Romanian Prime Minister Luca Niculescu stated that a possible unification of Romania and the Republic of Moldova depends on the will of the citizens of both countries; however, Bucharest’s current priority remains strengthening bilateral economic cooperation and supporting Moldova’s accession to the European Union. The head of the Romanian government made these remarks on October 27, 2026, in an interview with TVR Moldova during an official visit to Chisinau.
“This will happen when the citizens of both countries want it,” Niculescu said, responding to a question about the prospects for unification.
According to him, there are close historical, cultural, and economic ties between Romania and Moldova, which is why the issue of a possible unification remains a topic of public debate.
At the same time, the prime minister emphasized that the Romanian government is currently focused on further bringing the two countries closer together and accelerating Moldova’s European integration.
Niculescu made his first foreign visit after taking office as Prime Minister of Romania to Chisinau, where he held talks with his Moldovan counterpart, Vasile Tofan, and President Maia Sandu.
During the talks, the parties paid particular attention to expanding trade and economic cooperation, developing energy infrastructure and transportation links, and attracting Romanian investment.
According to Niculescu, trade between Romania and Moldova reached approximately €4.5 billion in 2025. Romanian investments have created about 12,000 jobs in Moldova.
The development of transport corridors across the Prut River remains one of the priorities of bilateral cooperation. The parties discussed accelerating the construction of a bridge in the Ungheni area, modernizing border infrastructure, and organizing joint control at the Cantemir–Fălciu crossing.
In the energy sector, discussions focused on expanding electrical interconnections between the two countries, including the construction of the Bălți–Suceava power line.
In addition, Moldova is interested in purchasing natural gas to be produced on the Romanian Black Sea shelf as part of the Neptun Deep project once it becomes operational.
During the visit, the prime ministers also reviewed the progress of the Chisinau substation modernization project, which is part of the new 157-km Vulcanesti–Chisinau power transmission line.
The new energy infrastructure is expected to strengthen Moldova’s independence from electricity supplies via the Transnistrian region and expand opportunities for imports from the European market.
The parties paid special attention to the participation of Romanian businesses in the Moldovan economy. Industry, energy, technology, and transportation infrastructure were cited as promising areas.
Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tofan also proposed viewing the country as a platform for Romanian companies to participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction projects.
The issue of regional security was another key topic of the talks against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.
Tofan stated that the security of Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania is closely intertwined, and that Russian air attacks and airspace violations pose threats to the entire region.
According to the Moldovan prime minister, more than 100 unauthorized overflights have been recorded in the country’s airspace since the start of the full-scale war.
Niculescu confirmed Bucharest’s intention to continue supporting Moldova’s European integration, including facilitating the opening of the remaining negotiation chapters by the end of 2026.
Thus, the Romanian government views economic integration, the development of shared infrastructure, and Moldova’s accession to the EU as priority areas for cooperation. The possible political unification of the two states remains a separate issue, the resolution of which, according to Niculescu’s position, must be based on the will of their citizens.
Romania and the Republic of Moldova share a border approximately 680 km long and have close linguistic and cultural ties. Most of the territory of modern-day Moldova was part of Romania from 1918 to 1940. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Moldova declared its independence on August 27, 1991. Romania has been a member of the European Union since 2007, while Moldova was granted EU candidate status in June 2022, and official accession negotiations began in June 2024.
Latvia continues to enjoy a high level of positive perception among Ukrainians: in August 2026, 68.3% of respondents viewed the country positively, while only 3.9% viewed it negatively. Compared to March, the share of positive assessments has decreased slightly; however, the country continues to rank among the nations with the highest levels of public favor, according to the Experts Club Information and Analytical Center.
According to the results of the August survey, 39.7% of Ukrainians view Latvia entirely positively, and 28.6% view it mostly positively. 26.6% of respondents hold a neutral position. 2.5% view the country mostly negatively, 1.4% view it entirely negatively, and another 1.2% were undecided.
The balance of positive and negative assessments stands at plus 64.4 percentage points. Thus, positive attitudes toward Latvia outnumber negative ones by more than 17 times. Overall, the countries of Northern Europe and the Baltic states maintained some of the highest levels of positive attitudes among Ukrainians in the August wave of the survey.
In March 2026, 71.6% of respondents had a positive attitude toward Latvia: 42.4% viewed it entirely positively and 29.1% viewed it mostly positively. A neutral stance was held by 24.5% of respondents, negative assessments accounted for about 2.6%, and another 1.4% were undecided.
Thus, over five months, the share of positive assessments decreased by 3.3 percentage points—from 71.6% to 68.3%. The negative segment increased by approximately 1.3 percentage points, while the neutral segment rose by 2.1 percentage points. The balance between positive and negative attitudes decreased from approximately plus 69 to plus 64.4 percentage points.
At the same time, the most significant change occurred among respondents with the most strongly positive views: the share of entirely positive assessments decreased from 42.4% to 39.7%, while the share of mostly positive assessments remained close to previous levels—29.1% in March and 28.6% in August.
On an annual basis, the overall picture also remains stable. In August 2025, 72.7% of Ukrainians viewed Latvia positively, while 5.3% viewed it negatively. In other words, the current share of positive responses is slightly lower than a year ago, but the negative segment also remains smaller.
Oleksandr Pozniy, director of the research firm Active Group, commenting on the results of the previous survey wave regarding Latvia, attributed the high level of public support to the country’s consistent engagement with Ukraine.
“Ukrainians, in general, are very good at distinguishing between countries that demonstrate consistent support for Ukraine. At the same time, the level of positive attitude is shaped not only by political statements but also by concrete actions that people can experience firsthand. That is precisely why even small countries can have a very strong positive image,” Pozniy noted.
The latest wave of the survey shows a slight decline in positive assessments of Latvia, but no fundamental shift in public perception. More than two-thirds of Ukrainians continue to view the country positively, while the share of negative responses remains below 4%.
The survey was conducted in August 2026 using an online self-administered questionnaire via the SunFlowerSociology panel among 800 Ukrainian citizens aged 18 and older. The maximum theoretical margin of error for indicators at the 50% confidence level is ±3.5 percentage points.
ACTIVE GROUP, BALTIC STATES, EUROPEAN UNION, EXPERTS CLUB, international relations, LATVIA, Pozniy, PUBLIC OPINION, SOCIOLOGY, UKRAINE
According to Experts.news, prices for gasoline and motor oils for private vehicles in European Union countries rose by 31.4% in September 2026 compared to September of last year, the EU’s statistical office (Eurostat) reported.
The largest price increases were recorded in Bulgaria (+42.2%), Estonia (+40.6%), and Lithuania (+40.2%). The lowest rates of price growth were observed in Hungary (+6.9%), Ireland (+17.7%), and Sweden (+19.9%).
Ranking of EU countries by fuel price inflation in September 2026, % year-over-year:
1. Bulgaria — +42.2%
2. Estonia — +40.6%
3. Lithuania — +40.2%
4. Czech Republic — +37.5% 5–15. Other EU countries with increases exceeding 30% — according to Eurostat, there were 15 such countries in total, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic.
5. Portugal — +30.3%
6. Sweden — +19.9%
7. Ireland — +17.7%
8. Hungary — +6.9%
According to Eurostat, in September, compared to August, diesel prices in the EU rose by 5.9%, and gasoline prices by 6.7%. In August, the corresponding increases were 8.3% and 3.3%.
According to Ukrainian retail price monitoring data, the average price of A-95 gasoline in Ukraine at the end of September was approximately 89.3 UAH per liter, and diesel fuel was 98.4 UAH per liter. At the beginning of the month, these figures were approximately 80.3 UAH and 91.4 UAH per liter, respectively.
Thus, during September, A-95 gasoline rose in price by approximately 11.1%, and diesel fuel by 7.7%.
At the same time, these figures reflect price changes over the course of a single month, whereas the Eurostat ranking cited is based on annual trends. Therefore, without comparable data for September 2025, it is incorrect to include Ukraine in the overall ranking of countries based on annual rate of price increases.
The Ukrainian steel industry is going through very difficult times, and the likelihood that the sector will survive to participate in post-war reconstruction is low—not only because of the war, but also due to restrictions imposed by the European Union, said Oleksandr Vodoviz, head of the office of the CEO of the Metinvest Group, according to a correspondent for Interfax-Ukraine.
“In the steel industry, half of the companies have gone bankrupt. And not because of the war… Is the steel industry ready to ensure recovery? Let’s hope we live to see that recovery, because the way things are going, we won’t make it. We need to take a sober look at the truth: the plants have been bombed; we’re not talking about millions of dollars in losses, but billions,” he said at the fourth “Economic Truth” export forum in Kyiv this week.
In addition to the need to rebuild metallurgical plants after the war, Vodoviz also highlighted a staffing problem that was already acute before the war, when European companies were poaching Ukrainian workers. According to him, despite the losses, Metinvest is currently retaining its staff, but this remains a pressing issue.
“Will we be able to ensure recovery? If we rebuild the plants and find the people,” he noted.
Vodoviz also stated that one of the main issues for the Ukrainian metallurgical industry right now is to secure the same level of export quotas to the EU as existed in 2025, at the very least.
According to him, Ukraine’s metallurgical sector does not question the strategic goal of integrating into the EU’s internal market, but recent actions by Brussels—the introduction of the CBAM carbon tax and restricted quotas, which, despite promises, in no way take into account the fact of the war in Ukraine and the losses incurred by the Ukrainian industry—cast doubt on the mutual progress toward this goal.
A Metinvest representative clarified that the quotas currently amount to 40% of last year’s exports.
“Our number one problem is, of course, the strikes on steel mills; all our steel enterprises have been destroyed, are in ruins, and are not operating. Four days ago, Zaporizhstal was struck again—seven missiles. And in this situation, we are trying to explain to the Europeans that they should grant us quota reductions,” Vodoviz described the situation.
As previously reported, “Ukrmetallurgprom” criticized the EU’s decision to restrict imports of Ukrainian steel products, which had been supplied to Europe duty-free for the first three years following Russia’s full-scale aggression. The association believes that Ukraine currently poses no threat to European producers because, due to the war, steel production in the country initially fell from 40 million metric tons to 7.5 million metric tons, and now almost all steel plants have been shut down due to shelling.
The European Union is facing significant disagreements over its long-term budget for 2028–2034, raising concerns about potential delays in approving up to €100 billion in financial assistance for Ukraine, according to the Experts Club information and analytical center.
Following the European Council summit on October 15–16, 2026, EU leaders failed to agree on the main parameters of the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Reaching a political compromise by the end of 2026 remains a negotiating objective rather than a legally binding deadline.
The European Commission’s original proposal, presented in July 2025, envisaged a seven-year budget of €1.763 trillion in constant 2025 prices, equivalent to almost €2 trillion in current prices. However, on October 10, 2026, Ireland, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, proposed reducing the framework to €1.622 trillion. The reduction amounts to €141 billion, or approximately 8%.
The largest proposed reduction concerns competitiveness, security and innovation programs, with funding cut by €66.6 billion. External action programs face a €33.1 billion reduction, while regional development and agricultural programs could lose €32.2 billion.
The main disagreements are between major net contributors to the EU budget, including Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, and countries seeking to preserve agricultural and regional subsidies. Rising defense spending, technological modernization requirements and the repayment of NextGenerationEU debt add further pressure.
According to EU budget documents, approximately €149.3 billion in constant 2025 prices is earmarked for servicing and repaying joint European borrowing during 2028–2034. These obligations reduce the resources available for new investment programs.
The European Parliament opposes the proposed cuts. Its negotiating position provides for financial resources approximately €316 billion higher than the Irish proposal, taking into account separate funding for debt repayment.
For Ukraine, the most significant development is the preservation of a dedicated financial reserve totaling €88.869 billion in constant 2025 prices. This corresponds to approximately €100 billion in current prices, as originally proposed by the European Commission.
The mechanism would support Ukraine’s economy, infrastructure reconstruction and European integration through grants, budget guarantees and lending instruments. However, the proposed allocation does not constitute approved funding, and actual disbursements will depend on subsequent EU decisions.
Negotiations are further complicated by the European electoral calendar, including parliamentary elections in Spain in late 2026 and presidential elections in France in spring 2027. These developments could encourage national governments to postpone politically sensitive decisions on increasing budget contributions.
Experts Club identifies three possible scenarios: reaching a compromise before the end of 2026, postponing an agreement until the first half of 2027, or allowing negotiations to continue until late 2027.
“The main risk for Ukraine is not an immediate reduction of the proposed €100 billion, but a possible delay in the legal approval and practical implementation of financial support after 2027,” the Experts Club analysis states.
A delay in adopting the new budget would not automatically suspend EU funding, as European treaties provide for the temporary extension of existing budgetary ceilings. Nevertheless, prolonged negotiations could complicate the launch of new programs, including long-term financial assistance mechanisms for Ukraine.
On October 20, Hungary blocked the next stage of the negotiation process regarding Ukraine and Moldova’s accession to the European Union by refusing to approve the results of the preliminary review of legislation for the last two outstanding negotiation clusters. Budapest’s position was not supported by the remaining 26 EU countries, according to “European Truth,” citing European diplomats.
The decision was discussed at a meeting of the EU Council’s Working Group on Enlargement (COELA) in Brussels. The participants had planned to approve the results of the screening of Ukrainian and Moldovan legislation regarding negotiation clusters No. 4 and No. 5, which is a necessary procedural step before their official opening.
However, the Hungarian representative refused to support the approval of the documents, despite the position of the other EU member states.
As three European diplomats told The Kyiv Independent, representatives from other countries asked the Hungarian delegation to explain the reasons for the refusal. According to one of the publication’s sources, Budapest did not provide any new arguments, stating only that its position remains unchanged.
At the time of publication, Hungary’s official mission to the EU had not provided the publication with a comment.
The fourth negotiation cluster, “Green Agenda and Sustainable Interconnectivity,” covers transportation policy, energy, trans-European networks, environmental legislation, and the fight against climate change.
The fifth cluster, “Resources, Agriculture, and Cohesion Policy,” involves harmonizing regulations in the areas of agricultural policy, food security, veterinary and phytosanitary controls, fisheries, regional development, as well as financial and budgetary provisions.
Both clusters are of significant importance for Ukraine’s economic integration into the EU, as they concern access for agricultural products to the European market, transportation, energy infrastructure, and future mechanisms for the distribution of European budget funds.
This new impasse occurred one week after the previous progress in the negotiation process.
On October 13, the Council of the EU officially opened two negotiation clusters for Ukraine and Moldova: No. 2, “Internal Market,” and No. 3, “Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth.” These clusters encompass 17 negotiation chapters, including issues related to competition, entrepreneurship, and economic regulation.
As reported by the Council of the EU, at that time, four of the six clusters provided for in the accession procedure had been opened for both countries.
The previous decision became possible after Hungary withdrew its objections to the opening of the second and third clusters following the Verkhovna Rada’s adoption on October 12 of amendments to education legislation concerning the rights of national minorities.
Previously, Budapest had linked the progress of negotiations to ensuring the linguistic and educational rights of the Hungarian community in Zakarpattia.
According to The Kyiv Independent, the current delay may prove to be temporary. European diplomats expect that the remaining two negotiation clusters will be officially opened in December 2026.
Ireland, which will hold the EU Council presidency in the second half of 2026, intends to continue discussing this issue at upcoming meetings of the Enlargement Working Group.
However, Hungary’s October decision does not cancel the negotiation clusters that have already been opened and does not mean the end of accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova. It does, however, delay the necessary harmonization of documents required for both countries to move forward.
Ukraine and Moldova were granted EU candidate status in June 2022. In December 2023, the European Council decided to open negotiations, and the first intergovernmental conference took place in June 2024.
The accession process involves aligning national legislation with EU law, implementing institutional reforms, and negotiating 35 chapters, most of which are grouped into six thematic clusters. The opening of all clusters marks a stage in the negotiations but does not in itself signify the completion of the accession process.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, EUROPEAN UNION, HUNGARY, MOLDOVA, UKRAINE
