According to the Serbian business media outlet Parametar, the European development company CTP has announced the start of construction on the large-scale CTPark Belgrade Borča complex in the Borča district of Belgrade.
Key project details:
Site area: 40 hectares.
Total planned area of industrial and warehouse facilities: 222,700 square meters.
Number of buildings: 15.
Distance to the center of Belgrade: approximately 10 km.
Upon completion of construction, the facility is set to become Serbia’s largest industrial and logistics park.
The first major tenant has already been secured. MD International, a subsidiary of the Hungarian logistics group Waberer’s, has signed a lease for 10,000 square meters of space, with the option to expand to 20,000 square meters.
The company is scheduled to begin operations at the new complex in the first quarter of 2027.
The park will cater not only to large international companies but also to small and medium-sized businesses. Facilities of various sizes are planned—ranging from a few hundred to tens of thousands of square meters.
The expansion of warehouse and industrial infrastructure strengthens Belgrade’s position as a transportation and logistics hub in the Balkans. The new facilities can be used for distribution, e-commerce, and manufacturing.
CTP already manages several industrial parks in Serbia, including facilities in Belgrade and Novi Sad.
The victory of the opposition “Student List” in Serbia’s snap parliamentary elections on October 25, 2026, opens up the prospect of a change of government after 14 years of dominance by the political force of Aleksandar Vučić. However, as analyzed by the Serbian business publication Parametar, a fundamental change in Belgrade’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war may not occur in the near future: the student movement supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity but has simultaneously declared its intention to maintain Serbia’s refusal to impose sanctions against Russia.
According to preliminary data from the research organizations Ipsos and CeSID, the “Students Are Winning” list received approximately 52% of the vote and can expect to secure 138 of the 250 parliamentary seats. The political bloc “Aleksandar Vučić — United Serbia” won 39.3% of the vote, corresponding to approximately 104 seats.
On the evening of October 25, Aleksandar Vučić acknowledged the defeat of his bloc, stating that the student movement would receive between 135 and 140 seats in parliament, while his political force would obtain around 105.
A total of 126 parliamentary seats is required to independently form a parliamentary majority. Thus, if the preliminary results are confirmed, the student movement will be able to form a new government without the participation of the previous ruling coalition.
The final election results must be approved by Serbia’s Republic Electoral Commission.
As previously analyzed by the Serbian business portal Parametar, the main distinguishing feature of the 2026 elections was the transformation of the student protest movement into an independent political force capable of competing with the Serbian Progressive Party. In an article published on October 6, the outlet noted that the struggle for power had effectively become concentrated between the two largest blocs, while the traditional opposition had been pushed into the background.
At the same time, the key issues facing the future government will include not only the fight against corruption and the reform of state institutions but also relations with the European Union, Russia, China, and neighboring Balkan countries.
Despite its opposition to Vučić, the student movement does not advocate an immediate severing of Serbia’s political and economic relations with Russia.
On September 30, 2026, representatives of the “Students in Blockade” movement published a statement on foreign policy and sanctions, confirming their intention to maintain Serbia’s refusal to introduce restrictive measures against the Russian Federation.
The movement explained its position by citing its negative attitude toward sanctions as an instrument for resolving international conflicts, referring, among other things, to Serbia’s own historical experience and the consequences of sanctions policies for the population. Thus, on one of the most sensitive issues for Ukraine, the position of the future parliamentary force practically coincides with the policy of the previous Serbian authorities.
At the same time, the political program of the “Student List” provides for respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
As reported on October 24 by the European publication The New Union Post, citing the movement’s program, the students support maintaining the policy of not joining sanctions against Russia while simultaneously recognizing Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
This means that the movement does not propose revising Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders but also does not intend to automatically join the European Union’s sanctions policy.
At the same time, the students’ political platform brings together people with different views, including supporters of European integration and more conservative groups.
According to an assessment published on October 21 by the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), the student movement has focused primarily on domestic reforms, the fight against corruption, and restoring the independence of state institutions, while avoiding a detailed definition of its foreign policy course.
Therefore, the new government’s eventual policy toward Ukraine and Russia will depend on its personnel composition, the distribution of powers, and decisions made after the formation of the cabinet.
For Ukraine, the movement’s victory creates opportunities to renew bilateral political dialogue, but in itself does not guarantee a change in Serbia’s position on sanctions against Russia.
Under Aleksandar Vučić, Belgrade pursued a policy of balancing between Moscow, Brussels, and Kyiv.
Serbia officially supported Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, provided humanitarian assistance, participated in certain international initiatives, and maintained diplomatic contacts with the Ukrainian leadership. At the same time, the country refused to join most Western sanctions against Russia, continuing to maintain economic and energy ties with Moscow.
In August 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Belgrade, where he held talks with the Serbian leadership. Following the meetings, the parties reaffirmed mutual respect for territorial integrity and their interest in developing economic cooperation.
Ukraine’s position on Kosovo remains an important factor. Kyiv does not recognize its independence, which creates a certain basis for mutual understanding between the two countries on issues of international law and the inviolability of borders.
This position may also be preserved under the new government, since the student movement likewise opposes recognizing Kosovo’s independence.
At the same time, the lack of an intention to impose sanctions against Russia limits the possibilities for a rapid convergence of Kyiv’s and Belgrade’s foreign policy positions.
One possible change could be more active cooperation on European integration, democratic reforms, and the restoration of state institutions.
Representatives of the student movement have repeatedly emphasized the need to strengthen the rule of law, judicial independence, and the fight against corruption.
If the future cabinet intensifies negotiations on Serbia’s accession to the EU, Belgrade will inevitably face the question of more fully aligning its foreign policy with that of Europe, including its approach to sanctions against Russia.
However, to date, the student movement has not declared its readiness to change its position on this issue.
From an economic perspective, a change of government in Serbia could open up additional opportunities for cooperation with Ukraine in industry, construction, energy, agriculture, and information technology.
One potential area remains the participation of Serbian companies in the reconstruction of Ukrainian infrastructure after the war.
Serbia has construction, mechanical engineering, metallurgical, and electrical engineering enterprises whose products could be used in the reconstruction of Ukraine’s energy facilities, transport infrastructure, and industrial enterprises.
Ukrainian businesses, in turn, may be interested in expanding their presence in the Serbian market, developing joint production facilities, and using Serbia as a logistics and investment destination in the Western Balkans.
Additional prospects are associated with the agro-industrial sector, food processing, pharmaceuticals, and technology services.
At the same time, the implementation of such projects will depend on the economic policy of the new government and the willingness of both countries to create practical mechanisms to support bilateral business activities.
As Parametar noted in an analytical article dated September 28, 2026, one of the main problems of the Serbian economy remains its dependence on foreign investment and large state infrastructure programs.
According to data cited by the publication with reference to the National Bank of Serbia, the inflow of foreign direct investment in 2025 decreased by 33.5%, from a record €5.23 billion to €3.48 billion.
Against this background, one of the new government’s primary challenges will be restoring investor confidence and ensuring the predictability of state economic policy.
If institutional reforms are successfully implemented, Serbia could become a more attractive partner for Ukrainian companies interested in operating in the markets of Southeastern Europe.
Thus, the victory of the student movement could contribute to the development of Ukrainian-Serbian relations primarily through economic cooperation, European integration, and institutional reforms.
However, there are currently no grounds to expect Belgrade to automatically shift toward a tougher policy on Russia. The movement’s official position combines recognition of Ukraine’s territorial integrity with a refusal to impose sanctions against Moscow.
The decisive factors will be the new government’s first foreign policy decisions, its personnel composition, and its willingness to develop practical cooperation with Kyiv.
The “Student List” emerged from mass protests that began after the collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad on November 1, 2024, which killed 16 people. The movement’s main demands were an investigation into the tragedy, the fight against corruption, the independence of state institutions, and the holding of early parliamentary elections.
Source: Parametar
According to Serbian Economist, the American conservative organization CPAC (Conservative Political Action Conference), which has close ties to the U.S. Republican Party and President Donald Trump’s political circle, will hold the first CPAC Balkans conference in Belgrade from November 18 to 21, 2026. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić will be the keynote speaker at the event.
This will be the first time the conference is held in Southeast Europe, and it will bring together conservative politicians, representatives of civil society organizations, experts, and supporters of right-wing political movements from the Balkan states. The organizers intend to discuss issues of national sovereignty, economic policy, free enterprise, traditional values, and international cooperation.
One of the central themes will be energy security in the Balkan region. According to CPAC, increased supplies of American energy resources could help diversify energy imports and reduce the Balkan states’ dependence on individual suppliers.
The organizers view the United States as a potential partner for countries in the region in ensuring energy independence. Discussion of this issue is of particular importance for Serbia, which continues to diversify its natural gas supply sources and develop energy cooperation with foreign partners.
CPAC Chairman Matt Schlapp stated that the organization welcomes the holding of the first Balkan conference in Serbia. He highlighted the role of Aleksandar Vučić in developing strategic cooperation between Belgrade and Washington and expressed satisfaction with his upcoming speech.
According to Schlapp, conservative political movements have achieved significant success in North and South America, as well as in Japan. The organizers expect that hosting CPAC Balkans will help expand the international networks of European conservative organizations.
CPAC has already held international conferences in Hungary, Japan, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, Israel, Argentina, Paraguay, Poland, the United Kingdom, and Italy. The Belgrade meeting will mark the next step in expanding the organization’s international network.
The choice of Serbia as the conference venue reflects the desire of American conservative circles to expand their political presence in the Balkans and strengthen ties with the leadership of countries in the region.
The names of the remaining participants and the detailed conference program have not yet been published. The organizers promise to release them in the coming weeks.
CPAC is not a U.S. government agency or an official body of the Republican Party, although its events are traditionally attended by leading figures from the American political right, including Donald Trump.
According to Serbian Economist, the Serbian government has approved a shareholders’ agreement between the state-owned companies Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS), Srbijagas, and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR.
The new joint venture will be responsible for financing, constructing, and operating a gas-fired power plant in Niš.
The government’s decision on this matter was published in the official gazette, “Službeni Glasnik.”
The plant’s planned capacity is up to 500 MW. The facility will use combined heat and power (CHP) technology.
This approach allows for more efficient use of natural gas, as the heat generated during electricity production is also used for heating or other utility needs.
The project will mark a continuation of energy cooperation between Serbia and Azerbaijan. SOCAR is Azerbaijan’s state-owned oil and gas company and participates in international projects involving the extraction, transportation, and supply of energy resources.
The establishment of the joint venture paves the way for further preparation of the investment project; however, construction has not yet begun, and the final cost of the power plant has not been announced.
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As the Serbian portal Parametar reports in its article, two weeks before the snap parliamentary elections on October 25 in Serbia, published opinion polls continue to show sharply differing pictures of support for the two largest forces — the “Aleksandar Vučić – United Serbia” list and “Students Win”.
The most recent Faktor Plus poll, conducted on September 16–20 with a sample of 986 people, gives Vučić’s list 48.6% and the student list 37.1%. The gap amounts to 11.5 percentage points. In the same survey, Ivica Dačić’s Socialists receive 4.9%, while “European Serbia” receives 3.6%.
However, the NSPM poll published on September 30 shows almost the opposite situation: “Students Win” – 44.4%, “United Serbia” – 41.7%. Moreover, in the previous measurement by the same organization, the figures were 39.6% and 37.5%, respectively.
Thus, the difference between the two latest publicly available surveys is fundamental: one gives the authorities a lead of more than 11 points, while the other gives the students a lead of almost 3 points.
At the same time, the dynamics within the polls themselves are also interesting. At the beginning of September, Faktor Plus estimated Vučić’s list at 47.2% and the students at 31.5%. Just a few weeks later, the students’ figure rose to 37.1%, that is, by 5.6 percentage points, while Vučić’s list gained only 1.4 percentage points.
A separate June survey by CRTA and the Stanford Democracy Action Lab also showed a high degree of political polarization. It recorded significant differences in the views of supporters of the student list and the SNS and confirmed that Serbian society is increasingly dividing into two large political camps.
It is noteworthy that sociologists themselves are now cautious about attempts to determine the exact balance of support. Faktor Plus representative Vladimir Pajić stated on October 1 that the only thing that can be considered sufficiently probable based on the survey data is high voter turnout.
Turnout itself may become one of the key factors on October 25. In the September Faktor Plus survey, 64% of respondents said they would definitely vote, while another 11% were undecided. Among those intending to participate in the elections, 69% already knew exactly whom they would vote for.
Against this background, the campaign is increasingly resembling a referendum between the two largest blocs. Even NSPM researcher Đorđe Vukadinović explicitly spoke of the approaching “referendum atmosphere,” in which the space for third forces is noticeably narrowing.
There will be 18 parties on the ballot on October 25, but the actual struggle for the majority of votes is increasingly concentrated around the two largest political projects.
Source: Parametar, NSPM, CRTA.
Ukrainians’ attitude toward Serbia in August 2026 remains predominantly neutral: 53.4% of respondents hold this view. 22.7% of those surveyed view the country positively, while 20.3% view it negatively. Compared to March, the figures have changed only slightly; however, on a year-over-year basis, perceptions of Serbia have improved noticeably, according to the Experts Club Information and Analytical Center.
According to the results of the August survey, 5.5% of Ukrainians view Serbia entirely positively, while 17.2% view it mostly positively. A neutral response was chosen by 53.4%. The country is viewed mostly negatively by 17.6%, entirely negatively by 2.7%, and another 3.5% were undecided.
According to the rounded data in the table, the balance between positive and negative attitudes is approximately plus 2.4 percentage points. Thus, positive assessments already slightly outweigh negative ones, although the difference remains small, and more than half of Ukrainians continue to hold a neutral position.
In March 2026, 21.7% of respondents viewed Serbia positively: 5.6% viewed it entirely positively and 16.1% viewed it mostly positively. Fifty-five percent held a neutral position, 19.6% viewed the country negatively, and another 3.7% were undecided.
Thus, over the course of five months, the positive segment grew by approximately 1 percentage point—to 22.7%—while the negative segment also increased slightly—by about 0.7 percentage points—and the share of neutral responses decreased by 1.6 percentage points. In fact, following a noticeable improvement recorded in the spring, attitudes have stabilized.
The annual trend is much more pronounced. In August 2025, only 13.7% of Ukrainians had a positive attitude toward Serbia, while 26% had a negative one. By March 2026, the positive figure had risen to 21.7%, while the negative figure had fallen to 19.6%. Thus, compared to August of last year, positive attitudes are now approximately 9 percentage points higher, while negative attitudes are nearly 6 percentage points lower.
Maksym Urakin, founder of the Experts Club information and analytical center and a candidate of economic sciences, attributed this positive trend, in particular, to the more active work of Serbia’s diplomatic mission in Ukraine, headed by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Andon Sapundži. The Serbian Embassy resumed operations in Kyiv in 2025, and Sapundži publicly emphasized the need to restore active cooperation between the two countries.
“The results regarding Serbia show that Ukrainian society reacts quite sensitively to the foreign policy behavior of other countries. The increase in positive assessments indicates a certain softening of perceptions, but the high level of neutrality means that the country’s image remains ambiguous. In such cases, consistency in actions and signals that build trust at the societal level plays a key role. “The active involvement of the Serbian diplomatic mission, led by the new ambassador, in humanitarian and economic initiatives and in establishing intergovernmental dialogue has undoubtedly had a positive impact on Ukrainians’ attitudes toward this Balkan country,” Urakin noted.
According to Maksym Urakin, an additional factor in 2026 was the noticeable revival of political and economic contacts between Kyiv and Belgrade. In May, a Serbian-Ukrainian business forum was held in Belgrade, attended by more than 40 representatives of companies from both countries. The forum discussed the resumption of negotiations on a free trade zone, the expansion of trade, and the possibility of using Serbia as one of the logistics and business hubs for Ukrainian companies in the Balkans.
In addition, in July, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić traveled to Kyiv for the Ukraine–Southeast Europe Summit, and in September he visited Ukraine again to participate in the Carpathian Summit.
In the first half of 2026, Ukraine’s trade turnover with Serbia totaled approximately $345.9 million, of which $102.7 million came from Ukrainian exports and $243.2 million from imports of Serbian goods. The trade deficit for Ukraine amounted to approximately $140.5 million.
Current results indicate that the long-term trend in attitudes toward Serbia is more positive than it was a year ago, but a significant neutral group—more than half of those surveyed—leaves considerable potential for further shaping the country’s image through diplomatic, humanitarian, cultural, and economic contacts.
ACTIVE GROUP, Andon Sapundži, EXPERTS CLUB, international relations, PUBLIC OPINION, SERBIA, SOCIOLOGY, the Balkans, UKRAINE, URAKIN
