Poland remained the largest market for Ukrainian exports and the second-largest supplier of goods to Ukraine during January–July 2026, according to data from the State Customs Service.
Ukraine exported $2.8 billion worth of goods to Poland, while Polish exports to the Ukrainian market totaled $5.5 billion.
Thus, the total trade volume between the two countries over the seven-month period reached approximately $8.3 billion.
Ukraine’s bilateral trade balance in goods was negative by approximately $2.7 billion.
Poland accounted for about 11.6% of Ukraine’s total goods exports and approximately 9.5% of its imports.
Turkey became the second-largest market for Ukrainian goods, with exports totaling $2 billion, while Germany ranked third with $1.5 billion.
In terms of the volume of imports into Ukraine, China took first place by a wide margin, with $16.8 billion. Germany ranked third after Poland, with $3.8 billion.
Overall, Ukraine’s merchandise imports for January–July rose by 26.6% to $58.1 billion, while exports increased by 3.8% to $24.1 billion.
According to “Serbian Economist”, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will pay an official visit to Serbia on August 8 and meet with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić in Belgrade. The Serbian president’s press service has officially confirmed the visit. This will be Zelenskyy’s first visit to Serbia during his presidency.
A detailed agenda for the talks has not yet been published. However, judging by the contacts between Belgrade and Kyiv in recent months, the central topics are likely to include bilateral relations, the European integration of both countries, the expansion of economic cooperation, a possible free trade agreement, regional security, and Serbia’s participation in Ukraine’s reconstruction.
In May, Zelenskyy and Vučić had already discussed the development of bilateral relations over the phone. At that time, the Ukrainian president placed particular emphasis on resuming negotiations on a free trade zone with Serbia. Vučić, for his part, cited economic cooperation as one of the key areas for further rapprochement between the two countries.
Following this, talks between representatives of the two countries’ governments took place in Belgrade. On May 21, Serbian Minister of Domestic and Foreign Trade Jagoda Lazarević and Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Trade Representative Taras Kachka signed a joint statement on the continuation of negotiations on a free trade agreement. At the same time, a Serbian-Ukrainian business forum was held with the participation of representatives from about 30 companies.
The upcoming visit continues a noticeable revival of political contacts between Belgrade and Kyiv.
In June 2025, Vučić visited Ukraine for the first time since the start of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, taking part in the “Ukraine–Southeast Europe” summit in Odesa. At that time, he reaffirmed Serbia’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and offered Serbia’s participation in the reconstruction of one or more Ukrainian cities or regions.
On July 15, 2026, Vučić was in Ukraine again—for the 5th “Ukraine–Southeast Europe” summit in Kyiv.
At the same time, Serbia’s position on the war remains unique. Belgrade supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and has voted in favor of a number of relevant international documents, provides humanitarian aid, but has not joined the EU sanctions against Russia. Vucic has also repeatedly avoided signing certain regional declarations insofar as they called for increased pressure on Moscow.
Therefore, the very fact of the Ukrainian president’s visit to Belgrade carries political significance: Serbia is attempting to simultaneously maintain traditional relations with Russia, develop relations with Kyiv, and continue its path toward EU membership.
Another topic of discussion could be the new regional Carpathian Initiative proposed by Ukraine. Zelenskyy has previously stated that Serbia, in particular, is planned to be involved in the initiative, and cooperation could cover the economy, logistics, security, tourism, and Ukraine’s reconstruction.
The economic aspect of the visit is particularly relevant against the backdrop of the resumption of bilateral trade.
According to official data from the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the country’s Statistical Office, trade between Serbia and Ukraine totaled 391.8 million euros in 2025. Serbia exported goods worth 179.6 million euros to Ukraine and imported Ukrainian products worth 212.2 million euros. Thus, the trade balance remained in Ukraine’s favor by approximately 32.6 million euros.
In dollar terms, according to Marko Čadež, president of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, bilateral trade reached $442.2 million, practically returning to the level of the last pre-war year, 2021. Serbian exports totaled $202.9 million, while Ukrainian exports to Serbia amounted to $239.3 million. About 900 Serbian companies conduct trade with Ukraine, including approximately 670 that import Ukrainian goods.
According to Dw.com, German law enforcement authorities detained a 33-year-old Ukrainian citizen suspected of gathering information about a defense contractor in Bavaria to prepare for possible sabotage.
As reported on August 6 by the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Bavarian State Criminal Police Office, the man was detained on August 2 in the federal state of Thuringia with the assistance of local police. The following day, a Munich district court issued an arrest warrant, after which the suspect was placed in a pretrial detention center in Bavaria.
According to the investigation, in June 2026, the man allegedly photographed the premises of a defense contractor in southern Germany and transmitted the images to his client. German law enforcement officials suspect that this material could have been used to prepare acts of sabotage.
The suspect is considered a so-called “low-level agent.” German security agencies use this term to describe individuals whom foreign intelligence services may recruit to carry out specific, straightforward tasks, such as photographing facilities, conducting surveillance, or gathering publicly available information.
The prosecutor’s office has not disclosed which country’s intelligence service may have recruited the man. The name of the defense contractor is also being withheld due to the ongoing investigation.
In Germany, suspicion of espionage aimed at preparing acts of sabotage carries criminal liability. The investigation is currently ongoing, and the detainee’s guilt has not been established by a court.
German security agencies have previously warned of an increase in attempts by foreign intelligence services to recruit operatives via social media and messaging apps. Defense companies, military facilities, and transportation and energy infrastructure were cited as potential targets of such operations. At the same time, law enforcement officials have not yet officially linked the new arrest to a specific country or other investigations.
Lev Kishakevich, a judge of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, who was selected as Ukraine’s primary candidate for election as a judge of the International Criminal Court (ICC) following a competitive selection process, does not possess the required proficiency in the ICC’s working languages—French and English—according to an ICC document.
A report by the Advisory Committee on the Nomination of Judges, dated August 5, 2026, and posted on the ICC website, notes in particular that the Rome Statute requires candidates for judgeship to be fluent in the ICC’s working languages, and that the candidate from Ukraine does not speak French and does not possess the required level of English to perform the duties of a judge of the Court.
“The Committee regrets that the candidate’s language skills, as demonstrated during the interview, did not allow the Committee to properly assess his qualifications and suitability for the position in accordance with Article 36 of the Rome Statute,” the document states.
The Committee concluded that “the candidate does not meet the qualification requirements for appointment as a judge of the International Criminal Court.”
According to the ICC’s statement, the overall assessment of the candidate’s readiness for the position of judge was therefore incomplete due to the candidate’s language limitations.
“The Committee determined that the candidate’s language limitations would prevent him from making an immediate contribution to the work of the Court,” the document notes.
The “Interfax-Ukraine” news agency contacted the Supreme Court requesting comment on this situation.
On January 1, 2025, Ukraine officially became the 125th State Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC. Thus, in accordance with the Statute, Ukraine, like every State Party, may nominate one candidate to the ICC.
As reported by the Supreme Court, on April 8, 2026, the selection committee responsible for choosing Ukraine’s candidate for election as an ICC judge—based on the results of interviews with the candidates held on March 24–26—selected Ukraine’s primary candidate for election as an ICC judge. That candidate is Lev Kishakevich, a judge of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court.
Source: https://asp.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/asp_docs/Report%20ACN.05Aug26.1000.pdf
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/sessions/documentation/25th-session#documentation
From July 27 to August 2, Ukraine reduced electricity imports by 32.0% compared to the previous week—to 22,600 MWh—while exports rose by 49.6%—to 84,200 MWh, according to the DIXI Group analytical center, citing data from Energy Map.
“Thus, Ukraine has maintained its status as a net exporter for the fourth consecutive week: the volume of electricity supplied abroad exceeded imports by a factor of 3.7,” the center noted.
Last week’s export growth was driven by increased demand for electricity in European countries due to hot weather and competitive pricing conditions. Throughout the week, prices on Ukraine’s “day-ahead” (DAA) market remained lower than on the DAA markets of neighboring Eastern European countries.
According to Energy Map, Hungary accounted for the largest share of imports last month—7.8 thousand MWh, or 34.6%. Romania accounted for 6,900 MWh (30.4%), Slovakia for 5,900 MWh (26.3%), and Poland for 2,000 MWh (8.7%).
Exports, in turn, took place daily, and their daily volumes throughout the week were 2–6 times higher than imports.
Hungary also remained the main export destination, with 36.3 thousand MWh (43.1% of total exports) supplied there. Exports to Moldova totaled 25.8 thousand MWh (30.6%), to Romania – 18.9 thousand MWh (22.5%), to Slovakia – 3.1 thousand MWh (3.7%), and to Poland – 0.1 thousand MWh (0.1%).
Compared to the previous week, exports increased by 7–70% for most destinations.
As of August 5, the European Union has changed the conditions for granting temporary protection to certain Ukrainian citizens subject to military service. New applicants will be required to confirm that they have complied with the requirements of Ukrainian law, have been exempted from military service, or have legally left the territory of Ukraine.
The relevant provisions are contained in EU Council Implementing Decision No. 2026/1912, adopted on July 30 and published in the Official Journal of the European Union on August 4, 2026. The decision entered into force the day after its publication.
The new restriction applies only to individuals who apply for temporary protection after the decision enters into force. Ukrainians who have already been granted this status in an EU country retain their rights, and the new rules do not apply to them.
To obtain temporary protection, a new applicant must confirm compliance with their military obligations in Ukraine. Evidence may include a passport with a stamp confirming lawful departure from the country, or a paper or electronic document confirming exemption from service or the fulfillment of relevant obligations. The decision will depend on the availability of documents confirming the legality of departure and the applicant’s status under Ukrainian law.
At the same time, the Council of the EU has extended temporary protection for Ukrainian citizens for another year—until March 4, 2028. Previously, the program was set to expire on March 4, 2027.
The Council of the EU explained that the new condition was introduced to simultaneously ensure protection for displaced persons and address Ukraine’s defense needs. EU member states agreed that, going forward, temporary protection should be granted only to new applicants who are fulfilling their military obligations in Ukraine.
Temporary protection grants Ukrainians the right to reside in EU countries, as well as access to the labor market, medical care, social security, housing, and education for their children.
According to the Council of the EU, as of the end of May 2026, approximately 4.38 million people who had left Ukraine after the start of the full-scale war were benefiting from temporary protection in the European Union.
