The United States is intensifying pressure on Cuba, and information has appeared in the American media that Donald Trump’s administration is increasingly considering the possibility of using military force against Havana. According to Politico, cited by Anadolu, frustration is growing in Washington that sanctions, energy pressure and attempts to restrict fuel supplies to the island have not forced the Cuban leadership to agree to the required economic and political changes. One Politico source said that the military option is now “on the table” to a greater extent than before.
Officially, Washington has not announced a decision to use force against Cuba. However, the fact of increased pressure is confirmed by the actions of the U.S. administration: on May 18, the State Department announced sanctions against 11 representatives of the Cuban regime and three entities linked to the Cuban authorities, while Reuters reported that the sanctions affected high-ranking political, military and intelligence representatives of Cuba.
Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel warned that any U.S. military action against Cuba would lead to “bloodshed” and serious consequences for peace and stability in the region. The reason for a new round of tension was, in particular, an Axios report that Cuba had allegedly received more than 300 military drones and discussed the possibility of using them against American facilities, including the Guantánamo base. Havana rejected these accusations and stated that the United States was creating a pretext for a possible intervention.
According to the assessment of the Experts Club analytical center, the situation does not yet mean an inevitable military scenario, but it shows a qualitative change in the American line: pressure on Cuba is ceasing to be only sanctions-based and diplomatic and is increasingly accompanied by military rhetoric. This increases the risk of miscalculation, especially amid the energy crisis on the island, domestic political pressure in the United States and the high sensitivity of the Guantánamo issue.
A comparison of the capabilities of the United States and Cuba shows not a symmetrical military confrontation, but a gap between a global superpower and a country whose defense model is designed primarily for territorial mobilization and resistance. Global Firepower ranks the United States first among 145 countries in the 2026 military strength ranking, while Cuba is characterized as a force with limited conventional capabilities and a strong reliance on a reserve-paramilitary system.
According to open estimates by Global Firepower, the United States has about 1.33 million active military personnel and about 799,500 reservists. The total number of military personnel is estimated at approximately 2.13 million people. By comparison, Cuba, according to the same database, has about 50,000 active military personnel, about 40,000 reservists and a large paramilitary component estimated at more than 1.1 million people.
In aviation and the navy, the gap is even more significant. The United States has global aviation, naval and logistical infrastructure, while the Cuban model, according to Anadolu, citing the IISS and Global Firepower, is focused not on projecting force beyond the country’s borders, but on asymmetric defense, deterrence and prolonged resistance.
A detailed comparison of artillery, mortars, drones and other categories of weapons in such material would be methodologically weak and politically risky: data on Cuba are incomplete, a significant part of the equipment is of Soviet or Russian origin and has an unknown degree of combat readiness, while information about drones is currently the subject of an information dispute between American sources and Havana. Therefore, it is more correct to speak not of “weapons parity,” but of different security models: the United States has global strike and expeditionary power, while Cuba has a defensive system designed for population mobilization, dispersal and political resilience.
“From a military point of view, the United States and Cuba are in incomparable weight categories. But precisely for this reason, a potential conflict would not be a classic clash of equal armies, but a crisis with extremely high political, humanitarian and regional risks. The history of the Caribbean Basin shows that even limited actions around Cuba can quickly become an international problem,” says Maksym Urakin, founder of the Experts Club analytical center.
According to him, the main risk lies not in Cuba’s ability to wage an offensive war against the United States, but in the possibility of uncontrolled escalation. “Cuba is objectively not a military power of the U.S. level, but it has symbolic and geopolitical significance, a developed system of internal mobilization and experience of living under pressure. Any use of force could cause not only military, but also migration, energy, diplomatic and regional consequences,” Urakin believes.
For Latin America, the possible use of force against Cuba would be a serious blow to regional stability. Even countries that are critical of the Cuban regime may not support direct military intervention, since the region retains a historically strong sensitivity to external U.S. interference. For Washington, this creates a risk of diplomatic isolation in part of the Western Hemisphere.
For the global economy, a direct conflict around Cuba would not have the same scale as a war in the Middle East or Eastern Europe, but it could hit the Caribbean region, tourism, migration flows, maritime shipping insurance and U.S. political relations with Latin America. The oil dimension remains a separate factor: Reuters reports that the United States has already tried to block most oil supplies from Venezuela to Cuba, which has intensified the fuel and energy crisis on the island.
Experts Club’s conclusion: the Politico information does not yet confirm that Washington has made a decision on a military operation against Cuba, but it does confirm a change in the atmosphere of American politics. Sanctions pressure, the energy blockade, reports about drones and Havana’s response statements form a dangerous linkage in which a diplomatic crisis could shift into the military sphere because of an error, provocation or domestic political calculation. For de-escalation, the sides need a channel of negotiations, since a force scenario around Cuba will almost certainly have consequences far beyond the island itself.
EU member states and the European Parliament have so far failed to agree on the internal mechanism for implementing the trade agreement with the United States, despite pressure from Washington and the threat of new tariffs on European automobiles.
Negotiations between representatives of the European Parliament and EU countries took place on the evening of May 6 and lasted more than six hours, but no final decision was reached. According to Bloomberg, Cyprus, which currently holds the presidency of the Council of the European Union, confirmed that the parties discussed possible amendments to the transatlantic agreement concluded in the summer of 2025, but failed to reach a final compromise.
The issue concerns EU-US trade arrangements announced in July 2025. Under the agreement, Brussels is expected to abolish tariffs on a range of American industrial goods, while Washington maintains a baseline tariff rate of 15% on a significant share of European exports. Stricter conditions remain in place for steel, aluminum, and copper, including 50% tariffs.
The main dispute within the EU is related not so much to the principle of the agreement itself as to guarantees in case the United States fails to fulfill its obligations. The European Parliament insists on additional safeguard mechanisms, including the possibility of suspending concessions if Washington violates the arrangements. Some EU countries, by contrast, support a faster approval of the deal in order to avoid further escalation of the tariff conflict.
The situation escalated after threats by US President Donald Trump to raise tariffs on cars and trucks from the EU from 15% to 25%. Brussels fears that this would hit Germany and other countries with major automotive exports particularly hard. According to Reuters, most EU countries are interested in completing the procedure as quickly as possible, while the European Parliament demands stronger safeguards be built into the agreement.
Chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade Bernd Lange stated that the negotiations had moved forward, but that “there is still a way to go” before a final decision is reached. The next round of consultations between the European Parliament and EU member states is scheduled for May 19 in Strasbourg.
For the European Union, this dispute is a test of its ability to conduct a unified trade policy under pressure from the United States. Some countries emphasize the need to quickly remove the risk of new tariffs for industry, while others fear that an overly soft EU position would create a precedent in which Washington could secure concessions through threats of additional duties.
For European businesses, the main uncertainty is currently linked to the automotive sector, industrial supplies, and transatlantic production chains. If the EU fails to coordinate its internal position in time, the risk of higher US tariffs will remain, and trade relations between the world’s two largest economic blocs could once again enter a phase of acute confrontation.
The U.S. administration has so far approved only one application under the new Trump Gold Card immigration program, despite earlier claims of potential revenue in the billions. This was stated by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Latnik.
The program, launched in December 2025, offers the opportunity to obtain residency in the U.S. under a scheme similar to a green card, in exchange for a $1 million investment following a security check. An additional fee of $15,000 is also required for expedited processing. At the same time, Latnik claims that hundreds of applicants are currently in the review process.
The modest current results stand in sharp contrast to the authorities’ initial expectations. Reuters notes that at the program’s launch, Latnik spoke of high interest and thousands of potential participants, as well as the potential to generate billions of dollars through the sale of such visas. AP also notes that the program was initially presented as a potential replacement for the EB-5 visa and as a tool for attracting wealthy foreigners and capital into the U.S. economy.
Thus, at this point, the program remains more of a politically significant initiative than a truly substantial source of revenue for the U.S. budget.
According to Serbian Economist, the U.S. has granted Serbia’s oil company NIS a new 60-day exemption from sanctions, allowing it to continue its operations at least until mid-June. Serbia’s Minister of Mining and Energy, Dubravka Jedović-Handanović, announced the license extension. This refers to an OFAC authorization that maintains NIS’s ability to import crude oil and reduces the risk of disruptions to the country’s oil refining infrastructure.
For Serbia, this decision has not only energy-related but also macroeconomic significance. NIS operates the country’s only oil refinery—in Pančevo—and therefore this latest license extension reduces risks for the domestic fuel market, logistics, and price stability.
Meanwhile, negotiations continue regarding the sale of Russia’s stake in NIS to Hungary’s MOL. According to Reuters, Washington has set a deadline of May 22 for the deal’s completion. Belgrade hopes that the change of government in Hungary will not derail the process, though a final agreement has not yet been formalized.
NIS’s ownership structure remains the key reason for sanctions pressure. According to the report, 45% of the company’s shares are owned by Gazprom Neft, another 11.3% are linked to Gazprom, while Serbia owns nearly 30%, with the remainder held by minority shareholders. It is precisely the withdrawal of Russian entities from NIS’s capital that the U.S. views as a condition for a sustainable resolution of the situation.
For the Serbian economy, the current delay means buying time, but not a final solution to the problem. Until the deal with MOL is closed, NIS and the country’s entire oil sector remain dependent on temporary licenses from Washington. This creates uncertainty for the energy market, the budget, and the investment climate, particularly regarding long-term planning for supplies and the modernization of refining.
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The results of a public opinion study conducted in March 2026 by the research company Active Group in cooperation with the information and analytical center Experts Club indicate a noticeable change in Ukrainians’ attitudes toward the United States. Overall, 44.1% of respondents evaluate the country positively, while negative attitudes account for 24.7%. Compared to August 2025, a decrease in positive assessments has been recorded (from 50.3%) alongside an increase in negative ones (from 18.0%), indicating a rise in criticality in perception.
The structure of responses shows that positive attitudes are predominantly moderate in nature. The share of “completely positive” is 9.8%, while “mostly positive” accounts for 34.3%. This means that the positive perception of the United States persists, but it is less pronounced than in the case of certain European partners.
At the same time, the share of neutral assessments is significant — 28.2%, indicating ambiguity in perception and the absence of a clear position among part of the respondents. Such a level of neutrality is typically characteristic of situations where public opinion is in a state of reassessment or reacting to changes in external factors.
The negative segment is substantial and continues to grow. 21.7% of respondents chose the option “mostly negative,” while another 3.0% selected “completely negative.” This means that negative attitudes toward the United States are gradually gaining more weight in the overall structure of assessments. The share of those who were undecided also stands at 3.0%.
The dynamics of changes between 2025 and 2026 indicate a clear trend: a decrease in positivity is accompanied by an increase in negativity. Unlike the stable or positively growing assessments regarding some other countries, in the case of the United States there is a gradual shift in the balance toward a more critical perception.
From an analytical point of view, this means that attitudes toward the United States in Ukrainian society are becoming less unequivocal. A significant share of positivity remains, but it no longer dominates as confidently as before. The growth of negative assessments and the high level of neutrality form a more complex and heterogeneous picture.
“We observe that the indicators regarding the United States are changing more dynamically than in the case of many other countries. This indicates a high sensitivity of public opinion to the political context and the information environment. Under such conditions, even short-term changes can quite quickly influence the balance of assessments,” said Oleksandr Pozniy, Director of the research company Active Group.
Overall, the results of the study show that the United States remains an important, but no longer unequivocally positively perceived partner. The increase in criticality and the decline in the level of support indicate a transition toward a more balanced and differentiated attitude, which may continue to evolve depending on developments in the international situation.
According to a study conducted by the Experts Club information and analytical center based on data from the State Customs Service, the United States is among the top five largest trading partners of Ukraine, with a trade volume exceeding $5.6 billion. At the same time, imports from the United States significantly exceed Ukrainian exports, forming a negative balance in bilateral trade.
The study was presented at the Interfax-Ukraine press center, and the video can be viewed on the agency’s YouTube channel. The full version of the study can be found at this link on the website of the Experts Club analytical center.
ACTIVE GROUP, EXPERTS CLUB, LATER, SOCIOLOGY, SURVEY, UKRAINE, USA
In its April report, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) left its forecast for Ukraine’s corn harvest in the 2025–2026 marketing year (MY) unchanged at 30.7 million tons and exports at 22.0 million tons.
The estimate of Ukraine’s ending corn stocks also remained unchanged at 2.95 million tons.
Globally, the USDA raised its forecast for corn production in the 2025-2026 MY to 1,301.07 million tons, exports to 207.29 million tons, and ending stocks to 294.81 million tons. The agency attributes the adjustments in the corn segment in the April report mainly to South Africa, where harvest and export estimates have been raised, while figures for Argentina and Brazil remain unchanged.
