The Pakistani army has ordered to gradually abandon the use of WhatsApp in official correspondence and transfer the official chats of military personnel to the Chinese messenger WeChat, the Experts Club information and analytical center told the Indian publication NDTV, citing an internal directive of the Pakistani armed forces.
According to the outlet, the command explained the decision by the risks of surveillance, information leaks and the hacking of official conversations on WhatsApp. Officers and military personnel have been instructed to gradually move official communications to WeChat.
However, there has so far been no public confirmation of the decision from the Pakistani armed forces’ Inter-Services Public Relations directorate, ISPR, or the country’s Ministry of Defence.
If the decision is implemented on the stated scale, it will become an illustrative example of how a country’s geopolitical orientation is beginning to extend not only to arms procurement but also to digital infrastructure.
NDTV links the decision to the growing cooperation between Pakistan and China in the defence, intelligence and cyber spheres. However, the choice of WeChat raises an obvious question from the standpoint of information security.
WhatsApp uses end-to-end message encryption by default. This does not eliminate all risks: devices, backups, accounts and communication metadata may remain vulnerable.
WeChat, however, is structured differently. In a technical analysis published in 2024, the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab research group found that WeChat’s encryption system protects data transmission between a user’s device and the company’s servers but does not constitute end-to-end encryption. Tencent’s servers are technically capable of decrypting and processing transmitted messages.
Citizen Lab had previously also identified the monitoring of files and images transmitted through WeChat, including materials belonging to users registered outside China.
It would therefore be incorrect to explain Islamabad’s possible choice solely by WeChat’s supposedly higher level of technical security.
It is more likely to involve a combination of issues concerning control, trust in the digital platform provider and the general reorientation of Pakistan’s military infrastructure towards China.
China is already Pakistan’s principal foreign arms supplier.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, China accounted for 81% of Pakistan’s imports of major arms in 2020–2024, compared with 74% during the previous five-year period. Over the same period, Pakistan’s total arms imports increased by 61%.
In SIPRI’s updated statistics, Pakistan remains one of the world’s five largest arms importers based on the results for 2021–2025.
Military cooperation between the two countries covers aviation, naval programmes, joint production, exercises, military personnel training and interaction between their commands.
In May 2026, the head of Pakistan’s armed forces, Field Marshal Asim Munir, once again visited Beijing. During their meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi described China-Pakistan relations as “unwavering” and emphasised the high level of political trust and practical cooperation between the two countries.
The Chinese side has repeatedly called Pakistan one of its closest strategic partners.
However, it would be inaccurate to describe China and Pakistan as formal military allies of the NATO type.
There is no public mutual defence treaty between them that would oblige China to enter a war automatically in the event of an attack on Pakistan. Their relationship is more accurately defined as an exceptionally deep strategic and defence partnership that, in several areas, is effectively acquiring the characteristics of a military alliance.
An analytical report by the Takshashila Institution published in January 2026 also notes that the China-Pakistan defence partnership is built on numerous agreements and joint projects, but that there is no formal allied mutual defence treaty between the countries.
The defence partnership between Beijing and Islamabad is also based on a shared strategic factor — India.
Pakistan regards India as its principal traditional military adversary, while China and India have their own continuing territorial and geopolitical disputes.
This has created a stable model in which close relations with Pakistan help Beijing maintain the strategic balance in South Asia, while helping Islamabad compensate for India’s significantly greater economic and demographic potential.
China-Pakistan military cooperation became especially visible after the new India-Pakistan crisis of 2025.
At the same time, the relationship extends far beyond the defence sphere. China is implementing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, CPEC, in Pakistan, linking China’s western regions with the Arabian Sea. The security of Chinese citizens and CPEC infrastructure has become a separate topic of negotiations between Beijing and Pakistan’s military leadership. Reuters reported that China had repeatedly demanded stronger protection for its specialists and projects following attacks on Chinese citizens in Pakistan.
Against this background, the transfer of the Pakistani army’s official communications to a Chinese digital platform, if officially confirmed, will be symbolically significant: dependence on China’s defence ecosystem will begin to extend to communication services as well.
Pakistan is not the first: armed forces have previously abandoned popular messaging applications.
The decision by armed forces to stop using a widely used commercial messenger is not in itself a unique practice.
The most illustrative example is Switzerland.
In January 2022, the Swiss armed forces banned the use of WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram for official communications and ordered a transition to the Swiss messenger Threema. The decision was explained by data protection requirements and the desire to use a service subject to Swiss rather than foreign jurisdiction.
In effect, Switzerland followed a model of digital sovereignty: the military abandoned the most popular international platforms in favour of a national solution.
A similar trend can also be observed in France. In 2023, the government was instructed to stop using WhatsApp, Telegram and Signal for official communications in favour of the French solutions Olvid and, subsequently, Tchap. Since September 2025, Tchap has been the primary secure messenger for French ministries. It is not exclusively a military system, but the rule also applies to government bodies working with sensitive information.
The Indian Army uses a different approach. Under an updated policy introduced in late 2025, military personnel were permitted to exchange only general, non-classified information through WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram, while strict restrictions on publishing official information and using certain social networks remained in place.
Thus, the global trend consists not so much in abandoning WhatsApp specifically as in the gradual separation of ordinary user communications from official military communications.
The Swiss and French examples differ substantially from Pakistan’s reported decision.
Bern and Paris replaced foreign applications with their own or other national platforms to reduce dependence on foreign jurisdictions.
Pakistan, by contrast, according to NDTV, intends to replace an American service with a Chinese one.
This therefore represents not so much digital autonomy as a shift in technological dependence from one external partner to another. That is precisely what makes the story interesting from a geopolitical perspective.
If Islamabad confirms the directive, the decision will provide further evidence of how deeply the China-Pakistan strategic partnership is penetrating Pakistan’s military infrastructure.
China maintained its top position by a wide margin among suppliers of goods to Ukraine in January–July 2026, accounting for $16.8 billion in imports, according to the Experts Club information and analytical center, based on data from the State Customs Service.
According to calculations based on State Customs Service statistics, China accounted for about 28.9% of Ukraine’s total goods imports, which reached $58.1 billion over the seven-month period.
Poland was the second-largest supplier with $5.5 billion, or about 9.5% of imports, while Germany ranked third with $3.8 billion, or 6.5%.
Thus, just three countries accounted for almost 45% of the value of all goods imported into Ukraine in January-July.
Total goods imports over the seven months increased by 26.6% compared with the same period of 2025, from $45.9 billion to $58.1 billion.
Machinery, equipment and vehicles remain the main factor behind the high level of imports, with purchases amounting to $25.7 billion. Fuel and energy products accounted for another $8.5 billion, while chemical industry products amounted to $8 billion.
At the same time, Ukraine’s exports over the same period grew significantly more slowly — by 3.8%, to $24.1 billion.
Financial regulators in Kazakhstan and China have reached an agreement to launch a pilot project on settlements in the digital tenge and digital yuan, the press service of the National Bank of Kazakhstan reported following a visit by its delegation to China.
“An important step was the agreement reached between the National Bank and the People’s Bank of China to launch a pilot project for settlements in digital tenge and digital yuan,” the statement said.
“We have agreed to integrate the digital tenge and the digital yuan in two complementary ways: through the mBridge multilateral platform (an international multi-currency platform for real-time cross-border payments and transfers using blockchain technology) and through direct bilateral integration via CBETS (Cross-Border e-CNY Transfer Services, the digital yuan platform for cross-border settlements),” explained Binur Zhalenov, Deputy Chairman of the National Bank of Kazakhstan, who participated in the negotiations, on his social media page.
During negotiations with Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), the parties discussed further practical steps to implement the memorandum of understanding between the National Bank, the National Payment Corporation, and CIPS, as well as prospects for expanding the use of cross-border payment infrastructure, developing settlements in national currencies, and strengthening cooperation in the field of international payments.
As part of the implementation of the memorandum between the National Payment Corporation of Kazakhstan and UnionPay International (UPI)—the global division of China UnionPay responsible for the international development of UnionPay products and services—the integration of QR payments between the two countries will be completed by the end of the year, according to the National Bank of Kazakhstan.
The central banks also signed a new three-year currency swap agreement, with the option to extend it by mutual agreement of the parties.
During meetings with the China Banking Association and the leadership of China’s largest commercial banks, discussions focused on their participation in financing investment projects in Kazakhstan and issuing debt instruments.
CHINA, KAZAKHSTAN, PAYMENT, тенге, Юань
According to Experts.news, global production of humanoid robots has moved from isolated prototypes to the first mass-produced batches; however, the industry remains highly concentrated: Chinese companies accounted for about 85% of shipments in 2025.
According to estimates by the Chinese research center CCID, in 2025, Chinese manufacturers shipped approximately 14,400 humanoid robots, accounting for 84.7% of the global market. Thus, the global total was approximately 17,000 units. Other studies estimate global shipments at approximately 18,000 units.
According to IDC, the number of humanoid robots shipped worldwide in 2025 increased more than sixfold—by approximately 508%. However, statistics from various research organizations differ significantly, as some count only bipedal robots, while others also include wheeled humanoid platforms and general-purpose robots with artificial intelligence.
China remains the only country where humanoid robots are already being produced by the thousands by several manufacturers simultaneously. There are over 140 companies in the country working on humanoid robots, and the number of models available exceeds 330. AGIBOT, Unitree, and UBTECH have become the largest manufacturers.
TrendForce expects Chinese production of humanoid robots to grow by another 94% in 2026. Unitree and AGIBOT are expected to maintain their leading positions thanks to their well-developed supply chains, access to low-cost actuators, batteries, and sensors, and their capacity for mass assembly.
China’s advantage lies not only in artificial intelligence but also in its ability to rapidly reduce the cost of hardware. Some of Unitree’s entry-level models are already priced below $6,000, while most American and European systems are geared toward more expensive industrial pilot projects.
The U.S. lags significantly behind China in terms of the actual number of robots produced, but it has the largest announced manufacturing projects outside of China.
Figure has launched BotQ, a facility whose first production line is designed to produce up to 12,000 humanoid robots per year. In April 2026, the company announced its transition from prototypes to the production phase and that it had reached an assembly rate of one robot per hour.
Agility Robotics operates the RoboFab plant in Oregon with a potential capacity of over 10,000 Digit robots per year. Actual output is currently significantly lower than the stated maximum capacity.
The U.S.-Norwegian company 1X has begun full-scale production of its NEO home robot at a factory in California. Tesla is setting up its first production lines for Optimus but has not yet disclosed confirmed data regarding mass production.
South Korea’s Hyundai Motor Group plans to build a facility in the U.S. with a capacity of up to 30,000 robots per year by 2028. The facility is expected to produce, among other things, the Atlas humanoid robots developed by Boston Dynamics. The first Atlas robots are scheduled to arrive at Hyundai’s U.S. facilities in 2028.
One of the most advanced European projects is Germany’s NEURA Robotics, which has developed the 4NE1 humanoid robot.
The company calls it the first European humanoid robot ready for industrial production. NEURA is collaborating with Bosch and Schaeffler, planning to scale up production of robots for industry, logistics, and service tasks.
In 2026, NEURA announced that it had raised up to $1.4 billion to expand mass production and develop a network of centers where robots will be trained to perform real-world tasks.
In Serbia, AGIBOT and Minth Group are preparing to launch a facility in Šabac. The initial production volume is stated at 1,000–2,000 humanoid robots per year. The facility is expected to open in August 2026, although the timeline has already been revised several times. Therefore, Serbia should for now be classified among countries with announced but not yet confirmed mass production.
If the project is implemented, Serbia could become one of the first countries in Europe where Chinese humanoid robots will be mass-produced and adapted for regional markets.
Japan has many years of experience in developing humanoid robots, but so far has focused primarily on research, components, medicine, and elder care. Kawasaki continues to develop the Kaleido platform but has not announced mass production on a scale comparable to that of Chinese companies. TrendForce believes that Japan’s competitive advantage could lie in actuators, sensors, control systems, and solutions for elderly care.
In South Korea, Samsung has acquired control of Rainbow Robotics and intends to integrate its robotics developments with its own artificial intelligence and software technologies. Hyundai is simultaneously developing Atlas through its subsidiary Boston Dynamics, though the group plans to build a large factory in the U.S.
There is no comprehensive international registry of humanoid robot production. Companies disclose the potential capacity of their factories much more frequently than actual production volumes, and the term “humanoid robot” is applied to various types of devices.
The only reliably confirmed fact is China’s leadership, with a share of approximately 85% of global shipments in 2025. The remaining roughly 15% is accounted for primarily by the U.S. and small batches, prototypes, and pilot series from Europe, Japan, and South Korea.
In 2026–2028, the distribution may change following the launch of plants by Figure, Agility Robotics, Tesla, Hyundai, NEURA, and the Serbian AGIBOT project. However, for now, China retains a significant advantage in terms of actual production volume, component costs, and supply chain readiness.
China will gradually introduce a consumption tax on lithium and lithium-ion batteries, as well as solar cells, which have been exempt from taxation since 2015, according to the Xinhua News Agency.
Mercury-free, nickel-metal hydride, lithium, and lithium-ion batteries, as well as vanadium flow batteries, will be taxed at a rate of 2% starting September 1, 2026. Starting in September 2027, the rate will increase to 4%.
For photovoltaic, or solar, cells, a 2% tax will take effect on April 1, 2027, and will also be raised to 4% starting in April 2028.
The new rules were announced by China’s Ministry of Finance, the General Administration of Customs, and the State Taxation Administration.
The introduction of the tax could increase the production costs of batteries and solar cells in China. If manufacturers pass on the additional costs entirely to buyers, selling prices could rise by approximately 2% in the initial phase and up to 4% once the rate is fully implemented.
However, the actual price increase will depend on competition, corporate profitability, and contracts with buyers. Chinese manufacturers may absorb part of the costs themselves to avoid losing market share in both domestic and foreign markets.
The changes will potentially affect the cost of electric vehicles, energy storage systems, and solar power plants, as batteries and photovoltaic modules are among the key components of such projects. At the same time, due to the high proportion of other costs, the price of a finished electric vehicle or solar power plant will not necessarily increase by the full 4%.
Some promising technologies will remain temporarily exempt from the tax until December 2028. These include sodium-ion and solid-state batteries, fuel cells, as well as perovskite, tandem, and gallium arsenide solar cells.
China currently levies a 4% consumption tax on most battery products. At the same time, lithium and lithium-ion batteries, as well as solar and fuel cells, have been exempt since 2015.
This policy has facilitated rapid expansion of production capacity and helped Chinese companies become global leaders. However, the excess supply has simultaneously intensified price competition and reduced profitability for some manufacturers.
Analysts at Citic Securities estimate that the tax changes could generate an additional 45 billion yuan, or about $6.6 billion, in revenue for the Chinese government.
Following the announcement of the new rules, shares of solar cell manufacturer Longi Green Energy Technology rose 2.1%, JinkoSolar’s rose 4%, and those of CATL, the world’s largest battery manufacturer, rose 4.6%.
The largest suppliers of beer to China in the first half of 2026 were Germany ($53.2 million), the Netherlands ($45.8 million), and Spain ($41.5 million), according to data from the General Administration of Customs (GAC) of the People’s Republic of China.
From January through June, China imported beer from 54 countries, while exporting its own beer to more than 100 countries worldwide.
