Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković accused the country’s president, Zoran Milanović, and the left-wing opposition of blocking the participation of Croatian military personnel in international missions to train and support the Ukrainian army. According to him, because of these decisions, the Croatian Armed Forces have lost the opportunity to gain valuable experience in military cooperation with Ukraine.
Plenković made this statement on November 10, 2026, during a speech in the Croatian Parliament (Sabor), while presenting a report on the results of the European Council meeting held on October 15–16, according to the Croatian news agency Hina.
The prime minister noted that the Croatian army is not participating in the European Union’s military training mission, EUMAM Ukraine, through which more than 100,000 Ukrainian servicemen have already received training.
“We missed the boat,” Plenković said, commenting on the decision not to participate in international military aid programs for Ukraine.
According to the Croatian prime minister, the Ukrainian army is currently one of the best-trained and most experienced in Europe thanks to the practical application of modern technologies and combat operations.
Plenković believes that the lack of participation in relevant programs limits the Croatian military’s ability to learn from the experience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and adapt its own training system to modern conditions.
“The Croatian army is essentially unaware of what is currently happening in the field of military cooperation regarding support for Ukraine,” the prime minister noted.
He called this situation a serious shortcoming of the country’s defense policy.
Apart from the European mission EUMAM, Croatia does not participate in the activities of the NATO Security Assistance and Training Mission for Ukraine (NSATU), as President Milanović, in his capacity as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, has not approved the relevant decision.
Milanović had previously opposed the involvement of Croatian military personnel in such programs, arguing that it risked dragging the country into the war between Russia and Ukraine. He has repeatedly emphasized that Croatian military personnel should not be deployed to Ukrainian territory.
Plenković refuted these arguments, noting that the countries participating in the military training of Ukrainian forces conduct such activities primarily outside Ukraine.
According to him, refusing to participate in the missions contradicts the position of the Croatian government, the General Staff, and the Ministry of Defense.
The EU has extended its military training mission for Ukraine until 2028
The Croatian prime minister’s statements came the day after the Council of the European Union decided to extend the mandate of the EUMAM Ukraine military training mission for another two years.
According to an official statement from the Council of the EU dated November 9, 2026, the mission will continue its work until November 15, 2028. Nearly EUR300 million has been allocated for its activities over the next two years.
The EUMAM Ukraine program was established in October 2022 to train Ukrainian military personnel on the territory of EU member states.
It encompasses individual, collective, and specialized military training, as well as the coordination of training programs and the provision of necessary equipment.
Since the mission began, more than 100,000 Ukrainian military personnel have undergone training.
The new EU decision also provides for the establishment of a mission presence in Ukraine to coordinate directly with Ukrainian military leadership and international partners. EUMAM’s main training activities take place within the European Union.
Disagreements Have Arisen in the European Union Regarding Funding for Ukraine
During his speech, Plenković also reported on disagreements among EU member states regarding further funding for Ukraine.
According to him, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria stated at the October meeting of the European Council that they were unwilling to participate in the annual funding of aid to Ukraine.
The Croatian prime minister criticized the position of these countries, noting that they receive more funds from the EU budget than they contribute to it, yet are unwilling to participate in the joint financing of Ukraine’s needs.
He also drew attention to the position of Germany, which provides approximately 20% of the EU budget’s funding. According to Plenković, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is linking future budget agreements within the EU to the issue of financial support for Ukraine.
Plenković emphasized that there remains a consensus among EU member states on the need to achieve peace in Ukraine, but approaches to further military and financial aid differ.
Croatia has been a member of the European Union since 2013 and of NATO since 2009. Since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, the country’s government has supported providing military, financial, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. The issue of Croatian military participation in international training missions remains a point of disagreement between the government and the country’s president.
Sources: Hina / N1 Hrvatska, November 10, 2026; Council of the EU, decision on the extension of EUMAM Ukraine dated November 9, 2026.
Ukrainians’ attitudes toward Belgium in August 2026 improved slightly compared to the previous survey wave: 59.8% of respondents view the country positively, while only 1.4% view it negatively. At the same time, more than a third of those surveyed—36%—remain neutral, according to the Experts Club Information and Analytical Center.
According to the results of the August survey, 21.1% of Ukrainians view Belgium entirely positively, and 38.7% view it mostly positively. A neutral attitude was expressed by 36% of respondents. Only 0.8% view the country mostly negatively, 0.6% view it entirely negatively, and another 2.7% were undecided.
According to the table, the balance of positive and negative assessments is +58.4 percentage points. Thus, Belgium remains among the Western European countries with a distinctly positive perception, and negative attitudes toward it are virtually marginal.
In March 2026, 58.7% of respondents viewed Belgium positively: 19.3% viewed it entirely positively and 39.4% viewed it mostly positively. 37.1% of respondents held a neutral view, 2.3% held a negative view, and another 1.9% were undecided.
Thus, over the course of five months, the share of positive assessments rose by 1.1 percentage points—from 58.7% to 59.8%—while negative assessments fell by 0.9 percentage points—from 2.3% to 1.4%. The neutral segment also decreased by 1.1 percentage points. The balance between positive and negative attitudes rose from approximately plus 56.4 to plus 58.4 percentage points.
At the same time, the internal structure of positive responses changed slightly. The share of fully positive assessments increased from 19.3% to 21.1%, while the share of mostly positive assessments decreased from 39.4% to 38.7%. This means that the overall improvement was modest, but a portion of respondents began to view Belgium more unequivocally positively.
Oleksandr Pozniy, director of the research firm Active Group, previously noted that a significant proportion of neutral responses regarding Belgium is not linked to a negative perception but rather to the specific characteristics of the country’s established image.
“Belgium is perceived by Ukrainians as an important member of the European Union and NATO, a country that consistently supports Ukraine on the international stage. At the same time, its relative distance and the lack of deep historical ties account for the high proportion of neutral assessments,” Pozniy explained.
The new wave of the survey generally confirms this characterization. The positive segment is gradually expanding, negative assessments remain at a minimal level, yet more than a third of Ukrainians still hold a neutral position. This indicates significant potential for further shaping a more defined image of Belgium through economic, humanitarian, educational, and intercultural contacts.
The previous wave of the survey was conducted in March 2026 among 800 Ukrainian citizens aged 18 and older using self-administered online questionnaires on the SunFlowerSociology panel. The sample was representative by age, gender, and region; the maximum theoretical margin of error for indicators at the 50% confidence level was ±3.5 percentage points.
ACTIVE GROUP, BELGIUM, EUROPEAN UNION, EXPERTS CLUB, international relations, NATO, Pozniy, PUBLIC OPINION, SOCIOLOGY, UKRAINE
Stocks of Patriot interceptor missiles held by U.S. forces in Europe have plummeted following large-scale deliveries to Ukraine and particularly heavy ammunition consumption during the war with Iran, raising concerns about NATO’s ability to repel sustained ballistic missile attacks.
The Associated Press reported this on August 27, citing a U.S. military official in Europe and a NATO spokesperson, both of whom spoke on condition of anonymity.
According to the U.S. official, the most serious problem concerns the Patriot missiles specifically designed to intercept high-speed ballistic missiles.
He described inventory levels as “below critical” and stated that U.S. forces in Europe currently “definitely” do not have enough interceptors to repel a sustained series of ballistic missile strikes.
The official described the ability to defend against even a single ballistic strike or an errant Russian missile that has veered off course and is heading toward NATO territory as “very limited.”
A NATO spokesperson who spoke with the AP also confirmed the low level of Patriot stockpiles among U.S. and NATO forces in Europe.
However, both the Pentagon and NATO officially reject assessments of a critical shortage.
NATO’s senior military representative, U.S. Army Colonel Martin O’Donnell, told the AP that the claim that the number of Patriot missiles in Europe is “below critical levels” is not true. According to him, NATO has sufficient air defense capabilities both for its own protection and to continue assisting Ukraine.
Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell also dismissed reports of a shortage of U.S. ammunition as false and stated that the U.S. military has the necessary stockpiles to conduct operations.
Nevertheless, independent assessments show a significant reduction in U.S. reserves.
According to Mark Kansian, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Ukraine has received more than 600 Patriot missiles from U.S. and allied stocks since the start of the full-scale war.
However, the main factor behind the sharp decline in reserves was the U.S. war with Iran.
According to CSIS estimates, approximately 65% of U.S. Patriot stockpiles—roughly 1,500 out of 2,330 interceptors—were expended during the campaign against Iran. By the end of July, CSIS analysts estimated that the remaining U.S. Patriot stockpiles stood at fewer than 1,000 missiles.
Ed Arnold, an expert at the British Royal United Services Institute, noted that deliveries to Ukraine had been planned in advance and were relatively manageable, whereas the need for massive deployment of interceptors in the Middle East arose much sooner than expected, exposing the limitations of the production chain.
The shortage is particularly acute for Europe, as there are currently few alternatives to the Patriot system for intercepting modern ballistic missiles.
France and Italy are developing a new version of the SAMP/T NG system, which is expected to have broader capabilities against ballistic targets; however, this new variant has not yet been tested in actual combat conditions. The current version of the SAMP/T has a shorter range than the Patriot.
A sharp increase in production capacity should partially resolve the problem.
In 2026, approximately 600–650 modern PAC-3 MSE missiles are expected to be produced, and the U.S. defense industry plans to increase production capacity to 2,000 interceptors per year by 2030. Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon have already signed agreements designed to significantly expand production.
Additional production capacity is being established directly in Europe.
In September 2026, the first European production center for Patriot missiles is scheduled to launch in Schrobenhausen, Germany. The facility is being established by COMLOG, a joint venture between MBDA Deutschland and the American company Raytheon.
The new facility will carry out final assembly and testing of PAC-2 GEM-T missiles. The first deliveries are expected in 2027. Among the countries that have already placed orders, AP lists Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain.
Raytheon received a separate $3.7 billion contract in April 2026 to produce GEM-T missiles for Ukraine. The company explicitly stated that the new plant in Germany is also expected to play a key role in replenishing Ukraine’s stockpile of interceptors.
For Ukraine, this situation means increased competition for the limited supply of missiles being produced. Kyiv needs the Patriot system primarily to intercept Russian ballistic missiles, which remain one of the most challenging targets for Ukraine’s air defense.
At the same time, U.S. manufacturers must replenish their own stockpiles, meet the needs of European NATO members, fulfill orders from Middle Eastern countries, and continue to support Ukraine.
CSIS warns that even with a significant ramp-up in production, it will take several years to fully replenish U.S. stockpiles. Until new production lines reach full capacity, the U.S. and its allies will have to prioritize the allocation of a limited number of interceptors among Europe, Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region.
The United Kingdom and France blocked a proposal for NATO member states to allocate 0.25% of their GDP to military aid for Ukraine, according to The Telegraph.
Earlier this week, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte acknowledged that his plan would not be implemented because it had not received sufficient support.
“I don’t think this proposal will be put to a vote,” he told reporters, without naming the opponents.
According to The Telegraph, the idea was blocked by the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, and Canada.
Rutte had hoped to secure approval for this proposal at the upcoming annual NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey.
This week, ministers began discussing what, in the opinion of the alliance’s civilian chief, should become a concrete manifestation of support for the war-torn country.
“An alliance insider reported that at least seven member states, which spend more than 0.25% of their GDP on military aid to Ukraine, have expressed their support. However, any proposals adopted by NATO require unanimous support from all member capitals,” the report states.
According to publicly available data compiled by the Kiel Institute, the Netherlands, Poland, as well as the Nordic and Baltic countries, provide aid at a level of 0.25% of GDP or higher. The size of the UK’s military contribution—the third largest after the US and Germany—is also uncontroversial, despite the fact that it does not reach the 0.25% of GDP mark.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer has pledged to allocate at least £3 billion per year—approximately 0.1% of GDP—in the near future.
Most of the criticism is directed at countries such as France, Spain, Italy, and Canada, which have repeatedly been accused of not doing their part. These countries—three of which are Europe’s third, fourth, and fifth-largest economies—lag behind many of their smaller allies in terms of aid levels.
Rutte argues that aid to Ukraine “is not distributed evenly within NATO,” and that many countries “are not spending enough to support Ukraine.”
The NATO chief, who served as the Dutch prime minister for 14 years, has long argued that Europe must take on greater responsibility for supporting Ukraine, in response to Donald Trump’s complaints about the continent “freeloading.”
A spokesperson for the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office stated: “The UK continues to work with NATO allies on all proposals to ensure the best possible support for Ukraine from the alliance.”
Representatives from France, Italy, Spain, and Canada did not respond to The Telegraph’s requests for comment.
upport among Ukrainians for joining the North Atlantic Alliance as the best guarantee of security for Ukraine is declining, while support for more pragmatic options is growing, according to the results of a survey conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in conjunction with the Razumkov Center’s sociological service.
“…Despite the fact that a relative majority of the population still considers NATO to be the best alternative, compared to December last year, the share of the population that named NATO membership as the best option for ensuring security has fallen from 55% to 38%. The decline in support for NATO has not been accompanied by an increase in sympathy for non-aligned status as such. Instead, there has been a shift in expectations toward alternative, less ambitious, or more flexible security models. In particular, over the past year, there has been a noticeable increase in the proportion of those who place their hopes on strategic defense cooperation agreements with individual NATO member countries (from 9% to 15%). Support for Ukraine’s neutral status has also increased, but on condition of international security guarantees (from 12% to 16%), as well as for the option of relying exclusively on its own defense capabilities, even without external guarantees (from 3% to 7%),” the survey results say.
At the same time, it is noted that these shifts indicate not so much a change in value orientations as growing doubts about the realism of Ukraine’s rapid accession to NATO in the context of a protracted war and ambiguous signals from international partners.
There also remain significant regional differences in the choice of security model, which play an important role in shaping the respondents’ positions.
“Respondents from western regions are significantly more likely (53%) than residents of other regions to name NATO membership as the best guarantee of security. In the central regions, this option also dominates, although less clearly (39%). In the southern and especially eastern regions, the share of NATO supporters is significantly lower: 32.5% and 22%, respectively. In the southern regions, respondents are more likely to choose neutral status with international guarantees (23%). At the same time, in the eastern regions, there are the most respondents who could not decide on the best option for ensuring Ukraine’s security compared to other macro-regions – their share is 26%. This reflects both different experiences of war and different expectations regarding international support,” sociologists write.
However, a much more significant factor than the macro-region of residence is belief in Ukraine’s victory.
“Among respondents who believe in victory, NATO membership remains the most desirable option (49.5%). At the same time, among those who do not believe in victory, only a relative minority (14%) support this option. Meanwhile, in this group, support for neutral status with international security guarantees (from 12% to 27%) and the option of relying on one’s own forces without international guarantees (5% to 13%) is growing significantly. The strength of the link between belief in victory and the vision of a security model is clear, which allows us to speak of the systemic nature of this factor,” according to the survey results.
The nationwide survey was conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in cooperation with the Razumkov Center’s sociological service between December 5 and 16, 2025.
A total of 2,000 respondents aged 18 and older were interviewed face-to-face in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Chernivtsi regions, and the city of Kyiv. In Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions, the survey was conducted only in those territories controlled by the Ukrainian government and where there is no fighting.
The survey was conducted using a stratified multistage sample with random selection in the early stages of sample formation and a quota method of selecting respondents in the final stage, when respondents were selected according to gender and age quotas. The structure of the sample population reflects the demographic structure of the adult population in the territories where the survey was conducted as of early 2022, by age, gender, and type of settlement. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.
At the same time, additional systematic deviations in the sample may be due to the consequences of Russian aggression, in particular, the forced evacuation of millions of citizens.
According to the Serbian Economist, Croatia is officially reintroducing compulsory military service on January 1, 2026 after a 17-year hiatus.
According to changes to the Defense Law approved by the Croatian Parliament in October 2025, the country is introducing two months of basic military training for conscripts amid rising tensions in Europe and the Balkans.
According to Ministry of Defense clarifications and government communications, the mandatory service will apply to men, primarily young men born in 2007 and onward, while women will be able to participate on a voluntary basis. The first calls for medical examinations are scheduled to be sent out at the end of December, while the first conscripts will enter military units in March 2026.
Basic service (temeljno vojno osposobljavanje) will last two months and include handling personal weapons, use of modern equipment, first aid and basic self-defense skills.
Recruits will receive about 1,100 euros per month (2,200 euros for the entire term of service), with payment for food, accommodation and travel; the time of service will be counted in the employment record. For conscientious objectors, civilian service in the civil protection system for up to three or four months with a lower payment (about 250 euros per month) is envisaged.
Previously, compulsory conscription in Croatia was abolished in 2008 amid the transition to a professional army and NATO membership. The authorities explain the decision to return military service by the need to strengthen defense capabilities and prepare the population to act in crisis situations against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the general growth of instability in the region.
https://t.me/relocationrs/2005
