The Hungarian government has proposed to stop issuing investment visas and residence permits to foreigners who invest in Hungarian investment funds and educational institutions starting January 1, 2027. The corresponding bill was published by the country’s Ministry of the Interior on November 4, 2026, and is open for public comment until November 12.
The proposed changes call for the removal of the Guest Investor Program—known as the “golden visa”—from Hungary’s immigration laws.
A government statement dated November 5 clarifies that investment-based residence permits already issued will remain valid until their expiration dates; however, it will not be possible to renew them once the new rules take effect.
However, the decision to terminate the program has not yet been finalized. The changes must go through the legislative process before they can take effect.
According to the published draft bill, foreigners who have applied for an investment visa or residence permit by December 31, 2026, will be able to complete the process under the current rules.
A mandatory requirement is the payment of the corresponding administrative fee no later than the specified date.
Similar transitional provisions apply to applications for the renewal of previously issued permits.
Investors who have obtained a valid investment visa by January 1, 2027, will be able to apply for a residence permit even after the program has been terminated.
However, for third-country nationals eligible for visa-free entry to Hungary, the option to submit new applications for an investment residence permit directly within the country as of January 1, 2027, is proposed to be abolished.
This provision is particularly relevant for Ukrainian citizens, who currently enjoy visa-free entry and, provided they meet the established requirements, can apply for an investment residence permit without first obtaining a special visa.
Investment residence permits that have already been issued will remain valid until their expiration dates. Their holders and eligible family members will retain the right to work in Hungary for the duration of the permits’ validity.
Hungary reinstated its investment residency program in 2024. It allows citizens of countries outside the European Economic Area to obtain a residence permit valid for up to 10 years. Currently, there are two main options for participation.
The first involves purchasing investment shares in a real estate fund registered with the Hungarian National Bank for an amount of at least 250,000 euros. The investment must be maintained for a minimum period of five years.
The second option involves a non-refundable donation of at least 1 million euros to a Hungarian institution of higher education managed by a relevant public foundation. The funds must be used to support education, scientific research, or creative activities.
The direct purchase of residential real estate valued at 500,000 euros or more was originally included in the program but was removed from it at the end of 2024.
Under current rules, an investment-based residence permit is issued for a term of up to 10 years, with the possibility of a further extension for another 10 years. A new legislative initiative proposes eliminating the possibility of extension.
Official statistics on the use of the Hungarian investment residency program are published only to a limited extent. However, in a March 12, 2025, report, the Hungarian publication Szabad Európa cited information about applicants obtained from sources familiar with the work of immigration authorities.
According to this data, by the end of February 2025, 25 applications had been submitted directly for an investment residence permit.
The largest number of applications came from Chinese citizens—nine in total. Of these, four were approved, and five were pending review.
Vietnamese citizens ranked second with five applications, two of which were approved.
Two applications were submitted by citizens of the Republic of South Africa.
In addition, one application each was submitted by citizens of Burundi, Kazakhstan, the United Kingdom, Dominica, Israel, Afghanistan, India, Turkey, and Saint Kitts and Nevis.
Thus, citizens of China accounted for 36% of all applications for investment-based residence permits in this sample, Vietnam for 20%, and South Africa for 8%.
It should be noted that these figures refer specifically to applications, not to all permits issued. Some applications were still under review at the time of the study’s publication.
Separately, according to Szabad Európa, 192 applications for preliminary investment visas had been submitted by the end of February 2025.
Russian citizens constituted a significant group among the applicants. Of the 50 Russian applicants, four received visas, 24 were denied, 15 withdrew their applications or discontinued the process, and seven cases were still under review. National security concerns were cited as grounds for some of the denials. This information pertains to early 2025 and does not reflect the final results of the program for its entire duration.
In the available statistics from Szabad Európa regarding the 25 applications for investment-based residence permits submitted by the end of February 2025, Ukrainian citizens are not listed.
However, this does not mean that Ukrainians did not take advantage of the program later on. As of November 9, 2026, no comprehensive published statistics on the issuance of Hungarian investment residence permits for 2025–2026, broken down by citizenship, could be found. Therefore, it is not yet possible to determine the exact number of Ukrainian investors who took advantage of the “golden visa” program.
For comparison, according to Eurostat statistics, in 2025, Ukrainian citizens received 7,922 initial residence permits in Hungary on various grounds.
By this measure, Ukrainians ranked third among citizens of non-EU countries, behind the Philippines and China.
In total, 12,281 initial permits were issued to citizens of the Philippines, 11,348 to China, 4,703 to Vietnam, 3,859 to India, 3,715 to Turkey, and 2,936 to Russia.
It is important to note that these Eurostat data cover all major categories of initial residence permits, including those for employment, education, family reunification, and other grounds. They do not allow for determining the number of participants in the investment program and cannot be used as a ranking of “golden visa” applicants.
The proposal to abolish investment-based residency is part of a broader package of legislative changes concerning the law enforcement system, public safety, and immigration regulation. However, the government’s published materials do not contain a detailed, independent assessment of the program’s economic outcomes or the reasons for its proposed termination.
Previously, Hungarian media had highlighted the relatively limited number of applications, the difficulties in launching investment funds, and repeated changes to the requirements for program participants.
Against the backdrop of the possible closure of Hungary’s investment residency program, foreign investors may turn their attention to other European countries that maintain programs offering residence permits in exchange for investment, notably Greece and Portugal.
However, the terms of such programs vary significantly in terms of cost, available investment options, residency requirements, and the possibility of renewing permits.
The final termination of the Hungarian program as of January 1, 2027, will depend on Parliament’s approval of the proposed changes.
The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump is considering nominating former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán for the position of UN Secretary-General, hoping to secure the support of Russia and China. U.S. officials have already discussed this initiative with the Hungarian politician, but a final decision on his participation in the election has not yet been made, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on October 25, 2026, citing sources in three countries.
According to the publication, the idea of nominating Orbán initially originated within the U.S. administration, after which American officials suggested that the former Hungarian prime minister consider running for the position of UN secretary-general.
Washington hopes that Orbán could become a joint candidate of the U.S., Russia, and China, as he has maintained political contacts with the leadership of all three countries.
A U.S. State Department official told the WSJ that, according to preliminary estimates, Orbán can count on the support of eight out of the 15 members of the UN Security Council. Under favorable circumstances, the number of votes in his favor could rise to ten.
However, to recommend a candidate for Secretary-General, at least nine Security Council votes are required, provided there is no veto from any of the five permanent members—the U.S., Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France.
Thus, even with the support of Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, Orbán’s appointment will depend on the stance of the remaining Security Council members, primarily London and Paris.
According to the WSJ, representatives of the Trump administration view Orbán’s political experience and his ideological affinity with the American conservative MAGA movement favorably.
In particular, officials in Washington are noting his long-standing policy of restricting migration, his conflicts with European institutions, and his experience governing the country amid international political pressure.
It is expected that, should Orbán be officially nominated, U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance may publicly support him. However, according to the publication’s sources, such an announcement may be postponed until after the U.S. midterm elections in November 2026.
Orbán himself, according to journalists, has expressed interest in the proposal but is not ready to launch a campaign without sufficient confidence in his chances of being elected.
The White House, Moscow, and Beijing have not officially confirmed the information regarding the coordinated nomination of the Hungarian politician. Furthermore, as of October 26, his name is not included in the list of officially nominated candidates published by the UN.
The WSJ report was published in the Opinion section. The publication cites its own sources regarding the negotiations.
The term of current UN Secretary-General António Guterres ends on December 31, 2026. His successor is scheduled to take office on January 1, 2027.
According to the UN Charter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The election of the organization’s new leader will take place sometime in 2026.
Several international politicians and diplomats are vying for the position, including Rafael Gross, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Rebecca Greenspan, Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Orbán’s potential nomination could spark further debate regarding the foreign policy direction of the future UN leadership, particularly in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war.
During his tenure as head of the Hungarian government, Orbán maintained contacts with Russian President Vladimir Putin and repeatedly opposed certain EU sanctions and financial decisions regarding Russia and Ukraine.
In particular, his government blocked the approval of certain European initiatives to provide financial support to Kyiv, explaining its position by the need to protect Hungary’s national economic interests.
Following Orbán’s defeat in the parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the new government led by Péter Magyar announced its intention to improve relations with European institutions.
Viktor Orbán was born on May 31, 1963, in Székesfehérvár, Hungary. He graduated from the Faculty of Law at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. In 1988, he became one of the founders of the Fidesz party. He first served as Hungary’s prime minister from 1998 to 2002, then returned to the post in May 2010 and held it until 2026. During his years leading the country, he established a conservative political agenda based on national sovereignty, restrictions on immigration, and a critical stance toward certain aspects of European Union policy. In the parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, his party, Fidesz, was defeated by the opposition party Tisa, led by Péter Magyar. Orbán stepped down as prime minister after 16 years of uninterrupted rule.
The total transit of grains and oilseeds from Ukraine through neighboring Moldova, Slovakia, and Hungary increased by 46.5% in September compared to August, but the bulk of the increase came from Moldova and Slovakia, Ukraine’s Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Taras Vysotsky told reporters in Kyiv on Thursday.
According to his data, transit through Moldova rose by 59.7%—to 107,000 metric tons in September from 67,000 metric tons in August; through Slovakia—by 61.5%, to 336,000 metric tons from 208,000 metric tons; and through Hungary—by 8.5%, to 115,000 metric tons from 106,000 metric tons.
“An increase is possible; we’ll see how much. We’re working on all fronts,” Vysotsky emphasized.
At the same time, he refrained from making any forecasts.
“We’ll report the actual results every month,” the minister noted.
Regarding the prospects for opening a maritime grain corridor, the head of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy stated that “there are currently no signals from our partners that could be interpreted as providing any kind of planning horizon.”
“The situation remains unchanged—no more, no less,” Vysotsky said.
Earlier, the minister reported that in September, Ukraine managed to export 2.4 million metric tons of agricultural products, or 46% of what was supposed to be exported, including 1.4 million metric tons of grain (38%), 444,000 metric tons of oilseeds (83%), oil—311,000 metric tons, or 64%, and meal—280,000 metric tons, or 46% of the potential required exports.
EXPORTS, GRAIN, HUNGARY, MOLDOVA, SLOVAKIA, TRANSIT, UKRAINE
The Hungarian government has drafted a bill to introduce an annual tax on large fortunes at rates of 1–1.5%, which could affect not only Hungarian citizens but also foreign owners of real estate and businesses. The new tax is scheduled to take effect on December 15, 2026, and the first payments are due to the budget by August 31, 2027, according to a draft from the Hungarian Ministry of Finance.
According to the document, the net value of assets exceeding 1 billion forints (approximately $3.08 million) will be subject to taxation. A rate of 1% applies to the portion of taxable assets up to 100 billion forints, and 1.5% applies to the amount exceeding that threshold.
A tax-free allowance of 1 billion forints is granted to each individual separately, including spouses. When calculating the tax base, the value of assets is taken into account net of documented liabilities.
The list of taxable assets includes real estate, shares in companies, cash, securities, cryptoassets, investment-grade precious metals, and other valuable assets. The tax may also apply to works of art and jewelry valued at more than 3 million forints per item, as well as vehicles valued at more than 10 million forints.
Tax residents of Hungary are subject to taxation on their worldwide assets. However, a special rule applies to Hungarian citizens: after moving abroad, they will lose their resident status for purposes of the new tax only after ten years of living outside the country.
Foreign non-residents will pay tax exclusively on certain Hungarian assets, including real estate, property rights, and shares in companies registered in Hungary. Shares in foreign companies may also fall under the scope of the law if more than 75% of their balance sheet assets consist of Hungarian real estate.
However, simply owning an apartment or house in Hungary does not in itself create a new tax liability. A tax-exempt threshold of 1 billion forints is also provided for non-residents with respect to the relevant Hungarian assets.
According to estimates by the Ministry of Finance, the tax could affect approximately 15,000 high-net-worth individuals and 2,000 asset management entities. The expected additional revenue over four years is estimated at 800 billion forints.
The bill has passed the public consultation phase, which concluded on October 14; however, as of October 19, a final parliamentary decision has not yet been made.
The new tax regime is of interest to foreign investors, among whom citizens of Germany, Romania, Slovakia, China, the Netherlands, and Austria remain the largest groups of buyers of Hungarian real estate.
According to data from the National Bank of Hungary, compiled based on information from the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) and published in August 2026, foreign citizens accounted for 4% of all homebuyers in the country in 2025.
Citizens of Germany accounted for the largest share—1.1% of all homebuyers. Citizens of Romania accounted for 0.6%, Slovakia for 0.5%, the Netherlands and China for 0.3% each, and Austria for 0.2%.
More detailed statistics from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) for 2024 allow for an assessment of the number of purchases by nationality. At that time, foreigners purchased approximately 6,600 residential properties with a total value of 309 billion forints, accounting for 6.4% of the value of all transactions in the housing market.
German citizens purchased the most properties—1,369. They were followed by buyers from China—708 properties; Romania and Slovakia—671 each; the Netherlands—438; Vietnam—329; and Austria—268.
Russian citizens purchased 185 residential properties in 2024, while Ukrainians purchased 144. The average value of housing purchased by Russians was 83.5 million forints, and by Ukrainians—35.6 million forints.
Thus, the average transaction value for these two groups was significantly below the projected threshold for the new tax, although some wealthy investors may own significantly more expensive properties or multiple types of assets.
The geographic distribution of foreign demand varies noticeably depending on the buyers’ nationality.
Germans primarily purchase homes in the western and southwestern regions of Hungary, particularly in the Somogy and Zala counties, located near Lake Balaton and the borders with Austria and Croatia.
According to data from 2025, foreigners accounted for 11.3% of residential property purchases in both counties. More than two-thirds of these transactions were made by German citizens. Buyers from the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland are also active in the local markets.
Citizens of Romania and Slovakia tend to buy real estate in border regions. Chinese, Vietnamese, Israeli, and Russian buyers primarily focus on Budapest.
In the Hungarian capital in 2025, foreign nationals accounted for 5.5% of all homebuyers. In the central districts of Pest—including Districts V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX—their share reached 13.2%.
Chinese citizens were particularly active in central Budapest, accounting for 3.5% of all residential property purchases in these districts. The share of Vietnamese and Israeli citizens was 0.8% each, Turkish citizens 0.7%, Russian citizens 0.6%, and French citizens 0.5%.
These statistics reflect the distribution of new purchases by nationality, not the overall structure of real estate already owned by foreigners.
The proposed wealth tax could have the greatest impact on owners of expensive apartments, commercial real estate, large investment portfolios, and stakes in Hungarian companies.
For most foreign buyers of standard apartments, the new tax—based on the proposed threshold of 1 billion forints—should not create additional obligations, provided that the total value of their taxable Hungarian assets does not exceed the established limit.
The final terms of taxation will depend on the version of the law adopted by the Hungarian Parliament.
On October 20, Hungary blocked the next stage of the negotiation process regarding Ukraine and Moldova’s accession to the European Union by refusing to approve the results of the preliminary review of legislation for the last two outstanding negotiation clusters. Budapest’s position was not supported by the remaining 26 EU countries, according to “European Truth,” citing European diplomats.
The decision was discussed at a meeting of the EU Council’s Working Group on Enlargement (COELA) in Brussels. The participants had planned to approve the results of the screening of Ukrainian and Moldovan legislation regarding negotiation clusters No. 4 and No. 5, which is a necessary procedural step before their official opening.
However, the Hungarian representative refused to support the approval of the documents, despite the position of the other EU member states.
As three European diplomats told The Kyiv Independent, representatives from other countries asked the Hungarian delegation to explain the reasons for the refusal. According to one of the publication’s sources, Budapest did not provide any new arguments, stating only that its position remains unchanged.
At the time of publication, Hungary’s official mission to the EU had not provided the publication with a comment.
The fourth negotiation cluster, “Green Agenda and Sustainable Interconnectivity,” covers transportation policy, energy, trans-European networks, environmental legislation, and the fight against climate change.
The fifth cluster, “Resources, Agriculture, and Cohesion Policy,” involves harmonizing regulations in the areas of agricultural policy, food security, veterinary and phytosanitary controls, fisheries, regional development, as well as financial and budgetary provisions.
Both clusters are of significant importance for Ukraine’s economic integration into the EU, as they concern access for agricultural products to the European market, transportation, energy infrastructure, and future mechanisms for the distribution of European budget funds.
This new impasse occurred one week after the previous progress in the negotiation process.
On October 13, the Council of the EU officially opened two negotiation clusters for Ukraine and Moldova: No. 2, “Internal Market,” and No. 3, “Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth.” These clusters encompass 17 negotiation chapters, including issues related to competition, entrepreneurship, and economic regulation.
As reported by the Council of the EU, at that time, four of the six clusters provided for in the accession procedure had been opened for both countries.
The previous decision became possible after Hungary withdrew its objections to the opening of the second and third clusters following the Verkhovna Rada’s adoption on October 12 of amendments to education legislation concerning the rights of national minorities.
Previously, Budapest had linked the progress of negotiations to ensuring the linguistic and educational rights of the Hungarian community in Zakarpattia.
According to The Kyiv Independent, the current delay may prove to be temporary. European diplomats expect that the remaining two negotiation clusters will be officially opened in December 2026.
Ireland, which will hold the EU Council presidency in the second half of 2026, intends to continue discussing this issue at upcoming meetings of the Enlargement Working Group.
However, Hungary’s October decision does not cancel the negotiation clusters that have already been opened and does not mean the end of accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova. It does, however, delay the necessary harmonization of documents required for both countries to move forward.
Ukraine and Moldova were granted EU candidate status in June 2022. In December 2023, the European Council decided to open negotiations, and the first intergovernmental conference took place in June 2024.
The accession process involves aligning national legislation with EU law, implementing institutional reforms, and negotiating 35 chapters, most of which are grouped into six thematic clusters. The opening of all clusters marks a stage in the negotiations but does not in itself signify the completion of the accession process.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, EUROPEAN UNION, HUNGARY, MOLDOVA, UKRAINE
The Hungarian Parliament has repealed several provisions of a 2021 law that restricted the distribution to minors of materials containing information about homosexuality, gender identity, and gender transition. This information has been confirmed by Hungarian and international sources; however, this does not constitute a complete repeal of all existing restrictions on LGBT content in the country.
The amendments were adopted on October 13, 2026: 139 members of parliament voted in favor, while 51 voted against. Provisions prohibiting the “display” or “promotion” of sexual and gender diversity in content accessible to persons under the age of 18 have been removed from the legislation. Instead, a more general provision has been introduced to protect minors from material that could seriously harm their physical, intellectual, emotional, or moral development.
The restrictions were introduced in 2021 under Viktor Orbán’s government as part of the so-called Child Protection Act. In addition to measures against pedophilia, the document included a ban on the distribution to minors of materials that the authorities interpreted as “promoting” homosexuality or gender transition. The restrictions applied, in particular, to educational and media content.
The legislative change marked one of the first notable policy revisions in this area since Prime Minister Péter Mádjár’s government took office. The ruling Tisza Party, which holds a two-thirds majority in parliament, supported the amendments. Former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party voted against them.
The parliament’s decision followed a ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union on April 21, 2026. The court found Hungary’s 2021 restrictions to be incompatible with EU law and the fundamental values of the European Union. Following the vote, EU representatives described the changes as an important signal of Hungary’s commitment to common European principles.
