According to the Experts Club information and analysis centre, Harvard University has once again topped the 2026 Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), known as the Shanghai Ranking. It is followed by Stanford University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Cambridge came fourth, and the University of California, Berkeley, fifth.
The top ten also included Princeton in 6th place, Oxford in 7th, Columbia University in 8th, the University of Chicago in 9th, and the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) in 10th. Thus, eight of the world’s ten best universities are located in the United States, with the other two in the United Kingdom.
The composition of the top ten did not change compared with 2025, although there were some shifts in positions. Princeton rose from seventh to sixth place, overtaking Oxford, while the University of Chicago moved from tenth to ninth, swapping positions with Caltech. Harvard, Stanford, MIT, Cambridge, and Berkeley retained the top five positions.
The best university outside the United States and the United Kingdom was France’s Paris-Saclay University, ranked 13th. Asia’s best university, China’s Tsinghua University, rose to 18th place. ETH Zurich ranks 19th, Peking University 22nd, while the University of Toronto and Zhejiang University share 24th place.
Despite the dominance of American universities at the top of the ranking, the most notable long-term trend remains China’s strengthening position.
In the ARWU 2026 top 100, the United States is represented by 37 universities, mainland China by 16, up from 13 a year earlier, and the United Kingdom by eight. They are followed by Australia and Switzerland with five universities each, France and Germany with four each, and Canada with three.
In total, universities from 18 countries and territories are represented in the top 100. At the same time, China’s position is strengthening rapidly: in ARWU 2025, mainland China had 13 universities in the top 100, compared with 16 now. Southeast University, Tianjin University, and Harbin Institute of Technology, in particular, entered the new top 100.
But the situation across the entire published top 1,000 is even more revealing. Mainland China is represented by 234 universities, compared with 187 from the United States. Thus, China already significantly surpasses the United States in terms of the breadth of its representation in ARWU, although American universities still maintain an enormous advantage at the very top of the ranking.
France has 27 universities in the top 1,000, four of which are in the top 100. In addition to Paris-Saclay in 13th place, PSL University ranks 33rd, Sorbonne University 55th, and Université Paris Cité 57th.
ARWU evaluates more than 2,500 universities worldwide but publishes only the top 1,000. Unlike rankings that take into account reputation among students and employers, internationalization, or the quality of the educational environment, the Shanghai Ranking is focused almost entirely on research activity.
Its methodology takes into account alumni and staff who are Nobel Prize and Fields Medal laureates, Highly Cited Researchers identified by Clarivate, publications in Nature and Science, the number of research papers indexed in Web of Science, and academic performance per capita. Therefore, ARWU is essentially primarily a ranking of universities’ research strength rather than the quality of education as such.
Not a single university from Ukraine appeared in this ranking.
The original source is ShanghaiRanking Consultancy, Academic Ranking of World Universities 2026, published on August 15, 2026.
EDUCATION IN CHINA, EXPERTS CLUB, SHANGHAI-RANKING, WORLD UNIVERSITIES
Following the reinstatement of mandatory statistical reporting in 2026, Ukrainian companies must once again comply with the data submission deadlines set by the State Statistics Service. However, as noted by the Experts Club Information and Analytical Center, the set of statistical forms varies by company and depends on the type of activity and whether the company is included in a specific government statistical survey.
How to Find Out What a Specific Company Must Submit
The State Statistics Service uses the “My Reporting” service, where an enterprise can check the list of forms for the statistical surveys in which it is included. A qualified electronic signature — QES — is required to obtain this information.
In addition, the official portal of the State Statistics Service has published the calendar for submitting state statistical survey forms and financial statements for 2026.
Depending on a company’s activities, the statistics authorities may request information on production, sales, services, the number of employees and wages, freight and passenger transportation, agriculture, foreign economic operations and other indicators. The list of forms for 2026 has been published by the State Statistics Service itself.
At the same time, financial statements must be submitted to the statistics authorities by legal entities that are required to maintain accounting records and file such statements in accordance with the law. The State Statistics Service specifically indicates this in its reporting calendar for 2026.
Do Individual Entrepreneurs Need to Report?
Most individual entrepreneurs do not submit statistical reports. However, an individual entrepreneur may be included in a particular state statistical survey depending on the type of activity. In this case, the relevant form appears in the “Respondent’s Cabinet” and must be submitted within the established deadline.
The State Statistics Service cites individual entrepreneurs engaged in industrial production and passenger or freight road transportation as examples.
How to Submit Reports
Reports may be submitted electronically through the official free “Respondent’s Cabinet” or through compatible specialised software. The Cabinet displays the forms applicable directly to a particular enterprise or individual entrepreneur, their submission deadlines and instructions.
What Penalties Are Provided For?
According to Opendatabot, citing the applicable administrative liability provisions, failure to submit statistical reports, violation of submission deadlines, or the submission of incomplete or inaccurate information is punishable by a fine of UAH 51–85 for individuals and UAH 170–255 for officials and individual entrepreneurs. Liability may be higher for a repeated violation.
In practice, the average fine imposed by the State Statistics Service in 2020–2025 amounted to approximately UAH 170. Over six years, 228 penalty orders totalling UAH 38,862 were issued.
Mandatory statistical reporting was fully reinstated on 5 July 2025. Therefore, in 2026, enterprises should no longer rely on the deferral regime that was in force during the first years of the full-scale war.
EXPERTS CLUB, penalties, State Statistics Service, STATISTICAL REPORTING
According to the Experts Club analytical center, citing data from the A-95 Consulting Group, the Ukrainian gasoline market continues to be concentrated around supplies from Poland and Lithuania: in July 2026, these two countries accounted for 55% of total imports.
Ukraine received 56,100 tonnes of gasoline from Lithuania and 51,700 tonnes from Poland. Together, this amounted to around 107,800 tonnes out of total imports of approximately 196,000 tonnes.
The Polish supply route is demonstrating particularly high growth rates. Compared with July last year, the volume of supplies increased by 68% and reached its highest level since August 2025.
Imports from Lithuania increased by 16% year-on-year.
The ORLEN oil refining group plays a key role in both supply routes. The group’s facilities in Poland and Lithuania supplied around 97,000 tonnes of gasoline to the Ukrainian market.
A-95 estimates ORLEN’s share at more than half of total imports. Comparing the rounded figures of 97,000 tonnes and the total volume of 196,000 tonnes, this represents approximately half of the market.
The high level of concentration has a dual effect.
On the one hand, the large and stable refineries in Poland and Lithuania allow Ukraine to rapidly increase purchases during periods of higher demand and compensate for the loss of other suppliers.
On the other hand, more than half of the available supply comes from only two geographical routes, while a very significant share of deliveries is linked to a single refining group.
Poland’s importance increased particularly after Ukraine switched to E10 gasoline. The change in standards limited the possibility of using some traditional sources, including certain Greek refineries.
At the same time, Greece has not disappeared from the market entirely. In July, Ukraine imported around 25,000 tonnes of gasoline produced by Motor Oil.
Germany became another rapidly growing supply route. It supplied 21,000 tonnes of gasoline, 78% more than in July 2025. The UPG network imported the entire volume.
Thus, the structure of imports in July demonstrates two parallel trends: ORLEN’s growing role as a key supplier and simultaneous attempts by Ukraine’s largest fuel retail networks to diversify purchases through Germany, Romania and Greece.
According to the Experts Club analytical center, citing data from the A-95 Consulting Group, Ukraine imported about 196,000 tonnes of gasoline in July 2026, the highest figure since August 2025.
At the same time, data from an infographic published by the A-95 Consulting Group show that the volume of supplies increased by approximately 51% compared with June. In June, the main supply routes accounted for about 130,000 tonnes of gasoline, whereas in July the figure reached around 196,000 tonnes.
The sharp increase in imports occurred despite the Ukrainian market’s transition to the E10 standard on July 1, which requires the mandatory addition of bioethanol to gasoline. The new requirement temporarily narrowed the range of available foreign suppliers.
In particular, the Greek Hellenic Petroleum refinery does not produce gasoline of the required standard. Its products had previously been used by Ukrainian traders during periods of increased demand.
At the same time, the beginning of July coincided with rising petroleum product prices on the global market and increased domestic demand.
A-95 noted that the situation was most strained during the first half of the month. However, the increase in supplies made it possible to stabilize the market in the second half of July. Importers also contracted the necessary volumes for August in advance.
Poland and Lithuania became the main sources of additional supply. Imports from Lithuania increased from 40,500 tonnes in June to 56,100 tonnes in July, while imports from Poland rose from 30,700 tonnes to 51,700 tonnes.
Supplies from Germany also increased noticeably, from 16,900 tonnes to 20,900 tonnes. Around 34,000 tonnes arrived from Romania, compared with 31,200 tonnes one month earlier.
At the same time, imports from Moldova decreased from 9,600 tonnes to 5,800 tonnes.
Thus, July became a test of the Ukrainian market’s ability to rapidly restructure external supplies following changes to gasoline quality requirements. Despite the initial contraction of the available supply base, importers managed to increase supplies by approximately one and a half times within a single month.
The Hungarian parliament has elected former Supreme Court president András Baka as the country’s new president, marking another important stage in the restructuring of Hungary’s political system following the end of Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule.
On 11 August, 140 MPs voted for the 73-year-old lawyer, while six voted against. Representatives of the opposition Fidesz party did not participate in the vote, protesting against the early termination of the powers of the previous president, Tamás Sulyok. Baka is due to officially take office on 19 August.
Baka’s election is primarily of political and institutional significance. The president of Hungary does not head the government or determine the country’s economic or foreign policy, but can serve as a constitutional counterweight to the parliamentary majority and the cabinet. This function is particularly important now, as Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s Tisza party holds a constitutional majority in parliament and is carrying out sweeping changes to the institutions shaped under Orbán.
Baka fits well into this political arrangement. From 1991 to 2008, he served as a judge at the European Court of Human Rights, and in 2009 parliament elected him president of the Supreme Court of Hungary. His mandate was terminated early in early 2012 after he publicly criticised the Orbán government’s judicial reforms. The European Court of Human Rights subsequently found violations of his right of access to a court and freedom of expression.
Therefore, Baka’s return to one of the country’s highest public offices almost 15 years later has clear symbolic significance. It demonstrates the new authorities’ intention to distance themselves from the institutional model of the Orbán era while simultaneously making the independence of the judiciary one of the central themes of the political transformation.
“For Hungarian society, this is much more than an ordinary change of president. After sixteen years of dominance by a single political force, any large-scale restructuring of state institutions will inevitably be perceived differently by society. For supporters of change, this is an opportunity to restore the system of checks and balances, while for a significant proportion of Fidesz supporters, what is happening may look like political revenge by the new authorities,” said Oleksandr Poznii, an expert at the Experts Club analytical centre and co-founder and director of the Active Group research company.
According to Poznii, the key test will be the ability of the new institutions to demonstrate genuine independence from Péter Magyar’s government.
“Baka’s main task is not to become the president of the victorious party. If the new head of state can truly distance himself from the government and act as an arbiter between different political groups, this will be an important signal to society. Otherwise, Hungary risks seeing not the dismantling of the former model of concentrated power, but merely a change in the political force controlling that model,” Poznii noted.
The sociologist also draws attention to the high degree of political polarisation in Hungarian society. In such a situation, the significance of the presidential office is determined not so much by the scope of its formal powers as by the trust that different groups of the population place in the head of state.
“In countries with strong political polarisation, symbolic institutions can be far more important than the text of the constitution might suggest. The president may not manage the economy or foreign policy, but he can either reduce the level of conflict in society or, conversely, become another participant in that conflict. Therefore, the main measure of Baka’s success will not be the number of laws he blocks, but whether he can be perceived as the president of all Hungarians,” Poznii emphasised.
Following his election, Baka himself stated that under the previous authorities the system of checks and balances had effectively ceased to function, but stressed that political change should not turn into revenge against supporters of the former government. He also declared his intention to represent citizens with different political views.
Hungary is a parliamentary republic, meaning that the real centre of executive power is located not in the presidential palace, but in the government.
Under the Fundamental Law of Hungary, the president is the head of state, embodies the unity of the nation and is responsible for safeguarding the democratic functioning of state institutions. At the same time, the president has no executive power of his own and does not head the ministries.
Nevertheless, his powers extend beyond purely ceremonial functions. The president signs laws adopted by parliament and, before signing, may return a law to MPs once for reconsideration. If he considers a document to be contrary to the Fundamental Law, he may refer it to the Constitutional Court.
Following parliamentary elections, the president proposes a candidate for prime minister to parliament. He also formally appoints ministers upon the recommendation of the head of government, performs a range of personnel and representative functions, and represents the Hungarian state in foreign relations.
Thus, the head of state can delay certain decisions by the parliamentary majority or initiate a constitutional review of them, but cannot independently determine the country’s political course.
The prime minister, by contrast, is the effective head of the executive branch. The government is the principal body of executive power and public administration, while the prime minister determines its overall political course. It is the prime minister who forms the government team, directs the work of the cabinet and, through the parliamentary majority, implements the principal budgetary, economic, social and foreign policy decisions.
Therefore, the key political figure in Hungary remains Péter Magyar, who came to power following Tisza’s victory in the April parliamentary elections. The party won two-thirds of the seats in parliament, ending Orbán’s 16-year period of uninterrupted rule.
After coming to power, Magyar began seeking the replacement of the heads of a number of state institutions associated with the previous system of government. One of the most notable episodes was the early termination of President Tamás Sulyok’s term of office.
For the new authorities, Baka’s election is particularly symbolic because of his long-standing conflict with the Orbán system. The former president of the Supreme Court is effectively returning to the highest level of state politics after the defeat of the political force under which he lost his judicial post.
At the same time, this is precisely where one of the main risks facing Hungary’s new political system emerges. Tisza holds a constitutional majority and therefore has exceptionally broad powers to change laws and institutions. The new authorities must consequently dismantle the mechanisms created under Orbán while simultaneously proving that they are not replacing them with their own party control.
This is the paradox of Hungary’s new political arrangement: Magyar has obtained an exceptionally strong position thanks to his parliamentary majority, while Baka is expected to embody a limit on the excessive concentration of power.
For Ukrainian audiences, Hungary’s transformation also has foreign policy significance. Following Orbán’s defeat, Budapest’s position on Ukraine has become less confrontational, although Magyar does not present himself as an unconditional supporter of Kyiv and continues to link some bilateral issues to the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia.
Therefore, the ultimate criterion for determining whether Hungary has entered a new political era will be not only the departure of officials from the Orbán era, but also whether the new authorities can establish a system of institutions capable of functioning independently of whichever party controls parliament and the government.
Ukraine’s revenue from ferrous metal exports in July 2026 totaled $199.9 million, down approximately 31.9% from June’s $293.6 million, according to the Experts Club Information and Analytical Center.
This calculation is based on data from the State Customs Service of Ukraine.
The July dynamics significantly worsened the industry’s results for the seven-month period. Overall, in January–July, foreign currency revenue from exports of ferrous metals decreased by 7.6% year-on-year to $1.678 billion.
At the same time, Ukraine imported $176.4 million worth of ferrous metals in July. Thus, the monthly gap between exports and imports of these products narrowed to approximately $23.5 million.
Exports of metal products generated another $71.4 million in July, while imports of these products amounted to $106.3 million. Consequently, imports of metal products directly exceeded exports by almost $35 million in July.
In total, exports of ferrous metals and metal products amounted to approximately $271.3 million in July, while imports reached around $282.6 million.
Thus, if these two groups are considered together, Ukraine effectively recorded a small negative trade balance of approximately $11 million in July, although the balance for the entire seven-month period remains positive so far.
For comparison, in 2025 Ukraine received $3.339 billion from exports of ferrous metals and $916.2 million from exports of metal products.
The sharp decline in July requires further monitoring: data for a single month alone do not yet make it possible to determine whether this marks the beginning of a sustained deterioration in export conditions or a short-term fluctuation in supplies.
