The European Union is facing significant disagreements over its long-term budget for 2028–2034, raising concerns about potential delays in approving up to €100 billion in financial assistance for Ukraine, according to the Experts Club information and analytical center.
Following the European Council summit on October 15–16, 2026, EU leaders failed to agree on the main parameters of the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Reaching a political compromise by the end of 2026 remains a negotiating objective rather than a legally binding deadline.
The European Commission’s original proposal, presented in July 2025, envisaged a seven-year budget of €1.763 trillion in constant 2025 prices, equivalent to almost €2 trillion in current prices. However, on October 10, 2026, Ireland, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, proposed reducing the framework to €1.622 trillion. The reduction amounts to €141 billion, or approximately 8%.
The largest proposed reduction concerns competitiveness, security and innovation programs, with funding cut by €66.6 billion. External action programs face a €33.1 billion reduction, while regional development and agricultural programs could lose €32.2 billion.
The main disagreements are between major net contributors to the EU budget, including Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, and countries seeking to preserve agricultural and regional subsidies. Rising defense spending, technological modernization requirements and the repayment of NextGenerationEU debt add further pressure.
According to EU budget documents, approximately €149.3 billion in constant 2025 prices is earmarked for servicing and repaying joint European borrowing during 2028–2034. These obligations reduce the resources available for new investment programs.
The European Parliament opposes the proposed cuts. Its negotiating position provides for financial resources approximately €316 billion higher than the Irish proposal, taking into account separate funding for debt repayment.
For Ukraine, the most significant development is the preservation of a dedicated financial reserve totaling €88.869 billion in constant 2025 prices. This corresponds to approximately €100 billion in current prices, as originally proposed by the European Commission.
The mechanism would support Ukraine’s economy, infrastructure reconstruction and European integration through grants, budget guarantees and lending instruments. However, the proposed allocation does not constitute approved funding, and actual disbursements will depend on subsequent EU decisions.
Negotiations are further complicated by the European electoral calendar, including parliamentary elections in Spain in late 2026 and presidential elections in France in spring 2027. These developments could encourage national governments to postpone politically sensitive decisions on increasing budget contributions.
Experts Club identifies three possible scenarios: reaching a compromise before the end of 2026, postponing an agreement until the first half of 2027, or allowing negotiations to continue until late 2027.
“The main risk for Ukraine is not an immediate reduction of the proposed €100 billion, but a possible delay in the legal approval and practical implementation of financial support after 2027,” the Experts Club analysis states.
A delay in adopting the new budget would not automatically suspend EU funding, as European treaties provide for the temporary extension of existing budgetary ceilings. Nevertheless, prolonged negotiations could complicate the launch of new programs, including long-term financial assistance mechanisms for Ukraine.
On October 20, Hungary blocked the next stage of the negotiation process regarding Ukraine and Moldova’s accession to the European Union by refusing to approve the results of the preliminary review of legislation for the last two outstanding negotiation clusters. Budapest’s position was not supported by the remaining 26 EU countries, according to “European Truth,” citing European diplomats.
The decision was discussed at a meeting of the EU Council’s Working Group on Enlargement (COELA) in Brussels. The participants had planned to approve the results of the screening of Ukrainian and Moldovan legislation regarding negotiation clusters No. 4 and No. 5, which is a necessary procedural step before their official opening.
However, the Hungarian representative refused to support the approval of the documents, despite the position of the other EU member states.
As three European diplomats told The Kyiv Independent, representatives from other countries asked the Hungarian delegation to explain the reasons for the refusal. According to one of the publication’s sources, Budapest did not provide any new arguments, stating only that its position remains unchanged.
At the time of publication, Hungary’s official mission to the EU had not provided the publication with a comment.
The fourth negotiation cluster, “Green Agenda and Sustainable Interconnectivity,” covers transportation policy, energy, trans-European networks, environmental legislation, and the fight against climate change.
The fifth cluster, “Resources, Agriculture, and Cohesion Policy,” involves harmonizing regulations in the areas of agricultural policy, food security, veterinary and phytosanitary controls, fisheries, regional development, as well as financial and budgetary provisions.
Both clusters are of significant importance for Ukraine’s economic integration into the EU, as they concern access for agricultural products to the European market, transportation, energy infrastructure, and future mechanisms for the distribution of European budget funds.
This new impasse occurred one week after the previous progress in the negotiation process.
On October 13, the Council of the EU officially opened two negotiation clusters for Ukraine and Moldova: No. 2, “Internal Market,” and No. 3, “Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth.” These clusters encompass 17 negotiation chapters, including issues related to competition, entrepreneurship, and economic regulation.
As reported by the Council of the EU, at that time, four of the six clusters provided for in the accession procedure had been opened for both countries.
The previous decision became possible after Hungary withdrew its objections to the opening of the second and third clusters following the Verkhovna Rada’s adoption on October 12 of amendments to education legislation concerning the rights of national minorities.
Previously, Budapest had linked the progress of negotiations to ensuring the linguistic and educational rights of the Hungarian community in Zakarpattia.
According to The Kyiv Independent, the current delay may prove to be temporary. European diplomats expect that the remaining two negotiation clusters will be officially opened in December 2026.
Ireland, which will hold the EU Council presidency in the second half of 2026, intends to continue discussing this issue at upcoming meetings of the Enlargement Working Group.
However, Hungary’s October decision does not cancel the negotiation clusters that have already been opened and does not mean the end of accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova. It does, however, delay the necessary harmonization of documents required for both countries to move forward.
Ukraine and Moldova were granted EU candidate status in June 2022. In December 2023, the European Council decided to open negotiations, and the first intergovernmental conference took place in June 2024.
The accession process involves aligning national legislation with EU law, implementing institutional reforms, and negotiating 35 chapters, most of which are grouped into six thematic clusters. The opening of all clusters marks a stage in the negotiations but does not in itself signify the completion of the accession process.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, EUROPEAN UNION, HUNGARY, MOLDOVA, UKRAINE
Denmark continues to rank among the countries with the highest level of positive perception among Ukrainians: in August 2026, 66.9% of respondents viewed it positively, while only 1.8% viewed it negatively. Compared to March, the share of positive assessments has decreased slightly, but the overall attitude remains distinctly favorable, according to the Experts Club Information and Analytical Center.
According to the results of the August survey, 31.3% of Ukrainians have a completely positive attitude toward Denmark, and 35.6% have a mostly positive attitude. A neutral stance is held by 28.8% of respondents. Only 1.4% expressed a mostly negative attitude, 0.4% a completely negative one, and another 2.5% were undecided.
The balance of positive and negative assessments stands at plus 65.1 percentage points. Thus, positive responses outnumber negative ones by more than 37 times. Denmark remains among the group of Northern European countries that enjoy very high public favor among Ukrainians.
In March 2026, 69.9% of respondents viewed Denmark positively: 33.3% viewed it entirely positively and 36.6% viewed it mostly positively. A neutral attitude was expressed by 26.8% of respondents, a negative one by only 1.2%, and another 2.1% were undecided.
Thus, over the course of five months, the share of positive assessments decreased by 3 percentage points—from 69.9% to 66.9%. The neutral segment increased by 2 percentage points—to 28.8%—while negative attitudes rose by only 0.6 percentage points. The balance of positive and negative assessments decreased from +68.7 to +65.1 percentage points, respectively.
There has also been a noticeable and definite decline in the intensity of positive attitudes: the share of fully positive responses fell from 33.3% to 31.3%, and that of mostly positive responses—from 36.6% to 35.6%. At the same time, the increase in the negative segment remains minimal, so the current trend suggests that some respondents are shifting to a neutral position rather than developing a critical attitude toward Denmark.
Oleksandr Pozniy, director of the research firm Active Group, commenting on Denmark’s high ratings in previous waves of the survey, noted: “Ukrainians perceive Denmark as a sincere partner and a reliable ally under the current circumstances. The high level of trust reflects both the humanitarian aid and Copenhagen’s consistent political support for Ukraine.” In the broader context of the survey, he also emphasized: “Ukrainians clearly associate the support received primarily from European Union countries and the United Kingdom with a positive attitude toward them.”
The latest wave of the survey shows that this positive image persists. Despite a decline in the figure compared to March, approximately two-thirds of Ukrainians continue to view Denmark positively, while the share of negative responses does not even reach 2%.
The previous wave of the survey was conducted in March 2026 among 800 Ukrainian citizens aged 18 and older using self-administered online questionnaires on the SunFlowerSociology panel. The sample was representative by age, gender, and region; the maximum theoretical margin of error for indicators at the 50% confidence level was ±3.5 percentage points.
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Latvian Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs has called for a complete halt to the issuance of tourist visas to Russian citizens at the European Union level. In his view, such restrictions are necessary to counter the hybrid threats faced by European states.
As reported by the Financial Times on October 18, 2026, Kulbergs, in an interview with the publication, called on all EU countries to tighten visa policies toward Russian citizens, emphasizing the need for a unified approach to security issues.
According to the Latvian prime minister, the country faces hybrid threats from Russia on a daily basis, including attempts to cross the border illegally, the use of migration flows to destabilize the situation, as well as risks of sabotage and intelligence activities.
Kulbergs noted that in 2026, Latvia expects to face the greatest migratory pressure on its borders in the past five years. He believes that restricting Russian tourist travel to Europe should be one of the preventive security measures.
The Latvian prime minister paid particular attention to France, Italy, and Spain, which remain the EU countries that issue the most Schengen visas to Russian citizens.
According to the European Commission, these three countries account for over 70% of the visas issued to Russians in 2025. In total, Russian citizens received over 600,000 Schengen visas last year.
The issue of further tightening visa restrictions was discussed during the European Council meeting in Brussels on October 15–16. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that the EU has the capacity to impose additional restrictions on private and business travel by Russian citizens.
According to the Financial Times, France is also considering significantly tightening visa restrictions, particularly regarding former Russian military personnel. Italy has shown a willingness to discuss additional measures, although these countries had previously not supported a complete ban on tourist visas.
At the same time, no pan-European decision to suspend the issuance of tourist visas to Russians has been adopted yet. The issuance of short-term Schengen visas remains the responsibility of the national authorities of EU member states, which review applications in accordance with the Common Visa Code.
Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has already imposed a series of restrictions. In particular, on September 12, 2022, the agreement on a simplified visa regime between the EU and Russia was suspended.
This has led to higher visa processing fees, stricter documentation requirements, and longer processing times for applications.
In November 2025, the European Commission further restricted the issuance of multiple-entry Schengen visas to Russian citizens residing in and applying from Russia, while maintaining certain exceptions.
In July 2026, the EU also adopted a legal framework to restrict the issuance of short-term visas to Russian military personnel and former combatants who participated in hostilities against Ukraine. The relevant provisions allow for exceptions on humanitarian grounds and other grounds specified by law.
According to European Commission estimates, the number of Schengen visas issued annually to Russian citizens has fallen from approximately 4 million before the start of the full-scale war to 618,000 in 2025.
Latvia’s proposal calls for further tightening of these restrictions and the effective cessation of Russian tourist travel to Schengen countries on the basis of new tourist visas.
Andris Kulbergs has led the Latvian government since May 28, 2026. Previously, he served as a member of the Saeima and worked on parliamentary committees on economic affairs, entrepreneurship, energy, and regional policy. Latvia is a member of the European Union and NATO and shares a border with Russia and Belarus.
Source: Financial Times, interview dated October 18, 2026
Austria continues to be viewed predominantly positively by Ukrainians: in August 2026, about 52.7% of respondents expressed a positive attitude toward the country, while only 2.7% expressed a negative one. At the same time, 41.7% of those surveyed hold a neutral position, which remains a distinctive feature of perceptions of Austria, according to the Experts Club Information and Analytical Center.
According to the results of the August survey, 15.3% of Ukrainians have a completely positive attitude toward Austria, and 37.4% have a mostly positive attitude. A neutral response was chosen by 41.7% of respondents. 2.3% view the country mostly negatively, only 0.4% view it entirely negatively, and another 2.9% were undecided.
Thus, the balance of positive and negative assessments, when rounded, stands at approximately plus 50 percentage points. There are nearly 20 times as many positive responses as negative ones; however, Austria differs from a number of other Western European countries in having a significantly higher proportion of neutral attitudes.
Compared to March 2026, the proportion of positive assessments has decreased slightly. In the previous survey wave, 17.5% of respondents had a completely positive attitude toward Austria, and 38.5% had a mostly positive attitude, meaning the combined positive rating was about 55.9%. A neutral stance was held by 40.3% of respondents, while about 2.6% expressed a negative attitude.
Thus, over the course of five months, the share of positive assessments decreased by approximately 3.2 percentage points—to 52.7%. The share of negative assessments remained virtually unchanged—about 2.6% in March compared to 2.7% in August—while the neutral segment increased by 1.4 percentage points. The most notable decline was in the share of entirely positive responses—from 17.5% to 15.3%.
This pattern indicates that the slight weakening of the positive rating is not accompanied by a shift toward a negative attitude among a significant portion of respondents. A neutral stance remains the primary alternative to a positive assessment of Austria.
Oleksandr Pozniy, director of the research company Active Group, when commenting on Ukrainians’ attitudes toward Austria, previously highlighted precisely this combination of a positive image of the country with a large neutral group.
“Austria is traditionally perceived by Ukrainians as a European country with high social standards, a rich cultural heritage, and a stable political system. Although Austria is not Ukraine’s main partner in foreign policy, the overall level of favorability remains positive,” Pozniy noted.
The current wave of the survey generally confirms this assessment: the negative segment remains very small, and changes are occurring primarily among positive and neutral responses. More than nine out of ten respondents view Austria positively or neutrally.
The survey was conducted in August 2026 using self-administered online questionnaires in the SunFlowerSociology panel among 800 Ukrainian citizens aged 18 and older. The previous survey wave in March also included 800 respondents; the sample was representative by age, gender, and region, with a maximum theoretical margin of error of ±3.5 percentage points for indicators at the 50% confidence level.
ACTIVE GROUP, AUSTRIA, EUROPEAN UNION, EXPERTS CLUB, international relations, Pozniy, PUBLIC OPINION, SOCIOLOGY, UKRAINE, WESTERN EUROPE
The Hungarian Parliament has repealed several provisions of a 2021 law that restricted the distribution to minors of materials containing information about homosexuality, gender identity, and gender transition. This information has been confirmed by Hungarian and international sources; however, this does not constitute a complete repeal of all existing restrictions on LGBT content in the country.
The amendments were adopted on October 13, 2026: 139 members of parliament voted in favor, while 51 voted against. Provisions prohibiting the “display” or “promotion” of sexual and gender diversity in content accessible to persons under the age of 18 have been removed from the legislation. Instead, a more general provision has been introduced to protect minors from material that could seriously harm their physical, intellectual, emotional, or moral development.
The restrictions were introduced in 2021 under Viktor Orbán’s government as part of the so-called Child Protection Act. In addition to measures against pedophilia, the document included a ban on the distribution to minors of materials that the authorities interpreted as “promoting” homosexuality or gender transition. The restrictions applied, in particular, to educational and media content.
The legislative change marked one of the first notable policy revisions in this area since Prime Minister Péter Mádjár’s government took office. The ruling Tisza Party, which holds a two-thirds majority in parliament, supported the amendments. Former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party voted against them.
The parliament’s decision followed a ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union on April 21, 2026. The court found Hungary’s 2021 restrictions to be incompatible with EU law and the fundamental values of the European Union. Following the vote, EU representatives described the changes as an important signal of Hungary’s commitment to common European principles.
