The Hungarian parliament has elected former Supreme Court president András Baka as the country’s new president, marking another important stage in the restructuring of Hungary’s political system following the end of Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule.
On 11 August, 140 MPs voted for the 73-year-old lawyer, while six voted against. Representatives of the opposition Fidesz party did not participate in the vote, protesting against the early termination of the powers of the previous president, Tamás Sulyok. Baka is due to officially take office on 19 August.
Baka’s election is primarily of political and institutional significance. The president of Hungary does not head the government or determine the country’s economic or foreign policy, but can serve as a constitutional counterweight to the parliamentary majority and the cabinet. This function is particularly important now, as Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s Tisza party holds a constitutional majority in parliament and is carrying out sweeping changes to the institutions shaped under Orbán.
Baka fits well into this political arrangement. From 1991 to 2008, he served as a judge at the European Court of Human Rights, and in 2009 parliament elected him president of the Supreme Court of Hungary. His mandate was terminated early in early 2012 after he publicly criticised the Orbán government’s judicial reforms. The European Court of Human Rights subsequently found violations of his right of access to a court and freedom of expression.
Therefore, Baka’s return to one of the country’s highest public offices almost 15 years later has clear symbolic significance. It demonstrates the new authorities’ intention to distance themselves from the institutional model of the Orbán era while simultaneously making the independence of the judiciary one of the central themes of the political transformation.
“For Hungarian society, this is much more than an ordinary change of president. After sixteen years of dominance by a single political force, any large-scale restructuring of state institutions will inevitably be perceived differently by society. For supporters of change, this is an opportunity to restore the system of checks and balances, while for a significant proportion of Fidesz supporters, what is happening may look like political revenge by the new authorities,” said Oleksandr Poznii, an expert at the Experts Club analytical centre and co-founder and director of the Active Group research company.
According to Poznii, the key test will be the ability of the new institutions to demonstrate genuine independence from Péter Magyar’s government.
“Baka’s main task is not to become the president of the victorious party. If the new head of state can truly distance himself from the government and act as an arbiter between different political groups, this will be an important signal to society. Otherwise, Hungary risks seeing not the dismantling of the former model of concentrated power, but merely a change in the political force controlling that model,” Poznii noted.
The sociologist also draws attention to the high degree of political polarisation in Hungarian society. In such a situation, the significance of the presidential office is determined not so much by the scope of its formal powers as by the trust that different groups of the population place in the head of state.
“In countries with strong political polarisation, symbolic institutions can be far more important than the text of the constitution might suggest. The president may not manage the economy or foreign policy, but he can either reduce the level of conflict in society or, conversely, become another participant in that conflict. Therefore, the main measure of Baka’s success will not be the number of laws he blocks, but whether he can be perceived as the president of all Hungarians,” Poznii emphasised.
Following his election, Baka himself stated that under the previous authorities the system of checks and balances had effectively ceased to function, but stressed that political change should not turn into revenge against supporters of the former government. He also declared his intention to represent citizens with different political views.
Hungary is a parliamentary republic, meaning that the real centre of executive power is located not in the presidential palace, but in the government.
Under the Fundamental Law of Hungary, the president is the head of state, embodies the unity of the nation and is responsible for safeguarding the democratic functioning of state institutions. At the same time, the president has no executive power of his own and does not head the ministries.
Nevertheless, his powers extend beyond purely ceremonial functions. The president signs laws adopted by parliament and, before signing, may return a law to MPs once for reconsideration. If he considers a document to be contrary to the Fundamental Law, he may refer it to the Constitutional Court.
Following parliamentary elections, the president proposes a candidate for prime minister to parliament. He also formally appoints ministers upon the recommendation of the head of government, performs a range of personnel and representative functions, and represents the Hungarian state in foreign relations.
Thus, the head of state can delay certain decisions by the parliamentary majority or initiate a constitutional review of them, but cannot independently determine the country’s political course.
The prime minister, by contrast, is the effective head of the executive branch. The government is the principal body of executive power and public administration, while the prime minister determines its overall political course. It is the prime minister who forms the government team, directs the work of the cabinet and, through the parliamentary majority, implements the principal budgetary, economic, social and foreign policy decisions.
Therefore, the key political figure in Hungary remains Péter Magyar, who came to power following Tisza’s victory in the April parliamentary elections. The party won two-thirds of the seats in parliament, ending Orbán’s 16-year period of uninterrupted rule.
After coming to power, Magyar began seeking the replacement of the heads of a number of state institutions associated with the previous system of government. One of the most notable episodes was the early termination of President Tamás Sulyok’s term of office.
For the new authorities, Baka’s election is particularly symbolic because of his long-standing conflict with the Orbán system. The former president of the Supreme Court is effectively returning to the highest level of state politics after the defeat of the political force under which he lost his judicial post.
At the same time, this is precisely where one of the main risks facing Hungary’s new political system emerges. Tisza holds a constitutional majority and therefore has exceptionally broad powers to change laws and institutions. The new authorities must consequently dismantle the mechanisms created under Orbán while simultaneously proving that they are not replacing them with their own party control.
This is the paradox of Hungary’s new political arrangement: Magyar has obtained an exceptionally strong position thanks to his parliamentary majority, while Baka is expected to embody a limit on the excessive concentration of power.
For Ukrainian audiences, Hungary’s transformation also has foreign policy significance. Following Orbán’s defeat, Budapest’s position on Ukraine has become less confrontational, although Magyar does not present himself as an unconditional supporter of Kyiv and continues to link some bilateral issues to the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia.
Therefore, the ultimate criterion for determining whether Hungary has entered a new political era will be not only the departure of officials from the Orbán era, but also whether the new authorities can establish a system of institutions capable of functioning independently of whichever party controls parliament and the government.
Ukraine’s revenue from ferrous metal exports in July 2026 totaled $199.9 million, down approximately 31.9% from June’s $293.6 million, according to the Experts Club Information and Analytical Center.
This calculation is based on data from the State Customs Service of Ukraine.
The July dynamics significantly worsened the industry’s results for the seven-month period. Overall, in January–July, foreign currency revenue from exports of ferrous metals decreased by 7.6% year-on-year to $1.678 billion.
At the same time, Ukraine imported $176.4 million worth of ferrous metals in July. Thus, the monthly gap between exports and imports of these products narrowed to approximately $23.5 million.
Exports of metal products generated another $71.4 million in July, while imports of these products amounted to $106.3 million. Consequently, imports of metal products directly exceeded exports by almost $35 million in July.
In total, exports of ferrous metals and metal products amounted to approximately $271.3 million in July, while imports reached around $282.6 million.
Thus, if these two groups are considered together, Ukraine effectively recorded a small negative trade balance of approximately $11 million in July, although the balance for the entire seven-month period remains positive so far.
For comparison, in 2025 Ukraine received $3.339 billion from exports of ferrous metals and $916.2 million from exports of metal products.
The sharp decline in July requires further monitoring: data for a single month alone do not yet make it possible to determine whether this marks the beginning of a sustained deterioration in export conditions or a short-term fluctuation in supplies.
Verifying a foreign investor helps Ukrainian businesses establish the origin of capital, the ownership structure and the partner’s ability to fulfil its obligations.
When raising foreign financing, the main attention is usually paid to verifying the Ukrainian company. A potential investor analyses financial statements, corporate documents, taxes, litigation, assets and the business model.
However, Ukrainian owners should also verify the party offering the capital. The name of a well-known fund in a presentation or claimed access to significant financial resources does not yet confirm that the negotiations are being conducted by an authorised person or that the money actually belongs to the declared investor.
Before signing an agreement, it is worth verifying the legal entity, the date of its establishment, its executives, owners, corporate group, previous investments and possible sanctions or reputational risks.
Particular caution is required if the investor demands payment of an upfront fee, uses unofficial email addresses, avoids providing corporate documents or proposes making payments through a company that is not a party to the agreement.
D&B third-party verification solutions make it possible to identify a company, analyse its corporate relationships, establish its owners and conduct checks against sanctions lists and other risk sources. D&B Investigate is also used to visualise business relationships and support enhanced due diligence.
“When raising capital, it is not only the Ukrainian company that undergoes verification. Business owners also need to understand who is offering the financing, where this capital comes from and whether the potential investor is capable of fulfilling its obligations,” emphasised Maksym Urakin, Director of Development and Marketing at Interfax-Ukraine, Head of the D&B-Interfax-Ukraine Business Unit and PhD in Economics.
According to him, verification is particularly important for small and medium-sized businesses that do not have their own large legal or compliance department and may perceive the very fact of a foreign investor’s interest as confirmation of its reliability.
The verification result does not replace legal and financial due diligence, but it helps determine whether it is worth proceeding to the costly stage of negotiations, disclosing confidential data and providing access to internal documentation.
Before signing an agreement, it is also necessary to make sure that the representative is authorised to act on behalf of the investor and that the bank account used for the transaction belongs to a party to the agreement or to a duly authorised entity.
Dun & Bradstreet is an international business data and analytics company founded in 1841. Its solutions are used for company verification, corporate ownership analysis, compliance, credit risk assessment and business decision support.
In Ukraine, Dun & Bradstreet is represented by the Interfax-Ukraine News Agency. The D&B-Interfax-Ukraine unit helps Ukrainian enterprises verify potential investors, partners, buyers and suppliers. The agency has operated in the political and economic information market since 1992.
Enquiries can be submitted via D&B’s specialised resource — dnb.ua, by email at Urakin@interfax.kyiv.ua or by telephone at +38 (044) 270-65-74.
Ukraine continues to have the lowest minimum wage among European countries with a statutory minimum wage included in Eurostat statistics.
As of 1 July 2026, Ukraine’s minimum wage amounts to EUR 169 gross per month when converted into euros, according to Eurostat data.
Moldova ranks second from the bottom with a minimum wage of EUR 313, while in all other countries covered by the survey, the figure exceeds EUR 500.
For comparison, the minimum wage is approximately EUR 517 in Albania, EUR 620 in Bulgaria, EUR 621 in Türkiye, EUR 624 in North Macedonia, EUR 670 in Montenegro and EUR 743 in Serbia.
At the opposite end of the European ranking is Luxembourg, with a minimum wage of EUR 2,771 per month. It is followed by Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France, where the minimum wage exceeds EUR 1,800 in all cases.
When making comparisons, it should be taken into account that Eurostat presents the figures in euros and as gross monthly equivalents. For countries that do not use the euro, the amounts are converted using the exchange rate at the end of the previous month. Therefore, changes in the national currency’s exchange rate may also affect a country’s position in the ranking.
In total, Eurostat covers 22 EU member states with a national minimum wage and seven candidate and potential candidate countries where such a wage is established at the national level. At the same time, Denmark, Italy, Austria, Finland and Sweden do not have a single statutory national minimum wage.
Below is the full ranking of minimum wages in Europe as of 1 July 2026, from highest to lowest, gross per month converted into euros according to Eurostat’s methodology.
Luxembourg — €2,771
Ireland — €2,391
Germany — €2,343
Netherlands — €2,338
Belgium — €2,234
France — €1,867
Slovenia — €1,482
Spain — €1,425
Lithuania — €1,153
Poland — €1,119
Cyprus — €1,088
Greece — €1,073
Portugal — €1,073
Croatia — €1,050
Malta — €994
Estonia — €946
Czechia — €923
Slovakia — €915
Hungary — €906
Romania — €825
Latvia — €780
Serbia — €743
Montenegro — €670
North Macedonia — €624
Türkiye — €621
Bulgaria — €620
Albania — €517
Moldova — €313
Ukraine — €169
Ukraine exported $14.1 billion worth of food products in January–July 2026, according to data from the State Customs Service.
According to calculations by the Experts Club information and analytical centre based on State Customs Service statistics, food products accounted for approximately 58.5% of Ukraine’s total merchandise exports, which amounted to $24.1 billion over the seven-month period.
Metals and metal products ranked second among export categories at $2.5 billion, or slightly more than 10% of total exports.
Exports of machinery, equipment and transport vehicles amounted to $2.1 billion, corresponding to approximately 8.7% of external shipments.
Thus, food, metal products and engineering products collectively accounted for approximately 77.6% of Ukraine’s merchandise exports.
Poland remained the largest market for Ukrainian goods over the seven-month period, receiving $2.8 billion worth of products. Exports to Türkiye amounted to $2 billion, while exports to Germany totalled $1.5 billion.
Overall, Ukrainian exports in January–July 2026 increased by 3.8% compared with the same period last year, rising to $24.1 billion from $23.2 billion.
At the same time, imports increased significantly faster, rising by 26.6% to $58.1 billion.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy continues to overhaul the diplomatic corps, a process that is gradually extending to include not only countries in the European Union and the Western Balkans but also nations in Asia and the Middle East.
On August 6, the president dismissed four ambassadors at once: Vasyl Kyrylych in Croatia, Volodymyr Shkurov in Albania, Oleg Gerasymenko in Montenegro, and Markiyan Chuchuk in Pakistan.
The relevant personnel decisions were formalized by decrees No. 709/2026–No. 712/2026.
According to the Experts Club think tank, the simultaneous replacement of the heads of four diplomatic missions appears to be part of a broader restructuring of Ukraine’s foreign policy apparatus, rather than an isolated personnel move.
As early as May 18, Zelenskyy had spoken of the need for “replacements and adjustments” within the diplomatic corps, and on July 15, he explicitly stated that he was discussing with First Deputy Head of the Office of the President Serhiy Kyslytsya and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andriy Sybiga a list of Ukrainian ambassadors who needed to be replaced.
The rotation began even before a series of decisions were made in August. Specifically, on June 26, the president dismissed the Ukrainian ambassadors to Oman, Cyprus, Vietnam, and Cambodia. At the same time, new appointments were made to other diplomatic posts.
Thus, this represents a gradual renewal of Ukraine’s network of diplomatic missions over the course of several months.
Three of the four ambassadors had served for more than six years
The length of the diplomats’ tenures also suggests that the August decisions should be viewed primarily in the context of rotation.
Vasyl Kyrylych was appointed Ukraine’s ambassador to Croatia on December 24, 2019, and served in Zagreb for more than six and a half years.
Volodymyr Shkurov took the helm of the Ukrainian Embassy in Albania on April 13, 2020, and also served for over six years.
Markiyan Chuchuk was appointed Ukraine’s ambassador to Pakistan on April 17, 2020. His diplomatic mission lasted over six years.
Oleg Gerasymenko headed the Ukrainian Embassy in Montenegro starting May 4, 2022—a little over four years.
The very fact that three of the four diplomats held their posts for such a long time is further evidence supporting the theory of a planned personnel rotation. The published decrees do not specify the reasons for the dismissals.
It is particularly telling that three of the four August decisions concern Southeast Europe—Croatia, Albania, and Montenegro.
Experts Club notes that the importance of this region for Ukrainian diplomacy has grown significantly.
Croatia is a member of the EU and NATO and remains one of Ukraine’s steadfast partners. Croatia’s experience with postwar reconstruction, demining, the return of the population, and the integration of territories following the conflicts of the 1990s is also important for Kyiv.
Albania is also a NATO member and actively supports Ukraine in international forums. Tirana hosted one of the previous summits in the “Ukraine–Southeast Europe” format.
Montenegro presents another area of interest. It is a NATO member and, at the same time, the most promising candidate for EU accession among the countries of the Western Balkans. Therefore, relations with Podgorica are becoming important for Kyiv in the context of its own European integration.
On July 15, Kyiv hosted the fifth “Ukraine–Southeast Europe” summit, attended by representatives from Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro. The participants reaffirmed their support for Ukraine and the need to expand regional cooperation.
Against this backdrop, the nearly simultaneous replacement of three Ukrainian ambassadors to Balkan countries may indicate Kyiv’s desire to inject additional momentum into this direction.
Of the three Balkan appointments, Montenegro may prove to be the most interesting.
Podgorica expects to conclude negotiations on accession to the European Union and become one of the next new EU members. For Ukraine, which is also negotiating membership, Montenegro’s experience could be of practical value.
In addition, Ukraine is gradually building a separate network of relations with countries in the Adriatic region—Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, and neighboring Serbia.
The most recent example is Zelenskyy’s official visit to Belgrade on August 8 and his talks with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, during which they discussed free trade, energy, agriculture, Ukraine’s recovery, and political cooperation.
Thus, the Balkans are gradually transforming from a secondary focus of Ukrainian diplomacy into an independent regional track.
The replacement of the ambassador to Pakistan presents a completely different challenge.
Islamabad is important to Ukraine as one of the largest centers in South Asia and a representative of the so-called Global South. Pakistan’s population is approaching 250 million; the country wields significant regional political influence and is a nuclear power.
At the same time, Pakistan’s foreign policy is based on a complex system of relations with China, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, Russia, and the Gulf states.
For Ukraine, expanding ties with Pakistan could be significant in several areas at once—food trade, industry, international organizations, and building support for Kyiv among Asian nations and the Muslim world.
As Ukraine’s foreign policy increasingly shifts away from focusing exclusively on the EU and the U.S., embassies in countries such as Pakistan, India, the Gulf states, Indonesia, and African nations are gaining greater importance.
That is precisely why replacing the ambassador in Islamabad after a mission lasting more than six years appears to be a logical part of the renewal of Ukraine’s Asian policy.
The August dismissals are likely not the end of the process.
As early as July 15, Zelenskyy publicly spoke about forming a “pool of ambassadors” slated for replacement. This suggests that new personnel decrees may be issued in the coming weeks.
At the same time, the current diplomatic rotation coincides with more extensive personnel changes in Ukraine’s government system, which took place in July and affected the government, security agencies, and other state institutions.
According to Experts Club, what matters most will not be the number of diplomats dismissed, but who Kyiv appoints to replace them.
If key posts are filled not only by career diplomats but also by former ministers, representatives of the Office of the President, economic negotiators, or prominent public figures, this could signal Ukraine’s transition to a model of so-called “political diplomacy,” in which embassies are assigned more specific economic, investment, and negotiating tasks.
As of August 10, 2026, presidential decrees appointing new Ukrainian ambassadors to Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, and Pakistan have not been published.
Experts Club believes that future appointments will provide a clearer understanding of the logic behind the current rotation.
If diplomats with significant European and economic experience are sent to Zagreb, Tirana, and Podgorica, this will confirm a strengthening of the Balkan focus. The appointment to Islamabad of a specialist in Asian affairs, trade diplomacy, or relations with the Global South, in turn, could signal an expansion of Ukraine’s activities beyond its traditional circle of Western partners.
Overall, the current rotation signals a transition of Ukrainian diplomacy to a new phase: after four years of full-scale war, embassies are now expected not only to secure international support for Ukraine but also to work toward EU membership, the country’s recovery, exports, attracting investment, and forging long-term regional alliances.
