According to Experts.news, the European Commission is preparing proposals to reform the EU enlargement process, which are set to form the basis for a strategic discussion among EU leaders in October 2026. One of the key areas of discussion is the introduction of additional safeguards that would allow for the restriction of certain rights of new member states in the event they violate their obligations to the EU.
The European Commission has confirmed that it is preparing the reform. As early as July 6, an EC representative told Euronews that Brussels was working on its own proposals ahead of the October summit, as member states themselves are increasingly engaged in discussions regarding the new rules.
The European Council has officially confirmed that at its meeting on October 15–16, 2026, EU leaders will hold a strategic discussion on the Union’s enlargement and internal reforms. However, there is as yet no official confirmation that the European Commission will present the final package on October 15 specifically.
One of the most discussed options is a temporary restriction on certain voting rights of new member states.
Back in June, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg proposed discussing the possibility of a transition period during which new EU members would be unable to block decisions in the most sensitive areas, where unanimity among all countries is currently required.
This primarily concerns foreign policy, the EU budget, and the Union’s further expansion.
In addition, the five countries propose including special safeguard mechanisms in future accession treaties. These would allow measures to be taken against a new member state in the event of a serious deviation from the principles of democracy, the rule of law, or media freedom.
These proposals are largely linked to Hungary’s experience under Viktor Orbán, when Budapest repeatedly used the unanimity requirement to block important EU decisions.
However, for now, the discussion centers on reform options rather than newly agreed-upon rules.
This discussion is of the greatest significance for Montenegro, which is currently the most advanced candidate for accession.
According to the European Commission, the country has opened all 33 negotiation chapters, 16 of which have already been provisionally closed. Podgorica intends to conclude negotiations and become the 28th member of the European Union in 2028.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated in June that Montenegro’s accession by 2028 is “achievable.” The EU has already begun drafting the future accession treaty.
Therefore, Montenegro’s accession treaty could potentially become the first document of a new generation, providing additional guarantees for the EU following the country’s admission.
However, the European Commission is concerned about a scenario in which new conditions would be developed exclusively for Montenegro. That is why Brussels wants to establish a universal approach that can also be applied to future candidate countries.
The reform will be of direct importance to both Ukraine and Moldova.
Negotiations with both countries accelerated significantly in the summer of 2026. In June, the EU opened the first negotiation cluster with Ukraine and Moldova, focusing on fundamental issues—the rule of law, democratic institutions, and public administration. In July, negotiations also made progress on foreign policy issues.
That said, Ukraine and Moldova are much further from concluding negotiations than Montenegro.
For Kyiv, the future model is particularly important: if the EU does indeed introduce transitional restrictions on the right of veto, Ukraine could potentially gain full membership but would initially have limited ability to block decisions in certain areas.
At the same time, such a system could facilitate political consensus on Ukraine’s membership within the current EU, as some member states fear that expanding from 27 to more than 30 members would significantly complicate decision-making.
The assertion that France, Germany, and the Netherlands are generally opposed to rapid EU enlargement requires clarification. These countries support further enlargement but belong to a group of states that demand prior strengthening of institutional safeguards and stricter oversight of future members’ compliance with the rule of law. Together with Belgium and Luxembourg, they have proposed developing a new template for accession treaties.
France, in particular, takes a cautious stance regarding Ukraine’s accelerated accession. Officials in Paris are concerned about the budgetary implications, the impact of Ukraine’s large agricultural sector on the single market, and the potential for the decision-making process to become more complicated in an expanded EU.
Germany, on the other hand, actively supports enlargement but at the same time insists on reforming the European Union itself and is considering options for the gradual integration of new member states.
Essentially, the debate boils down to an attempt to resolve the tension between two objectives.
On the one hand, the geopolitical situation is prompting the EU to accelerate the accession of Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, and Moldova. Brussels views enlargement as a tool for strengthening European security and limiting the influence of Russia and China in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, existing member states are reluctant to admit new members who, once admitted, could use their veto power to exert pressure on other EU countries.
Therefore, the future model may be based on the following principle: full membership is granted more quickly, but some of the new member state’s political tools remain limited during a transition period, and compliance with obligations continues to be monitored even after accession.
The final parameters of such a system have not yet been agreed upon. The main political discussion is set to take place at the European Council on October 15–16, 2026, after which it will become clearer which of the proposed mechanisms may be included in the future accession treaties for Montenegro, Ukraine, Moldova, and other candidates.
Marshal of the Polish Sejm Włodzimierz Czarzasty has stated that Ukraine’s accession to the European Union will require the Ukrainian side to reconsider controversial chapters of its own history, including its assessment of the mass killings of Poles in Volhynia during the Second World War.
Czarzasty made the statement on August 10 in Szczawnica following a meeting with Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Ruslan Stefanchuk, the Polish Press Agency PAP reported.
Czarzasty stressed that he personally supports Ukraine’s future membership in the EU but believes that European integration entails not only economic benefits but also the acceptance of a certain system of values and historical responsibility.
“The EU is about democracy and values; it is not merely an ATM,” the Marshal of the Sejm said, adding that it is also necessary “to call genocide genocide.” In his opinion, no nation can escape its own history.
The main subject of the historical dispute remains the mass killings of the Polish population in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943–1945, responsibility for a significant portion of which the Polish side places on the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
In Poland’s state historical policy, these events are officially classified as genocide. As early as 2016, the Sejm enshrined this interpretation in a parliamentary resolution, and in 2025 Poland went further: by law, it designated July 11 as the National Day of Remembrance of Poles — Victims of the Genocide Committed by the OUN and UPA in the Eastern Territories of the Second Polish Republic. The law was adopted unanimously by the Sejm and subsequently approved by the Senate.
The Polish side demands three things from Ukraine above all: recognition of the genocidal nature of the crimes, the opportunity to search for and exhume the remains of Polish victims without obstruction, and the dignified burial and commemoration of those killed. Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance regards the depoliticisation of exhumations as one of the key conditions for genuine historical reconciliation.
Warsaw therefore no longer views the issue solely as a dispute among historians. In recent years, it has become part of the state’s remembrance policy and is increasingly being linked by Polish politicians to the issue of Ukraine’s European integration.
Official Kyiv does not deny the mass killings of the Polish population or the need to honour the memory of those killed. However, it avoids accepting the Polish formula of sole responsibility on the part of Ukraine and the official classification of the entire Polish-Ukrainian conflict of that period as a genocide of Poles.
The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance predominantly uses the terms “Volhynia Tragedy” and “Ukrainian-Polish confrontation.” In July 2026, UINR head Oleksandr Alforov stated during a joint Ukrainian-Polish commemoration that the tragic events of 1943 must be remembered and that relations between the two nations should be built on mutual respect and acknowledgement of past mistakes.
The Ukrainian side also points out that not only Poles but also Ukrainians were killed in the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation, including as a result of retaliatory actions by Polish armed formations and the policies of the Polish state. Notably, in July 2026, Polish Ambassador to Ukraine Piotr Łukasiewicz also publicly stressed the need to take Ukrainian victims into account.
When the Polish Sejm legislatively designated July 11 as a day of remembrance for the “victims of the genocide committed by the OUN and UPA” in June 2025, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the decision unilateral and warned that such steps did not contribute to achieving mutual understanding and reconciliation. Kyiv proposed focusing on the joint work of historians, searches, exhumations and the dignified commemoration of all victims.
Despite the political dispute over terminology, substantial progress has been made in practical matters over the past year. Ukraine resumed issuing permits to the Polish side for search and exhumation work. In 2026, investigations were conducted, in particular, in the former villages of Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska in Volhynia, while on August 7, Ukraine’s interdepartmental commission approved new exhumation work in Huta Peniatska in the Lviv region and in the village of Uhly in the Rivne region.
Work in Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska was completed on August 7, and the remains discovered there are to be reburied. Thus, one of the most acute practical issues that had complicated relations between Warsaw and Kyiv for several years has gradually begun to move forward.
Following his meeting with Stefanchuk, Czarzasty also called for political and historical conflicts not to be transferred to relations between Polish and Ukrainian societies. According to him, a permanent channel of communication must be maintained between the parliaments of the two countries and mutual trust must be restored. At the same time, he stressed that “without a secure Ukraine, there is no secure Poland” and expressed support for Ukraine’s membership in the EU and Poland’s participation in the country’s post-war reconstruction.
The European Union has transferred an additional 30 million euros to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund, thereby increasing its total contribution to the fund to 279 million euros, according to Ukraine’s First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy Denys Shmyhal.
“The funds received through this financial instrument are helping us restore energy infrastructure damaged by Russian attacks, purchase urgently needed equipment for our energy companies, and ensure a reliable energy supply, first and foremost for critical infrastructure,” – Shmyhal was quoted as saying by the Ministry of Energy’s press service on its Telegram channel on Saturday.
According to Experts.news, Montenegro and Iceland may eventually become members of the European Union at the same time—the possibility of combining the two countries’ accession into a single package is being discussed in Brussels by representatives of the European Commission and European diplomats, Politico reports.
This option is being considered against the backdrop of Montenegro’s rapid progress in membership negotiations and Iceland’s possible return to the European integration process, which was put on hold more than a decade ago. The EU has not yet made a final decision on the countries’ joint accession.
A key event will be the referendum in Iceland on August 29, 2026, in which citizens will have to decide whether the country should resume negotiations on EU accession. The Icelandic parliament approved the referendum in May. If a majority supports resuming negotiations, the outcome will subsequently have to be put to a second referendum—this time directly on the country’s membership in the European Union.
European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos called Iceland a “special case,” as the country is already deeply integrated with the European Union through the European Economic Area and the Schengen Area.
In her assessment, if the referendum yields a positive result, negotiations with Reykjavík could potentially last only one or two years. Kos also stated that the EU is ready to seek special solutions for the issues most sensitive to Iceland, primarily fisheries and agriculture.
This theoretically allows Iceland to catch up with Montenegro and enter the final stretch of negotiations at roughly the same time as Podgorica.
Montenegro is currently the candidate that has advanced the furthest in the EU accession process.
All 33 negotiation chapters have already been opened, and following the EU–Montenegro Intergovernmental Conference on July 14, 18 chapters were provisionally closed. The most recent chapters to be closed were those on competition policy and the Customs Union.
Thus, Podgorica has completed more than half of the process of closing negotiation chapters and expects to conclude negotiations by the end of 2026.
The government of Prime Minister Milojko Spajić has officially set a goal of becoming the 28th EU member state in 2028. The European Union has already begun preparatory work on Montenegro’s accession treaty, and on June 30, the European Commission presented a financial package outlining the budgetary implications of the country’s future membership.
One of Politico’s sources at the European Commission stated that there is a significant likelihood of a joint package being formed for the two countries.
The economic rationale for this option lies in the substantial differences between the two countries.
Iceland is a wealthy economy and, upon accession, would likely become a net contributor to the EU budget. Montenegro, by contrast, due to its relatively low per capita income, would be a recipient of European funding.
According to European diplomats, combining the two countries into a single package could therefore simplify the political coordination of enlargement for current EU members.
Montenegro’s Minister for European Affairs, Maida Gorčević, told Politico that Podgorica is open to the possibility of linking its accession to that of Iceland.
Iceland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Torgurdur Katrín Gunnarsdóttir, also called joint accession “absolutely” possible.
However, each country will have to fulfill the membership criteria independently. Merely combining them into a single treaty or political package does not eliminate the need to complete negotiations and secure the consent of all current EU member states.
Despite the high level of economic integration, Iceland’s possible return to the negotiations does not guarantee their smooth conclusion.
For Iceland, control over fishery resources carries significantly greater economic and political weight than it does for most EU member states. The country’s foreign minister has stated that retaining control over fisheries will be one of the fundamental conditions of any future agreements with Brussels.
However, Iceland already applies a significant portion of EU legislation thanks to its membership in the European Economic Area. That is why the process could potentially proceed much faster than for most current candidates.
Montenegro applied for EU membership in 2008, was granted candidate status in 2010, and membership negotiations officially began on June 29, 2012. Currently, all 33 negotiation chapters have been opened, of which 18 have been provisionally closed. Following an acceleration of reforms in 2024–2026, the country became the leading candidate for the next EU enlargement.
Iceland took a completely different path. Following the global financial crisis, it applied to the EU in July 2009, and negotiations began in 2010. By the time negotiations were suspended, 27 negotiation chapters had been opened, 11 of which had been provisionally closed.
After a new government took office in 2013, negotiations were frozen, and in March 2015, Reykjavík asked the European Union to no longer consider Iceland a candidate country. At the same time, the country maintained the closest possible integration with the EU through the European Economic Area and the Schengen Area.
In 2026, the issue of membership returned to the political agenda. Parliament scheduled a referendum for August 29 on whether to resume negotiations.
The format of several countries joining the EU simultaneously is not new. Spain and Portugal joined the Community at the same time in 1986; ten countries joined the EU as part of the 2004 enlargement; and Bulgaria and Romania joined simultaneously in 2007.
If Iceland votes to resume negotiations and is able to quickly resolve contentious issues with Brussels, 2028 becomes, for the first time, a theoretically possible date for the simultaneous accession of Montenegro and Iceland. For now, however, this is a political scenario rather than an approved EU enlargement timeline.
The European Commission is developing a new legislative framework that will allow national, regional, and municipal authorities to restrict short-term housing rentals in areas facing particularly sharp price increases and a shortage of apartments for permanent residents.
The initiative will be part of the future European Affordable Housing Act, which the European Commission plans to present in 2026. The document is intended to help authorities identify areas under housing pressure based on publicly available statistical data and take measures commensurate with the scale of the problem.
This does not mean a blanket ban on Airbnb, Booking.com, or other services across the entire European Union. The European Commission intends to create a legal framework within which cities and regions can independently regulate short-term rentals without violating the rules of the single European market.
In particular, municipalities should be given greater legal certainty when imposing restrictions in areas where tourist rentals reduce the housing supply for local residents. Possible measures will be determined taking into account the local situation, the interests of the tourism sector, and the principle of proportionality.
During the consultations, representatives of cities and regions called on the European Commission to develop a list of tools compatible with EU legislation. They also emphasized the need to take into account the differences between major tourist centers, small towns, and rural areas.
The drafting of the Affordable Housing Act is proceeding in parallel with the implementation of previously approved EU rules on the collection of information regarding short-term rentals. EU Regulation No. 2024/1028 will take effect on May 20, 2026. It provides for the creation of digital registration systems for landlords and the exchange of data between platforms and government agencies.
In countries that implement such registration, property owners must obtain a unique property number and include it in their listings. Online platforms are required to display and verify these numbers, conduct random checks, and remove listings at the request of authorities if they do not comply with established rules.
Platforms must also submit monthly data on the number of guests and booked nights via a single national digital gateway. This will allow municipalities to assess the actual scale of short-term rentals and make data-driven decisions.
However, the current regulation primarily governs registration and the exchange of information. It does not, in and of itself, establish EU-wide limits on the number of apartments available for rent or the permitted number of nights.
According to the European Commission, short-term rentals already account for about a quarter of all tourist accommodation supply in the EU.
In 2025, 951.6 million guest nights were booked through Airbnb, Booking.com, Expedia, and other major online platforms. Compared to 2024, this figure increased by 11.4%.
The European Commission acknowledges that this market generates income for property owners, expands options for tourists, and supports local businesses. At the same time, the high concentration of short-term rentals in historic centers and popular resorts may reduce the supply of apartments for permanent residence and contribute to rising prices.
According to the European Affordable Housing Plan, the number of short-term rental bookings through the largest platforms increased by more than 90% between 2018 and 2024. Professional operators account for more than 45% of listings, even though they represent a minority of property owners.
Once the new legislation is adopted, the rules will depend not only on the country but also on the situation in a specific city or district. In tourist destinations with a housing shortage, local authorities will potentially be able to impose stricter requirements regarding registration, licensing, and rental duration. In regions where there is a shortage of tourist accommodations and short-term rentals support the local economy, restrictions may be significantly fewer.
In 2025, Ukraine remained the fifth-largest supplier of organic products to the EU, although its export volume decreased by 14.3%—from 203,897 thousand to 174,701 thousand metric tons. Ukraine’s share of the EU’s total organic imports was 5.9%.
The largest suppliers were Ecuador with 434,970 thousand metric tons, China with 314,404 thousand metric tons, Peru with 220,333 thousand metric tons, and the Dominican Republic with 177,642 thousand metric tons. Ukraine ranked behind them.
Ukraine retained its top position in organic grain exports. In 2025, the EU imported 85,859 thousand metric tons of such products from Ukraine, accounting for 27.7% of European imports in this category.
In terms of oilseeds and protein crops, Ukraine ranked third behind China and Togo, supplying 48,828 thousand metric tons. Exports of organic fruits and nuts totaled 20,250 thousand metric tons, placing Ukraine in ninth place.
