Ukraine ranked 20th among Uzbekistan’s largest trading partners for the period from January through June 2026, according to data from the National Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan.
Foreign trade turnover between Ukraine and Uzbekistan over the six-month period totaled $206.1 million, compared to $151.9 million during the same period in 2025. Thus, bilateral trade increased by 35.7%.
Ukrainian exports to Uzbekistan totaled approximately $171.9 million, while Uzbek exports to Ukraine were estimated at $34.2 million. Ukraine’s trade surplus with Uzbekistan reached approximately $137.7 million.
Ukraine accounted for about 0.5% of Uzbekistan’s total foreign trade turnover.
Overall, Uzbekistan’s foreign trade turnover in January–June 2026 amounted to about $41 billion.
China remained the country’s largest trading partner, accounting for 23.1% of total trade, or about $9.5 billion. Russia ranked second with a share of 17.1%, corresponding to approximately $7 billion.
Uzbekistan’s top five trading partners also included Kazakhstan with a 6.8% share, Turkey with 3.4%, and Afghanistan with 2.6%.
Separately, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry, and Trade reported that the country’s exports, excluding gold, totaled $14.4 billion in the first half of the year, an increase of 32.2%, or $3.5 billion, compared to the same period last year.
The main market for Uzbek goods and services was Russia, to which $2.4 billion worth of products were shipped. Exports to China totaled $2.18 billion, to Afghanistan – $961 million, to Kazakhstan – $715 million, to France – $707 million, to Turkey – $516 million, and to Kyrgyzstan – $453 million.
The main drivers of growth in Uzbek exports were services ($5.7 billion), light industrial goods ($1.66 billion), metallurgical and mining products ($1.3 billion), fruits and vegetables ($875 million), and construction materials ($714 million).
Uzbekistan’s export geography expanded to include seven additional countries and territories in the first half of the year, bringing the total to 211 countries and territories.
Sources: National Committee on Statistics of Uzbekistan and a press release from the Ministry of Investment, Industry, and Trade of Uzbekistan dated July 29, 2026.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has signed a decree relieving Olga Stefanishyna of her duties as Ukraine’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States.
The corresponding decree, No. 696/2026, has been published on the president’s website.
In a Facebook post, Stefanishyna announced that she had decided to step down as Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States due to personal circumstances.
“This is my own decision, dictated by personal circumstances that I have mentioned previously,” she noted.
According to Stefanyishyna, representing Ukraine in Washington during a full-scale war was the greatest honor of her life.
At the same time, the diplomat emphasized that the main tasks she came to Washington to accomplish have been fulfilled. In particular, she said, she succeeded in increasing U.S. arms supplies and maintaining support for Ukraine amid changes in the U.S. political landscape, enshrining that support in law, and shifting Ukraine’s role “from a country that receives aid to a country in which investments are made and whose technologies are purchased.”
Stefanyishyna also stated that she would comment separately and publicly on issues that have recently been raised in the media, and assured that she would continue to work for the benefit of Ukraine “wherever she can be of use.”
Olga Stefanyishyna was born on October 29, 1985, in Odesa. In 2008, she graduated from Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv with a degree in international law and as an English translator; in 2016, she received a specialist degree in finance and credit from Odesa National Economic University.
From 2006 to 2007, she worked in private legal practice. Since 2007, she has worked at the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, where she held positions in departments responsible for European integration and international law. From 2017 to 2019, she headed the Office for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration at the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
In June 2020, the Verkhovna Rada appointed Stefanyishyna as Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine and included her in the National Security and Defense Council.
In 2021, Stefanyishyna was appointed to the Political Council of the “Servant of the People” party.
In 2024, the Verkhovna Rada appointed Stefanyishyna as Minister of Justice of Ukraine following the dismissal of Denys Malyuska. She retained her position as Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.
In July 2025, Stefanyishyna lost her positions as Minister of Justice and Deputy Prime Minister following the resignation of Denys Shmyhal’s government. Subsequently, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appointed her as the President of Ukraine’s Representative for the Development of Cooperation with the United States, and in August 2025, as Ambassador Extraordinary and
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the United States.
On July 23, 2026, Zelenskyy announced that he had offered Yulia Svyrydenko the position of U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine.
AMBASSADOR, DIPLOMACY, Stefanyishyna, UKRAINE, UNITED STATES
As of July 31, 2026, Ukraine had exported, since the start of the 2026/27 marketing year (MY, July–June), 2.601 million metric tons of grains and legumes, which is 54.9% more than on the same date a year ago, when this figure stood at 1.679 million metric tons.
According to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, citing data from the State Customs Service, total exports of grains, legumes, and flour reached 2.603 million metric tons, compared to 1.684 million metric tons on the same date last marketing year.
Specifically, wheat exports totaled 1.059 million metric tons, compared to 744,000 metric tons a year ago; corn exports totaled 1.244 million metric tons, compared to 627,000 metric tons; and barley exports totaled 294,000 metric tons, compared to 267,000 metric tons. As was the case last year, no rye was exported.
Flour exports since the start of the 2026/27 marketing year totaled 1,800 metric tons, which is half the volume recorded on the same date last marketing year (3,600 metric tons). In particular, wheat flour exports also halved—to 1,700 metric tons from 3,400 metric tons a year ago.
In January–June 2026, Ukraine recorded a merchandise trade deficit with 37 of its 50 largest trading partners, according to calculations by the Experts Club information and analytical center based on foreign trade data.
Total trade turnover with the TOP 50 countries amounted to $66.97 billion. Imports reached $47.35 billion, exports totaled $19.62 billion, and the overall trade deficit stood at $27.73 billion.
The combined deficit in trade with the 37 countries from which imports exceeded exports amounted to $30.72 billion. A surplus of $2.99 billion with the remaining 13 partners partially offset this gap.
For comparison, according to official data from the State Customs Service, Ukraine’s total trade turnover in the first half of the year amounted to $70.3 billion, including $49.3 billion in imports and $21 billion in exports. Thus, the TOP 50 partners accounted for more than 95% of Ukraine’s foreign trade in goods.
The ten largest deficit-generating trade routes accounted for $41.78 billion in trade turnover. Ukraine imported $32.95 billion worth of goods from these countries while exporting only $8.83 billion. The deficit amounted to $24.12 billion, or approximately 87% of the net trade deficit with the TOP 50 partners.
The import coverage ratio by exports in this group was 26.8%. In other words, every dollar of Ukrainian exports corresponded to approximately $3.73 in imports.
The top five countries—China, Poland, Germany, the United States, and Türkiye—generated a deficit of $20.59 billion. This represented 74.3% of the net trade deficit with the TOP 50 partners.
China ranked first by a wide margin. Imports of Chinese products amounted to $13.9 billion, while exports of Ukrainian goods totaled only $778.4 million. The deficit reached $13.12 billion, or 47.3% of the total trade deficit with the TOP 50.
Exports covered only 5.6% of imports. Thus, the volume of Chinese supplies to Ukraine was almost 18 times greater than the flow of goods in the opposite direction.
According to the State Customs Service’s publicly available commodity breakdown, the leading categories of Chinese imports were electric batteries at $1.62 billion, transmission, television, and video equipment at $1.11 billion, fiber-optic products at $770.5 million, transformers and chokes at $720.8 million, and unmanned aerial vehicles at $684.4 million.
Significant volumes also included telephone and telecommunications equipment at $620.8 million, electric motors and generators at $589.8 million, computer equipment at $363.7 million, and semiconductor devices at $347.8 million.
Thus, the deficit with China is generated not by a single category but by a broad range of technological, energy, electronic, and consumer products.
Poland ranked second in terms of the trade deficit, at $2.29 billion. At the same time, trade with Poland was considerably more balanced than trade with China: Ukrainian exports covered 51% of imports, while Poland remained the largest individual market for Ukrainian products.
The largest disclosed category of imports of Polish origin was oil and petroleum products, totaling $904.6 million. These were followed by petroleum gases at $205.6 million, aircraft parts at $192 million, unmanned aerial vehicles at $133.9 million, compound fertilizers at $121.6 million, electricity at $114.4 million, and coke and semi-coke at $111 million.
The structure of these supplies indicates that Poland serves Ukraine not only as a trading partner but also as an important energy, industrial, and logistics hub.
Germany generated the third-largest deficit, at $1.94 billion. Ukrainian exports covered 39.5% of imports.
The main disclosed categories of German products were passenger cars at $347.6 million, medicines at $220.2 million, petroleum products at $151.9 million, crop-harvesting machinery at $115.3 million, soil cultivation equipment at $97.1 million, plant protection products at $93.5 million, and tractors at $84.3 million.
The trade deficit with the United States amounted to $1.9 billion, while exports covered only 23.6% of imports. The largest publicly available categories of US supplies were petroleum products at $436.6 million, passenger cars at $417.9 million, coal at $182.2 million, and telecommunications equipment at $155.3 million.
Imports from the United States also included tractors, ethylene polymers, petroleum gases, medicines, frozen fish, and electronic equipment. Production, transport, and energy goods accounted for a significant share of both US and German imports.
Türkiye ranked fifth, with a deficit of $1.34 billion. At the same time, the import coverage ratio by exports stood at 57.1%, the highest figure among the top five countries.
Radar and radio navigation instruments and remote-control apparatus, totaling $332.8 million, stood out in the publicly available commodity structure. Significant supplies also included rolled steel products, petroleum products at $110.1 million, citrus fruits at $83.3 million, electric generator sets at $73.1 million, sunflower seeds at $59.2 million, automotive components, vegetables, and other food products. Trade with Türkiye combines industrial products, technological equipment, metals, and foodstuffs, while the country remains one of the largest markets for Ukrainian exports.
The trade deficit with Greece amounted to $861.5 million. Oil and petroleum products accounted for almost $809 million in the publicly available commodity breakdown. Other categories included petroleum coke and bitumen at $38.1 million, petroleum gases at $36.4 million, and fertilizers at $35.1 million. The structure of the deficit with Lithuania, which reached $607.7 million, was similar. Petroleum products accounted for $576.1 million of disclosed imports, while petroleum gases accounted for $46.4 million. Ukraine also imported passenger cars, freight vehicles, petroleum coke, fertilizers, polymers, and animal feed.
Unlike China, where the deficit is distributed among numerous technological categories, the imbalance with Greece and Lithuania is largely associated with energy purchases.
The trade deficit with the Czech Republic amounted to $752.4 million. The main import categories included aircraft parts at $101.8 million, passenger cars at $101 million, electric generator sets at $96.6 million, batteries at $44.5 million, telecommunications equipment at $34.3 million, and coal at $32.3 million.
The trade deficit with Hungary reached $658.1 million. The publicly available structure of supplies was dominated by electricity at $349.9 million, petroleum gases at $157.4 million, passenger cars at $113.2 million, and cable products at $87.8 million.
The deficit with France amounted to $648.9 million. The largest categories were plant protection products at $120 million, medicines at $76.1 million, passenger cars at $72.5 million, trucks at $47.7 million, tractors at $39.9 million, and automotive components at $35.3 million. Supplies of sunflower and corn seeds, as well as cosmetic products, were also significant.
Immediately outside the top ten was Sweden, with a deficit of $606.9 million. Exports covered only 8.3% of imports. The main publicly available categories included petroleum products, passenger cars, medicines, and agricultural machinery.
The deficit with Taiwan amounted to $563.8 million, with Vietnam to $544.2 million, and with Japan to $496.9 million. The import coverage ratio by exports in trade with these countries ranged from only 3.8% to 5.8%. Supplies from Taiwan included unmanned aerial vehicles at $205.3 million, radar and navigation equipment at $58.4 million, integrated electronic circuits at $55 million, and navigation instruments at $47.6 million.
Imports from Vietnam included unmanned aerial vehicles at $132.7 million, telecommunications equipment at $108.7 million, computer equipment, rolled steel products, footwear, coffee, and fish products. Japanese imports were dominated by passenger cars at $302.5 million, as well as motorcycles, automotive components, printing, medical, and construction equipment.
The overall structure of purchases explains a significant part of the trade gap. According to the State Customs Service, machinery, equipment, and transport accounted for $21.3 billion of imports in the first half of 2026, fuel and energy products for $7.4 billion, and chemical industry products for $6.9 billion. Together, these three categories accounted for 72% of imported goods.
Thus, the deficit is not associated solely with the consumption of finished foreign products. A significant part of it is generated by purchases of energy resources, passenger cars, production equipment, electronics, batteries, generators, pharmaceutical products, agricultural machinery, and components.
“The trade deficit cannot be assessed exclusively as a negative indicator. Amid the war and large-scale reconstruction, a significant share of imports serves a critical or investment purpose. Ukraine purchases energy resources, generators, batteries, transport, industrial equipment, electronics, medicines, and components without which it would be impossible to maintain the functioning of the economy, energy sector, and infrastructure,” emphasized Maksym Urakin, founder of the Experts Club information and analytical center.
At the same time, according to him, the concentration of the deficit creates risks of dependence on individual suppliers, increases demand for foreign currency, and demonstrates the insufficient presence of Ukrainian producers in key foreign markets.
“The problem arises when imports of finished products grow systematically while Ukrainian exports and domestic production fail to develop at a corresponding pace. Trade with China is particularly indicative, as Ukrainian exports cover less than 6% of imports. Such a disparity increases dependence on a single supplier and creates constant additional demand for foreign currency,” the economist stressed.
According to Urakin, the most realistic response lies not in mechanically restricting imports but in localizing the production of goods for which Ukraine has the necessary technological and resource prerequisites, developing industrial cooperation, expanding exports of processed goods, and encouraging foreign suppliers to establish production capacity within the country.
The production of energy equipment, battery systems, electrical equipment, automotive components, construction materials, agricultural machinery, highly processed food products, and certain types of chemical products holds particular potential.
At the end of July, Ukraine’s Danube port cluster sharply increased its intake of grain carriers amid a slowdown in operations at the Greater Odessa ports; however, a critical drop in water levels on the Danube could limit the capacity of this alternative export route.
According to the brokerage firm Spike Brokers, the number of grain railcars heading to the Danube ports increased nearly sevenfold over the week—from 167 to 1,141 thousand railcars. The average daily unloading rate rose by 17 railcars to 51 railcars per day.
At the same time, the number of grain railcars heading toward the ports of Greater Odessa fell by approximately 70%—to a record low of 1,356 railcars, compared to 4,525 railcars a week earlier. Average daily unloading decreased by 160 railcars to 690, while loading decreased by 203 railcars to 580 railcars per day.
In July, 1.38 million metric tons of grain were transported by rail to Ukrainian seaports, which is 37% less than in June. Additional constraints included overcrowding at certain port terminals and delays in transshipping grain from railcars to ships.
Thus, the increase in railcar deliveries to the Danube currently appears to be an immediate market response to the slowdown in operations in the Greater Odessa area. However, the capacity of the Danube route is also under pressure due to the rapid shallowing of the river.
At the end of July, the water flow in the Danube at the entrance to Romania dropped to 1,650 cubic meters per second, compared to an average July level of about 4,750 cubic meters. By August 4, according to forecasts, the figure could drop to 1,500 cubic meters per second, approaching the historic low of 1,400 cubic meters set in 1985.
Back in July, the Romanian Lower Danube Administration recorded a sharp drop in water levels across virtually the entire navigable stretch from Băziaș to Sulina. Near Corabia, several barges ran aground, and actual depths in certain critical sections decreased to 1.5–1.7 meters. Dredging operations are being carried out to maintain depths of at least 1.8–2 meters.
The main risk for Ukraine lies not necessarily in a complete shutdown of the Danube ports, but in a reduction in the permissible draft of vessels. Barges and river-sea hybrid vessels will be forced to carry less grain, which will increase the number of voyages, transportation costs, and fleet turnaround time.
Even if the terminals in Reni and Izmail retain the capacity to receive railcars, the slowdown in loading grain onto vessels could lead to a buildup of rolling stock at stations near the ports. The disparity is already evident: 1,141 railcars are heading toward the Danube ports, while the average daily unloading rate is only 51 railcars.
If this ratio persists, the terminals may once again face overcrowding, after which Ukrzaliznytsia will have to impose restrictions on the shipment of certain cargoes or implement temporary measures.
The second risk is related to the increase in queues on the Romanian sections of the Danube and the Sulina Canal. The ports of Reni and Izmail depend not only on the water depths directly at the Ukrainian berths but also on the condition of the entire Lower Danube route. As the Danube Commission notes, a single shallow section can become a “weak link” and restrict traffic along the entire international corridor.
Silting also complicates the transport of Ukrainian grain by barge to Constanta, Romania. A reduction in the load capacity of a single barge means that more vessels must be deployed to transport the same volume of cargo. This increases freight rates, transshipment costs, and the risk of fines for vessel downtime.
The third risk is the simultaneous decline in the reliability of the two main maritime routes. The ports of Greater Odessa are currently operating more slowly due to terminal congestion and delays in loading ships, while the Danube—which is supposed to serve as a backup route—faces a natural limitation on its throughput capacity.
This factor becomes particularly critical during the arrival of the new grain harvest. Rising logistics costs could lower purchase prices within Ukraine, delay the fulfillment of export contracts, and widen the price gap between Ukrainian ports and the global market.
On June 24, the Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority began operational dredging in the waters of the Port of Izmail. The work is intended to restore the design depths near the berths and allow for the maximum possible draft and cargo capacity of vessels. It was planned to be completed within two months.
However, dredging within the Ukrainian port alone cannot fully compensate for the drop in water levels in the Romanian and transboundary sections of the Danube. To maintain stable traffic flow, Ukraine and Romania will need to work in sync, promptly mark the fairway, conduct regular depth soundings, dredge critical sections, and regulate vessel queues.
The Ministry of Infrastructure had previously identified dredging as one of the main “bottlenecks” in Danube logistics and discussed with the European Commission and Romania the coordination of traffic, the use of the PRIMUS digital system, and measures to address a potential reduction in the capacity of the Odessa-Danube route.
The Danube ports remain a strategic reserve for Ukraine’s foreign trade.
After the start of the full-scale war, their throughput capacity was increased to 35 million metric tons per year. However, actual transshipment volumes fell from 17.4 million metric tons in 2024 to 8.9 million metric tons in 2025, and authorities had previously forecast approximately 5 million metric tons for 2026.
The current increase in grain ship traffic indicates that businesses are ready to quickly return to the Danube route should problems arise in the Greater Odessa area. However, record-low water levels in the river may prevent the ports from fully accommodating this additional traffic, potentially turning the rerouting of cargo by rail into a new logistical bottleneck.
According to Open4business, the Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv regions accounted for about half of all new enforcement proceedings related to utility debts initiated in Ukraine during the first half of 2026.
The highest number of new cases was recorded in the Kharkiv region—22,171 thousand, or about 20% of the national total, according to a study by Opendatabot published on August 3.
The Dnipropetrovsk region ranked second with 19,636 thousand cases, accounting for 18% of new utility debt cases.
The Mykolaiv region came in third with 12,841 thousand cases, or about 12% of the total.
In total, 54,648 thousand enforcement proceedings were initiated in these three regions—slightly more than half of the 108,561 thousand new cases across Ukraine.
The statistics specifically account for enforcement proceedings, not individual consumers. Multiple cases may be opened against a single person, for example, for heating, water, gas, or electricity.
As of early July 2026, there were 829,768 thousand utility debts listed in the Unified Register of Debtors. Sixty-five percent of the enforcement proceedings initiated during the first half of the year remained open and unpaid.
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Kharkiv Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast, UKRAINE, Utility debt
