Ukraine continues to have the lowest minimum wage among European countries with a statutory minimum wage included in Eurostat statistics.
As of 1 July 2026, Ukraine’s minimum wage amounts to EUR 169 gross per month when converted into euros, according to Eurostat data.
Moldova ranks second from the bottom with a minimum wage of EUR 313, while in all other countries covered by the survey, the figure exceeds EUR 500.
For comparison, the minimum wage is approximately EUR 517 in Albania, EUR 620 in Bulgaria, EUR 621 in Türkiye, EUR 624 in North Macedonia, EUR 670 in Montenegro and EUR 743 in Serbia.
At the opposite end of the European ranking is Luxembourg, with a minimum wage of EUR 2,771 per month. It is followed by Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France, where the minimum wage exceeds EUR 1,800 in all cases.
When making comparisons, it should be taken into account that Eurostat presents the figures in euros and as gross monthly equivalents. For countries that do not use the euro, the amounts are converted using the exchange rate at the end of the previous month. Therefore, changes in the national currency’s exchange rate may also affect a country’s position in the ranking.
In total, Eurostat covers 22 EU member states with a national minimum wage and seven candidate and potential candidate countries where such a wage is established at the national level. At the same time, Denmark, Italy, Austria, Finland and Sweden do not have a single statutory national minimum wage.
Below is the full ranking of minimum wages in Europe as of 1 July 2026, from highest to lowest, gross per month converted into euros according to Eurostat’s methodology.
Luxembourg — €2,771
Ireland — €2,391
Germany — €2,343
Netherlands — €2,338
Belgium — €2,234
France — €1,867
Slovenia — €1,482
Spain — €1,425
Lithuania — €1,153
Poland — €1,119
Cyprus — €1,088
Greece — €1,073
Portugal — €1,073
Croatia — €1,050
Malta — €994
Estonia — €946
Czechia — €923
Slovakia — €915
Hungary — €906
Romania — €825
Latvia — €780
Serbia — €743
Montenegro — €670
North Macedonia — €624
Türkiye — €621
Bulgaria — €620
Albania — €517
Moldova — €313
Ukraine — €169
Ukraine exported $14.1 billion worth of food products in January–July 2026, according to data from the State Customs Service.
According to calculations by the Experts Club information and analytical centre based on State Customs Service statistics, food products accounted for approximately 58.5% of Ukraine’s total merchandise exports, which amounted to $24.1 billion over the seven-month period.
Metals and metal products ranked second among export categories at $2.5 billion, or slightly more than 10% of total exports.
Exports of machinery, equipment and transport vehicles amounted to $2.1 billion, corresponding to approximately 8.7% of external shipments.
Thus, food, metal products and engineering products collectively accounted for approximately 77.6% of Ukraine’s merchandise exports.
Poland remained the largest market for Ukrainian goods over the seven-month period, receiving $2.8 billion worth of products. Exports to Türkiye amounted to $2 billion, while exports to Germany totalled $1.5 billion.
Overall, Ukrainian exports in January–July 2026 increased by 3.8% compared with the same period last year, rising to $24.1 billion from $23.2 billion.
At the same time, imports increased significantly faster, rising by 26.6% to $58.1 billion.
Marshal of the Polish Sejm Włodzimierz Czarzasty has stated that Ukraine’s accession to the European Union will require the Ukrainian side to reconsider controversial chapters of its own history, including its assessment of the mass killings of Poles in Volhynia during the Second World War.
Czarzasty made the statement on August 10 in Szczawnica following a meeting with Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Ruslan Stefanchuk, the Polish Press Agency PAP reported.
Czarzasty stressed that he personally supports Ukraine’s future membership in the EU but believes that European integration entails not only economic benefits but also the acceptance of a certain system of values and historical responsibility.
“The EU is about democracy and values; it is not merely an ATM,” the Marshal of the Sejm said, adding that it is also necessary “to call genocide genocide.” In his opinion, no nation can escape its own history.
The main subject of the historical dispute remains the mass killings of the Polish population in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943–1945, responsibility for a significant portion of which the Polish side places on the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
In Poland’s state historical policy, these events are officially classified as genocide. As early as 2016, the Sejm enshrined this interpretation in a parliamentary resolution, and in 2025 Poland went further: by law, it designated July 11 as the National Day of Remembrance of Poles — Victims of the Genocide Committed by the OUN and UPA in the Eastern Territories of the Second Polish Republic. The law was adopted unanimously by the Sejm and subsequently approved by the Senate.
The Polish side demands three things from Ukraine above all: recognition of the genocidal nature of the crimes, the opportunity to search for and exhume the remains of Polish victims without obstruction, and the dignified burial and commemoration of those killed. Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance regards the depoliticisation of exhumations as one of the key conditions for genuine historical reconciliation.
Warsaw therefore no longer views the issue solely as a dispute among historians. In recent years, it has become part of the state’s remembrance policy and is increasingly being linked by Polish politicians to the issue of Ukraine’s European integration.
Official Kyiv does not deny the mass killings of the Polish population or the need to honour the memory of those killed. However, it avoids accepting the Polish formula of sole responsibility on the part of Ukraine and the official classification of the entire Polish-Ukrainian conflict of that period as a genocide of Poles.
The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance predominantly uses the terms “Volhynia Tragedy” and “Ukrainian-Polish confrontation.” In July 2026, UINR head Oleksandr Alforov stated during a joint Ukrainian-Polish commemoration that the tragic events of 1943 must be remembered and that relations between the two nations should be built on mutual respect and acknowledgement of past mistakes.
The Ukrainian side also points out that not only Poles but also Ukrainians were killed in the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation, including as a result of retaliatory actions by Polish armed formations and the policies of the Polish state. Notably, in July 2026, Polish Ambassador to Ukraine Piotr Łukasiewicz also publicly stressed the need to take Ukrainian victims into account.
When the Polish Sejm legislatively designated July 11 as a day of remembrance for the “victims of the genocide committed by the OUN and UPA” in June 2025, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the decision unilateral and warned that such steps did not contribute to achieving mutual understanding and reconciliation. Kyiv proposed focusing on the joint work of historians, searches, exhumations and the dignified commemoration of all victims.
Despite the political dispute over terminology, substantial progress has been made in practical matters over the past year. Ukraine resumed issuing permits to the Polish side for search and exhumation work. In 2026, investigations were conducted, in particular, in the former villages of Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska in Volhynia, while on August 7, Ukraine’s interdepartmental commission approved new exhumation work in Huta Peniatska in the Lviv region and in the village of Uhly in the Rivne region.
Work in Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska was completed on August 7, and the remains discovered there are to be reburied. Thus, one of the most acute practical issues that had complicated relations between Warsaw and Kyiv for several years has gradually begun to move forward.
Following his meeting with Stefanchuk, Czarzasty also called for political and historical conflicts not to be transferred to relations between Polish and Ukrainian societies. According to him, a permanent channel of communication must be maintained between the parliaments of the two countries and mutual trust must be restored. At the same time, he stressed that “without a secure Ukraine, there is no secure Poland” and expressed support for Ukraine’s membership in the EU and Poland’s participation in the country’s post-war reconstruction.
Consumer prices in Ukraine rose by 0.3% in July 2026 compared with June, while annual inflation accelerated to 7.7% from 7.2% a month earlier, according to data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. Since the beginning of the year, consumer prices have risen by 6%. In January–July 2026, they were 7.8% higher than in January–July 2025.
The acceleration in annual inflation is partly due to the base effect: in July 2025, prices fell by 0.2%. However, the current rate of 7.7% remains lower than the 8.2% recorded in May.
Core inflation slowed to 0.3% in July from 0.5% in June and 0.7% in May. On an annual basis, it remained at 8.1%.
The trends in individual components of the consumer basket varied significantly. Food and non-alcoholic beverages fell in price by 0.2% over the month, while clothing and footwear fell by 4.8%. At the same time, housing and utilities rose by 1.6%, and transportation by 1.3%.
At the end of July, the NBU raised its inflation forecast for the end of 2026 from 9.4% to 10%, and its core inflation forecast from 7.2% to 9.2%. The regulator attributes the increase in underlying price pressures to rising business costs for logistics, labor, and energy resources.
Data from the State Statistics Service excludes territories temporarily occupied by Russia and parts of the country where hostilities are ongoing or have taken place.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy continues to overhaul the diplomatic corps, a process that is gradually extending to include not only countries in the European Union and the Western Balkans but also nations in Asia and the Middle East.
On August 6, the president dismissed four ambassadors at once: Vasyl Kyrylych in Croatia, Volodymyr Shkurov in Albania, Oleg Gerasymenko in Montenegro, and Markiyan Chuchuk in Pakistan.
The relevant personnel decisions were formalized by decrees No. 709/2026–No. 712/2026.
According to the Experts Club think tank, the simultaneous replacement of the heads of four diplomatic missions appears to be part of a broader restructuring of Ukraine’s foreign policy apparatus, rather than an isolated personnel move.
As early as May 18, Zelenskyy had spoken of the need for “replacements and adjustments” within the diplomatic corps, and on July 15, he explicitly stated that he was discussing with First Deputy Head of the Office of the President Serhiy Kyslytsya and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andriy Sybiga a list of Ukrainian ambassadors who needed to be replaced.
The rotation began even before a series of decisions were made in August. Specifically, on June 26, the president dismissed the Ukrainian ambassadors to Oman, Cyprus, Vietnam, and Cambodia. At the same time, new appointments were made to other diplomatic posts.
Thus, this represents a gradual renewal of Ukraine’s network of diplomatic missions over the course of several months.
Three of the four ambassadors had served for more than six years
The length of the diplomats’ tenures also suggests that the August decisions should be viewed primarily in the context of rotation.
Vasyl Kyrylych was appointed Ukraine’s ambassador to Croatia on December 24, 2019, and served in Zagreb for more than six and a half years.
Volodymyr Shkurov took the helm of the Ukrainian Embassy in Albania on April 13, 2020, and also served for over six years.
Markiyan Chuchuk was appointed Ukraine’s ambassador to Pakistan on April 17, 2020. His diplomatic mission lasted over six years.
Oleg Gerasymenko headed the Ukrainian Embassy in Montenegro starting May 4, 2022—a little over four years.
The very fact that three of the four diplomats held their posts for such a long time is further evidence supporting the theory of a planned personnel rotation. The published decrees do not specify the reasons for the dismissals.
It is particularly telling that three of the four August decisions concern Southeast Europe—Croatia, Albania, and Montenegro.
Experts Club notes that the importance of this region for Ukrainian diplomacy has grown significantly.
Croatia is a member of the EU and NATO and remains one of Ukraine’s steadfast partners. Croatia’s experience with postwar reconstruction, demining, the return of the population, and the integration of territories following the conflicts of the 1990s is also important for Kyiv.
Albania is also a NATO member and actively supports Ukraine in international forums. Tirana hosted one of the previous summits in the “Ukraine–Southeast Europe” format.
Montenegro presents another area of interest. It is a NATO member and, at the same time, the most promising candidate for EU accession among the countries of the Western Balkans. Therefore, relations with Podgorica are becoming important for Kyiv in the context of its own European integration.
On July 15, Kyiv hosted the fifth “Ukraine–Southeast Europe” summit, attended by representatives from Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro. The participants reaffirmed their support for Ukraine and the need to expand regional cooperation.
Against this backdrop, the nearly simultaneous replacement of three Ukrainian ambassadors to Balkan countries may indicate Kyiv’s desire to inject additional momentum into this direction.
Of the three Balkan appointments, Montenegro may prove to be the most interesting.
Podgorica expects to conclude negotiations on accession to the European Union and become one of the next new EU members. For Ukraine, which is also negotiating membership, Montenegro’s experience could be of practical value.
In addition, Ukraine is gradually building a separate network of relations with countries in the Adriatic region—Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, and neighboring Serbia.
The most recent example is Zelenskyy’s official visit to Belgrade on August 8 and his talks with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, during which they discussed free trade, energy, agriculture, Ukraine’s recovery, and political cooperation.
Thus, the Balkans are gradually transforming from a secondary focus of Ukrainian diplomacy into an independent regional track.
The replacement of the ambassador to Pakistan presents a completely different challenge.
Islamabad is important to Ukraine as one of the largest centers in South Asia and a representative of the so-called Global South. Pakistan’s population is approaching 250 million; the country wields significant regional political influence and is a nuclear power.
At the same time, Pakistan’s foreign policy is based on a complex system of relations with China, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, Russia, and the Gulf states.
For Ukraine, expanding ties with Pakistan could be significant in several areas at once—food trade, industry, international organizations, and building support for Kyiv among Asian nations and the Muslim world.
As Ukraine’s foreign policy increasingly shifts away from focusing exclusively on the EU and the U.S., embassies in countries such as Pakistan, India, the Gulf states, Indonesia, and African nations are gaining greater importance.
That is precisely why replacing the ambassador in Islamabad after a mission lasting more than six years appears to be a logical part of the renewal of Ukraine’s Asian policy.
The August dismissals are likely not the end of the process.
As early as July 15, Zelenskyy publicly spoke about forming a “pool of ambassadors” slated for replacement. This suggests that new personnel decrees may be issued in the coming weeks.
At the same time, the current diplomatic rotation coincides with more extensive personnel changes in Ukraine’s government system, which took place in July and affected the government, security agencies, and other state institutions.
According to Experts Club, what matters most will not be the number of diplomats dismissed, but who Kyiv appoints to replace them.
If key posts are filled not only by career diplomats but also by former ministers, representatives of the Office of the President, economic negotiators, or prominent public figures, this could signal Ukraine’s transition to a model of so-called “political diplomacy,” in which embassies are assigned more specific economic, investment, and negotiating tasks.
As of August 10, 2026, presidential decrees appointing new Ukrainian ambassadors to Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, and Pakistan have not been published.
Experts Club believes that future appointments will provide a clearer understanding of the logic behind the current rotation.
If diplomats with significant European and economic experience are sent to Zagreb, Tirana, and Podgorica, this will confirm a strengthening of the Balkan focus. The appointment to Islamabad of a specialist in Asian affairs, trade diplomacy, or relations with the Global South, in turn, could signal an expansion of Ukraine’s activities beyond its traditional circle of Western partners.
Overall, the current rotation signals a transition of Ukrainian diplomacy to a new phase: after four years of full-scale war, embassies are now expected not only to secure international support for Ukraine but also to work toward EU membership, the country’s recovery, exports, attracting investment, and forging long-term regional alliances.
Oleksandr Mishchenko, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, accepted copies of the credentials from Anjani Kumar, the newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of India to Ukraine. According to the press service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the parties emphasized the importance of further developing bilateral cooperation and maintaining regular political dialogue at all levels.
The Deputy Minister emphasized Ukraine’s expectations that India play a more active role in promoting the restoration of a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and in holding the aggressor state accountable for the crimes it has committed.
“The parties discussed the agenda for upcoming high-level events, particularly in the context of implementing the agreements reached during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Ukraine on August 23, 2024,” the statement reads.
Special attention was paid to the development of interparliamentary cooperation and the further strengthening of collaboration in the humanitarian sphere. The parties also discussed ways to intensify bilateral economic cooperation and restore positive momentum in contacts between business representatives of the two countries.
“Following the meeting, the parties agreed to continue active cooperation and promote the further development of Ukrainian-Indian relations in areas of mutual interest. Oleksandr Mishchenko wished the Ambassador of the Republic of India success in his diplomatic mission in Ukraine and the achievement of significant results for the benefit of both countries and their peoples,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs added.
