According to Experts.news, the European Commission is preparing proposals to reform the EU enlargement process, which are set to form the basis for a strategic discussion among EU leaders in October 2026. One of the key areas of discussion is the introduction of additional safeguards that would allow for the restriction of certain rights of new member states in the event they violate their obligations to the EU.
The European Commission has confirmed that it is preparing the reform. As early as July 6, an EC representative told Euronews that Brussels was working on its own proposals ahead of the October summit, as member states themselves are increasingly engaged in discussions regarding the new rules.
The European Council has officially confirmed that at its meeting on October 15–16, 2026, EU leaders will hold a strategic discussion on the Union’s enlargement and internal reforms. However, there is as yet no official confirmation that the European Commission will present the final package on October 15 specifically.
One of the most discussed options is a temporary restriction on certain voting rights of new member states.
Back in June, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg proposed discussing the possibility of a transition period during which new EU members would be unable to block decisions in the most sensitive areas, where unanimity among all countries is currently required.
This primarily concerns foreign policy, the EU budget, and the Union’s further expansion.
In addition, the five countries propose including special safeguard mechanisms in future accession treaties. These would allow measures to be taken against a new member state in the event of a serious deviation from the principles of democracy, the rule of law, or media freedom.
These proposals are largely linked to Hungary’s experience under Viktor Orbán, when Budapest repeatedly used the unanimity requirement to block important EU decisions.
However, for now, the discussion centers on reform options rather than newly agreed-upon rules.
This discussion is of the greatest significance for Montenegro, which is currently the most advanced candidate for accession.
According to the European Commission, the country has opened all 33 negotiation chapters, 16 of which have already been provisionally closed. Podgorica intends to conclude negotiations and become the 28th member of the European Union in 2028.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated in June that Montenegro’s accession by 2028 is “achievable.” The EU has already begun drafting the future accession treaty.
Therefore, Montenegro’s accession treaty could potentially become the first document of a new generation, providing additional guarantees for the EU following the country’s admission.
However, the European Commission is concerned about a scenario in which new conditions would be developed exclusively for Montenegro. That is why Brussels wants to establish a universal approach that can also be applied to future candidate countries.
The reform will be of direct importance to both Ukraine and Moldova.
Negotiations with both countries accelerated significantly in the summer of 2026. In June, the EU opened the first negotiation cluster with Ukraine and Moldova, focusing on fundamental issues—the rule of law, democratic institutions, and public administration. In July, negotiations also made progress on foreign policy issues.
That said, Ukraine and Moldova are much further from concluding negotiations than Montenegro.
For Kyiv, the future model is particularly important: if the EU does indeed introduce transitional restrictions on the right of veto, Ukraine could potentially gain full membership but would initially have limited ability to block decisions in certain areas.
At the same time, such a system could facilitate political consensus on Ukraine’s membership within the current EU, as some member states fear that expanding from 27 to more than 30 members would significantly complicate decision-making.
The assertion that France, Germany, and the Netherlands are generally opposed to rapid EU enlargement requires clarification. These countries support further enlargement but belong to a group of states that demand prior strengthening of institutional safeguards and stricter oversight of future members’ compliance with the rule of law. Together with Belgium and Luxembourg, they have proposed developing a new template for accession treaties.
France, in particular, takes a cautious stance regarding Ukraine’s accelerated accession. Officials in Paris are concerned about the budgetary implications, the impact of Ukraine’s large agricultural sector on the single market, and the potential for the decision-making process to become more complicated in an expanded EU.
Germany, on the other hand, actively supports enlargement but at the same time insists on reforming the European Union itself and is considering options for the gradual integration of new member states.
Essentially, the debate boils down to an attempt to resolve the tension between two objectives.
On the one hand, the geopolitical situation is prompting the EU to accelerate the accession of Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, and Moldova. Brussels views enlargement as a tool for strengthening European security and limiting the influence of Russia and China in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, existing member states are reluctant to admit new members who, once admitted, could use their veto power to exert pressure on other EU countries.
Therefore, the future model may be based on the following principle: full membership is granted more quickly, but some of the new member state’s political tools remain limited during a transition period, and compliance with obligations continues to be monitored even after accession.
The final parameters of such a system have not yet been agreed upon. The main political discussion is set to take place at the European Council on October 15–16, 2026, after which it will become clearer which of the proposed mechanisms may be included in the future accession treaties for Montenegro, Ukraine, Moldova, and other candidates.
Verifying a foreign investor helps Ukrainian businesses establish the origin of capital, the ownership structure and the partner’s ability to fulfil its obligations.
When raising foreign financing, the main attention is usually paid to verifying the Ukrainian company. A potential investor analyses financial statements, corporate documents, taxes, litigation, assets and the business model.
However, Ukrainian owners should also verify the party offering the capital. The name of a well-known fund in a presentation or claimed access to significant financial resources does not yet confirm that the negotiations are being conducted by an authorised person or that the money actually belongs to the declared investor.
Before signing an agreement, it is worth verifying the legal entity, the date of its establishment, its executives, owners, corporate group, previous investments and possible sanctions or reputational risks.
Particular caution is required if the investor demands payment of an upfront fee, uses unofficial email addresses, avoids providing corporate documents or proposes making payments through a company that is not a party to the agreement.
D&B third-party verification solutions make it possible to identify a company, analyse its corporate relationships, establish its owners and conduct checks against sanctions lists and other risk sources. D&B Investigate is also used to visualise business relationships and support enhanced due diligence.
“When raising capital, it is not only the Ukrainian company that undergoes verification. Business owners also need to understand who is offering the financing, where this capital comes from and whether the potential investor is capable of fulfilling its obligations,” emphasised Maksym Urakin, Director of Development and Marketing at Interfax-Ukraine, Head of the D&B-Interfax-Ukraine Business Unit and PhD in Economics.
According to him, verification is particularly important for small and medium-sized businesses that do not have their own large legal or compliance department and may perceive the very fact of a foreign investor’s interest as confirmation of its reliability.
The verification result does not replace legal and financial due diligence, but it helps determine whether it is worth proceeding to the costly stage of negotiations, disclosing confidential data and providing access to internal documentation.
Before signing an agreement, it is also necessary to make sure that the representative is authorised to act on behalf of the investor and that the bank account used for the transaction belongs to a party to the agreement or to a duly authorised entity.
Dun & Bradstreet is an international business data and analytics company founded in 1841. Its solutions are used for company verification, corporate ownership analysis, compliance, credit risk assessment and business decision support.
In Ukraine, Dun & Bradstreet is represented by the Interfax-Ukraine News Agency. The D&B-Interfax-Ukraine unit helps Ukrainian enterprises verify potential investors, partners, buyers and suppliers. The agency has operated in the political and economic information market since 1992.
Enquiries can be submitted via D&B’s specialised resource — dnb.ua, by email at Urakin@interfax.kyiv.ua or by telephone at +38 (044) 270-65-74.
Ukraine continues to have the lowest minimum wage among European countries with a statutory minimum wage included in Eurostat statistics.
As of 1 July 2026, Ukraine’s minimum wage amounts to EUR 169 gross per month when converted into euros, according to Eurostat data.
Moldova ranks second from the bottom with a minimum wage of EUR 313, while in all other countries covered by the survey, the figure exceeds EUR 500.
For comparison, the minimum wage is approximately EUR 517 in Albania, EUR 620 in Bulgaria, EUR 621 in Türkiye, EUR 624 in North Macedonia, EUR 670 in Montenegro and EUR 743 in Serbia.
At the opposite end of the European ranking is Luxembourg, with a minimum wage of EUR 2,771 per month. It is followed by Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France, where the minimum wage exceeds EUR 1,800 in all cases.
When making comparisons, it should be taken into account that Eurostat presents the figures in euros and as gross monthly equivalents. For countries that do not use the euro, the amounts are converted using the exchange rate at the end of the previous month. Therefore, changes in the national currency’s exchange rate may also affect a country’s position in the ranking.
In total, Eurostat covers 22 EU member states with a national minimum wage and seven candidate and potential candidate countries where such a wage is established at the national level. At the same time, Denmark, Italy, Austria, Finland and Sweden do not have a single statutory national minimum wage.
Below is the full ranking of minimum wages in Europe as of 1 July 2026, from highest to lowest, gross per month converted into euros according to Eurostat’s methodology.
Luxembourg — €2,771
Ireland — €2,391
Germany — €2,343
Netherlands — €2,338
Belgium — €2,234
France — €1,867
Slovenia — €1,482
Spain — €1,425
Lithuania — €1,153
Poland — €1,119
Cyprus — €1,088
Greece — €1,073
Portugal — €1,073
Croatia — €1,050
Malta — €994
Estonia — €946
Czechia — €923
Slovakia — €915
Hungary — €906
Romania — €825
Latvia — €780
Serbia — €743
Montenegro — €670
North Macedonia — €624
Türkiye — €621
Bulgaria — €620
Albania — €517
Moldova — €313
Ukraine — €169
Ukraine exported $14.1 billion worth of food products in January–July 2026, according to data from the State Customs Service.
According to calculations by the Experts Club information and analytical centre based on State Customs Service statistics, food products accounted for approximately 58.5% of Ukraine’s total merchandise exports, which amounted to $24.1 billion over the seven-month period.
Metals and metal products ranked second among export categories at $2.5 billion, or slightly more than 10% of total exports.
Exports of machinery, equipment and transport vehicles amounted to $2.1 billion, corresponding to approximately 8.7% of external shipments.
Thus, food, metal products and engineering products collectively accounted for approximately 77.6% of Ukraine’s merchandise exports.
Poland remained the largest market for Ukrainian goods over the seven-month period, receiving $2.8 billion worth of products. Exports to Türkiye amounted to $2 billion, while exports to Germany totalled $1.5 billion.
Overall, Ukrainian exports in January–July 2026 increased by 3.8% compared with the same period last year, rising to $24.1 billion from $23.2 billion.
At the same time, imports increased significantly faster, rising by 26.6% to $58.1 billion.
Marshal of the Polish Sejm Włodzimierz Czarzasty has stated that Ukraine’s accession to the European Union will require the Ukrainian side to reconsider controversial chapters of its own history, including its assessment of the mass killings of Poles in Volhynia during the Second World War.
Czarzasty made the statement on August 10 in Szczawnica following a meeting with Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Ruslan Stefanchuk, the Polish Press Agency PAP reported.
Czarzasty stressed that he personally supports Ukraine’s future membership in the EU but believes that European integration entails not only economic benefits but also the acceptance of a certain system of values and historical responsibility.
“The EU is about democracy and values; it is not merely an ATM,” the Marshal of the Sejm said, adding that it is also necessary “to call genocide genocide.” In his opinion, no nation can escape its own history.
The main subject of the historical dispute remains the mass killings of the Polish population in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943–1945, responsibility for a significant portion of which the Polish side places on the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
In Poland’s state historical policy, these events are officially classified as genocide. As early as 2016, the Sejm enshrined this interpretation in a parliamentary resolution, and in 2025 Poland went further: by law, it designated July 11 as the National Day of Remembrance of Poles — Victims of the Genocide Committed by the OUN and UPA in the Eastern Territories of the Second Polish Republic. The law was adopted unanimously by the Sejm and subsequently approved by the Senate.
The Polish side demands three things from Ukraine above all: recognition of the genocidal nature of the crimes, the opportunity to search for and exhume the remains of Polish victims without obstruction, and the dignified burial and commemoration of those killed. Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance regards the depoliticisation of exhumations as one of the key conditions for genuine historical reconciliation.
Warsaw therefore no longer views the issue solely as a dispute among historians. In recent years, it has become part of the state’s remembrance policy and is increasingly being linked by Polish politicians to the issue of Ukraine’s European integration.
Official Kyiv does not deny the mass killings of the Polish population or the need to honour the memory of those killed. However, it avoids accepting the Polish formula of sole responsibility on the part of Ukraine and the official classification of the entire Polish-Ukrainian conflict of that period as a genocide of Poles.
The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance predominantly uses the terms “Volhynia Tragedy” and “Ukrainian-Polish confrontation.” In July 2026, UINR head Oleksandr Alforov stated during a joint Ukrainian-Polish commemoration that the tragic events of 1943 must be remembered and that relations between the two nations should be built on mutual respect and acknowledgement of past mistakes.
The Ukrainian side also points out that not only Poles but also Ukrainians were killed in the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation, including as a result of retaliatory actions by Polish armed formations and the policies of the Polish state. Notably, in July 2026, Polish Ambassador to Ukraine Piotr Łukasiewicz also publicly stressed the need to take Ukrainian victims into account.
When the Polish Sejm legislatively designated July 11 as a day of remembrance for the “victims of the genocide committed by the OUN and UPA” in June 2025, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the decision unilateral and warned that such steps did not contribute to achieving mutual understanding and reconciliation. Kyiv proposed focusing on the joint work of historians, searches, exhumations and the dignified commemoration of all victims.
Despite the political dispute over terminology, substantial progress has been made in practical matters over the past year. Ukraine resumed issuing permits to the Polish side for search and exhumation work. In 2026, investigations were conducted, in particular, in the former villages of Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska in Volhynia, while on August 7, Ukraine’s interdepartmental commission approved new exhumation work in Huta Peniatska in the Lviv region and in the village of Uhly in the Rivne region.
Work in Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska was completed on August 7, and the remains discovered there are to be reburied. Thus, one of the most acute practical issues that had complicated relations between Warsaw and Kyiv for several years has gradually begun to move forward.
Following his meeting with Stefanchuk, Czarzasty also called for political and historical conflicts not to be transferred to relations between Polish and Ukrainian societies. According to him, a permanent channel of communication must be maintained between the parliaments of the two countries and mutual trust must be restored. At the same time, he stressed that “without a secure Ukraine, there is no secure Poland” and expressed support for Ukraine’s membership in the EU and Poland’s participation in the country’s post-war reconstruction.
Consumer prices in Ukraine rose by 0.3% in July 2026 compared with June, while annual inflation accelerated to 7.7% from 7.2% a month earlier, according to data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. Since the beginning of the year, consumer prices have risen by 6%. In January–July 2026, they were 7.8% higher than in January–July 2025.
The acceleration in annual inflation is partly due to the base effect: in July 2025, prices fell by 0.2%. However, the current rate of 7.7% remains lower than the 8.2% recorded in May.
Core inflation slowed to 0.3% in July from 0.5% in June and 0.7% in May. On an annual basis, it remained at 8.1%.
The trends in individual components of the consumer basket varied significantly. Food and non-alcoholic beverages fell in price by 0.2% over the month, while clothing and footwear fell by 4.8%. At the same time, housing and utilities rose by 1.6%, and transportation by 1.3%.
At the end of July, the NBU raised its inflation forecast for the end of 2026 from 9.4% to 10%, and its core inflation forecast from 7.2% to 9.2%. The regulator attributes the increase in underlying price pressures to rising business costs for logistics, labor, and energy resources.
Data from the State Statistics Service excludes territories temporarily occupied by Russia and parts of the country where hostilities are ongoing or have taken place.
