifted significantly in a positive direction. In the survey’s overall ranking, China had a lower balance in August at minus 25.4 percentage points, and India at minus 14.3 percentage points
In March 2026, the situation was noticeably more negative. At that time, 4.9% of respondents viewed Hungary entirely positively, and 13.8% viewed it mostly positively—meaning that positive assessments totaled 18.6%. A total of 52.2% of respondents viewed the country negatively: 34.3% viewed it mostly negatively and 17.9% viewed it entirely negatively. 27.3% held a neutral position.
Thus, between March and August, the share of positive assessments increased by 4.3 percentage points—from 18.6% to 22.9%—while negative assessments fell by 16.6 percentage points—from 52.2% to 35.6%. At the same time, the share of neutral responses rose by 10.1 percentage points—to 37.4%.
The shift in the balance is even more pronounced: in March, it stood at minus 33.6 percentage points, and in August, at minus 12.7 percentage points. Thus, the gap between positive and negative assessments narrowed by 20.9 percentage points. At the same time, a significant portion of the former negative sentiment did not directly shift to positive assessments—it was the group of respondents with a neutral attitude that increased significantly.
Oleksandr Pozniy, director of the research company Active Group, commenting on previous waves of the survey, drew attention to the connection between public assessments and international politics as well as perceptions of support for Ukraine.
“This survey confirms the general trend in public sentiment in Ukraine, which has intensified since the start of the full-scale war. Ukrainians clearly associate the support received primarily from European Union countries and the United Kingdom with a positive attitude toward them,” Pozniy noted. Speaking specifically about Hungary, he emphasized: “These results are not surprising—the official rhetoric from Budapest and Bratislava often diverges from Ukraine’s interests and is viewed as pro-Russian, which inevitably influences public opinion.”
The new wave shows a significant softening in assessments of Hungary compared to March. At the same time, it is still too early to speak of a predominantly positive perception: negative responses remain about one and a half times more common than positive ones, and respondents with a neutral attitude now constitute the largest single group.
The survey was conducted in August 2026 using an online self-administered questionnaire via the SunFlowerSociology panel among 800 Ukrainian citizens aged 18 and older. The sample is representative by age, gender, and region; the maximum theoretical margin of error for indicators at the 50% confidence level is ±3.5 percentage points.
ACTIVE GROUP, EUROPE, EXPERTS CLUB, HUNGARY, international relations, Pozniy, PUBLIC OPINION, SOCIOLOGY, UKRAINE
